Britain, Italy and the early Cold War: Aspects of British foreign policy towards Italy, 1946-1949. by Pedaliu, Effie G. H
BRITAIN
ITALY
AND THE EARLY COLD WAR:
Aspects of British Foreign Policy towards Italy, 1946-49.
Efstathia Effie Pedaliu 
PhD Thesis
Department of International History 





INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U120851
Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
UDmry
British Library o< t^oiiticsl 
and Economic, Science
Abstract
This thesis examines political and military aspects of British policy towards Italy 
during 1946-1949. It focuses on five major areas: the punishment of Italian war 
criminality, the reconstruction of the Italian Armed forces, the role of Italy in 
British plans for European cooperation, British involvement in the Italian 
election of April 1948 and Italy’s inclusion into NATO. It analyses the factors 
that influenced the evolution of British policy such as pressures from the 
emerging Cold War, Britain’s diminished power in the region and its desire to 
remain a major international player in the post WWII world. It evaluates the 
impact that Italian domestic politics and Italian realities had on the conception 
and execution of British policy. It reveals that British policy towards Italy was 
governed not only by British power politics, the desire to frustrate the designs 
of the Soviet Union and the Italian Communists, and the challenge of growing 
US influence in Italy but also by moral and ideological underpinnings such as 
the desire to secure the punishment of some of the worst Italian war criminals 
and the aspiration, as manifested by British intervention in the Italian election 
of 1948, to provide Italy with a form of government which was a social 
democratic anti-Communist alternative to the American form based on an 
undiluted capitalism. British policy during this period had intended to include 
Italy in any British plans for European cooperation when the time was right. Its 
resistance to Italian inclusion into NATO stemmed primarily from pragmatism 
rather than any persisting punitive attitudes towards a defeated opponent. 
British foreign policy towards Italy did not achieve all its aims but it cannot, 
even remotely, be described as a failure. Italy remained firmly anchored in the 
Western bloc, the seeds of social democracy were nurtured, disengagement 
was managed in an orderly and successful manner and the British stance over 
Italo-Yugoslav relations succeeded in neutralising potential dangers to Italy by 
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Preface
My interest in this subject arose from research that I carried out for my MA 
dissertation on Anglo-ltalian relations during the ‘phoney war1 period and from 
M. Palumbo’s article in Epoca on Italian war crimes against Yugoslavia1 during 
the Second World War. When I read David Ellwood’s superb book on the Allied 
Administration of Italy21 wanted badly to find out what happened next. As soon 
as I started researching postwar Anglo-ltalian relations I noticed a large gap in 
English language secondary literature on the role Britain played in the political 
and military reconstruction of Italy during 1946-49 and I decided that this would 
provide an interesting and exiting research topic.
The thesis is based mainly on documents held at the Public Record Office at 
Kew Gardens and in particular the FO 371, FO 953, FO 800, FO 1110, CAB 
65, CAB 66, CAB 79, CAB 80, CAB 128, CAB 129, CAB 131, PREM 8, WO 
204, WO 32 and DEFE 4, 5 and 6 series. In addition research was carried out 
at the Italian Foreign Ministry Archive (Archivio Storico e Dipiomatico del 
Ministero degliAffari Esteri, ASMAE), the Italian State Central Archive (Archivio 
Centrale dello Stato, ACS) in Rome, the National Archive and Record 
Administration (NARA), in Maryland and the Historical archive of the Greek 
Foreign Ministry, in Athens and at the Labour History Archive and Study Centre 
of the Museum of Labour History, in Manchester. The Foreign Relations of the 
United States and Documents on British Policy Overseas series have been 
indispensable sources as were the many newspaper articles of the period.
In the course of researching and writing this thesis, I have acquired debts to 
many people and institutions which I wish to acknowledge, though, of course, 
the responsibility for any mistakes and interpretations belongs to me and me 
alone. I should like to thank to the British Academy for a three year fees-only 
award (1989-92) and the Central Research Fund of the University of London
1. Palumbo, M., ‘Genocidio all’ Italians’, Epoca, 17-1-1988.
2. Ellwood, D.W., Italy, 1943-45, Leicester, 1985.
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for meeting part of my expenses for a research trip to Rome in 1991-2. I should 
also like to thank the staff of the Public Record Office, the British Library of 
Political and Economic Science, the British Library, the Humanities Library at 
KCL, the ASMAE, ACS, NARA, the Labour History Archive of the Museum of 
Labour History, Churchill College, Cambridge and the Greek Foreign Ministry 
archive for their patience, assistance and willingness to help me beyond the 
call of duty.
I should like to thank Dr Robert W. D. Boyce for his patience and supervision, 
Prof. Donald Cameron Watt for encouraging and supporting me throughout this 
project, Prof. David Stevenson for his support during the early stages of this 
thesis, Dr Zara Steiner for being such an inspirational teacher and introducing 
me to the intricate and challenging world of diplomatic history, Prof. Antonio 
Varsori, for his perceptive comments and his efforts to keep me up to date with 
any new additions to Italian historiography and Prof. Paul Preston for 
encouraging me to finish. I should like to express my deepest gratitude to Dr 
Saki Dockrill, Dr Kate J. Morris, Dr Lisa N. Pine, Dr Pamela J. Shatzkes and 
Prof. John W. Young for reading endless drafts, offering invaluable advice and, 
above all, loyalty, friendship and support throughout what must have been for 
them an interminable period of time.
Finally, a note of personal thanks and gratitude to my parents Eleni and 
George Pendalios for their love, unfailing support and trust. I must extend a 
special thanks to Prof. Mike L. Dockrill and Andrew Fields for helping me keep 
my sanity by never taking me too seriously. Last but not least and above all my 
thanks go to Jimmy D. Athanassiou for his unstinting support during good and 
bad times, his willingness to sacrifice his personal life and time to discuss 




From the moment Mussolini had forsaken ‘non-belligerency’ and had embarked 
on his ‘parallel war" against the British Empire it was a matter of time when Italy 
would have to pay for the ‘curse’ Garibaldi had so sternly warned it against.1 
The combined Royalist and Fascist coup that deposed Mussolini led to the 
unconditional surrender of Italy in September 1943 and brought with it the 
division of the country and the placing of the Southern Kingdom under the 
direct control and administration of Britain and America. Britain, because of its 
logistical superiority in the Mediterranean theatre of war was initially the ‘senior’ 
partner in this relationship and thus the extremely harsh Armistice terms were 
to reflect the British government’s punitive attitude towards Italy.2 Anglo-ltalian 
relations suffered during the period of ‘co-belligerency’ because of Anthony 
Eden’s almost ‘irrational’ and at times quasi ‘psychotic’ anti-ltalianism and 
Winston Churchill’s mercurial disposition which fluctuated between bountiful 
generosity, utter contempt and blatant disregard for basic Italian dignity and 
sensibilities according to his mood swings or political expediency.3 This 
situation alarmed many including the Foreign Office, Harold Macmillan, the
1. Giuseppe Garibaldi stated that ‘there should be a curse upon Italy if she 
were to break away from her friendship with Britain’.On Mussolini’s ‘parallel wari 
see Knox, M., Mussolini Unleashed, 1939-43: Politics and Strategy in Fascist 
Italy’s Last War, Cambridge, 1982, pp. 53-4, 88-9 and 272-89; Kogan, N., Italy 
and the Allies, Cambridge, 1956; Woodward, Sir L., British Foreign Policy during 
the Second World War, Vols. II and III, London, 1971.
2. On British punitive attitudes towards Italy during this period see Varsori, 
A., ‘L’atteggiamento britannico verso d’ltalia, 1940-3: alle origini della politica 
punitiva’, in Placanica, A., (ed), 1944, Salerno, capitate istituzioni e societa, 
Napoli, 1985, pp. 137-59. On the development of British policy towards Italy 
during 1943-45 see Ellwood, op. cit.; Ellwood, D.W., ‘From “Re-Education” to the 
Selling of the Marshall Plan in Italy’ in Pronay, N., and Spring, D.W., (eds), The 
Political Re-Education of Germany and her Allies after World War II, London, 
1985, pp. 219-38; Aga-Rossi, E., L’Italia nella sconfitta: politica interna e 
situazione internazionale durante la seconda guerra mondiale, Napoli, 1985; 
Filippone-Thaulero, G., La Gran Bretagna e I’Italia dalla Conferenza di Mosca a 
Potsdam, 1943-45, Roma, 1979.
3. Ellwood, Italy, p. 9; Clark, M., Modern Italy, 1871-1995, London, 1996,
p. 306.
6
British Resident Minister, the British military authorities in Italy and antagonised 
the Americans who were committed to rebuilding Italy as an anti-communist 
bastion. More significantly, it alienated the Italians who sought to cultivate the 
more amenable Americans, who as a result of British attitudes, by 1945 had 
seen a phenomenal increase of their power in the peninsula.4
The first signs of a declining British influence in Italy were manifested after the 
collapse of Badoglio’s Government and the assumption of the Italian 
premiership by Ivanoe Bonomi the reformist socialist leader. Churchill had been 
forced to accept ‘parity’ in Italian affairs with the Americans by early 1945.5 The 
period 1943-45, was in a sense a microcosm of the shift that was transforming 
the international system into a bi-polar one after the eclipse of Continental and 
the decline of British power. The contraction of European power left a vacuum 
which in the Western and anti-communist world came to be filled, reluctantly 
but yet inexorably, by the recently awakened interventionism of American 
power. By summer 1945, Britain had come to welcome and even encourage 
American interest in the region in an effort to lessen its own financial burdens 
and to concentrate on rebuilding its strength and to defeating the ‘Wind from 
the North’, the influence of the Italian resistance in Italian politics.6 The
4. Macmillan, H., War Diaries: Politics and War in the Mediterranean, 
January 1943 - May 45, London, 1982, pp. 595, 388, 680-1 and 694; Horne, A., 
Harold Macmillan: Volume I: 1894-1956, London, 1988, pp. 218-9; Ellwood, op. 
cit., pp. 1-2, 23-5 and 137-8 and 201; Ellwood, ‘Re-Education’, p. 222; Miller, J.E., 
The United States and Italy, 1940-1950, Chapel Hill, 1986, pp. 102-4; NARA RG 
59, Department of State, Decimal Files: 740.00119, CONTROL, (ITALY)/ 2-2445, 
Box: 3797, Office memorandum to J.D. Hickerson, Deputy Director of the Office 
of European Affairs, State Department and J.C. Dunn, Director of the Office of 
European Affairs, 22-2-1945; ibid., confidential, memorandum of conversation 
between Hickerson and R. Makins, Acting Minister, British Embassy in 
Washington, 24-2-1945; ibid., confidential, memorandum of conversation 
between Hickerson and Makins, 5-3-1945.
5. Fora detailed analysis of the issue see Varsori, A., ‘ “Senior” o “Equal” 
Partner?’, Rivista di Studi Politici Intemazionali, Vol. 2, 1978, pp. 229-60; Ellwood, 
Italy, pp. 23-5; Miller, op. cit., pp. 117-127.
6. Ibid.; Gat, M., Britain and Italy, 1943-49: The Decline of British
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replacement of Ferruccio Parri, Italy’s first Prime Minister after the end of the 
Second World War in Europe, in December 1945 with Alcide De Gasperi, 
signified that ‘the Wind from the North had died’ as Nenni so aptly put it7 and 
that the ascendancy of American power in the region had begun.8 The 
baggage from the ‘co-belligerency’ period was compounded by Britain’s 
inability to sooth Italian feelings with economic inducements and was to 
encumber the relations of the two countries in the immediate future.
In the meanwhile, the British people had decided, to give the Labour Party not 
only the opportunity to govern but also to underpin it for the first time ever with 
an absolute majority.9 The new Labour government, whilst attempting to build 
its social democratic ‘Jerusalem’ at home, was at the same time striving to 
ensure that Britain could still shape the international environment in a way that 
would be beneficial to its traditional interests and aims.10 Britain emerged from 
WWII with its imperial commitments enlarged through its trusteeship over Italy’s 
ex-colonies, its international prestige enhanced as one of the victors of the 
War and as the strongest Western European state but also with its economy 
in tatters. For the British economy the burden of fighting the war against the
Influence, Brighton, 1996, pp. 109 and 135.
7. Mercuri, L., ‘II primo govemo De Gasperi e il problema dell’epurazione’, 
in Le Forze Armate dalla liberazione all’ adesione alia NATO, Official History 
edited by the Italian Ministry of Defence, Rome, 1986, p. 140.
8. Ellwood, op. cit., pp. 22-3; Miller, op. cit., pp. 154-87; Piscitelli, E., Da 
Pam a De Gasperi: Storia del dopoguerra, 1945-48, Milano, 1975, pp. 11-138.
9 Morgan, K. O., Labour in Power, 1945-51, Oxford, 1987; Hennessy, P., 
Never Again: Britain, 1945-1951, London, 1992.
10 Young, J. W., Britain and the World in the Twentieth Century, London, 
1997, pp. 142-56; Warner, G., ‘Britain and Europe in 1948: the View from the 
Cabinet’, in Becker, J., and Knipping, F., (eds), Power in Europe? Great Britain, 
France, Italy and Germany in a Postwar World, 1945-50, Berlin, 1986, pp. 28-37; 
Adamthwaite, A., ‘Britain and the World, 1945: the View from the Foreign Office’ 
in Becker and Knipping, op. cit., pp. 12-20; Hennessy, op. cit., Chapters 3, 4 and
9.
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Axis alone for nearly two years had taken a severe toll. During the war Britain 
lost a quarter of its national wealth and this had left it weaker than the United 
States and the Soviet Union, the two emerging superpowers.11 Bi-polarity 
however, had not settled in the international system yet and Britain still 
outwardly appeared to be not just a great power but a superpower.12
The new Labour government, although painfully aware of the adverse realities 
facing Britain, was not prepared to give in without trying to reverse the difficult 
position in which the country found itself. In any case, it regarded the situation 
as a transient handicap which could be rectified and overcome.13 As Peter 
Hennessy has observed, Ernest Bevin, the Labour Foreign Secretary, ‘was not 
one to relinquish voluntarily one ounce of British power1.14 He was also 
prepared to defy the internationalism of the new Prime Minister, Clement R. 
Attlee, to follow a foreign policy that was geared towards ensuring that Britain 
retained independence from both the United States and the Soviet Union and 
that it remained if not one of the ‘Big-Three’ in the postwar world, then at least 
it would be one of the ‘Big Two and a half.15 The achievement of this policy
11. Peden, G.C., ‘Economic Aspects of British Perceptions of Power in the 
Eve of the Cold War1, in Becker and Knipping, (eds), op. cit., pp. 237-260; 
Northedge, F.S., Descent from Power: British Foreign Policy, 1945-73, London, 
1974; Reynolds, D., The European Dimension of the Cold War* in Leffler, M.P. 
and Painter, D.S., (eds), Origins of the Cold War: An International History, 
London, 1994, p. 128.
12. Reynolds, D., Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in 
the Twentieth Century, London, 1991, p. 173.
13. FO 371 /50912/U5471/5471, 11-7-1945, top secret, Revise, 
‘Stocktaking Memorandum’, drafted by Sir Orme G. Sargent, Deputy Under­
secretary of the FO, 11-7-1945; Adamthwaite, op. cit., pp. 12-16; Kent, J., British 
Imperial Strategy and the Cold War, Leicester, 1993, pp. 54-6; Young, op. cit., pp. 
142-8 and 153-6; Warner, ‘Britain and Europe’, pp. 35-8; Bullock, A., Ernest 
Bevin: Foreign Secretary, Oxford, 1985, pp. 111-3.
14. Hennessy, op. cit., p. 93.
15. For Attlee’s and Bevin’s disagreements see Smith, R., and Zametica, 
J., The Cold Warrior: Clement Attlee Reconsidered, 1945-47', International 
Affairs, Vol., 61, 1985, pp. 237-52; Kent, J., The British Empire and the Origins
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rested on harnessing the resources of the Empire, promoting cooperation with 
Europe, using American aid to ‘gain time’ for the British economy to recover to 
such a degree as to support an equidistant foreign policy from both 
superpowers, exploiting Labour’s links with international socialism, taking 
advantage of Britain’s diplomatic prestige and manipulating the emergent cold 
war in order to safeguard its traditional interests.16 It also rested on the ability 
of Britain to remain a Mediterranean power, something on which Bevin was 
adamant because this region along with the adjacent Middle East was closely 
associated with its position as a World Power, the security of the imperial lines 
of communication, the preservation of the Empire and the safe access to oil 
supplies. From the moment Britain had identified the Soviet Union as posing 
a challenge to its preeminence in the Mediterranean, Labour Britain’s efforts 
to reconstruct Italy and Greece ‘as bastions of liberalism’ began in earnest. The 
continuation of British interest in Italy became inevitable because of its 
geostrategic importance for Britain and increased even further as soon as
of the Cold War, 1944-9' in Deighton, A., Britain and the First Cold War, London, 
1990, pp. 166-77; CAB 131/1, top secret, DO(46)5, 15-2-1946; ibid, top secret, 
DO(46) 8, 18-3-1946; FO 371/50912/U5471/5471/G, 11-7-1945, top secret, 
Revise, ‘Stocktaking Memorandum’, drafted by Orme Sargent, 11-7-1945.
16. Kent, British Imperial Strategy, p. 71; Kent, J., ‘British Policy and the 
Origins of the Cold War* in Leffler and Painter, op. cit., pp. 139-53; Kent, J., 
‘Bevin’s Imperialism and the Idea of Euro-Africa, 1945-49' in Dockrill, M.L., and 
Young, J.W., British Foreign Policy, 1945-56, London, 1989, pp. 47-76; 
Woodward, Sir. L., British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, Vol. V, 
London, 1976, pp. 3-4; Adamthwaite, op. cit., p. 12-3; Dilks, D., Retreat from 
Power, Vol. 2, London, 1981, p. 21; Warner, G., The Labour Governments and 
the Unity of Western Europe, 1945-51', in Ovendale, R., (ed.), The Foreign Policy 
of the British Labour Governments, 1945-51, Leicester, 1984, pp. 61-82; CAB 
128/14, confidential, Annex, CM(48)19th, 5-3-1948.
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Italy’s susceptibility to Communism became evident17 and the Greek Civil War 
showed no signs of abating.18
The policy of the Conservative-dominated National government towards Italy 
has been thoroughly and eloquently treated by Ellwood’s books and articles as 
well as by Italian historians.19 The historiography of British foreign policy
17. FO 371/43335/N2409/183/38, 21-4-1944, minute by E. O. Skaife, 
USSR Section, Research Department of the Foreign Office, (FORD), 5-4-1944; 
ibid., N2883/183/38, 12-5-1944, top secret, PHP(43)1(0), Post-Hostilities 
Planning Committee, Revised Draft, 24-4-1944; FO 371/56831/N3742/605/38, 21- 
3-1946, top secret, telegram, no. 1090, F.K. Roberts, charge d’affaires at the 
British Embassy in Moscow, 21-3-1946; PREM 8/515, top secret, C0S(46)43(0), 
13-2-46; CAB 131/1, top secret, DO(46)5, 15-2-1946; ibid, top secret, DO(46) 8, 
18-3-1946; Arcidiacono, B., ‘La Gran Bretagna e il “pericolo communista” in Italia: 
gestazione, nascita e primo sviluppo di una percezione, 1943-44', Storia delle 
Relazioni Internazionali, Vol. Ill, 1985, pp. 239-266; RoSs, G., ‘Foreign Office 
Attitudes to the Soviet Union, 1941-45', Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 16, 
1981, pp. 521-40; Ellwood, D.W., ‘Al tramonto dell’ impero britannico: Italia e 
Balkani nella srategia inglese, 1942-1946', Italia Contemporanea, Vol. XXXI, 
1979, pp. 73-92, passim; Ross, G., The Foreign Office and the Kremlin: British 
Documents on Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1941-45, Cambridge, 1984; Roger Louis, 
W., The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945-51, Oxford, 1984; Rothwell, V.H., 
Britain and the Cold War, 1941-47, London, 1982, pp. 74-290, passim; Watt, 
D.C., ‘Britain the United States and the Opening of the Cold War\ in Ovendale, 
(ed), op. cit., p. 50-5 and 57-9; Watt, D.C., ‘British Military Perceptions of the 
Soviet Union as a Strategic Threat, 1945-50' in Becker and Knipping, (eds), op. 
cit., pp. 328-335; Woodward, op. cit., 471-91; Adamthwaite, op. cit., p. 13; Kent, 
‘British Policy’, pp. 139-52.
18. On Britain and the Greek Civil War see Alexander, G.M., The Prelude 
to the Truman Doctrine: British Policy in Greece, 1944-47, Oxford, 1982; Eudes,
D., The Kapetanios: Partisans and the Civil War in Greece, 1943-49, London, 
1973; latrides, J.O., Revolt in Athens: The Greek Communist ‘second round’, 
1944-45, Princeton, 1972; Papastratis, P., British Policy towards Greece during 
the Second World War, 1941-44, London, 1984; Richter, H., British Intervention 
in Greece: From Varkiza to Civil War, February 1945 to August 1946, London, 
1986; Woodhouse, C.M., The Struggle for Greece, 1941-49, London 1976; 
Woodhouse, C.M., Apple of Discord: A Survey of Recent Greek Politics in their 
International Setting, London, 1948; Xydis, S., Greece and the Great Powers, 
1944-47: Prelude to the ‘Truman Doctrine’, Thessaloniki, 1963.
19 Ellwood, D.W., Italy, 1943-45, Leicester, 1985 op. cit.; Ellwood, D.W., 
‘Al tramonto’, pp. 73-92, passim; Filippone-Thaulero, op. cit.; Woodward, op. cit., 
Vol, III, Chapter XLIV; Arcidiacono, op. cit.; Varsori, op. cit.; Piscitelli, op. cit.; 
Gambino, A., Storia del dopoguerra dalla liberazione al potere CD, Rome, 1978; 
Mammarella, G., Italy After Fascism: A Political History, 1943-1965, Notre Dame, 
1966; Tamaro, A., Due anni di storia, 1943-45, Vol. II, Roma, 1948.
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towards Italy during 1946-49 is rather sparse. This is the period of transition 
that anchored Italy firmly and irrevocably in the Western bloc and which Ennio 
di Nolfo has characterised as an ‘epoch, in Italian contemporary history which 
was dominated by tragedy, hope and disillusionment’.20 Moshe Gat’s recent 
volume on the topic of Anglo-ltalian relations has incorporated the period as a 
mere appendage to that of the Allied administration period.21 His treatment of 
the Labour government’s policy towards Italy during 1946-49 is rather short 
and superficial. His conclusions are heavily biased by his research into the 
policies of the wartime British government during 1943-45. He sees Labour 
policy towards Italy as being identical in its aims and motivated by similar 
punitive reflexes as those of Churchill and Eden.22 The books by James E. 
Miller,23 E. Timothy Smith24 and H. Stuart Hughes25 on Italian-American 
relations offer useful insights but treat British policy only indirectly. Martin 
Folly’s article on Britain, Italy and NATO26 which has stood the test of time very 
well and Saul Kelly’s doctoral thesis on the United States and Britain and the 
disposal of the Italian ex-colonies27 are both extremely valuable studies but, by 
their very nature, they are topic specific and therefore many of the seminal 
attempts by the British government to reconstruct postwar Italy are not
20 Di Nolfo, E., Le paure e le speranze degli Italiani, 1943-1953, Milano, 
1986, p. 269.
21. Gat, op. cit.
22. Ibid., pp., 117-182, passim.
23. Miller, op. cit.
24. Smith, E. T., The United States, Italy and NATO, 1947-52, London,
1991.
25. Hughes, H. S., The United States and Italy, Cambridge, Mass., 1979.
26 Folly, M., ‘Britain and the Issue of Italian Membership of NATO, 1948- 
49, Review of International Studies, Vol. 13, 1987, pp. 177-96.
27. Kelly, S.M.B., Britain, the United States and the Question of the Italian 
Colonies, 1940-52, PhD thesis, London School of Economics, University of 
London, 1995.
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covered. Italian historiography is a much richer source but even here, the main 
emphasis lies in the period up to 1945 and research in the post 1945 period is 
again rather confined to topic specific areas. The historian who has worked 
most in this field is Antonio Varsori and his voluminous contribution is 
invaluable.28 Other Italian historians who have produced well researched books 
that treat aspects of Anglo-ltalian relations are Leopoldo Nuti,29 Maria 
Poggiolini30 and P. Sebastani.31 However, all these are works that focus either 
on the impact of Allied policy or on specific topics and they are not syntheses 
that would allow for a wide overview of British policy to emerge.
The purpose of the present work is to focus on the political and military aspects 
of British policy towards Italy in order to establish its principal threads and its 
successes and limitations. The chronological span covered begins from the 
moment that the Allied Administration of Italy ended and the whole of Italy with 
the exception of Venezia Giulia came under the control of the new postwar
28. Varsori, A., II diverso declino di due potenze coloniali. Gli eventi di 
Mogadiscio del Gennaio 1948 e I rapporti anglo-italiani, Roma, 1981; Varsori, A., 
‘Bevin e Nenni, Ottobre 1946-Gennaio 1947: Una fase nei rapporti anglo-italiani 
del secondo dopoguerra’, II Politico, Vol. XLIX, 1984, pp. 241-75; Varsori, A., 
‘L’incerta rinascita di una “tradizionale amizia”: I colloquT Bevin-Sforza dell’ ottobre 
1947', Storia Contemporanea, Vol. XVI, 1984, pp. 593-645; Varsori, A., ‘La Gran 
Bretagna e le elezioni politiche italiane del 18 aprile 1948', in Storia 
Contemporanea, Vol. XIII, no. 1, 1982, pp. 5-71; Varsori, A.,‘De Gasperi, Nenni, 
Sforza and their Role in Post-War Italian Foreign policy’, in Becker, J., and 
Knipping, F., (eds), Power in Europe? Great Britain, France, Italy and Germany 
in a Postwar World, 1945-50, Berlin, 1986, pp. 89-114; Varsori, A., ‘Great Britain 
and Italy, 1945-56: The partnership between a great Power and a Minor Power?’, 
Diplomacy and Statecraft, Vol. 3, 1992, pp. 188-228; Varsori, A., ‘II Labour Party 
e la crisi del socialismo italiano, 1947-48'; Varsori, A., ‘ “Senior” o “Equal” 
Partner?’, pp. 229-60.
29. Nuti, L., L’ esercito italiano nel secondo dopoguerra, 1945-50: La sua 
ricostruzione e I’assistenza militare alleata, Rome, 1989; Nuti, L., ‘Gli alleatti e le 
forze armate italiane, 1945-48', in Di Nolfo, E., Rainero, R., Vigezzi, B., (eds.), 
L’ltalia e la politica di potenza in Europa, 1945-50, Milano, 1988.
30. Poggiolini, I., Diplomazia della transizione: Gli alleati e il problema del 
trattato di pace italiano, 1945-47, Firenze, 1990.
31. Sebastiani, P., Laburistiinglesi e socialisti italiani, Rome, 1983.
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Italian state, a situation which left Italy according to David Ellwood, in a state 
‘of limited, political, economic, and military sovereignty ... [but] as it ended, 
stability and prosperity were offered from outside, as the beacons of the 
future...’32 The work continues to the moment that Italy’s entry to NATO and 
the Council of Europe had signalled that its international rehabilitation had 
become complete, at least within the Western World. It will endeavour to 
analyse the factors that influenced the evolution of British policy towards Italy 
such as pressures from the emerging Cold War; Britain’s diminished power in 
the region; its desire to remain a major international player in the post WWII 
world and the need to deny Italy to the Italian Communists and the Soviet 
Union. It will seek to evaluate the impact that Italian domestic politics and Italian 
realities had on the conception and execution of British policy. As the Peace 
Treaty and its ramifications underscore many of the issues discussed it will not 
be treated in isolation but it will be raised as an integral part of the issues that 
it influenced.
The dissertation will endeavour to show that although it did not change the 
major tenets of British foreign policy, the Attlee government adopted a less 
harsh and more even policy towards Italy. Its policy differed materially from that 
of Churchill’s wartime government’s in two respects. It did not aim at keeping 
Italy weak in perpetuity nor did it seek to dominate it. Its aim was to reconstruct 
Italy in such a way as to make it: first, safe for British interests; second 
acceptable to its neighbours and the international community; and third, to 
provide it with the means of attaining internal and external stability. The aims 
of their involvement are indicated by the areas in which the British became 
interested, namely, the reconstruction of the Italian armed and police forces, 
the intervention in the April 1948 election, British attempts to neutralize the
32. Ellwood, Italy, p. 241.
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threat Yugoslavia posed for Italy, Italian inclusion in British inspired plans for 
European cooperation and British efforts to disassociate the First Italian 
Republic from its links with Mussolini’s Italy by punishing those of its citizens 
that had been identified as war criminals by its neighbour countries.
The thesis will also confirm the trend identified by P. Hennessy and A. Arends 
that foreign policy making under Labour was not a collective process but the 
province of the Foreign Office.33 In the case of Italy this trend was even more 
pronounced because of the existing framework of the wartime period and 
because Attlee showed only limited interest on Italian matters. The Cabinet was 
consulted only rarely on Italy and then only in general terms or on matters 
which were relatively anodyne for its members such as the Italian colonies, or 
when policy rubber-stamping was needed. The Foreign Office acted as the 
initiator and final arbiter of Britain’s Italian policy since most issues regarding 
Italy were contentious and at times not conducive to either harmonious debate 
or unanimity. Thus, the Cabinet had no significant influence on policy towards 
Italy. In the case of Italy, Bevin falls in the second category of Foreign 
Secretary prototypes as identified by Donald Cameron Watt, that of the 
originator of policy and principal spokesman on matters of foreign affairs rather 
than merely that of the representative and facilitator of the Cabinet.34 He 
showed this with the determined insistence he displayed over salvaging some 
of the vestiges of British power in Italy and in being a partner of the Americans 
in brokering Italy’s future orientation. Bevin’s policy aimed at ensuring that 
British access to Italy was blocked by neither the United States nor the Soviet
33. Hennessy, P., and Arends, A., Mr Attlee’s Engine Room: Cabinet 
Committee Structure and the Labour Government, 1945-51, Glasgow, 1983, cited 
in Warner, op. cit., p. 28.
34. Watt, D.C., Personalities and Policies, London, 1965, Chapter 9; 
Bullock, op. cit., pp. 75-6; Roberts, F.K., ‘Ernest Bevin as Foreign Secretary’ in 
Ovendale (ed) The Foreign Policy of the Labour Government, 1945-1951, 
Leicester, 1984, p. 28.
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Union. The Western Department was chiefly responsible for policy towards 
Italy but because of the variety and complexity of issues pertaining to Italy it 
decided policy in consultation with other geographical and specialist 
departments, namely, the Southern, Northern, Peace Making, Reconstruction, 
Information and Research Departments. The Labour Party, especially the 
party’s Secretary and its International Department were also activated in the 
implementation of British policy towards Italy.
The thesis will attempt to establish that British policy was not determined by 
any residual and deep-seated anti-ltalianianism but based on efforts to promote 
British interests and plans in the postwar world. It is true that Foreign Office 
files for this period do not make politically correct reading and there is no doubt 
that some resentment towards Italy still lingered in the mid-1940s in the minds 
of British officials and politicians. Similarly, towards the end of the decade they 
were becoming tired with constant Italian complaints and the virulently anti- 
British campaigns of sections of the nationalist Italian press as to utter, by 
today’s standards, some unacceptable opinions about the Italians. Often 
irritation with Italy’s insistence on adopting the politics of pleading weakness35 
prompted comments that echoed the words of the Permanent Under-Secretary 
of the Foreign Office during the Great War, Sir Eyre Crowe: ‘the Italians have 
always threatened us with dire mishaps in their own country if we did not make 
concessions on questions of foreign policy’.36 A typical example of this is the 
outburst of the head of the Western Department, C.A.E. Shuckburgh that ‘we 
cannot for ever regard ourselves as patient (or impatient) psychiatrists treating
35. Maier, C.S., ‘Alliance and Autonomy: European Identity and U.S. 
Foreign Policy Objectives in the Truman Years’, in Lacey, M.J., The Truman 
Presidency, Cambridge, 1989, pp. 290-1.
36. FO 371/79346/Z2335/10535/170, 15-3-1949, minutes by A.D.F. 
Pemberton-Pigott, Italian Section of Western Department, 7-3-1949 and Sir Eyre 
Crowe, 4-11-1919.
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a not too amiable neurotic’ but more often than not these comments were 
tempered by interjections such as that of the Permanent Under-Secretary to 
the Foreign Office, Sir William Strang’s/the austere English understatement 
chills the Italian to the core, we must avoid giving the impression that we do not 
mind what [they] think’.37 However, what is evident is that despite its prejudices 
and frustrations Attlee’s government and its officials not did allow such 
concerns to influence or hi-jack policy. The pursuit of the national interest 
remained the utmost concern of any British policy towards Italy.
The thesis is divided into five chapters which examine the principle areas of 
British involvement in Italian domestic and military affairs. The first chapter is 
examines British attempts to deal with Italy’s war criminality in a manner which 
would promote stability in Italy and regional security. Chapter Two revolves 
around British attempts to rebuild the Italian armed and security forces to 
ensure that internal subversion did not succeed. The electoral triumph of the 
DC (Democrazia Cristiana) in April 1948 was secured with the aid of massive 
foreign intervention. British involvement in the Italian election and its aims is 
examined in Chapter Three. Chapters Four and Five centre on the international 
and European framework which emerged after the end of the war and British 
perceptions and planning for Italy’s role within it.
37. Ibid., Z4359/10535/170, 16-6-1949, minutes by Shuckburgh, 26-6- 
1949 and Strang, 30-6-1949.
Chapter One
British Policy towards the Prosecution of Italian War Criminals
The formulation of a policy on the prosecution of Italian war criminals was 
fraught with problems for Britain. The discharge of such a policy was influenced 
by two important objectives: first, to deliver Italy from the ruin Fascism had 
wreaked on its society, economy and political system, and second, to 
rehabilitate it with its neighbours and ex-enemies and ensure its security by 
punishing those who had initiated the War and perpetrated war crimes. The 
British needed to stabilise Italy quickly, neutralise the PCI and preserve an 
influence in the country. The countries with complaints against Italian war 
criminality, namely the UK, the US, Albania, France, Greece, Yugoslavia and 
Ethiopia sought justice and in effect, this meant the extradition of Italian citizens 
to face trial in the plaintiff countries.1 The non-Armistice Powers, particularly 
Yugoslavia, sought to use Britain in its role as an Armistice power, as a means 
of channelling their demands vis- ci-vis Italy and to secure the apprehension 
and extradition of Italian war criminals. The British government began to play 
the role of intermediary. Britain’s own policy on Italian war crimes was geared 
towards extradition, but this rested on the premise of Anglo-American 
cooperation for its achievement. In this way, Britain would not be seen as the 
only power which pressed unpopular decisions on the reluctant Italians and 
thereby jeopardising its status with them.2 The Americans, however, from early
1. The United Nations War Crimes Commission, History of the United 
Nations War Crimes Commission and the Development of the Laws of War, 
London, 1948, (hereafter UNWCC), p. 350-2; FO 371/51024/U4463/29/73, 18- 
6-1945, secret, C. 110, UNWCC minutes, 62nd meeting, 23-5-1945; BBC, 
Timewatch, Fascist Legacy: A Promise Unfulfilled, Part: I, Elstree, 1989.
2. FO 371/51030/U5413/29/73, 13-7-45, top secret, telegram,
FAN 591/FACS 259, CCS to Allied Commanders, 11-7-1945; top secret, 
telegram, NOD 978, Chiefs of Staff Committee, Cabinet Office (COS) to Joint 
Staff Mission (JSM), Washington 20-9-1945; FO 371/57519/U2338/70/73, 28-
2-1946, letter, D.S. Scott-Fox, War Crimes Section of the Foreign Office 
(WCS) and head of the British War Crimes Executive, to Under-Secretary of 
State, WO, 16-3-1946.
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on showed little interest in the issue. The American government’s initial 
indifference towards Yugoslavia became outright hostility after the May crisis 
in Venezia Giulia and Tito’s election in November 1945.3 American reluctance 
exposed Britain and it soon became apparent that the matter was indeed, 
making Britain unpopular in Italy. Britain, thus, found itself in a dilemma about 
which country to support most, Italy or Yugoslavia and also between upholding 
justice or following a more pragmatic course.4 British statesmen were 
eventually to conclude that they should not be the ones to enforce unpopular 
decisions on Italy unilaterally and by mid-1946 began looking to ‘shuffle out’ of 
direct responsibility for the setting in motion of Italian extraditions and ‘hand­
overs’.5
In this chapter, the process and the pressures which led British policy makers 
to amend their policy on ‘hand-overs’ and eventually decide to allow the Italian
3. NARA RG 59, E 381, Lot Files 54D328, Boxes: 1-10, Folder: War 
Criminals, secret, telegram to SACMED, 30-4-1945; ibid., secret, 
memorandum, Director of Civil Affairs Division, War Department, 3-10-1945; 
ibid., secret, State Department Memorandum, 10-6-1947, CCS memorandum, 
29-5-1947; NARA RG 43, E 390, Box 51, confidential, memorandum, undated; 
Rabel, R.G., Between East and West: Trieste, the United States and the Cold 
War, 1941-54, Durham, NC, 1988, pp. 52-73 and 89-91; Bohlen, C., Witness 
to History, 1929-69, New York, 1969, p. 253; FRUS, 1945, Vol. V, pp. 1229, 
1233, 1266 and 1291-4; FRUS, 1946, Vol. II, p. 728; FRUS, 1946, Vol. VI., 
869-70 and 887-88; FRUS, 1947, Vol. IV, 797-800.
4. FO 371/57519/U3031/70/73, 20-3-1946, minute by R.A. Beaumont, 
FO official and UK delegate at UNWCC and FO, 21-3-1946.
5. FO 371/57519/U349/70/73, 9-1-1946, secret, UNWCC circular, 
‘Extradition of War Criminals’, 2-1-1946; ibid., U2652/70/73, 9-1-1946, minutes 
by Sir J.R. Colville, Yugoslav Section of the Southern Department, FO, 15-3- 
1946, A. D. M. Ross, Italian Section of the Western Department, FO, 15-3- 
1946, Beaumont, 12-3-1946 and 18-3-1946, and Scott-Fox, 14-3-1946; secret, 
letter, GHQ.CMF, Lieutenant General, Commander in Chief to the Under 
Secretary of State, 26-2-1946; immediate, letter, Scott-Fox to Colonel Savill, 
WO, 18-3-1946; ibid, U3031/70/73, 20-3-1946, minutes by Beaumont, 21-3- 
1946, W.E. Beckett, FO Legal Section, 22-3-1946, Ross, 25-3-1946; telegram, 
no. 273, Philip Broad, British Political Advisor, Allied Forces HQ (AFHQ), 
Caserta, to FO, 19-3-1946; important, telegram, no. 454, FO to Rome, 28-3- 
1946; important, telegram, no. 494, FO to Belgrade, 28-3-1946.
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government to deal with the issue will be examined. It will be argued that far 
from conspiring to shield Italian war criminals,6 Britain tried hard to ensure that 
some of them, at least, were brought to justice. Its failure to do so in the end 
was not due to lack of trying on its part but simply because alone, it could do 
very little to enforce its policy on ‘hand-overs’ effectively. In fact, Britain paid 
a price for its moral stance on the issue and jeopardized its relations with post­
fascist Italy and which in the long run contributed to undermining its influence 
with that country. This was because Britain was not prepared to drop the idea 
of the inclusion of a war crimes clause from the final text of the Italian Peace 
Treaty.7
I. The Historical Background
The existence of Italian war criminality had been acknowledged by the 
liberating forces as early as September 1943. The concept of retributive action 
against Italian war criminals was enshrined in Article 29 of the Long Armistice 
Terms which obliged the new Italian government to apprehend and surrender 
to the UN, Mussolini, his fascist associates and all persons who had been 
involved in, or were suspected of having been involved in ‘war crimes’ or 
‘analogous offences’ against UN nationals.8 The Revised Armistice Terms
6. BBC, Timewatch, Fascist Legacy: A Pledge Betrayed, Part: II, 
Elstree, 1989.
7. FO 371 /57659/U5686/4473/73, 29-5-1946, minutes by Scott-Fox, 
25-5-1946 and Sir Basil Newton, Legal Section of the Foreign Office, 27-5- 
1946; letter, Scott-Fox to Colonel G.R. Bradshaw, Deputy Director of 
Personnel Services, (D.D.P.S.) at the WO, 29-5-1946; ibid., U7090/4473/73, 
11-9-1946, minutes by Scott-Fox, 29-8-1946 and C.L.S. Cope, UK delegation, 
Paris, 30-8-1946; FO 371/60607/ZM1950/1286/22, 11-6-1946, secret, 
CFM(D)(46) 61st meeting, 3-6-1946; FO 371/60711/ZM2371/1286/22, 8-7- 
1946, telegram, no. 1051, Sir Noel Charles, British Ambassador to Italy, to FO, 
6-7-1946; ibid., ZM2514/1286/22, 18-7-1946, confidential, despatch, no. 369, 
Charles to Bevin, 18-7-1946; minutes by Ross, 19-7-1946 and 24-7-1946 and 
Sir F. R. Hoyer-Millar, head of the Western Department, 19-7-1946.
8. Harris, C.R.S., The Allied Administration of Italy, 1943-45, London, 
1957, pp. 106-8 and 131.
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contained the same obligation.9 Italian complicity in war crimes was unstated 
in the Moscow Declaration not because the conferees considered the Italians 
innocent of war crimes but simply because of a typographical error in which the 
word ‘Italian’ was omitted from the final draft of the declaration.10 As a result of 
this omission, Article 29 of the Armistice and the relevant article of the Revised 
Armistice Terms became the legal cornerstones on which the apprehension 
and surrender of Italian war criminals were to be based. In addition to its 
involvement as a liberating power, Britain also found itself closely involved in 
the process of Italian war crimes detection, investigation and punishment 
through its membership of the United Nations War Crimes Commission 
(UNWCC).11 This body had been founded in London in October 1943 at the 
instigation of the British government and was made up of all the UN members 
fighting against the Axis powers. It was the first machinery set up by the Allies 
to investigate war crime charges against the Axis and its collaborators.12
The first attempts made by the British to deal with aspects of Italian war 
criminality can be traced back to June 1944 when the British War Cabinet
9. FRUS, 1945, Vol., V, pp. 1090-1; FRUS, 1946, Vol. V, p. 831.
10. FO 371/57520/U4331/70/73, 23-4-1946, minute by Scott-Fox, 26-4- 
1946. For the text of Moscow Declaration see Harris, op. cit., p. 126.
11. UNWCC., op. cit., p. 374.
12. UNWCC, op. cit., pp. 2 and 5. The creation of the Commission was 
the culmination of Churchill’s proposals to Roosevelt and it was based on the 
principles outlined in Eden’s paper “The Treatment of War Criminals”. The 
Commission’s functions were defined in a statement by the Lord Chancellor on 
the 20 of March 1943 and they were: first, to carry out investigations into 
alleged war crimes and to attempt to identify the perpetrators; second, to 
report to member governments those cases in which it appeared that 
adequate evidence existed for prosecution; and third for each member 
government to undertake the obligation to set up a National Office whose 
function it would be to investigate, evaluate and record all available 
information relating to crimes committed on its territory against its nationals.
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decided that it would treat only eight Italian gerarchi as major war criminals.13 
Due to the particularities of the Italian situation, the apprehension of these eight 
persons was not possible. They had either fled to the North with Mussolini or 
had been killed either in battle, or by the partisans.14 Britain was concerned 
also that Italian war crimes ought to be limited to those committed during the 
Second World War and those committed in earlier conflicts be excluded.15 The 
reasons behind this British position were manifold. First, there was a need to 
contain the scope of war crimes trials to manageable proportions.16 Second, 
the War Cabinet had decided that those who had held high position in the Axis 
had to be legally made an example of and be treated in a different manner to 
other citizens and that their treatment should not leave any margins for any
13. CAB 65/41, top secret, WM34(44), item: 4 , ‘War Criminals’, 
13-3-1944; CAB 65/42, top secret, WM83(44), item: 4, ‘War Criminals’, 
approved WP(44) 294 and WP(44)330, 28-6-1944; CAB 66/51, top secret, 
WP(44)330, memorandum by A. Eden, Foreign Secretary, Treatment of Major 
War Criminals’, Annex II, List of Major Italian War Criminals, 16-6-1944; ibid., 
top secret, WP(44)294, 2-6-1944; FO 371/51045/U5060/55/73, 26-6-1945, 
note on the List of Major Italian War Criminals forming ‘Annex II’ of War 
Cabinet paper, WP(44)330, 16-7-1944; minutes by P.H. Dean, War Crimes 
Section, 2-7-1945, Hoyer-Millar, 26-6-1945, Sir Oliver Harvey, Superintending 
Under-Secretary of the Western Department of the FO, 27-6-1945. Among 
them was General Rodolfo Graziani who played a prominent role in the Said 
Republic regime and went on to compound his already deplorable record by 
perpetrating war crimes against his own countrymen.
14. Ibid.; FO 371/51032/U5941/29/73, 3-8-1945, secret, UNWCC, C. 
135, 16-7-1945; FO 371/51033/U6120/29/73, 9-8-1945, UNWCC list, no. 12, 
July 1945.
15. FO 371/51044/U2108/55/73, 24-3-1945, minutes by J.C. Wardrop,
3-4-1945, Reconstruction Department of the FO and J.G. Ward, acting head of 
Reconstruction Department, 27-4-1945; FO 371 /57556/U6562/126/73, letter, 
no. 134, Faquahar, Addis Ababa to FO, 3-9-1946;
FO 371 /57556/U5985/126/73, 19-7-1946, secret, telegram, no. F 67661,
AFHQ to WO, 13-6-1946; ibid., U6560/126/73, 6-8-1946, doc. C. 217, UNWCC 
report presented by Committee III on the question on the jurisdiction of the 
UNWCC over war crimes committed in Ethiopia during the Italo-Abyssinian 
War, 31-7-1946, letter, Ambaye Wolde Mariam, Acting Vice Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, Imperial Ethiopian Government to FO, 22-7-1946; CAB 66/57, 
WP(44)648, memorandum by Eden, 4-11-1944; CAB 65/44, WM152(44), 
approved WP(44)648, 21-11-1944; CAB 66/57, WP(44)648, memorandum by 
Eden, 4-11-1944; CAB 65/44, WM152(44), approved WP(44)648, 21-11-1944.
16. CAB 65/42, WM83(44), item 4: War Criminals, 28-6-1944.
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revisionist claims.17 The spectre of the trials of German war criminals after the 
end of the Great War which had collapsed and had created embarrassment 
and ridicule for the Entente prosecuting authorities had made the British 
cautious and apprehensive of tieing themselves to promises that could prove 
impossible to keep, or which could produce undesirable consequences.18 
Third, British statesmen feared that if Ethiopia and Albania were accepted into 
the UNWCC, General Badoglio, Italy’s first prime minister after its unconditional 
surrender to the Allies, would eventually be implicated and this could 
undermine the whole edifice of ‘post-fascist’ Italy.19 Fourth, the Allied 
governments were concerned that whilst the war was still proceeding, the 
immediate arrest of suspected war criminals would have severe implications 
for Allied POWs whose lives could be endangered by reprisals.20 Fifth, there 
were the problems which arose from Italy’s distinctive position in being both an 
ex-enemy and a co-belligerent power. Thus, the UNWCC lists of alleged Italian 
war criminals contained the names of people who had collaborated with the 
Allied Forces at the time of the liberation of Italy.21 For both the British and the 
American governments the goal of ending the war as swiftly as possible
17. Ibid.
18. Bower, T., Blind Eye to Murder. Britain, America and the Purging of 
Nazi Germany - A Pledge Betrayed, London, 1981, pp. 28-32 and 48-50.
19. Domenico, R.P., Italian Fascists on Trial, 1943-1948, Chapel Hill, 
1991, pp. 24; Palumbo, M., ‘Genocidio all’ Italiana’, Epoca, 17-1-1988; 
UNWCC., op. cit., pp. 189-90 and 67-70; FO 371/51044/U2108/55/73, 24-3- 
1945, minutes by Wardrop, 3-4-1945 and Ward, 27-4-1945; ibid.,
U2108/55/73, 24-3-1945, minutes by Wardrop, 3-4-1945 and Ward, 27-4-1945; 
ibid, U2404/ 55/73, 4-4-1945, minute by Wardrop, 4-4-1945; letter, AFHQ to 
FO, 3-4-1945.
20. FO 371/51018/U3095/29/73, 25-4-1945, JSM 733, top secret, 
Interdepartmental Committee on War Crimes, minutes, 24-4-1945; directive, 
JSM 733, approved on 26-4-1945; COS(45)108th meeting, 24-4-1945;
FO 371/51017/U2986/29/73, 21-4-1945, APW(45)58, secret, 19-4-45.
21. Ibid.
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eclipsed all other concerns.22 The successful conclusion of the war in the 
Italian theatre was deemed to be dependent on the docility of the Regno del 
Sud and on its total adherence to the terms King Victor Emmanuel and 
Badoglio had signed.23 Thus, the punishment of Italian war criminality assumed 
a low priority which the Armistice powers intended to deal with after the war 
was over.24
The limited and selective approach Churchill’s wartime Cabinet had intended 
to apply towards punishing Italian war criminality had to be abandoned because 
of the plethora of claims registered with the UNWWC against Italy.25 By the 
spring of 1945, the Allies had liberated most of the areas in which alleged 
Italian war crimes had occurred. France, Greece and Yugoslavia sought justice 
by lodging their claims against Germany and Italy with the United Nations War 
Crimes Commission. France and Greece tended to regard their grievances 
against Germany as being of higher priority than those against Italy. For the 
French government, hunting down German war criminals was far more 
important than any grievances it harboured against Italy. The French did 
attempt to extradite alleged Italian war criminals, but despite occasional 
frustrations with their Anglo-American Allies, they did not press their claims
22. Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Fifth Series,
1944-45, Vol. 408, Col. 1359, London, 1945, parliamentary question by Tom
E.N. Driberg, MP for Maldon, and answer by Anthony Eden, Foreign Secretary, 
28-2-1945;
FO 371/51013/U1565/29/73, 5-3-1945, telegram, no. 79, FO to Rome, 1-3- 
1945; ibid., U1687/29/73, 10-3-1945, minute by Wardrop, 9-3-1945;
FO 371/51014/U1849/29/73, 16-3-1945, minutes by P.S. Falla, Reconstruction 
Department of the FO, 12-3-1945 and Wardrop, 10-3-1945.
23. Domenico, op. cit., pp. 24-34; Ellwood, op. cit., pp. 99-126 and 149- 
198, passim; Miller, op. cit., pp. 133-7 and 159-60.
24. Ibid.
25. UNWCC., op. cit., p. 350.
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against Italy resolutely.26 Greece was also a founding member of the UNWCC 
and as early as September 1944, the Greek government had furnished the 
Allied Control Commission with a list of Italians who had perpetrated a number 
of serious war crimes against Greek nationals.27 However, war crimes 
punishment at this stage was not an imperative priority for a Greek government 
embroiled in a civil war. The reluctance of Greece to deal with the issue can be 
gleaned from the fact that the Greek National Office of War Crimes was only 
established in June 1945.28 K. Stavropoulos, Greece’s representative at the 
UNWCC, was a vehement anti-communist. He viewed most war crimes claims 
as communist fabrications and never once took an independent line from 
Britain on the issue.29 This was so even in cases where Greek interests in war 
crimes matters would have been better served by siding with Yugoslavia.
Tito’s government, unlike other Continental governments, was not prepared to 
distinguish between Germans and Italians and was determined to seek out with
26. FO 371/57659/U5780/4473/73, 31-5-1946, immediate, secret, 
telegram, no. 276, Paris to FO, 30-1-1946; FO 371/57521/U7950/70/73, 
1-11-1946, minutes of Allied Control Council, Italy: ACI’s 58th meeting held on 
25-10-1946, item: War Criminals; WO 310/176, secret, undated, FX 72714, 
AFHQ to Allied Commission, (ALCOM), Rome; ibid., secret, telegram, no. 
5307, Ellery Stone, Allied Commissioner, to AFHQ, 16-10-1945; ibid., 
confidential, letter, Shapcott, Judge Advocate General’s Office, 6-9-1945;
FO 371/57659/U5780/4473/73, 31-5-1946, immediate, secret, telegram, no. 
276, Paris to FO, 30-1-1946.
27. FO 371/51044/U172/55/73, 8-1-45, minutes by Wardrop, 13-1-1945, 
Viscount Hood, Reconstruction Department of the FO, 16-1-1945, Dean, 19-1- 
1945, Wardrop, 20-1-1945; letter by Sargent to the Greek Ambassador to the 
UK, 2-2-1945; Historical Archive of the Greek Foreign Ministry, 1945.
28. FO 371/51033/U6168/55/73, 11-8-1945, Greek Government 
Gazette, Part I, no. 145, Law no. 384, Archbishop Damaskinos, the Greek 
Prime Minister, 8-6-45; Historical Archive of the Greek Foreign Ministry, 1945.
29. Palumbo, M., The Waldheim Files: Myth and Reality, London, 1988, 
pp. 18-9; FO 371/51025/U4509/29/73, 9-6-1945, secret, C 117, UNWCC 
minutes, 2-6-1945; FO 371/51009-51046, passim; WO 310/180, 16000/22/A3, 
confidential, letter, CHQ. CMF, to Under Secretary of State, War Office, 28-11- 
46; ibid., Annexure, A 12, Italian War Crimes in Greece; Historical Archive of 
the Greek Foreign Ministry, 1945.
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equal vigour all those whom it had identified as being war criminals, be they 
Germans, Italians or ‘Quislings’.30 The Yugoslav government accused Italy of 
crimes against humanity as well as war crimes against peace and the rules and 
customs of war.31 It proved to be the most insistent in wanting to see Italian war 
criminals not only tried and prosecuted, but tried before its own courts.32 
Yugoslavia’s claims and demands caused major complications for British policy 
towards Italy in the immediate postwar period and undermined the preferred 
British approach of carefully selected targets as subjects for war crimes 
investigations.33 Furthermore, they created an invidious dilemma for Britain in 
that the satisfaction these demands would alienate Italy and their outright 
rejection would enrage Yugoslavia to such a degree as to transform it into a 
greater menace to the region.34
The case for Italian war criminality, as presented by Yugoslavia, was a strong 
one, centring around the maltreatment of Yugoslav civilians during the Italian
30. United Nations War Crimes Commission, Law Reports of Trials of 
War Criminals, Vol. XV, London, 1949, pp. 202-9; Yugoslav State Official 
Publication, Italian War Crimes in Yugoslavia, Belgrade, 1945, passim;
FO 371 /51023/U4210/29/73, 1-6-1945, secret, doc. C 110, UNWCC minutes, 
proposal by R. Zivkovid, Yugoslavia’s representative at the UNWCC, re.: 
establishment of an Agency attached to the ACC in Italy 14-5-1945;
FO 371 /51023/U4229/29/73, 1-6-1945, secret, doc. C 115, UNWCC minutes, 
24-5-1945 and record of UNWCC Conference of 6-5-1945;
FO 371/57523/70/73, 9-8-1946, ‘Report on Italian War Crimes in Yugoslavia 
and its People’, prepared by the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia 
State Commission for the investigation of War Crimes, Belgrade, 1946.
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occupation.35 After its assault on Yugoslavia in 1941, Italy had annexed parts 
of Slovenia and the Dalmatian coast and had occupied an area of the Adriatic 
coast which consisted of parts of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. It also 
established a protectorate over Montenegro and incorporated parts of southern 
Yugoslavia into its Albanian protectorate.36 Initially, the Italian occupation 
authorities were deeply shocked when they came face to face with the brutality 
the Ustasi had displayed towards Serbs, Jews and Gypsies and they decided 
to take a more direct approach in the running of the territories they had 
annexed.37 The Italians, however, found it extremely difficult to subdue these 
areas and in attempting to exercise control, the Italian armed forces and the 
occupation authorities frequently employed terror and cruelty.38 Mass arrests, 
mass executions, race oppression, the burning of villages, massacres of 
civilians, the expropriation and looting of properties, internment in 
concentration camps and the use of slave labour were some of the means 
employed by the invaders in their efforts to drive a wedge between the civilian
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population and the partisans and to consolidate Italian control.39
Some Italian commanders in Yugoslavia had been linked to the issuing of 
particularly harsh and inhumane orders for dealing with the Yugoslav 
population. General Mario Roatta, whose nickname in Yugoslavia was ‘beast’, 
issued a comprehensive order in March 1942, the notorious ‘C 3', which was 
directed against the civilian population and which characterised the whole 
civilian population as potential supporters of the partisans.40 Roatta was held 
personally responsible for the destruction of 800 villages, the forcible removal 
of 35,000 persons to concentration camps in Italy, the murder by starvation of 
4,500 hostages in an Italian camp in Yugoslavia and the shooting of 1000 
hostages in Italian custody.41 Most of these war crimes had been perpetrated 
during the mopping up operations in the winter of 1942-43, by which time the 
Balkan theatre of war had become one of the most barbaric and brutal of the 
Second World War.42 General Taddeo Orlando, in keeping with the spirit of the 
original Roatta circular ‘C 3', issued an order under which only the wounded, 
along with women and men under the age of eighteen should be handed over 
to tribunals. All others arrested by Italian authorities should be ‘immediately 
shot on the spot’.43 In May 1942, General Robotti issued an order for the
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execution of hostages if those guilty of any violent act against the Italian armed 
forces were not found within 48 hours.44 The military Governor of Montenegro, 
General Alessandro Pirzio-Biroli, who was described by Djilas as an 'energetic 
and cruel man’, issued a handbook to the Italian armed forces fighting in 
Montenegro commanding them to ‘kill, shoot, bum and destroy these people’.45
As the Communist-led resistance in the occupied areas grew, the politics of 
occupation and oppression became embroiled in the politics of civil war and 
revolution. Italy resorted to a policy of divide and rule and of exploiting to the 
full the age-old ethnic and religious tensions existing in the area.46 The 
occupation forces utilised the virulently nationalistic Croatian Ustasi faction 
headed by Ante Pavelic and the ultra-nationalistic and anti-communist Serbian 
Cetniks under Draza Mihailovic in their attempt to ‘pacify’ the area.47 Concerted 
efforts were also made to erode a Yugoslav national identity by uprooting and 
destroying national and cultural institutions and to ‘italianize’ those areas of 
Yugoslavia which the Italian Fascist state claimed as its own. The methods 
used to achieve these ends included the imposition of the Italian language on 
south Slavic populations, the banning of native language newspapers, the 
supervision of education, mass conversions of non-Catholic populations to the 
Roman Catholic faith and the ‘italianization’ of Slavic surnames.48
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45. Djilas, op. cit., pp. 26, 38 and 74; Dedijer, V., The Wartime Diaries 
of Vladimir Dedijer, Vol. 1: From 6 April 1941 to 27 November 1942, Michigan, 
1990, pp. 146-7.
46. Singleton, op. cit., pp. 86-7.
47. Lindsay, op. cit., pp. 19-22; Singleton, op. cit., pp. 86-96; Deakin, 
op. cit., 37, 40, passim; Clissold, S., Whirlwind: An Account of Marshal Tito’s 
Rise to Power, London, 1947, pp. 9-116, passim; Djilas, op. cit., 3-216, 
passim; Milazzo, op. cit., pp. 52-5; Tomasevich, op. cit., pp. 105-8, 210-2 and 
256-61.
48. UNWCC., op. cit., p. 488.
29
The Yugoslav State Commission for the ‘investigation of the crimes of the 
invaders and their assistants’, the National Office of the UNWCC in 
Yugoslavia, estimated that between 1940 and 1943, two hundred Italian 
concentration camps had been set up in Yugoslavia, Albania and Italy and that 
approximately 143,000 Yugoslavs had been interned in these camps. The lack 
of food and sanitation had rapidly transformed them into death-camps.49 As far 
as the Yugoslavs were concerned, the Italians did not behave any better as 
occupiers than had the Germans and during this period it is estimated that 1.5 
m50 to 1.75 m Yugoslavs died51 as the result of Italian and German occupation. 
This massive toll amounted to nearly 11% of the pre-war population of 
Yugoslavia.52
II. Meting out Justice in an Uncertain World
From late 1944 onwards, with Italy as yet not completely liberated, the 
Yugoslav government embarked on a concerted effort to pressure the UNWCC 
and the Armistice Powers to assist them in carrying out its programme of war 
crimes trials. As early as October and November 1944, it submitted proposals 
to the Allied Forces Headquarters (AFHQ) designed to speed up the process 
of getting its hands on alleged Italian war criminals. The Yugoslavs suggested 
that they send a mission to Italy to investigate the evidence relating to 
suspected Italian war crimes committed against Yugoslav nationals. The 
Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) instructed the AFHQ to approve the Yugoslav 
proposal because they were concerned that if war crimes were not investigated
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promptly, then the perpetrators could disappear or obstruct the course of 
justice.53 This arrangement, however, was to be overtaken by developments 
in the European theatre of operations and which resulted in delay.54
The early months of 1945 saw renewed fighting in Italy and the issue of war 
crimes and the Yugoslav mission to Italy was put on the back burner. To the 
Yugoslavs, this meant that they could not pursue their programme of punishing 
war criminals as quickly as they wished. They also became disaffected with the 
structural shortcomings of the UNWCC which had a purely consultative 
function55 and did not include the USSR.56 As a result of their exclusion, the
53. FO 371/51009/U123/29/73, 6-1-45, confidential, telegram, TAM 413, 
CCS to Field Marshal H. Alexander, SACMED, 4-1-1945; WO 204/2191, 
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55. UNWCC, op. cit., p. 109-28; Bower, op. cit., p. 41; PREM 4,
110/10, 6-7-1942; WO 32/10790, 18-5-1942. The UNWCC could submit 
recommendations and compile lists of names of persons against whom prima 
facie evidence of war criminality existed, but it did not have the necessary 
executive powers invested in it to carry out its tasks successfully. It also lacked 
direct detection powers which meant that the UNWCC had to rely entirely 
‘upon the good faith, accuracy and diligence of the various member 
governments in presenting bona fide war crimes’.
56. UNWCC, op. cit., pp. 113; Bower, op. cit., pp. 50-58
FO 371/51015/U2089/29/73, 24-3-1945, Annex C, brief for the Lord Chancellor 
prepared by Ward, 15-3-1945. A further difficulty for the Commission was that 
the Soviet Union was not a member. The USSR had stayed outside the 
UNWCC because of an initial misunderstanding and subsequently because it 
had insisted upon an impossibly large representation. The Soviets wanted 
seven Soviet republics - Ukraine, Estonia, Byelorussia, Moldavia, Lithuania, 
Latvia and the Karelo-Finnish Republic - to be represented. This was 
unacceptable to the British. A decision to agree to the Soviet Union’s wishes 
and include the Baltic states would have been tantamount to a de facto 
Western recognition of the position of those republics that had fallen into 
Soviet control after the signing of the Nazi-Soviet pact. Further attempts by 
Britain and the UNWCC to entice the Soviet Union foundered again on this 
obstacle. As a result of their exclusion, the Soviets more often than not 
adopted an obstructive attitude towards the work of the UNWCC and did not 
recognize the legitimacy of its authority.
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Soviets more often than not adopted an obstructive attitude towards the work 
of the UNWCC and did not recognize the legitimacy of its authority. They 
believed that war crimes related matters ought to be governed by the Moscow 
Declaration and dealt with through the diplomatic channels of the ‘Big Three’ 
and within the European Advisory Council.57 Thus, the ability of the UNWCC 
to discharge its duties was hampered because of members’ concerns that any 
decision the body took could be viewed with suspicion by the Soviet Union.58 
Exclusion also allowed the USSR to act as a loose cannon. There were 
instances when the Soviets created mischief and attempted to embarrass their 
allies in the UNWCC. Articles appeared in Izvestiya claiming that certain 
circles in the West had employed delaying tactics on war crimes. The case of 
Italy was frequently and prominently highlighted. Such tactics enabled the 
Soviets to score points with world public opinion against their Western allies 
and made the Yugoslavs suspicious that the UNWCC could not carry out its 
work effectively.59 Soon, they manifested their frustration and this began to 
create problems and uneasiness at Caserta. The names of Italians alleged to 
have committed war crimes against nationals of Yugoslavia were broadcast 
over ‘Radio Free Yugoslavia’;60 articles recounting Italian wartime atrocities 
appeared in the Belgrade political journals Bortsa and Politika.61 Dusan
57. FO 371/51014/U1859/29/73, 16-3-45, minutes by R.J.M. Wilson, 
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Nedeljkovic, the President of the Yugoslav War Crimes Commission, publicly 
requested the extradition of Roatta to face trial at the scene of his crimes.62 
Field Marshal Harold Alexander, the Supreme Allied Commander in the 
Mediterranean (SACMED), found that the issue of war crimes had begun 
suddenly to intrude into his normal day-to-day relations with the Italian armed 
forces. General Taddeo Orlando, a name frequently cited by the Yugoslavs in 
connection with atrocities, was now in command of the Carabinieri in the Rome 
area. Alexander, thus, requested instructions from London how to approach 
such situations.63
As the whole issue carried a raft of political implications, the Armistice and Post 
War Committee of the Cabinet (APW) whose remit covered post-hostilities 
issues and by extension the treatment of war criminals, passed the matter on 
to the Foreign Office which in November 1944 had been given by the War 
Cabinet the responsibility for formulating policy on war crimes related issues.64 
The Foreign Office was asked by the APW to consider if any special 
reservations should be applicable in the case of Italy. After careful 
consideration of the issue the Western Department and the War Crimes
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Section of the Foreign Office concluded that they had no objections to the 
arrest of alleged Italian war criminals, barring of course the cases of those who 
had collaborated with the British authorities. The Foreign Office thus, informed 
the APW that collaboration cases were the only cases on which it should be 
notified in the future and that it could not see any need for further 
consultation.65 From the Foreign Office’s point of view, one which viewed 
Yugoslav claims against Italian war criminals with a degree of sympathy, the 
longer the issue was allowed to fester the more it would hamper its attempts 
to stabilise Italy.66 It was also worried that any delays in this area would expose 
Britain to charges of bad faith and dilatoriness67 and thus it hoped that 'the War 
Office would take the bit between the teeth and issue instructions to go ahead 
and to act on the UNWCC lists at once’.68
The War Office, to which the War Cabinet had entrusted the actual 
implementation of war crimes related policy69 was displeased with its brief of 
apprehending war criminals and was at times obstructive. It was already 
pressed for resources and regarded this obligation as a serious defeat for its 
long held position that it should not assume any responsibilities which would
65. FO 371/51019/U3354/29/73, 2-5-1945, minute by Wardrop, 28-4-
1945.
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not aid the war effort directly.70 Thus, it opted for delaying tactics. It decided to 
await a directive from the CCS and instructed Alexander not to take any action 
until he had received it.71 The Foreign Office thought that there was nothing 
worse than the indifference the War Office and the AFHQ were displaying and 
thus, due to their tardiness, it had to acquiesce reluctantly in adopting a more 
‘hands on’ approach to war crimes related matters at a time when its resources 
were similarly overstretched.72
During this period, the British government also found itself facing mounting 
pressure from the Press and Parliament to punish Italian war criminals. A 
series of newspaper articles in publications as diverse as the Daily Telegraph, 
the Times, the Manchester Guardian and the Daily Herald vividly described 
the horrors of the Italian occupation in Yugoslavia and highlighted the fact that 
‘it [was] an indictment of the Italians as much as of the Germans that terrorism 
became an instrument of policy’.73 Pressure from Members of Parliament also 
increased. The government succeeded in suppressing most of the questions
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filed in the House of Commons by intimating to MPs that no measures would 
be taken which could put the lives of British POWs in jeopardy through 
reprisals from the Germans and the Italians.74 In some cases this tactic worked. 
Irene Ward, the MP for Wallsend, filed parliamentary questions on two 
occasions but she was pressured on each occasion to drop them and await the 
end of the war in Europe to air her concerns about delays in punishing Italian 
war criminals.75 Others, however, such as Tom Driberg, the MP for Maldon, 
and M. Carver, the MP for Howdenshire, were not daunted and proceeded to 
put their questions to Parliament on the policy of the British government 
towards the punishment of Italian war criminals.76
At the conclusion of the war, the Yugoslavs renewed their efforts.77 These were 
marred by the unfortunate events at Venezia-Giulia in May-June 1945 which 
culminated in the Yugoslav occupation of Trieste and which led the Americans 
in particular, to regard Tito as nothing more than Stalin’s advanced pawn. The 
Americans interpreted Yugoslav initiatives to obtain extraditions merely as 
propaganda attempts to discredit Italy with world opinion and they adopted an
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obstructive attitude towards Yugoslav war crime claims against Italy.78 It was 
in this climate that Yugoslavia launched a major offensive through the 
UNWCC. In May 1945, Dr. Radomir Zivkovic, the Yugoslav representative, 
brought the issue of Italian war criminality to the centre stage of UNWCC 
deliberations. He was aided by the revulsion felt world-wide by the discovery 
of the horrors of Belsen, Buchenwald and Dachau. He described Italy as 
second only to Germany in the number of war crimes committed against UN 
nationals and he stressed that the crimes committed by the Italian armed 
forces and occupation authorities against the nationals of Yugoslavia, France, 
Greece and Albania did not fall short in brutality to the crimes committed by the 
Germans in the death camps. Zivkovic’s emotional and moving presentation 
ended with the statement that the primary task of Yugoslav policy was the 
punishment of war criminals.79 No one was left in any doubt about the 
determination of the Yugoslav government to see Italian war criminals face the 
full force of Yugoslav justice.80
On 23 May, Zivkovic launched yet another initiative aimed at embarrassing the 
British and the Americans into a faster and more rigorous implementation of the 
war crimes related provisions of the Long Armistice Terms. He proposed that
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Lord Finlay, the Chairman of the UNWCC, should request that an agency with 
advisory as well as executive powers be attached to the Allied Control 
Commission (ACC) in Italy to help the UNWCC carry out the provisions of 
Article 29, by tracing war criminals and thus, ensure that the SACMED 
replicated the actions of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary 
Forces (SHAEF) which had resulted in many alleged German war criminals 
being extradited to Yugoslavia for trial. These proposals were also embellished 
with accusations that the Allies were being tardy in apprehending Italian war 
criminals.81
The arrival of the Yugoslav proposals at the Foreign Office coincided with 
deliberations on how Theatre Commanders should proceed in order to 
apprehend war criminals on UNWCC lists in the areas of Italy under their 
authority. Britain had already pledged itself to the handing over to the 
requesting nation those war criminals whose names appeared on the UNWCC 
lists. Now, it tried to agree a policy of extraditions on demand with the 
Americans who had not given such a direct pledge. A common position was 
sought so that the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) could issue a directive.82 
Thus, Yugoslav claims that nothing was being done to punish Italian war 
criminals caused consternation and irritation to the British, especially as the 
Yugoslavs had been given permission to send missions to Italy but had not 
even bothered to acknowledge or act on this. The recently established and
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1945, record of discussion among Zivkovic, Lord Finlay and Stavropoulos, 23-
5-1945; FO 371/51025/U4593/29/73, 13-6-1945, letter, Finlay to Dean,
6-6-1945; FO 371/51027/U4933/29/73, 23-6-1945, secret, M 64, UNWCC 
minutes, 64th meeting, 6-6-1945.
82. FO 371/51027/U4956/29/73, 25-6-1945, secret, telegram, DON 840, 
JSM to AMSSO, 21-6-1945; FO 371/51030/U5413/29/73, 13/7/45, top secret, 
telegram, FAN 591/FACS 259, CCS to Allied Commanders, 11-7-1945; top 
secret, telegram, NOD 978, Cabinet Office to JSM, 20-9-1945;
FO 371/51021/U3821/29/73, 21-5-1945, secret, telegram, NAF 973, AFHQ to 
CCS, 16-5-1945; UNWCC, op. cit., pp. 31, 39 and 45.
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hugely overstretched War Crimes Section (WCS) of the Foreign Office, 
normally sympathetic to Yugoslav claims against Italian war criminals, received 
the proposals with disbelief and deemed them to be beyond the UNWCC’s 
mandate.83 Patrick H. Dean of the WCS and R. A. Beaumont, one of the British 
delegates on the UNWCC and a Foreign Office official, delivered the knock-out 
blow to Zivkovic’s proposals.84 Zivkovic reacted by explicitly accusing the allies 
of procrastination. He continued venting his anger by stating that even though 
the Allies had been in control of Italy since 1943, they had as yet failed to 
apprehend any war criminals.85
The WCS continued with its efforts to speed up the issuing of the CCS 
directive. In July 1945, the Allies were able to issue a directive to the Theatre 
Commanders that authorised them to deliver immediately to the requesting 
nation any person wanted for trial for war crimes allegedly committed in the
83. FO 371/51019/U3319/29/73, 1-5-1945, minutes by Dean, 27-4- 
1945, Ward, 28-4-1945; FO 371/51024/U4418/29/73, 7-6-1945, letter, FO to 
Rome, 7-6-1945. As more and more claims were being registered with the 
UNWCC, officials in the Reconstruction Department of the Foreign Office grew 
concerned that the ad hoc arrangements their department had set up to deal 
with the issue were in danger of collapsing due to the sheer number of 
allegations. In April 1945, Ward sensing impending chaos, advocated that a 
special section under a senior official within the Foreign Office should be 
created to coordinate policy on war crimes if a total breakdown was to be 
avoided. The Foreign Office heeded this warning: the War Crimes Section 
(WCS) was established to deal with war crimes committed by German, Italian 
and Japanese nationals against the nationals of other United Nations 
countries.
84. FO 371/51024/U4210/29/73, 1-6-1945, letter, Dean to Finlay,
2-6-1945; undated minute by Beaumont; telegram, no. 1895, FO to RESMED,
4-6-1945.
85. Ibid.; UNWCC, op. cit., pp. 351-2; FO 371/51026/U4729/29/73, 
17-6-1945, telegram, no. 1174, RESMED to FO, undated;
FO 371/51027/U4933/29/73, 23-6-1945, secret, M 64, UNWCC minutes, 64th 
meeting, 6-6-1945.
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territory of that nation.86 The directive was to be applicable to both German and 
Italian war criminals. Despite its all encompassing nature, the directive 
excluded from its mandate three major categories, namely, ‘major war 
criminals’ who were to be tried before international tribunals; alleged war 
criminals who were needed as witnesses at the international tribunals; finally, 
came those cases where a collaborator had been identified as an alleged war 
criminal. In these instances it was recommended that the Allied Commanders 
should seek the guidance of their political advisers before extradition could be 
decided.87 The 12th July directive gave ample freedom of action to SACMED 
to embark, at last, on the apprehension of Italian war criminals.88
In August 1945, Britain embarked on its own important trial against an Italian 
who had committed crimes against British military personnel. General Bellomo 
was accused of killing British POWs. The case was surrounded by 
controversy, as it emerged that the depiction of Bellomo as a cowardly war
86. WO 310/4, top secret, FAN 591/FACS 259, CCS to Alexander and 
Eisenhower, 11-7-1945; NARA RG 84, Decimal Files, 711.6, Box. 109, top 
secret, telegram, FAN 591/FACS 259, CCS to Alexander and Eisenhower, 11-
7-1945; top secret, telegram, FAN 590/NAF 973, CCS to SACMED, 11-7-1945.
87. Ibid.; FO 371/51019/U3450/29/73, 4-5-1945, most important, 
telegram, no. 293, FO to UK Delegation, San Francisco, 3-5-1945;
FO 371/51019/U3392/29/73, 3-5-1945, top secret, telegram, no. 90066, WO 
to AFHQ, 30-4-1945; FO 371/51019/U3354/29/73, 2-5-1945, minute by 
Wardrop, 28-4-1945; FO 371/51022/U4025/29/73, 26-5-1945, Annex,
FACS 217/FAN 551, 12-5-1945, APW minutes, APW(45)70, 25-5-1945;
WO 310/4, 34A, FAN 591, CCS to Alexander, FACS 259, CCS to Eisenhower. 
By this stage it was clear that no Italian would be prosecuted as a major war 
criminal. Of the eight Fascists included in the War Cabinet list the 
whereabouts of only one, Graziani, was known, and it had been decided that 
he would be tried by the Italians.
88. FO 371 /51027/U4956/29/73, 25-6-1945, secret, telegram, DON 840, 
JSM to AMSSO, 21-6-1945; FO 371/51020/U3821/29/73, 21-5-1945, secret, 
telegram, NAF 973, AFHQ to CCS, 16-5-1945; FO 371/51022/U4025/29/73, 
26-5-1945, Annex, FACS 217/FAN 551, CCS to Allied Commanders, 12-5- 
1945; ibid., U4098/29/73, 29-5-1945, secret, telegram, DON 785, JSM to 
Washington to AMSSO, 28-5-1945; WO 310/4, 34A, top secret, FAN 
591/FACS 259, CCS to Alexander and Eisenhower, 11-7-1945; WO 310/179, 
top secret, telegram, FAN551/FACS 259, CCS to SACMED, 12-5-45.
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criminal did not tally with his full war-time record.89 The trial formed the 
cornerstone of the British prosecution for war crimes perpetrated by Italian 
officers against British citizens. It was typified by the single-minded 
determination of the British government to see Bellomo punished. There were 
reports in the British Press that the trial had been unfair and these claims 
centred around the inability and the unsuitability of the defence lawyer who, it 
was felt, was simply not up to his brief. Pleas for leniency and clemency poured 
in.90 The outcome and the furore caused by the trial and the execution of 
Bellomo, however, increased the apprehension felt amongst the British for the 
war crimes issue and confirmed the prevalent feeling within the Foreign Office 
that the sooner the issue was dealt with the better.91
As the dust from the Bellomo case settled, the Yugoslavs again stepped up 
their campaign. In a highly publicised speech, Nedeljkovic, sought the trials of 
General Esposito, a regional military commander, General Eveli, the Inspector 
of Police in Trieste and Gaetano Colotti, a Police Commissioner, all three of 
whom he accused of being guilty of murder, imprisonment and terrorism in
89. Many at the time, as well as recent researchers, have maintained 
that General Bellomo was a valiant man who fought fiercely against the 
Germans and the neo-fascists at the time of the armistice. Such cases are 
often surrounded by mythical assertions and counter-assertions and thus the 
reality is hard to pin down, especially after so many years.
90. The most prominent of these petitions came from Sir Noel Charles, 
Ferrucio Parri, the Italian Prime Minister, and Ivor Thomas, MP, the chairman 
of the Anglo-ltalian Committee.
91. FO 371/51045/U6575/55/73, 31-8-1945, telegram, no. 2093, FO to 
Rome, 3-9-1945; ibid., U6583/55/73, 1-1-1945, RESMED to FO, 30-8-1945; 
ibid., U6636/55/73, 4-9-1945, telegram, no. 1644, Holy See to RESMED, 3-9- 
1945; ibid., U6920/55/73, 12-9-1945, letter, Ivor Thomas, MP, chairman of 
‘Friends of Italy Committee’, to Hector Me Neil, Minister of State 3-9-1945; 
letter, McNeil, to Ivor Thomas, 8-9-1945; ibid., U6960/55/73, 18-9-1945, 
Bovenschen to Sargent, 11-9-1945; FO 371/51046/U6973/55/73, 14-9-1945, 
telegram, no. 1415, Rome to FO, 12-9-1945; ibid., U7034/55/73, 15-9-1945, 
telegram, no. 426, Rome to FO, 14-9-1945; ibid., U7038/55/73, 16-9-1945, 
telegram, no. 1432, Rome to FO, 14-9-1945; ibid., U8089/55/73, 13-9-1945, 
telegram, no. 458, FO to Rome, 17-10-1945; The Times, article, 30-7-1945;
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Istria and Slovenia.92 The Yugoslav Ambassador to the UK lost no time at all 
and wrote to Clement Attlee urging him to issue the Allied military authorities 
in Italy with instructions similar to those governing the hand-over of German 
war criminals.93
By autumn 1945, Britain found itself having to perform a balancing act between 
Yugoslavia and Italy. As yet, the Italian authorities had shown little haste in 
apprehending those war criminals requested by Yugoslavia. The first UNWCC 
list passed on to the Italians in the summer of 1945 had not produced a single 
response let alone the detection or apprehension of an alleged Italian war 
criminal.94 From early on the Italian State had displayed a determined reticence 
over the issue. When in May 1944 the Council of Ministers under pressure 
from Tito, suggested that General Alessandro Pirzio Biroli, who had been a 
Commander in Albania and Yugoslavia, should be brought to face trial, 
Badoglio intervened vehemently and successfully to put an end to any such 
action.95 Any hopes that the Italian position would soften proved in vain even 
after the May-June 1945 London conference of the UNWCC National Officers. 
This conference accepted Italy’s status as a country which had been accused 
of having perpetrated war crimes, yet, at the same time, had been a victim of 
war crimes and that it constituted a special case. As such it should be allowed 
to prosecute neo-fascist Italian war criminals who had committed crimes
92. WO 310/176, 16000/A3, secret, FX 72714, AFHQ to ALCOM,
Rome, undated; ibid., secret, telegram, no. 5307, Stone to AFHQ, 16-10-1945; 
confidential, letter, Shapcott to AFHQ, 6-9-1945; FO 371/51045/U5064/55/73,
28-6-1945, telegram, Sir R.S. Stevenson, British Ambassador to Yugoslavia, 
to FO, 18-6-1945.
93. FO 371 /51046/U8375/55/73, 23-10-1945, Yugoslav Note, P. no. 
3142, 19-10-1945.
94. WO 310/179, confidential, APO 394, 18A, War Criminals Listed with 
UNWCC: Handover- General Policy: Italians Listed as War Criminals, 2-9-45.
95. Domenico, op. cit., p. 43.
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against other Italians despite the fact that it was not a UNWCC member.96 The 
government led by Parri was equally protective of Italian interests and resisted 
any intrusion into its affairs by Yugoslavia which it regarded as a predatory and 
hostile power. Italian misgivings of this kind signalled clearly to the British 
government that Italian co-operation was not going to be readily forthcoming. 
The fact, that these Italian reservations were received sympathetically at the 
Allied Commission and especially by Admiral Ellery Stone, the Allied 
Commissioner, also denoted that Italy would not be under any real pressure 
from the Allied Commission, the very body that was responsible for ensuring 
that Italy abided by the Armistice Terms fully.97
For its part, Britain tried to restore its credibility with Yugoslavia by showing that 
it was not involved in any conspiracy to shield Italian war criminals. Steps were 
taken to ensure that neutral countries, especially Switzerland, would not give 
asylum to alleged war criminals. In many instances the Foreign Office acted as 
Yugoslavia’s intermediary in advocating the merits of the Yugoslav case
96. UNWCC, op. cit., pp. 408-409; FO 371/51030/U5413/29/73, 13-7- 
45, minute by Ross 13-8-1945; secret, letter, Major Sprigg, WO to Beaumont; 
top secret, telegram, FAN 591/FACS 259, 11-7-1945; top secret, telegram, 
NOD 978, Cabinet Office to JSM, 20-9-1945; ibid., U5439/29/73, 14-7-1945, 
telegram, no. 173, saving, Charles to FO, 4-7-1945;
FO 371/51019/U3362/29/73, 2-5-1945, minutes by Ward, 5-5-1945, and Dean,
6-5-1945; FO 371/51028/U5073/29/73, 29-6-1945, letter, Dean to Norman, 
Cabinet Office, 5-7-1945; minute by Scott-Fox, WCS, 2-7-1945;
FO 371/51029/U5324/29/73, 9-7-1945, secret, GEN 59/6, minutes of the 
Interdepartmental Committee on War Crimes meeting on 10-7-1945;
FO 371/51020/U3538/29/73, 9-5-1945, secret, telegram, NOD 744, AMSSO to 
JSM, 9-5-1945; FO 371/51019/U3362/29/73, 2-5-1945, minutes by Ward,
5-5-1945, and Dean, 6-5-1945; FO 371/51037/U7427/29/73, 26-9-1945, 
secret, telegram, NOD 978, Cabinet Office to JSM, 21-9-1945;
FO 371/51039/U8375/29/73, 23-10-1945, secret, telegram, DON 32, JSM to 
Cabinet Office, 15-10-1945; letter, Scott-Fox to Colonel Isham, WO, 3-11- 
1945; secret, telegram, NOD 67, JSM to Cabinet Office, 5-12-1945; secret, 
telegram, FAN 633, CCS to AFHQ, 8-12-1945; letter, FO to the Yugoslav 
Ambassador, London, 15-12-1945.
97. WO 204/2194, top secret, S-410, Stone to AFHQ, 9-1-1945;
WO 310/179, confidential, APO 394, 18A, War Criminals Listed with UNWCC: 
Handover- General Policy: Italians Listed as War Criminals, 2-9-45.
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against a particular war criminal and pressured the Swiss not to give sanctuary 
to such persons.98 Two German war criminals who had been under British 
supervision, Generals Neidholdt and Rainer, were handed over to 
Yugoslavia.99 The British government supported the Yugoslav proposal for a 
mission to be sent to Italy to investigate war crimes against Yugoslavs, despite
9B. FO 371/51045/U4231/55/73, 1-6-1945, telegram, no. 63, FO to Holy 
Sea, 21-6-1945; minute by Ross, 6-6-1945; ibid., U4596/55/73, 13-6-1945, 
minute by Beaumont, 17-6-1945; ibid., U5538/55/73, 19-7-1945, minutes by 
Harvey, 12-7-1945 and Scott-Fox, 12-7-1945; ibid., U6528/55/73, 29-8-1945, 
minute by Scott-Fox, 16-8-1945; FO 371/51046/U7842/55/73, 28-9-1945, 
telegram, no. 458, Norton, Berne to FO, 28-9-1945; minutes Beaumont, 9-10- 
1945, Scott-Fox, 15-10-1945, and Dean, 17-10-1945. One of the most telling 
of these cases was that of G. Bastianini who had sought asylum in Switzerland 
after the collapse of the Said Republic. Bastianini was a former Ambassador 
to London and from June 1942 to February 1943, he had been a former 
Governor of Dalmatia. The Yugoslavs accused him of being responsible for, 
amongst other things, murders, massacres, systematic terrorism and the 
killing of hostages. They presented enough evidence to enable the UNWCC to 
determine that there was a prima facie case against him and place him on 
their lists. Even though many in the FO felt that Bastianini had been accused 
of these crimes because of his position rather than his personal actions, it was 
decided to handle the case when the Yugoslavs asked Britain to mediate with 
the Swiss authorities. At stake here was the British policy of pressing neutral 
countries not to give asylum to war criminals and not just the credibility of 
Britain with Yugoslavia. The Bastianini case was viewed as one that could 
create a precedent. Oliver Harvey stressed that Britain ‘should do nothing to 
encourage the Swiss to hold him [Bastianini] back or we shall weaken our 
whole policy’.
FO 371/51040/U9273/29/73, 24-11-45, letter, Scott-Fox to Isham,
11-12-1945; FO 371/51039/U8379/29/73, 23-10-1945, letter, Yugoslav 
Ambassador to FO, 23-10-1945.
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the strong disagreement of the SACMED, the ACC and the Americans.100 The 
Foreign Office, under Bevin, became even more involved in carrying out war 
crimes policy, especially since his aim was to improve Anglo-Yugoslav 
relations.101 Thus, despite a border incident at Venezia Giulia,102 Bevin 
instructed the WCS to impress again upon the War Office the need to arrest 
‘the persons listed by the UNWCC’ and to hand them over to Yugoslavia.103
The British military in Italy, however, were not prepared to move without 
pointing out the obvious contradictions of acting on the current UNWCC lists. 
On the one hand, the British military was expected to apprehend senior officers 
of the Italian Army on UNWCC lists and on the other, it had to nurture a close 
relationship with the Italian Armed Forces and standardize them along British
10°. NARA RG 84, Decimal Files, 711.6, Box: 109, confidential, 
memorandum, Stone to AFHQ, 28-8-1945; confidential, letter, no. 2208, 
Alexander Kirk, American Ambassador to Italy, to J. Grew, Acting Secretary of 
State, 4-9-1945; confidential, SACMED to CCS, 12-10-1945; NARA RG 84, 
Decimal Files, 800, Box: 118, confidential, telegram, MAT 962, re: TAM 718, 
SACMED to CCS, 10-12-1945; NARA RG 59, E381, Lot Files 54D328, Folder: 
War Criminals, Enclosure, telegram Barber to SACMED, 11-6-1945;
FO 371/51045/U6815/55/73, 10-9-1945, telegram, no. 1644, Broad, to FO, 8- 
9-1945; ibid., U4977/55/73, 26-6-1945, secret, telegram, MAT 739, Alexander 
to CCS, 6-6-1945; secret, telegram, TAM 625, CCS to AFHQ, 7-7-1945; ibid., 
U6017/55/73, 6-8-1945, minute by Beaumont, 9-8-1945; secret, telegram, no. 
2475, FO to AFHQ, 20-8-1945; ibid., U6929/55/73, 12-9-1945, secret, 
telegram, no. 1670, RESMED to FO, 11-9-1945;
FO 371/51046/U8204/55/73, 17-10-1945, letter, Dean to Bradshaw, 1-11- 
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Secretary of State, WO, 16-3-1946.
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lines.104 The problem was highlighted by the fact that the Yugoslav list 
contained the names of fifty Generals of whom thirteen were on the active list 
of the Italian Army.105 General W.D. Morgan, the new SACMED who had been 
Alexander’s Chief of Staff and who had been closely involved with British 
efforts to build a close relationship with the new Italian armed forces, cautioned 
that the arrest and extradition of ‘superior officers’ of the Italian Army would 
result in enormous political costs.106 Their removal, he admonished, would not 
only have a disastrous effect on the re-organisation of the Italian Armed Forces 
but it would also affect ‘the morale, efficiency and co-operation of the whole 
[Italian] Army’.107 Indeed, the British element of Military Mission to the Italian 
Army (MMIA) was appalled at the prospect of its involvement in any 
investigations into the wartime conduct of the Italian Army, especially as it had 
close links with many of the officers on the UNWCC lists. It saw such 
involvement as a recipe for destroying its working relationship with the Italian 
Ministry of War and wasting the atmosphere of co-operation and trust it had 
built up with the leadership of the Italian Armed Forces. MMIA felt that its job 
was to look towards the future, re-organise the Italian Army and maintain a
104. FO 371 /51046/U9732/55/73, 7-12-1945, secret, telegram, no.
1934, FO to Belgrade, 17-12-1945; secret, telegram, no. 2701, FO to Rome, 
17-12-1945; FO 371/57520/U6159/70/73, 1-7-1946, telegram, no. 521,
Broad, to FO, 28-6-1946; FO 371/49954/ZM4139/2273/22, 1-8-1945, 
memorandum by Major General Browning, MMIA, undated;
FO 371/60604/ZM3774/89/22, 11-11-1946, memorandum by Ross ‘Missions to 
the Italian Armed Forces and Police’, 8-11-1946;
FO 371/60603/ZM2883/89/22, 22-8-1946, secret, letter, Brigadier C. S. 
Sudgen, WO to Hoyer-Millar, 20-8-1946; ibid., ZM2624/89/22 30-7-1946, 
secret, letter, Hoyer-Millar to Sudgen, 30-7-1946; FO 
371 /60622/ZM187/187/22, 12-1-1946, secret, letter, WO to FO, 20-8-1946.





good relationship with the Italian military establishment.108 It resented what it 
perceived as the UNWCC and Judge Advocate General’s (JAG) office 
encroaching into its area. It estimated that such intrusions would jeopardise its 
efforts ‘by stirring up’ matters that were in the past.109 General Browning, the 
head of MMIA, pointed out that if Italian officers were to be arrested and 
handed over, a ‘great blow would be dealt to the morale of the Italian Army’. On 
top of this, he warned, the Italian military would come to the conclusion that the 
British had let them down.110 Consequently, MMIA announced that it would 
prefer not to get involved in war crimes work.111 For its part, the Foreign Office 
rejected the suggestion that the alleged war criminals should not be handed 
over to Yugoslavia to face trial despite any political embarrassment that this 
would cause. The alternative was a further deterioration in Anglo-Yugoslav
108. FO 371/49954/ZM4139/2273/22, 1-8-1945, minutes by Ross, 7-8- 
1945 and Hoyer-Millar, 8-8-1945; memorandum by Browning, undated;
AIR 23/6343, top secret, P/319 (Final) (Revised), ‘Italian Air Force’, 
memorandum by the Mediterranean Planning Staff, 15-12-1945
109. WO 310/4, secret, telegram, no. 234/5, Deputy Judge Advocate 
General’s Office (DJAG) to GHQ. CMF, 30-12-1945;
FO 371/51046/U9723/55/73, 6-12-1945 War Office memorandum, ‘War 
Criminals’, 22-11-1945; secret, telegram, no. 1934, FO to Belgrade, 17-12- 
1945; secret, telegram, no. 2701, FO to Rome, 17-12-1945; minutes by 
Beaumont, 7-12-1945 and 12-11-1945, Colville, 12-12-1945, and Dean, 13-12- 
1945; letter, SACMED to JAG, 27-11-1945.
11°. FO 371/51046/U9723/55/73, 6-12-1945, WO memorandum, ‘War 
Criminals’, 22-11-1945.
111. Ibid., U9732/55/73, 7-12-1945, secret, telegram, no. 1934, FO to 
Belgrade, 17-12-1945; secret, telegram, no. 2701, FO to Rome, 17-12-1945; 
minutes by Beaumont, 7-12-1945 and 12-11-1945, Colville, 12-12-1945, and 
Dean, 13-12-1945; letter, SACMED to JAG, 27-11-1945; WO 310/4, secret, 
telegram, no. 234/5, DJAG to GHQ.CMF, 30-12-1945. The Judge Advocate’s 
Office, sensitive to the concerns of MMIA, hastened to assure it that no action 
would be taken without consulting with HQ. The Judge Advocate General’s, 
however, misinterpreted the MMIA’s concerns as being based merely on 
procedural matters. Hence, he offered them the opportunity of being given 
powers to deal with the Italian Ministry of War directly in those cases where 
documentary evidence was needed from the records of these prominent 
officers. He had hoped that the MMIA could capitalize on its good relations 
with the Italian military and thus make any necessary investigations less 
embarrassing for the Italians.
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relations, the exposure of Britain to charges of bad faith from that country and 
a possibly hostile action by Yugoslavia against Italy.112
The November elections in Yugoslavia had confirmed Tito’s unshakable grasp 
over his country and highlighted once again the different tactics the British and 
the Americans had adopted towards Tito and which were eventually to affect 
war crimes policy implementation. Whereas, the Truman Administration had 
decided to mark its disapproval by putting distance between Washington and 
Belgrade, the Attlee government had decided that Yugoslavia was ‘strategically 
too important’ for Britain’s position in the Mediterranean, Greece and Italy for 
it ‘to adopt a policy of sulking’ and that it had to do its best to maintain a 
relationship with Yugoslavia.113 In keeping with the spirit of this policy, on 15 
December, Attlee wrote to the Yugoslav Ambassador to inform him that the 
CCS had authorised SACMED to hand over alleged Italian war criminals to 
Allied Governments subject to conditions similar to those laid down for the 
handing over of German war criminals.114 These new instructions to the 
Theatre Commanders were simply a reaffirmation of the previous general 
instructions regarding war criminals of July 1945.115 All assessments, however, 
pointed to the fact that implementation of these orders could be carried out only 
by compelling Italy to hand over its war criminals to Yugoslavia.116 The British 
felt that a unilateral implementation of such orders would make their position
112. FO 371/57519/U2338/70/73, 28-2-1946, letter, Scott-Fox to Under 
Secretary of State, WO, 16-3-1946.
113. Lane, ‘Coming to Terms with Tito’, p. 17.
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with Italy totally untenable and that in these circumstances it would better to act 
in close cooperation with the Americans. Once again however, American 
cooperation was unforthcoming.117 Whilst British policy had been orientating 
itself towards the hand-over of UNWCC listed Italians, American policy had 
been indecisive. The issue of Italian war criminals was seen by the United 
States as an attempt by Yugoslavia to discredit Italy and the Allies and thereby 
further its own interests and those of the PCI. Furthermore, the State 
Department was determined not to allow America’s influence in Italy to suffer, 
nor to be instrumental in destabilizing Italy should FAN 633 be implemented.118 
Lord Halifax, the British Ambassador to the United States, was informed that 
from the American point of view, the best action that the United States and 
Britain could adopt towards the issue of Italian war criminals was to ‘stall’ and 
not to implement any policy decision until the Italian Peace Treaty had been 
firmly concluded at which time Yugoslav claims could be dealt with directly by 
Italy and without any Allied entanglements.119
American attitudes towards the issue were not based on the merits of the 
Yugoslav case, but on their reading of Yugoslavia as a harbinger of Moscow’s 
expansionist policy. A measure of America’s attitude towards Yugoslavia was 
the fact that it had deliberately left the Belgrade Embassy without an
117. FO 371/57519/U2652/70/73, 9-1-1946, minutes by Colville, 15-3- 
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14-3-1946; secret, letter, GHQ.CMF, Lieutenant General, Commander in Chief 
to the Under Secretary of State, 26-2-1946; immediate, letter, Scott-Fox to 
Savill, WO, 18-3-1946; FO 371/51046/U9732/55/73, 7-12-1945, secret, 
telegram, no. 1934, FO to Belgrade, 17-12-1945; secret, telegram, no. 2701, 
FO to Rome, 17-12-1945.
118. NARA RG 59, Lot Files, 54D328, E381, Box: 4, top secret, 
telegram, letter by David McKey, charge d’affaires ad interim, Rome, to the 
Secretary of State, 6-4-1946; confidential, telegram, no. 359, 8-6-1946.
119. Ibid.; FO 371/57519/U4301/70/73, 22-4-1946, telegram, no. 2524, 
Earl of Halifax, the British Ambassador to US, to FO, 20-4-1946.
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ambassador in residence.120 American policy on the punishment of Italian war 
criminals was shaped to a large degree by the reports of the American 
Embassy in Rome and the dominant personality of Chief Commissioner Ellery 
Stone who was uncritically against surrendering any alleged Italian war 
criminals.121 The unyielding attitude of the State Department towards this issue 
provoked criticism from the American charge d'affaires in Belgrade, but the 
State Department did not waver.122 The adoption of such an attitude by the US 
had severe implications for the implementation of ‘hand-overs’ and the Foreign 
Office identified American obstructionism as one of the major problems Britain 
faced in fulfilling its wartime pledge to bring Italian war criminals to justice.123 
The AFHQ was a combined and fully integrated organisation. This meant that 
British decisions could not be executed without the agreement of their 
American allies. It also meant that the line on extraditions that the SACMED 
had adopted against the Foreign Office could not be isolated and marginalised. 
The AFHQ kept procrastinating and creating additional delays which made the 
British government uncomfortable. The reason behind this inaction was that the 
US political adviser at the AFHQ had been briefed on the US policy of ‘stalling’ 
and consequently attempted to gain maximum delay before any action had to
120. FRUS, 1947, IV, pp. 797-800.
121. WO 204/2194, top secret, S-410, Stone to AFHQ, 9-1-1945; Lane, 
Britain, the Cold War and Yugoslav Unity, pp. 99-100; Bohlen, C., Witness to 
History, 1929-69, New York, 1969, p. 253; FRUS, 1945, Vol. V, pp. 1229,
1233, 1266 and 1291-4; FRUS, 1946, Vol. II, p. 728; FRUS, 1946, Vol. VI., 
869-70 and 887-88.
122. FRUS, 1947, Vol. IV, 797-800.
123. FO 371/51019/U3354/29/73, 2-5-1945, minute by Dean, 30-4-1945.
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be taken.124
As a result of the reluctance of the Italians to cooperate and the American 
policy of ‘stalling’ on war crimes issues the British government found itself in 
an acute dilemma. Beaumont stated it in the following stark terms, that ‘justice 
requires the handing over of these people,.... expediency mitigates against it 
or at least against the handing over of some highly placed ones after such a 
long lapse of time’.125 Although the WCS was not prepared to assess the 
degree of expediency itself and despite the fact that the Western Department 
maintained that according to the Armistice terms the responsibility of SACMED 
to expedite ‘hand-overs’ was unequivocal and clear, the Foreign Office began 
to rethink its policy.
III. War Crimes Punishment, Postwar Stability and the Emergence of
the Cold War
Britain now sought a policy that would ensure that promises given in the past 
could be kept, but would be flexible enough to accommodate many more 
factors and considerations. These included the state of Anglo-ltalian relations; 
the need to thwart attempts by Moscow and the PCI to capitalize on the 
identification of prominent officers of the Italian military establishment as
124. FO 371 /57520/U5833/70/73, 4-6-1946, telegram, no. 461, Broad to 
FO, 3-3-1946; minute by Beaumont, 6-6-1946; letter, Sir Robert Craigie, the 
new chairman of the UNWCC, the retired pre-war Ambassador to Japan who 
replaced Finlay after the latter’s death, 3-5-1945; minute by Scott-Fox, 18-5- 
1946; ibid., U4353/70/73, 23-3-1946, telegram, no. 591, FO to Broad, 11-5- 
1946; letter, Bradshaw to Beaumont, 25-4-1946; top secret, important, 
telegram, no. 55502, WO to AFHQ, 19-4-1946; minutes, by Scott-Fox, 1-5- 
1946, 3-5-1946, 25-4-1945 and 10-5-1946, Newton, 2-5-1946, 6-5-1946 and
29-4-1946, Beckett, 29-4-1946, Colville, 30-4-1946, Sargent, 10-5-1946, Ross,
30-4-1946; telegram, no. 4048, FO to Washington, 1-5-1946.
125. FO 371/57519/U3031/70/73, 20-3-1946, minute by Beaumont, 21-
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common war criminals; the tangible deterioration in Anglo-Yugoslav relations; 
the urgency to speak in unison with America; and finally, genuine growing 
concern about fair trials. In view of this the Foreign Office sought the opinion 
of Sir Noel Charles, the British Ambassador to Italy, on the impact that the 
surrender of war criminals would have on Italian political stability in general and 
on Anglo-ltalian relations in particular. Charles urged caution and stated that 
in his opinion Britain would be better off if the Italian government had the 
responsibility of settling the matter directly with Yugoslavia.126 He advised also 
that in the event of extraditions, Britain should make sure that the process was 
seen as a joint Allied decision and not just a British one, so that any odium 
would be borne equally. He recommended that the CCS would have to 
implement such decisions and not the SACMED which was seen by the Italians 
as a British Command. The CCS was a joint Anglo-American institution and 
thus any resentment provoked by a CCS directive in Italy or Yugoslavia would 
be borne equally by the British and the US.127
The recommendations from Rome led the Foreign Office to the inescapable 
conclusion that any implementation of a hand-over policy would have to come 
from the CCS.128 This did not mean that Britain was prepared to bury the issue
126. FO 371/57519/U3483/70/73, 1-4-1946, telegram, no. 480, Charles 
to FO, 30-3-1946; important, letter, FO to Bradshaw, 11-4-1946.
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as yet.129 The WCS expressed the hope that the CCS would find a solution that 
did not depart from justice and that would not call into question the validity of 
the UNWCC lists.130 Whilst the WCS was rethinking policy, Anglo-Yugoslav 
relations were deteriorating rapidly. The Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee (JIC) 
concluded that the Yugoslavs had embarked on a war of nerves and that their 
external policy was ‘guided and encouraged’ by the Soviet Union.131 Although, 
Bevin and the higher echelons of the Foreign Office did not disagree with the 
assessment, they wanted to reverse this trend and they identified the issue of 
the hand over of war criminals and displaced persons as the main obstacles 
to accomplishing it.132 In fact, Britain did not change its standing orders to the 
Theatre Commanders and Bevin, in a letter to the Undersecretary of the War 
Office on 16 March 1946 stated that in his opinion, when an Allied 
government’s representative submitted a request to a British Commander for 
the surrender of a war criminal on a UNWCC list, then the ‘war criminal’ should 
be surrendered forthwith.133
Matters, however, were exacerbated by reports which highlighted the 
inhumane behaviour shown by the Yugoslavs, not only against Italian and
129. FO 371/57519/U3031/70/73, 20-3-1946, minutes by Beaumont,
21-3-1946, Beckett, 22-3-1946, Ross, 25-3-1946; telegram, no. 273, Broad to 
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German POWs, but also against their own dissidents and civilian population
during the war. In this light the partisans, once viewed as valiant resistance
fighters, came to be seen as brutal communists. This was a new understanding
of what had occurred in the Balkan theatre of war and it made British
judgements of the actions of some of the alleged war criminals less harsh.
Even General Roatta’s actions, looked at from this perspective, became
comprehensible:
[From] the subsequent behaviour of the Yugoslavs one cannot, 
however, help feeling that General Roatta may have had good 
reason for a rather strict reign, if not harsh, application of the 
international laws of war particularly against armed civilians, 
snipers etc.134
There was also the issue of fair trials. The Foreign Office had always hoped to 
ensure that the extradited Italians would face a fair trial.135 By this time, 
however, some of the excesses and arbitrariness of Yugoslav justice had 
become public and had shocked many in the Foreign Office, especially those 
at the Yugoslav desk of the Southern Department. The WCS tried to find a way 
of ensuring that persons arrested by the British military in Italy and handed 
over to Yugoslavia would get a fair trial. It asked the Yugoslav authorities to 
allow the British access to all interrogation reports and to allow the presence 
of an observer from the Mediterranean Command at the trials. A similar 
precedent had been created by the US in the case of the Czech war criminal, 
Franck. However, this raised the prospect of playing into Yugoslav and 
Russian hands by giving them the opportunity to present British efforts as
134. FO 371/57520/U4331/70/73, 23-4-1946, minutes by Beaumont, 24-
4-1946 and Scott-Fox, 26-4-1946; telegram, no. 337, Broad to FO, 20-4-1946; 
ibid., U5666/70/73, 29-5-1946, minute by Margaret Carlyle, Foreign Office, 
Research Department, (FORD), 13-6-1946.
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being motivated by a desire to shield Italian war criminals, so the suggestion 
was dropped.136
Parliamentary pressure in the opening months of 1946 was less intense than 
it had been in 1945. This was partly because of the lack of sympathy for the 
Yugoslavs in general public opinion.137 It was also due to the fact that the 
government had found the means of keeping embarrassing parliamentary 
questions at bay. MPs were either persuaded to withdraw their questions 
through informal means or, if they were insistent, were given details of British 
war crimes policy in private138 thus, guaranteeing their silence.139 The majority 
of Labour MPs, faced with the prospect of embarrassing their government by 
asking questions in favour of a country that was showing open hostility towards 
Britain, waived their questions. The MPs who continued asking awkward 
questions were those deemed to be recalcitrant troublemakers, confined to the 
backbenches. The Conservatives had not shown any lasting interest in the 
matter either. Thus, the government had a free hand on the issue and sought 
to find a way to ‘shuffle out’ of direct responsibility on extraditions and to 
regulate war crimes issues by including a war crimes clause in the Italian
136. Ibid.
137. Lane, Britain, the Cold War and Yugoslav Unity, pp. 97-8.
138. FO 371/57555/U2568/126/73, 7-3-1946, secret, letter, Savill to 
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Peace Treaty. But, even this was not to be a straightforward endeavour.140
During this period, the postwar Italian state had begun showing signs of 
asserting its newly found but as yet fragile sovereignty and was in the process 
of trying to achieve international rehabilitation. The prospect of the extradition 
of some of its citizens to a neighbouring state which entertained territorial 
ambitions vis-ii-vis Italy was not a welcome one. It was seen as an infringement 
of both Italian sovereignty and law. Rome decided to intervene in order to put 
a stop to all talk of extraditions and to convince Britain and America that a war 
crimes clause should not be included in the Italian Peace Treaty.141 The De 
Gasperi government attempted to establish the principle that Italy could not be 
prosecuted for war crimes against peace. It based this claim on two facts. 
Firstly, Italy had not been mentioned in the Moscow Declaration and therefore 
the Declaration did not apply to Italian War Criminals but only to German 
ones.142 Secondly, the fascist protagonists who had instigated the 1940 war 
had been dealt with already either by the partisans or, in the case of the 
surviving ones such as Graziani and Roatta, by the Italian Courts. As far as 
crimes against humanity were concerned, the Italian government maintained 
that Italy had not committed any. Accordingly, the only crimes the Italian 
government was prepared to concede that Italians had committed were war 
crimes connected with the violation of the rules and customs of war.143
140. FO 371 /57555/U2568/126/73, 7-3-1946, secret, letter, Savill to 
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De Gasperi’s argument was rather weak because the issue of Italian war 
criminality and the apprehension of Italian war criminals did not derive 
legitimacy from the Moscow Declaration, but from article 29 of the Armistice 
Agreement. Italy’s claims that its nationals had not committed crimes against 
humanity did not cut much ice with the Foreign Office.144 The War Crimes 
Section, the Western Department and W. E. Beckett, the Foreign Office’s 
Legal Advisor all agreed that the Italian case, as had been put forward by De 
Gasperi and Count Roberti, the Minister at the Italian Embassy in London, 
would be unacceptable to all the Allies and that it ran counter to established 
practice.145
The De Gasperi government however had established a close rapport with 
both the American Embassy and the American military authorities in Italy who 
appeared to be very receptive to its line of argument.146 De Gasperi put his 
case first to Admiral Ellery Stone whom he saw as the person most likely to 
champion his cause without wavering. He played up to American fears of the 
political repercussions that the extradition of Italian nationals to an ‘enemy’ 
state such as Yugoslavia would have on the internal situation in Italy. He also 
maintained that the Yugoslav judicial system could give ‘no guarantee 
whatsoever of compliance with the most elementary principles of justice’.147 
The Italian government then attempted to establish the jurisdiction of Italian
144. FO 371 /57556/U5984/126/73, 19-6-1946, minutes by Beaumont, 
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145. Ibid.
146. FO 371/57519/U3691/70/73, 6-4-1946, telegram, no. 338, Broad to 
FO, 5-4-1946; Miller, op. cit., p. 73; Ellwood, op. cit., 155-6.
147. FO 371/57520/U4331/70/73, 23-4-1946, minutes by Beaumont, 
24-4-1946, and Scott-Fox, 26-4-1946; telegram, no. 377, Broad to FO,
20-4-1946.
57
courts to try Italian war criminals. To make its case stronger the Italian 
government announced in May 1946 that the Italian Ministry of War had 
commenced its own investigations into the activities of the Italian Army in 
occupied territories, in order to punish those who were proven to be guilty of 
war crimes.148 Courts would be set up to try these war criminals.149 De Gasperi 
also promised Ellery Stone and Philip Broad, the British Political Advisor at the 
AFHQ, that the results of these investigations would be communicated to the 
Allied Commission as soon as they had been completed.150 The only point the 
Italians were prepared to concede voluntarily was that other states trying Italian 
war criminals should be limited to those cases where the accused men were 
already in the hands of the requesting state concerned.151 Italy, once again had 
made it abundantly clear that it would not collaborate willingly with any attempts 
to extradite its citizens to face trial in Yugoslavia or any other country for that 
matter.152
Thus it was, that one of the thorniest and most complex matters in the issue of 
implementing war crimes punishment - that of undertaking successful 
prosecutions and extraditions of war criminals who were nationals residing in
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a sovereign state - came to the fore.153 It was apparent that such people could 
only extradited by coercing an unwilling Italian government. SACMED warned, 
however, that the use of coercion on the Italian government to extradite officers 
of the Italian Army, some of who had rendered ‘valuable service’ to the Allies 
in the war against Germany and who were working very closely with the Allies 
on re-organising the new Italian Army, would harm the relations of Britain and 
the United States with the Italian government and that it would provoke such 
hostility in Italian public opinion that it would impede the stabilisation of the 
country.154 To give extra weight to his argument, he listed the names and rank 
of the most controversial cases. General Berardi, the Chief of Staff of the 
Italian Army until the capture of Rome, the Commander-in Chief of Sicily and 
now the Chairman of the Army re-organisation committee; General Pelligra, the 
Quartermaster General of the Italian Army since 1943 and General Orlando, 
the Commander of the Carabinieri Corps in Rome. He continued with Generals 
Cerutti, Rittan and Zatti who all held appointments at the three headquarters 
of the Italian Army Commands.155 Broad, also expressed his doubts about the 
advisability of forcing the Italian government to arrest and extradite Generals
153. FO 371/57519/U3691/70/73, 6-4-1946, Broad to FO, 5-4-1946.
154. FO 371/57520/U6159/70,73, 1-7-1946, telegram, no. 521, Broad, to
FO, 28-6-1945; FO 371/57523/U7877/70/73, 29-10-1946, letter, McNeil, 
Minister of State, FO to Captain J.W. Snow, House of Commons, 30-10-1946; 
draft minute to the Minister of State, 13-10-1946. In his eagerness to convince 
the CCS that these people should not be touched, Morgan, sent a letter to the 
State Department in which he claimed that some of these people were under 
consideration to receive military decorations from the British Government for 
their war-time services. SACMED’s emotive pleas were received with disbelief 
and anger at the Foreign Office. The idea that any of these Generals would be 
considered for decoration was openly laughed at. The War Crimes Section 
and other departments which were involved felt that SACMED’s arguments 
were not convincing nor adequate to justify a refusal of the Yugoslav request. 
There was also concern that the argument of not extraditing war criminals 
because they had co-operated and were still working together with the Allies 
was bound to create bitterness and hostility in Yugoslavia and was unlikely to 
gain the respect of Italians.
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on the Italian Army’s active list.156
Such factors, combined with the need to preserve Britain’s traditional interests 
in the area, led British statesmen to rethink their policy of hand-overs and to fall 
in with American line of postponing Allied responsibility for the apprehension 
of Italian war criminals to some future date after the signing of the Italian Peace 
Treaty.157 The new situation and its impact on war crimes policy was to become 
apparent during the Paris meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) 
in spring and summer 1946 at which discussions took place on the contents of 
the war crimes clause in the Italian Peace Treaty.
At these meetings of the CFM, East-West relations had become more 
obviously strained. The marked deterioration in any desire for co-operation was 
all too apparent. The adoption of the policy of containment by the United States 
had instilled a high degree of rigidity and intransigence in its behaviour towards 
the Soviet Union and although the Americans had not as yet given up on 
cooperation, they were determined not to make any substantial concessions
156. FO 371/57519/U3691/70/73, 6-4-1946, Broad to FO, 5-4-1946.
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to the Soviets.158 The drafting of a war crimes clause for the Italian Peace 
Treaty led to recriminations and discord. When the Council of Foreign Ministers 
met on 2 May 1946, Vyacheslav M. Molotov, Soviet Foreign Commissar, was 
at his most scathing, Bevin at his most ill-tempered, and James F. Byrnes, the 
American Secretary of State, offered solutions that failed to please anyone.159 
Both East and West proclaimed that they were in agreement, at least in 
principle, that Italy should co-operate with the UN in the apprehension, 
surrender and punishment of war criminals. However, there were profound 
differences on the wording of such a clause and these mirrored the different 
priorities and policy aims of each of the Powers vis-a-vis Italy. The Soviets, 
who were the champions of the Yugoslav cause in this instance and who were 
not hindered by considerations of the fate of high-ranking Italian officers, 
proposed a blunt and straightforward draft clause which imposed on Italy the 
obligation to surrender all alleged war criminals requested by an Allied or 
Associated power.160 The American, British and French proposals, in contrast, 
were more subtle and provided for the creation of an international screening
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body to assess the individual merits of Yugoslav requests.161 These proposals 
were intended to maintain stability in Italy and to protect it from the most 
extravagant Yugoslav claims. The Americans, in fact, were not entirely 
convinced that the inclusion of a war crimes in the Italian Peace Treaty was 
either necessary or desirable at all and that perhaps a protocol rather than a 
clause should be drawn up to include provisions for war criminals and thereby 
for the issue to be settled independently of the Peace Treaty. Both Bymes and 
his deputy James C. Dunn, maintained that the Peace Treaty was intended to 
regulate the future relations between Italy and the Allies and not to dwell on the 
past, thus it should contain only permanent provisions not temporary ones 
such as the punishment of war criminals.162
Byrnes’ proposals were met with open hostility by the Soviets and with private 
disquiet by the British and the French. Molotov characterised Byrnes’ 
proposals as being ‘undesirable’ and asserted that the omission of any 
provisions dealing with the apprehension of war criminals from the Italian 
Peace Treaty would create the impression that the Allied Powers ‘were 
granting amnesty to Italian war criminals still at large in Italy’.163 The 
atmosphere in the CFM became so antagonistic that it was decided to defer
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1946; FO 60703/ZM1435/1286/22, 1-5-1946, secret, CFM(D)(46) 46th 
meeting, item 3: War Criminals, US delegation proposal, CFM(D)(46)65 1-5- 
1946; FRUS, 1946, Vol. II, pp. 209-14.
163. FO 371/57659/U5686/4473/73, 29-5-1946, secret, CFM meeting,
28-5-1946; ibid., U4784/4473/73, 3-5-1946, secret, British record of CFM (46) 
7th meeting item 2, Italian Peace Treaty: War Criminals, 2-5-1946.
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the matter to a later date.164 The late May meeting appeared to be drawing 
towards another inconclusive end and one which could have been potentially 
harmful for East -West relations, when Bymes put some fresh proposals on the 
table.165 He went on to recommend that the screening machinery should have 
a fixed lifespan of twelve months during which period demands could be 
presented to the Italian Government for the extradition of war criminals. Such 
an arrangement, Byrnes, suggested, would in no way constitute an 
infringement of Italian sovereignty.166
The Soviets objected at once to the suggestion that such a screening body 
should be created at all. They maintained that their own proposals would deal 
adequately with the issue. To the disbelief of everyone present, they put 
themselves forward as the champions of Italian sovereignty by claiming that 
such a body would be inconsistent with the sovereignty of the Italian state. It 
was apparent that the Soviets, whilst pushing for Yugoslavia’s interests, were 
at the same time trying not to appear anti-Italian and thereby turning Italian 
public opinion against the PCI.167 After all, June 1946 was to be a critical time 
in Italy as elections for the Constituent Assembly and a referendum to decide 
the ‘institutional question’ were scheduled for 2 June. The adoption of this 
stance by the Soviets pushed the West into a defensive posture.168 Bevin’s 
deputy on the CFM, Gladwyn Jebb, appeared willing to accept the American
164. Ibid.; FO 371/60705/Z1855/1286/22, 1-6-1946, secret, CFM(D)(46) 
55th meeting, item 4, War Criminals, 28-5-1946.
165. Ibid.; FRUS, 1946, Vol. II, pp. 209-14.
166. Ibid.; FO 371/57659/U5686/4473/73, 29-5-1946, secret, CFM 
meeting, 28-5-1946.
167. FO 371 /57659/U4612/4473/73, 30-4-46, secret, CFM(D)(46)63, 
minute by Beaumont, 24-4-1946.
168. FO 371/60705/Z1855/1286/22, 1-6-1946, secret, CFM(D)(46) 55th 
meeting, item 4, War Criminals, 28-5-1946; FO 371/57659/U5686/4473/73, 29- 
5-1946, secret, CFM meeting, 28-5-1946.
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proposal so long as it contained strong enforcement provisions.169
The deputies’ meeting in Paris was inconclusive on the issue. Discord and 
non-cooperation were the order of the day. Nevertheless, what was significant 
as far as the West was concerned was that the Russians had succeeded in 
emerging as the champions of Italian sovereignty, whilst the West, which had 
set out to protect Italy, had succeeded only ‘in scoring an own goal’.170 
Attempts were made to rectify this situation and Gladwyn Jebb and Dunn were 
entrusted with the task of countering the claims advanced by Molotov’s deputy 
Andrei Vyshinski. The two maintained that, in view of Italy’s complex situation, 
Byrnes’ proposals for the establishment of a screening body was a strong and 
convincing one and that it did not constitute an infringement of Italian 
sovereignty.171
Vyshinski held his ground stubbornly. He embarked on a pro-Italian tirade,
169. FO 60703/ZM1435/1286/22, 1-5-1946, secret, CFM(D)(46) 46th 
meeting, item 3: War Criminals, US delegation proposal, CFM(D)(46)65, 1-5- 
1946.
17°. FO 371 /60706/Z1855/1286/22, 1-6-1946, secret, CFM(D)(46) 55th 
meeting, item 4, War Criminals, 28-5-1946; FO 371/57659/U5686/4473/73, 29-
5-1946, secret, CFM meeting, 28-5-1946. Jebb and Dunn produced lengthy 
and intricate explanations to underpin the creation of the screening authority. 
They claimed that it would deal with requests made from several governments 
for the same war criminal, it would consider whether the requests were 
genuine and it would monitor cases to ensure that criminals were brought to 
justice in the proper manner. In addition to these functions, the body could be 
used as a means to apply pressure on the Italian Government to ensure its co­
operation in obtaining the custody of certain war criminals.
171. Ibid.; FO 371/57659/U5767/4473/73, 31-5-1946, secret,
CFM(D)(46) 46th meeting, 1-5-1946. Jebb also replied to Soviet accusations 
by pointing out that their relative ease in dealing with war crimes in the 
Balkans and Eastern Europe lay in the fact that their position was substantially 
different to that of Italy which had been an Axis Power. This made Italy 
distinctly different from the ex-enemies countries. The ex-enemies had been 
involved in war with but one or two countries and this made the situation 
infinitely less complicated than that of Italy which had been involved in war 
with all the UN powers.
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claiming that after the signature of the Peace Treaty, the paramount authority 
in Italy ought to be the Italian government which being a democratic 
government could be trusted to deal faithfully with the problem. To put a 
committee over it would be ‘unfair* he concluded. In this atmosphere of 
recrimination, counter-recrimination and shifting arguments, Dunn and Jebb 
refused to compromise on the issue of a screening body even after Vyshinski 
declared that the first paragraph of the United States’ proposal was acceptable 
to him but that he still objected to the screening body. Thus, another impasse 
had been reached.172
Despite the public solidarity they maintained with the United States, London 
and Paris voiced their private doubts about the Byrnes proposals. France, in 
addition, was unhappy with the idea of dropping the issue of the punishment 
of war criminals from the Peace Treaty altogether and it was unwilling to see 
Italy free from the obligation of apprehending and surrendering war criminals 
after the signing of the Peace Treaty.173 The British also regarded Byrnes’ 
proposals as being unviable. Their main concern was that the proposals would 
create much bitterness in Yugoslavia and would give Belgrade the means to 
block the signing of the Treaty indefinitely. At this stage, Britain determined 
that it should not be drawn into the role of a referee in any disputes that could 
arise from Yugoslav requests and it was, moreover, concerned to extricate 
itself from having to enforce any of the provisions unilaterally. The War Crimes 
Section maintained that after the signing of the Peace Treaty, Britain’s priority
172. Ibid.
173. FO 371/57659/U5780/4473/73, 31-5-1946, immediate, secret, 
telegram, no. 276, Cooper to FO, 31-5-1946, 30-5-1946;
FO 371/57521/U7950/70/73, 1-11-1946, minutes of ACI’s 58th meeting, item: 
War Criminals, 25-10-1946.
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should be ‘to drop out of the picture as regards to the Yugoslav claims’.174
There ensued a flurry of activity in the Foreign Office to draft a new proposal 
that would ensure that a war crimes clause was incorporated in the Italian 
Peace Treaty but, at the same time, one that did not contain stronger terms 
than those included in the Armistice and one that did not entail any 
enforcement provisions that could draw Britain into the position of playing the 
adjudicator. The WCS drafted its own proposal which was rather innocuous 
and read:
on the request of any United Nations Government, the Italian 
Government will apprehend and surrender for trial or make 
available as witness, Italian subjects or nationals of states at 
war with the United Nations designated by the UNWCC or by 
the International Military Tribunal established by an agreement 
signed at London in London on 8 August 1945.175
At the 3 June meeting of the CFM, the United States accepted the long-held 
British position that the Peace Treaty should contain a war crimes clause and 
that applications for surrender should be made within 90 days through the 
UNWCC. The Soviets were still not ready to agree. The sticking point, now, 
was the reference to the UNWCC whose authority the Soviet Union did not 
recognise.176 This meant that the CFM failed to reach any consensus on the
174. FO 371 /57659/U5686/4473/73, 29-5-1946, minutes by Scott-Fox, 
25-5-1946 and Newton, 27-5-1946; letter, Scott-Fox to Bradshaw,
29-5-1946; ibid., U7090/4473/73, 11-9-1946, minutes by Scott-Fox, 29-8-1946 
and Cope, 30-8-1946.
175. FO 371/57659/U5781/4473/73, 31-5-1946, immediate, letter, 
Beaumont to Hood, 14-6-1946; minutes by Beaumont, 31-5-1946 and Beckett, 
4-6-1946; FO 371/60607/ZM1908/1286/22, 5-6-1946, secret, UK proposal, 
CFM(D)(46)108, 1-6-1946; ibid., ZM2264/1286/22, 27-6-1946, secret, Soviet 
proposal, for article 38, CFM(D)(46)145, 25-6-1946; ibid., ZM2265/1286/22, 
27-6-1946, secret, US proposal, CFM(D)(46)153, 26-6-1946.
176. FO 371/60607/ZM1950/1286/22, 11-6-1946, secret, CFM(D)(46) 
61st meeting, 3-6-1946; FO 371/60606/ZM1855/1286/22, 11-6-1946, secret, 
CFM(D)(46) 55th, meeting, item 4, 28-5-1948.
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matter.177 The issue was finally settled at the 26 June meeting where the text 
of the war crimes clause to be inserted in the main body of the text of the Draft 
Treaty with Italy was agreed.178 The Paris Peace Conference upheld the 
decision and article 45 of the Peace Treaty with Italy obliged Italy to take all 
necessary steps to ensure the apprehension and surrender for trial of alleged 
Italian war criminals.179
Any lingering concerns the British had about any Yugoslav reaction paled into 
insignificance when it became apparent that the terms of the Peace Treaty had 
come as a shock to the Italians who had hoped that co-belligerency would 
bring them redemption.180 Misgivings were articulated in Italy on the direction 
of the country’s foreign policy and comments were made that perhaps Italy 
should have ‘played up to the Soviets more’. Riots and violence against allied 
troops occurred amid wild talk that Italy would refuse to sign the Peace 
Treaty.181 Noel Charles believed that if, at this juncture, the decision was taken 
to hand over Italian nationals to Yugoslavia, then it would only be to the
177. Ibid.; FO 371/57569/U5939/4473/73, 14-6-1946, CFM(46)(D) 6th 
meeting, British record, item 1, Italian Peace Treaty: War Criminals, 3-6-1946; 
FO 371 /60708/ZM2084/1286/22, 18-6-1946, secret, Draft Peace Treaty with 
Italy: article 38, CFM(D)(46)177, 13-6-1946; FO 371/60710/ZM2201/1286/22, 
25-6-1946, secret, CFM(D)(46) 79th meeting, 22-6-1946; ibid.,
ZM2254/1286/22, 27-6-1946, secret, item 8, article 38, CFM(D)(46) 81st 
meeting, 25-6-1946.
178. FO 57659/U6170/4473/73, letter Cope, UK delegation, Paris, to 
Scott-Fox, 1-7-1946.
179. FO 371 /60710/ZM2276/1286/22, 1-7-1946, secret, CFM(D)(46)
83rd meeting, 26-6-1946; for the text of article 45 see Wheeler-Bennett, Sir J., 
and Nicholls, A., The Semblance of Peace: The Political Settlement after the 
Second World War, London, 1972, p. 671.
180. FO 371/57521/U6241/70/73, 8-7-1946, secret, telegram, no. 1044, 
Charles to FO, 6-7-1946; FO 371/60711/ZM2641/1286/22, 1-8-1946, telegram, 
no. 243, Charles to FO, 1-8-1946.
181. FO 371/60711/ZM2574/1286/22, 25-7-1946, restricted, telegram, 
no. FX69302, AFHQ to COS, 17-7-1946.
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detriment of Anglo-ltalian relations and that only the PCI and the USSR would 
benefit.182 He also reported that most Italian dissatisfaction with the Peace 
Treaty focused on Britain and that its popularity in Italy ‘had hit a record low’ 
because Britain had proved to be ‘too cool and impartial for this most feminine 
people’.183 Charles’ intervention focused minds in the Foreign Office and 
helped them to the conclusion, once again, that Italian political stability and the 
state of Anglo-ltalian relations took precedence over any other consideration.184
On 8 July 1946, SACMED was informed by the War Office that the United 
States and the British governments had agreed that the question of the 
apprehension and surrender of Italian War Criminals should be referred back 
to the CCS for further scrutiny. This was despite the fact that Britain was 
convinced that most of the Italian claims and assumptions lay in the grey area 
of legality.185 At the same time it was intimated that policy was becoming 
orientated towards letting the matter be settled by direct negotiations between 
the Italian and Yugoslav governments.186
182. FO 371/60710/ZM2276/1286/22, 1-7-1946, secret, CFM(D)(46) 
83rd meeting, 26-6-1946.
183. FO 371/60711/ZM2371/1286/22, 8-7-1946, telegram, no. 1051, 
Charles to FO, 6-7-1946; ibid., ZM2514/1286/22, 18-7-1946, confidential, 
despatch, no. 369, Charles to Bevin, 18-7-1946; minutes by Ross, 19-7-1946 
and 24-7-1946 and Hoyer-Millar, 19-7-1946.
184. Ibid., ZM2692/1286/22, 7-8-1946, minute by Ross, 24-7-1946.
185. FO 371 /57556/U5984/126/73, 19-6-1946, minutes by Beaumont, 
24-6-1946, Beckett, 26-6-1946, Ross, 28-6-1946, Garner, 16-6-1946; letter, 
Scott-Fox to Viscount Hood, 1-7-1946; letter, Hood to Scott-Fox, 8-7-1946. 
Beckett pointed out that the Armistice provisions which provided for the hand­
over of Italian War Criminals took precedence over the general principles of 
international law and that Italy would have to abide by the Armistice terms ex 
hypothesi.
,8e. FO 371/57520/U6159/70/73, 1-7-1946, telegram, no. 6786, FO to 
Washington, 10-7-1946; FO 371/57523/U7877/71/73, 29-10-1946, letter, 
McNeil to J.W. Snow, MP, 30-10-1946; FO 371/57520/U6159/70/73, 1-7-1946, 
top secret, telegram, NAF 1165, Morgan to CCS, 26-6-1946.
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In September 1946, the Italians finally announced that their own Commission 
of Inquiry had considered carefully the personnel records of Italian Army 
Officers who had served in occupied Europe and had decided to prosecute 
those who had ‘infringed the principles of the international laws of war and the 
dictates of humane feeling and in particular the principles of the inviolability of 
hostages and of the limitation of the right of reprisal’.187 The names of forty 
military officers and high-ranking fascist civilians on war crimes charges were 
duly identified by the Commission which asked the Italian Ministry of War to 
submit the facts surrounding the crimes of these people to the Italian 
judiciary.188 It was an attempt by the Italian government to gain the initiative on 
the issue, to silence communist jibes that it was not doing enough in this field 
and above all, to protect Italian sovereignty by resisting the extradition and trial 
of its nationals in courts outside its jurisdiction.189
The chances for such a scheme working were not good. The Italian state’s own 
programme of prosecutions against fascists had stalled at the end of 1945 with 
the issuing of the Togliatti Amnesty Decree. The Italian government was trying 
to lay to rest the ghosts of the past and not to continue with trials that gave free 
propaganda to the PCI and which could undermine the process of national
187. FO 371 /57566/U7192/126/73, 17-9-1946, letter, Rome to WCS,
10-9-1946; NARA RG 84, Decimal Files, 711.5-711.6, Box: 108, restricted, 
airgram, A-1005, Key to the Secretary of State, 25-10-1946.
188. FO 371/57566/U7437/126/73, 7-10-1946, letter, British Embassy, 
Rome to WCS, 27-9-1946; NARA RG 84, Decimal Files, 711.5-711.6, Box: 
108, letter, Key to Secretary of State, 25-9-1946.
189. FO 371/57556/U7437/126/73, 7-10-1946, letter, Rome to WCS, 
27-9-1946.
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reconciliation.190 Even if the State had been willing to proceed with such a 
programme, Italian judges, the least purged Italian institution because of the 
myth of the neutrality of public administration, had not indicated any proclivity 
for the matter.191 Italian prisons were already overcrowded and there was a 
reluctance to convict yet more people.192
A settlement which would allow Italy to deal directly with Yugoslavian requests 
was not without its practical complications. Yugoslavia was not properly 
equipped to deal directly with Italy because it had no formal representation in 
Rome.193 Britain was worried that the Yugoslavs and Italians would try to exploit 
this absence of direct contact and drag the British authorities into acting as 
their channel of communication. The British government was determined not 
to be placed in this position.194 The Americans, too, were concerned that both
190. Ferraresi, F., Threats to Democracy: The Radical Right in Italy after 
the War, Princeton, 1996, p. 20; Domenico, op. cit., pp. 207-8; Gambino, op. 
cit., pp. 253-6; Battaglia, A., Died anni dopo: Saggi sulla vita democratica 
italiana, Rome 1955, pp. 347-8; Algardi, Z., Processi ai fascisti: Anfuso,
Caruso, Graziani e Borghese di fronte alia giustizia, Firenze, 1958, pp. 18-9; 
Mercuri, L., L’epurazione in Italia, 1943-1948, Cuneo, 1988, p. 185; Mercuri,
L., ‘II primo governo De Gasperi e il problema dell’epurazione’, pp. 129-44; 
Bocca, G., Palmiro Togliatti, Bari, 1977, pp. 458-59.
191. Ibid., pp. 210-212; Ferraresi, op. cit., pp. 18-19; Battaglia, A., I 
Giudici e la politica, Bari, 1962, pp. 90-4; Canosa, R., and Federico, P., La 
magistratura in Italian dal 1945 a oggi, Bologna, 1974, pp. 130-1; Pavone, C., 
La continuity dello Stato: Istituzioni e uomini, Torino, 1974, pp. 252.
192. FO 371/57566/U7363, 1-10-46, minute by Ross, 1-10-1946;
NARA RG 84, Decimal Files, 711.5-711.6, Box: 108, secret, CHQ.CMF to 
AFHQ, 25-10-1946.
193. FO 371/57521/U7911/70/73, 31-10-1946, minute by Garner, 31-10-
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194. Ibid., letter, Ward, Rome to Dr. S.J. Smodlaka, Yugoslav 
Delegation to Allied Control Council, 23-10-1946; ibid., U7678/70/73, 18-10- 
1946, minutes by Garner, (undated) and Ross, 25-10-1946; letter, Bevin to the 
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Political Advisor, AFHQ to Rome, 16-10-1946; ibid., U7950/70/73, 1-11-1946, 
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1946.
70
countries would try to drag in the Armistice Powers, but they could see no other 
option than to inform Yugoslavia that it should take up the issue of extraditions 
directly with the Italians.195 The only way forward was to establish Yugoslavian 
relations with Italy.196 The Foreign Office was also concerned over the 
possibility that Yugoslavia might have solid grounds to reject the legality of any 
of these schemes. The fact was that the Revised Armistice Terms were still 
operational and would continue to be so until the Peace Treaty was formally 
ratified by the Italian government.197 The Americans, however, did not seem 
bothered by this. For them, the provisions of the 1943 Armistice had been 
superseded by events. This was so partly, because they had come to the 
conclusion that the legal status of Italy had changed de facto from the moment 
the AMG, regime had been abolished, and also because from the moment 
Yugoslav fighters had shot down two American C-47 transport planes in 
August they had begun treating Yugoslavia as a pariah state.198
A perceptible hardening of the British position also became abundantly clear 
in early August 1946 when Zivkovic launched his final assault at the UNWCC.
195. Ibid., U6459/70/73, 26-7-1946, minutes, by Garner, Ross and 
Scott-Fox, 26-7-1946; telegram, no. 4758, Lord Inverchapel, British 
Ambassador to the United States to FO, 25-7-1946; telegram, no. 7538, FO to 
Washington, 1-8-1946; telegram, no. 4903, Inverchapel to FO; NARA RG 59, 
E. 381, Lot Files, 54D238, Folder: War Criminals, confidential, memorandum, 
October 1946.
196. Ibid.
197. FO/371/57520/U5409/70/73, immediate, letter, WCS to British 
Embassy, Washington, 28-6-1946; NARA RG 59, Lot Files, 54D328, E381, 
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His aim was to put pressure on Britain and simultaneously to publicise 
Yugoslavia’s powerlessness in laying its hands on any of the listed Italians. 
Zivkovic outlined Yugoslav complaints to Sir Robert Craigie, the chairman of 
the UNWCC but eagerly accepted Craigie’s offer of a list of the names of the 
‘worst’ war criminals and whose cases did not imply any political 
considerations.199 The result was a new list of twenty-two alleged Italian war 
criminals whom the Yugoslav Government was extremely anxious to ‘bring to 
book’.200
This list was further reduced by Colonel H. H. Wade, the UNWCC Research 
Officer, to seven cases. The seven had been selected by Colonel Wade 
because specific charges had been brought against them which included 
brutality and a deliberate liquidation of civilian populations. Among the worst 
cases featured the names of General Pirzio Tucci the GOC of the notorious 
‘Messina’ Division, General Roatta, General Orlando, the GOC of the 
‘Sardegna’ Division, and Generals Macario and Berardi who were currently 
actually in command of troops.201 When Craigie presented his report to the War 
Crimes Section, he stated clearly that there was no justification for protecting 
these seven ‘irrespectively of what sort of trial they were likely to get’ and any 
fate Yugoslav justice had in store for them.202 The UNWCC also went on to 
declare that a refusal to surrender these seven Generals, in view of the serious 
nature of the charges against them, would expose the whole mechanism for
1" .  FO 371/57522/U6561 /71 /73, 6-8-46, letter, Zivkovic to Craigie, 
23-7-1946.
20°. Ibid., letter, Craigie to Zivkovic, 31-7-1946
201. FO 371/57523/U7435/71/73, 7-10- 1946, top secret, CCS 705/19, 
Appendix “B”, Enclosure “B”, 20-9-1946.
202. Ibid., memorandum drafted by Colonel Wade, Research Officer, 
UNWCC, 6-8-46.
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punishing war criminals to serious criticism and even condemnation.203
By contrast, the WCS, did not focus on the charges against the seven, but on 
the fact that they had occupied and were still occupying high ranking positions 
in the Italian military hierarchy.204 The Foreign Office accepted that the seven 
Generals fell into the categories of persons who would normally be handed 
over to Allied nations but decided that to apprehend and surrender such people 
would cause severe embarrassment to the Allied Authorities and give rise to
203. Ibid.; FO 371/57523/U7435/71/73, 7 October 1946, Enclosure “C”: 
Discussion, 20-9-1946. The UNWCC had stressed that they were meticulous 
in their listings and had gone on to explain their procedures. All cases were 
submitted to Committee I for examination. If the Committee was not totally 
satisfied that there was sufficient evidence to justify a prosecution or that the 
evidence constituted a prima facie case, the case was rejected or it was 
adjourned until such evidence was submitted. To strengthen their argument 
the UNWCC revealed that so far they had rejected in whole or in part, 77 
cases submitted by Yugoslavia and that they had adjourned 29 cases.
204. Ibid., minute by Garner, 10-8-1946 and Colville, 12-8-1946.
General Orlando’s case raised, understandably, the most important objections. 
Garner explained that it would be 'quite impracticable’ for the British 
government to force the Italian Government to extradite a man of Orlando’s 
seniority, ‘who had been appointed as a Minister of War by the Armistice 
Powers in 1943 and who currently commanded a Carabinieri Corps in 
Rome’.He was also quick to point out that similar considerations applied to the 
other names contained on Wade’s list. Colville, similarly, advised that it would 
be ‘politically most inexpedient’ to try to make the Italians hand over men such 
as Orlando.
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resentment by the Italians.205 The answer, again, was to impress on the 
Italians the necessity to get on with it, take the initiative themselves and ‘steal 
the Yugoslav thunder1.206
This approach did not meet with the approval of the UNWCC which was clearly 
appalled at the prospect of seeing these most guilty of men evade justice. 
However, the uppermost concern for the British government now was to wash 
its hands of the matter of the punishment of alleged Italian war criminals and 
thus, it was not prepared to be swayed.207 It knew that the pleas of the UNWCC 
would fall on deaf ears, since the Americans would not support extraditions and 
that the Italians would not co-operate.208 The Allied authorities in Italy were 
instructed by the CCS not to handle any of the Yugoslav requests. They were 
to inform the Yugoslavs that they should take up the matter directly with the 
Italian government and that they would have to put their requests for surrender 
to a panel made up of prominent Italians. Where disagreements arose or if the 
panel raised objections to the surrender of a person, the Yugoslavs could
205. FO 371 /57523/U7435/71/73, 7-10-1946, Appendix “B”, 20-9-1946; 
United Nations War Crimes Commission, Law Reports of Trials of War 
Criminals, Vol. 4, London, 1948, pp. 1-95, passim. The possibility that these 
men were listed as war criminals because of their position as commanding 
officers of troops who had committed war crimes and not because of any 
personal responsibility, was not deemed to be irregular or unprecedented. In 
fact, the Yamashita and Hamma cases that the United States tried in the Far 
East, had created the precedent that ‘a General who failed to control troops 
under his command may be charged as a war criminal because of that failure’. 
In the case of the Yugoslav Government, some of the claims against offences 
of this type had been corroborated in reports by the Office of Strategic 
Services (OSS). The case of General Orlando did not fall into this category. He 
had been charged, not because he had failed to control his troops, but 
because he had ordered his troops to kill immediately, on the spot, all 
hostages with the exception of the wounded, women and men under 18 years 
who should be handed over to prescribed tribunals
206. Ibid., minutes by Garner, 13-8-1946 and Colville, 12-8-1946.
207. Ibid., letter, Craigie to FO, 31-7-1946.
208. NARA RG 59, Lot Files, 54D328, E381, Box: 4, top secret, report 
by the Combined Civil Affairs Committee, CCAC 213, Enclosures “A”, “B” and 
“C”, August 1946.
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appeal to the ‘Four Ambassadors’ in Rome, namely the American, Soviet, 
British and French.209 If any one of the Ambassadors opposed the application 
‘a deadlock would ensue and the matter would most probably die a natural 
death’.210 These instructions meant essentially, the annulment of the provisions 
of July 1945 CCS directive.211 It also meant that the terms of the Italian Peace 
Treaty came to be applied even prior to its signing. The clear implication was 
that Yugoslavia would not be able to lay its hands on any of the war criminals 
and as a result, many an alleged war criminal escaped justice.212 The British 
government in the meantime hoped to avoid any Yugoslav opprobrium in the 
future because of the involvement of the Soviet Ambassador in the process.213
The change of British policy on ‘hand-overs’ nevertheless left a bitter taste in
the mouth of most Foreign Office officials. There was little disagreement that
as things stood this was the best policy for Britain to follow to extricate itself
from the matter. Nevertheless, the general feeling, as summarized in a minute
by Sir J. R. Colville, of the Southern Department, was that,
we have put ourselves in the wrong by not exerting pressure on 
the Italians in accordance with our obligations under the 
Armistice Terms to surrender at least some of the 
unquestioningly guilty men.214
Inevitably, the gloomy conclusion was drawn that British efforts to apprehend
209. FO 371/57521/U7678/70/73, 18-10-1946, telegram, no. 268, 
Scarlett to FO, re: FAN 696, 16-10-1946.
21°. FO 371/57659/U7187/4473/73, 16-9-1946, confidential, letter, WCS 
to Scarlett, 26-9-1946.
211. Ibid., minutes by Garner, 21-10-1946 and Ross, 25-10-1946;
FO 371/57521/U6989/70/73, 3-9-46, letter, British Embassy, Washington to 
WCS, 28-8-1946; letter, Garner to Stapleton, 6-9-1946.
212. Ibid.
213. FO 371/57521/U8105/70/73, 29-11-46, minutes by Garner, 3-12- 
1946 and Ross, 4-12-1946; ibid., U8137/70/73, 5-12-46, minute by Garner, 9- 
12-1946; letter, Ward to Attlee, 18-11-1946.
214 Ibid., minute by Colville, 26-2-1947.
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Italian War Criminals had been ‘scarcely adequate’.215 F. F. Garner, the head 
of the WCS, advised that the least Britain could do at this late stage, was to 
persuade the Italians themselves to take some action in ‘the most flagrant 
cases’.216 The Foreign Office, having failed to stick to policies that would 
ensure the prosecution of these alleged criminals and having suffered a bout 
of bad conscience, was becoming angry with what it regarded as Italian 
slackness in dealing with the issue. The De Gasperi government’s failure to act 
with the speed it had promised at the announcement of the establishment of 
the Commission of Inquiry into the deeds of the Italian Armed Forces in 
occupied Europe further exacerbated the Foreign Office’s irritation. There was 
also concern that Italian delay would offer ammunition to those who were 
accusing the Italian government of condoning the crimes of its fascist 
predecessors.217 In fact, it was not until November that the Italians informed the 
Rome Embassy that they were about to charge 40 Italians as war criminals. 
These included Bastianini and Generals Roatta, Robotti, Magdali, all of whom 
were people that had been listed as war criminals by the UNWCC at 
Yugoslavia’s request.218
This pressure on Italy to act, however, brought about a further deterioration in 
Anglo-ltalian relations. To compound the problem, the British shied away from 
assuring the Italians that so long as a war criminal was tried in an Italian court, 
he would not be liable for surrender to Yugoslavia. It was considered that such
215. FO 371/57557/U8026/126/73, 20-11-1946, minute by Garner, 
21-11-1946.
216. FO 371/57521/U8105/70/73, 29-11-46, minutes by Garner, 3-12-
1946 and Ross, 4-12-1946; ibid., U8137/70/73, 5-12-46, minute by Garner, 9- 
12-1946; letter, Ward to Attlee, 18-11-1946.
217. FO 371 /66566/U93/24/73, 17-1-1947, minutes by Garner, 18-1-
1947 and 28-3-1947, Ross, 18-1-1947 and Beckett, 23-1-1947.
218. FO 371 /57557/U8026/126/73, 20/11/46, Rome to WCS (copy of 
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an assurance would be contrary to the provisions of the treaty and would, 
moreover, be superfluous as the Four Ambassadors could justifiably refuse 
such requests if the person had already been punished by his own country’s 
courts.219 The net result of these British actions was that the Italians felt that 
they were being ‘picked on’. This significantly curtailed Britain’s ability to exert 
pressure on Italy to hand over at least a couple of ‘clear cases’.220 The idea of 
bringing the issue up at the Italian Foreign Minister’s forthcoming visit to 
London was floated, but this came to nothing. Such a step was deemed as 
desirable because it would help to minimise the controversy this issue had 
inevitably caused.221 First, the visit was postponed and then, after De Gasperi 
returned from Washington, in January 1947 and decided to resign in order to 
engineer a crisis that would lead to the eventual exclusion of the PCI and the 
PS I from future governments, he replaced Pietro Nenni with Count Carlo 
Sforza. As a result, Nenni’s visit never took place. By the time Sforza visited 
London in autumn, worries about the Italian General elections of April 1948 had 
overtaken every other concern.
With the decision that hand-overs were no longer a matter of Allied 
responsibility and that such issues would have to be settled directly between 
Yugoslavia and Italy, in October 1946, the Yugoslav government despatched
219. FO 371 /66567/U715/24/73, 9-6-1947, minutes by Garner, 11-6- 
1947 and 23-6-1947, and F.D. W. Brown, Italian Section of the Western 
Department of the FO, 12-6-1947; confidential, letter, WCS to Rome, 1-7- 
1947; ibid., U786/24/73, 28-7-1947, confidential, letter, Washington to WCS,
23-7-1947.
22°. FO 371 /66565/U21/21/73, 6-1-1947, minutes by Garner, 10-1-1947; 
FO 371 /66566/U164/24/73, 23-1-1947, Yugoslav note, 15-1-1947 . One of the 
‘clear cases’ considered was that of Pirzio-Biroli, the ex-military Governor of 
Montenegro whose name appeared in all Yugoslav demands and UNWCC 
lists.
22\  Ibid.; FO 371/57522/U6561/71/73, 6-8-1946, letter, Garner to the 
British Embassy, Rome, 27/8/1946; FO 371/66565/U21/21/73, 6-1-1947, 
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77
a note to the Foreign Office in which it proclaimed that its worst fears, that ‘an 
unjustified and incomprehensible discrimination between German and Italian 
war criminals’ would occur, had finally been realised.222 A reminder was 
included of the fact that, despite the assurances that they had received from 
the British government, of the seven hundred and seventy six (776) UNWCC 
listed Italian war criminals, not one had been extradited. The note concluded 
with a plea to the British government to reconsider its policy and honour its 
previous pledges.223 The Foreign Office reacted to the note with relief as it was 
perceived to be ‘mild’ and interpreted it as a sign of Yugoslav weariness with 
the issue. The British were not disposed to change their policies now but the 
Western Department and the WCS continued to advise that the best way 
forward was to urge the Yugoslavs to take the matter up directly with Italy and 
at the same time Britain attempted to convince the Americans to exert pressure 
on the Italians to surrender some of the ‘worst offenders’ and to pursue a more 
energetic course in dealing with, at least, some of their own war criminals.224 
For the USA, the cultivation of Italy was the main aim.225 In view of the
222. FO 371/57521/U8105/70/73, 29-11-46, Yugoslav note, no. P 1677, 
27-11-1946; ibid., U7678/70/73, 18-10-1946, Yugoslav note, 31-10-1946;
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American reluctance to exert any pressure on Italy, Britain concluded that there 
was no point in further undermining its relationship with that country. Yugoslav 
efforts to secure the extradition of the ‘worst offenders’ therefore came to 
nothing.226 The British dilemma of keeping both the Italians and the Yugoslavs 
satisfied had been resolved.227
Yugoslavia made a last ditch attempt to register its displeasure and embarrass 
the West for failing to bring any of the alleged Italian war criminals on the 
UNWCC lists before its courts. The Yugoslav Ambassador in London 
despatched further direct and acerbic notes to the Foreign Office on 8 and 15 
January 1947.228 Apart from the ritual protests against Britain’s failure to 
extradite not even one Italian War Criminal to Yugoslavia, he went on to voice 
explicit accusations that Britain had adopted, along with the Americans, a 
policy o f ‘non-extradition’.229 Yugoslavia thus accused Britain and America of 
a direct breach of their international obligations. Yugoslavia’s wrath had been 
further inflamed by what it perceived as the rehabilitation of fascist leaders in 
Italy. The Yugoslav government was enraged by the fact that persons it had
226. FO 371 /66566/U429/24/73, 17-2-1947, minute by Garner, 19-2- 
1947; NARA RG 59, Lot Files, 54D328, E. 381, Box: 1, top secret, 
memorandum, subject: ‘Tarchiani’s visit and revision of Italian Peace Treaty,
4-5-1947' drafted by W. Dowling, Director of European Affairs, to G. Marshall, 
Secretary of State, 6-5-1947.
227. FO 371/66567/U715/24/73, 9-6-1947, minutes by Brown, 11-12- 
1947 and 12-6-1947, Garner, 11-6-1947; memorandum, record of a meeting 
between Garner and Count Roberti, 6-6-1947; confidential, letter, WCS to the 
British Embassy, Rome, 1-7-1947; FO 371/66566/U492/24/73, 17-2-1947, 
minutes by Garner, 19-2 and 3-3-1947, Beckett, 20-2-1947, Colville, 26-2 and 
3-3-1947, Brown, 28-2 and 4-3-1947, C.F.A. Warner, Superintending Under­
secretary of the Information Department of the FO, 18-3-1947; confidential, 
telegram, no. 1044, Washington to FO, 17-2-1947; confidential, telegram, no. 
1673, 20-2-1947.




listed as war criminals and whose extradition it had repeatedly demanded, 
were allowed to roam free in Italy and even allowed to publish books which 
extolled their war records and the achievements of the Italian Army.230 This was 
interpreted as another attempt to bury the past.
Embarrassing Parliamentary questions on the British government’s policy 
towards the prosecution of Italian war criminals had been contained so far by 
appealing to the questioners’ better judgement, as well as by pressuring them 
to withdraw. However, not every Member of Parliament was prepared to be 
‘gagged’. At a time when the government had hoped that this issue had gone 
away, E. A. Bramall, MP for Bexley, raised the issue of the extradition of Pirzio- 
Biroli in the House of Commons.231 E. A. J. Davies, MP for Enfield, was asked 
by the Foreign Office to approach Bramall to convince him to withdraw his 
question. In private, Bramall expressed his anger at this approach by becoming 
abusive towards the Foreign Office and the military. In public, he simply 
refused to withdraw. His question was dealt with by a dismissive Hector 
McNeil, who replied, unhelpfully, that information included in UNWCC lists was 
not made public and that Biroli was in Rome.232
For the remainder of 1947, the issue surfaced occasionally in the form of 
acerbic Yugoslav notes and despite empty Yugoslav threats to take the matter 
to the Security Council of the United Nations233 its significance subsided as
23°. Graziani, R., Ho difeso la patria, Roma, 1948; Roatta, M., Otto 
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Anglo-Yugoslav relations improved for a while with the signing of the Bled 
agreement in September 1947.234 By the end of 1947 and as the April 1948 
general election in Italy approached, the concern to secure the electoral victory 
of the Christian Democrats eclipsed all other considerations and prompted 
Britain to drop all of its remaining war crimes claims against Italy.235 After the 
Stalin/Tito split in the summer of 1948 and the improvement of Yugoslavia’s 
relations with the West, the Yugoslav Government did not bring the matter up 
again. It died a quiet death. The issue remained buried until the late 1980s 
when journalists discovered the UNWCC archive.236
Conclusion
The honouring of the war time pledge which Britain had undertaken as an 
Armistice power and as a founding member of the UNWCC to ensure the 
surrender of alleged Italian war criminals to Yugoslavia became one of the 
most delicate and embarrassing aspects of British policy towards Italy. The 
issue was never intended to dominate British policy towards Italy and it was not 
one that the British regarded as being central to Anglo-ltalian relations. 
Nevertheless, Britain’s desire to uphold its commitments succeeded in 
straining critically the relations between the two countries at a time when both 
strove to build a new relationship. Early policy decisions and their 
implementation were complicated initially by the exigencies of war and later by 
the unwillingness of the post-war Italian state to compromise its newly found
234. For the Bled agreement see Lane, Britain, the Cold War and 
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sovereignty by handing over its citizens to face trial in a former enemy state.
In view of the circumstances prevalent in the international scene and in Italy, 
Britain had little scope for pursuing its policy towards hand-overs more 
vigorously than it did, short of enforcing its decisions unilaterally. Such action 
however carried with it the unwelcome prospect of probably precipitating the 
untimely collapse of the De Gasperi government.237 As a result, when tensions 
increased between East and West, the protection of the anti-Communist order 
in Italy and the neutralization of the PCI became paramount. These two aims 
were fundamental and they affected every aspect of British policy towards Italy 
and not least its war crimes policy.
Eventually, British attempts to achieve the surrender of alleged Italian war 
criminals were curtailed by the emergence of the Cold war and by Yugoslavia’s 
strong identification with Stalin.238 Consequently, the responsibility for war 
crimes punishment was passed on to the Italian government and the British 
dropped out from the scene. This signified Britain’s abdication of its position on 
extraditions but it did not mean that the British government was willing to see 
these alleged war criminals go unpunished, nor that it conspired to shield them. 
The Foreign Office continued to put pressure on Italy to try some of its ‘worst’ 
war criminals and such action contributed greatly to jeopardizing Anglo-ltalian 
relations and undermining British influence in Italy. The Italians felt that they 
were being treated harshly and unsympathetically by Britain and that British
237. FO 371 /73180/Z1836/317/22, 28-2-1948, minute by Brown, 28-2- 
1948; ibid., Z1625/317/22, 12-2-1948, letter, Rome to War Crimes Section, 25-
2-1948.
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actions fell short of the unequivocally supportive stance of America.239
The war crimes issue showed how difficult it was for Britain, despite its good 
intentions, to implement a policy when it was an issue of allied rather than 
unilateral responsibility, especially when the allies were at loggerheads with 
each other on how best to proceed. After all, action against Italian war criminals 
was not undertaken as a punitive exercise against postwar Italy but in the 
interests of justice and with the intention of rehabilitating Italy in the 
international scene. From the moment the issue began threatening the fragile 
new-order in that country, a compromise had to be reached that the Italian 
State would feel comfortable with and that would not put into question its newly 
found sovereignty. This was essential if Italy was to be successful in its 
herculean task of containing indigenous communism and maintaining its pro- 
Western orientation.
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Chapter Two
Britain and the Reconstruction of the Post-Fascist Italian Armed
Forces
For the British government, an active involvement in the reorganization of the 
Italian armed forces and the cultivation of close ties with the Italian military 
were important components of its foreign policy towards Italy in the immediate 
postwar period. British reconstruction plans for the Italian Army had several 
goals. These were, to build an armed force that would be properly equipped 
and adequately trained to preserve law and order in Italy and to defend its 
frontiers from a Yugoslav attack once Allied forces were withdrawn after the 
signing of the Italian Peace Treaty. At the same time, a fine balance had to be 
struck between Italy’s legitimate defence needs and the necessity to curb any 
menace it could pose to its neighbours.1 In addition to these obvious 
aspirations there were others. The British saw an involvement in Italian military 
and police matters and the fostering of close links with these circles as a 
means for preserving influence in post-treaty Italian affairs. This would bolster 
Britain’s position v/s-3-wsthe ascendancy of American power in the region and 
at the same time check the influence of the PCI in the new Italian forces 
establishment.2 Finally, there was the desire for Italy to become a client state 
of the British arms industry through procurement from Britain of standardised 
equipment since this would perpetuate a reliance on Britain for equipment and
1. FO 371/60602/ZM1584/89/22, 13-5-1946, top secret, telegram, FAN 
1135, SACMED to British Chiefs of Staff, 7-5-1946; letter, Ross to WO, 21-5- 
1946; FO 371/49890/ZM6285/243/22, 29-12-1945, minutes by Hood, 4-1-1946 
and Ross, 8-1-1946; top secret, telegram, NAF 1103, SACMED to CCS, 21- 
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reinforce the British export drive on which domestic hopes of economic up-turn 
had been based.3
British policy was also influenced by the following concerns: first, that the size 
and equipment of the interim Italian armed forces should not be seen as 
prejudicing the eventual shape of the military clauses of the Peace Treaty;4 
second, that although Britain was prepared to enter into financial commitments 
in the interests of building efficient armed forces for Italy, it was not willing to 
incur punitive financial burdens in the process of doing so;5 and third, that the 
new Italian forces structure ought to be ready to uphold law and order quickly 
so that British forces could withdraw from Italy as soon as possible and thus 
comply with the reduced defence expenditure favoured by Prime Minister 
Attlee and his Chancellor Hugh Dalton.6 For these reasons, Britain favoured 
the creation of lean and efficient Italian armed forces that would operate within
3. FO 371 /60604/ZM3152/89/22, 12-9-1946, letter, Hoyar-Millar to 
Esme Iredell, Western Department, 11-9-1946; CAB 66/67, CP(45)64, 5-7- 
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the parameters set by the Italian Peace Treaty,7 that their size would also be
proportionate to Italy’s economic capacity to maintain them without external
assistance but that at the same time
they must be large enough to maintain internal security and to 
defend Italy’s frontiers particularly with YUGOSLAVIA (sic) 
[but]... they must NOT (sic) be strong enough to offer ITALY 
(sic) any prospect of attacking her neighbours or threaten the 
interests of the principal Allied Powers.8
The British government decided that its contribution to the reorganization of the 
Italian armed forces ought to take the form of a package deal providing 
training, technical advice and equipment and this was the arrangement that 
was put before the Italian government for their consideration and approval.9
In this present chapter, the following matters will be assessed: the contribution 
of Britain to the reconstruction of the Italian Armed Forces and the factors that 
impacted on its ability to implement its schemes such as its continuous 
financial problems throughout the second half of the 1940s and the fear that 
even if military equipment was provided to the Italians it could fall into the 
wrong hands if Italy went Communist.10 The uncertainties as to precisely what
7. FO 371/60602/ZM1584/89/22, 13-5-1946, top secret, telegram, FAN 
1135, SACMED to British Chiefs of Staff, 7-5-1946; letter, FO to WO, 21-5- 
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limitations the Peace Treaty would impose on the Italian armed forces11 and the 
hesitations of the Italian government as to the best course of action to take to 
reconstruct its armed forces will be examined. Fears of Soviet intentions, the 
fact that the PCI was an integral part of all postwar Italian governments from 
194412 and American indecisiveness and reluctance to cooperate with British 
plans for the reconstruction of the Italian armed forces will also be looked at.13
British perceptions of the security threats facing postwar Italy
British perceptions of the threats the new Italian state would have to face and 
counter was to impact not only on the type of services Italy needed but also on 
the urgency with which the task would have to be accomplished. From as early 
as 1944, upon the return of Palmiro Togliatti to Rome, the strength of the PCI 
had surprised and concerned British policy makers. Such fears increased as 
time progressed because of the popularity of the party in the occupied North 
and the impact it could have on Italian politics after the eventual reunification 
of Italy.14 Initial British fears were compounded by the as yet only partial
11. FO 371 /60602/ZM1584/89/22, 13-5-1946, top secret, telegram, FAN 
1135, SACMED to British Chiefs of Staff, 7-5-1946; letter, Ross, to WO, 21-5- 
1946; AIR 23/6343, top secret, P/319 (1st Draft), ‘Italian Navy and Airforce’, 
Mediterranean Planning Staff, 2-12-1945; top secret, P/319 (Final) (Revised), 
‘Italian Air Force’, 15-12-1945; FO 371/60604/ZM3774/89/22, 11-11-1946, 
secret, telegram, no. 516, FO to Washington, 22-11-1946.
12. FO 371 /60562/ZM975/35/22, 22-3-1946, top secret, FX 62994, 
CHQ.CMF to WO, undated; FO 371/67814/Z5748, Annual Report for 1946, 12-
6-1947; Ellwood, op. cit., pp. 127-30; Miller, op. cit., pp. 191-3.
13. FRUS, 1945, Vol. IV, p. 1050-9; FRUS, 1946, Vol. Ill, pp. 867-79; 
FRUS, 1946, Vol. V, p. 950; FO 371/67791/Z599/135/22, 17-1-1947, minute 
by Ross, 20-1-1947; ibid., ZZ1967/135/22, 24-2-1947, confidential, telegram, 
no. 1702, FO to Washington, 22-2-1947; ibid., Z2238/135/22, 3-3-1947, 
confidential, telegram, no. 1308, Washington to FO, 1-3-1947. Miller, op. cit., 
pp. 191-2, 203, 215 and 230.
14. FO 371/43335/N2883/183/38, 12-5-1944, top secret, PHP(43)1(0),
24-4-1944; Arcidiacono, op. cit., pp. 239-266, passim; Ellwood, ‘Al tramonto’ 
pp. 75-92; Rothwell, op. cit., pp. 74-290, passim.
87
disarmament of the resistance after the liberation of the North. There was also 
the Italian population’s tendency to erupt into violent internal disorders and 
overt demonstrations of hostility, even physical violence, against the 
occupation forces as an expression of the people’s frustration with dire poverty 
and bleak prospects. Such disorders had occurred all over Italy in cities as 
diverse as Bari, Padua, Trieste and Venice to name but a few.15 The net result 
of this situation was that the British and American governments formed the 
impression that the intention of Togliatti’s PCI was to conspire to make a bid for 
power through a coup d’6tat.16 These fears of a coup d’ 6tat were capitalised 
on by the Christian Democrats and conservative circles in Italy who time and 
again presented the legitimate protests of people demanding jobs and land as 
Communist inspired agitation which further exacerbated Western fears that 
were, in any case, heightened by the resurgence of the civil war in Greece.17 
In fact, the PCI had no real intention of seizing power through a revolution at 
this time. The British intervention in Greece left Togliatti with no doubts that a
15. Ibid.; FO 371/60562/ZM1285/35/22, 23-4-1946, letter, C-in-C, 
Mediterranean to Admiralty, 18-3-1946; FO 371/60565/ZM4210/35/22, 13-12- 
1946, important, telegram, 1827, Ward to FO, 12-12-1946; ibid., 
ZM4220/35/22, 13-12-1946, important, telegram, 1830, 13-12-1946; ibid., 
ZM4219/35/22, 14-12-1946, telegram, no. 377, Ward to FO, 13-12-1946; ibid., 
ZM4317/35/22, 13-12-46, confidential, telegram, no.381, Ward to FO, 12-12- 
1946; FO 371/60563/ZM1604/35/22, 14-5-1946, confidential, C-in-C, 
Mediterranean, to Admiralty, 10-5-1946; ibid., ZM1724/35/22, 23-5-1946, 
Parliamentary Question, by Mr. Sutcliffe, MP, 21-5-1946;
FO 371/60713/ZM2514/1344/22, 18-7-1946, confidential, despatch, no. 369, 
Charles to Bevin, 18-7-1946; FO 371/67814/Z5748, Annual Report for 1946,
12-6-1947; FO 371/67731/Z118/22, 6-1-1947, confidential, telegram no. FX 
73767, AFHQ to CCS, 19-12-1946, Piscitelli, op. cit., pp. 175-88.
16. FO 371/60707/ZM2064/1344/22, 17-6-1946, top secret, telegram, 
no. 906, Clutton to FO, 18-6-1946; telegram, no. 202, Paris to FO, 16-6-1946; 
top secret, telegram, no. 528, Sofia to FO, 15-6-1946; top secret, telegram, 
no. 200, Bevin to Attlee, 15-6-1946; ibid., ZM2065/1344/22, 17-6-1946, minute 
by Ross, 17-6-1946; Miller, op. cit., p. 155; Ellwood, op. cit., pp. 90-100, 127- 
34, 234-40, 167-98.
17. FRUS, 1946, Vol. VI, pp. 877-8 and 887-9; FRUS, 1946, Vol. V, pp. 
856-60 and 888-9; Ferraresi, op. cit., p. 22; Murgia, P.G., II Vento del Nord: 
Storia e cronaca del fascismo dopo la resistenza, 1945-50, Milano, 1975.
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communist insurrection in Italy would precipitate a Western intervention with 
calamitous results for his party and country. He also did not wish to divide his 
country nor did he want to expose it to the misery that had befallen the 
Spaniards and which he had experienced at first hand as ‘comrade Ercoli’, the 
Comintern’s man in Spain during the Civil War.18 Togliatti adopted a 
constitutional approach and his principal tactical aim was to embed the PCI into 
the Italian political system by transforming it from a traditional cadres-based 
communist party into a mass party. A ‘partito nuovo’ which could be capable 
of winning elections through the ballot-box. He demonstrated this tactic through 
the proclamation of the ‘svolta di Salerno’, his loyal participation in all Cabinets 
from 1944 and in the PCI’s efforts to restrain working class protest during these 
years.19 Such actions were not taken at face value by the Foreign Office which 
viewed them with deep scepticism. The Foreign Office felt that a better 
measure of actual communist intentions in Italy was provided by the fact that 
the disarmament of partisans had been only partial and that the unaccounted 
for weaponry was known to have been tucked away for the mythical ‘zero’ 
hour’.20 Furthermore, even if such worries were inflated as G. Warner has 
observed, the ‘communist threat’ in Italy was not imaginary, because the PCI 
never disclaimed ‘its desire to assume power1 it simply renounced to use of
18. Urban, J.B., Moscow and the Italian Communist Party: from Togliatti 
to Berlinguer, London, 1986, pp. 207-8, 211, 219-20; Sassoon, D., The 
Strategy of the Italian Communist Party, New York, 1981, pp. 65-6 and 73-8; 
Blackmer, D.L.M., ‘Continuity and Change in Postwar Italian Communism’, in 
Blackmer, D.L.M. and Tarrow, S. Communism in Italy and France, Princeton, 
1975, pp. 48; Reale, E., Nacsita del Cominform, Milan, 1958, pp. 119-21. On 
the impact of Greece on Allied policy towards Italy see Delzell, C.F.,
Mussolini’s Enemies: the Italian anti-Fascist Resistance, Princeton, 1961, pp. 
464-8.
19. Allum, P. A., and Sassoon, D., ‘Italy’, in McCauley, (ed.), Communist 
Power in Europe, 1944-49, pp. 169-178; Ginsborg, op. cit., pp. 79-88 and 105- 
15; Gambino, op. cit., pp. 104 and 387; Bocca, op. cit., p. 401.
20. Miller, op. cit., p. 140.
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insurrectionary means to attain it’.21
The June 1946 referendum on the ‘institutional question’ and the simultaneous 
elections for a Constituent Assembly were carried out in a tense atmosphere 
and amidst rumours that possible Yugoslav, or even Russian invasions and 
civil war were imminent.22 Although these rumours proved to be unfounded the 
outcome of these elections offered little solace to the West. It revealed not only 
the extent of the appeal of the parties of the Left but also the dramatic increase 
in the membership of the PCI.23 The elections for the Constituent Assembly had 
shown that should Italian Socialists and Communists combine their forces the 
prize of government and with it, the political transformation of Italy according 
to the ideals of the Italian Resitance, was within their reach. When news of the 
reconfirmation of the ‘Unity of Action Pact’ between the PCI and the PSIUP 
emerged on 25 October 1946 and which gave rise to rumours of an impending 
‘fusion’ of the parties of the Left, the Foreign Office which was already 
unsettled by these developments became positively alarmed. London decided 
that the Italian internal security forces had to be built up immediately to attain 
a degree of efficiency which would enable them to meet head-on and deflect 
a subversion of Italy’s pro-western course. This concern was apparent at the 
CFM meetings during June 1946 when Bevin consistently supported high
21. Warner, G., ‘Italy and the Powers’ in Woolf, S., (ed.), The Rebirth of 
Italy, 1943-50, London, 1972, pp. 46-7.
22. FO 371/60707/ZM2064/1344/22, 17-6-1946, top secret, telegram, 
no. 906, Clutton to FO, 18-6-1946; telegram, no. 202, Paris to FO, 16-6-1946; 
top secret, telegram, no. 528, Sofia to FO, 15-6-1946; top secret, telegram, 
no. 200, Bevin to Attlee, 15-6-1946; ibid., ZM2065/1344/22, 17-6-1946, minute 
by Ross, 17-6-1946.
23. Miler, op. cit., pp. 39-40; Travis, D., ‘Communism and Resistance in 
Italy, 1943-8' in Judt, T., (ed.), Resistance and Revolution in Mediterranean 
Europe, 1939-48, London, 1989, p. 216.
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ceilings for the Italian police force.24
The deep concerns over Italy’s internal security were compounded by worries 
over the security of its borders from an external attack. Post-Fascist Italy found 
itself in a neighbourhood of few friends and with neighbours who still bore fresh 
wounds from Fascist Italy’s aggression. Despite this, of its neighbours, only 
Yugoslavia constituted a possible threat to Italy’s territorial integrity during the 
1940s and Yugoslavia was a communist state. The Italo-Yugoslav rift over 
Italy’s North-Eastern border and the future of Trieste and of Venezia Giulia was 
soon identified as potential flashpoint between East and West.25 Venezia Giulia 
was an area of mixed Italian and Slavic population. Enmity and ethnic rivalry 
between the two groups was traditional.26 For the Italian nationalist the Giulian 
plain was an integral part of Italy even when the ethnic make up of the region 
as a whole could not support such a claim outright. The incorporation of this 
area into Italy had been the raison d ’etre for Italian entry into the First World 
War on the Entente side. The failure by the Italians to gain the whole territory 
at the Peace Settlement in 1919 led to the myth of the ‘mutilated victory’ which 
rekindled nationalistic feelings in Italy and contributed greatly to the 
establishment of Mussolini’s Fascist dictatorship in 1922.27 Bad feeling among
24. FO 371/60710/ZM2239/1344/22, 26-6-1946, letter, Bevin to De 
Gasperi, June 1946; ibid., ZM2272/1344/22, 29-6-1946, minute by Sargent, 
29-6-1946; telegram, no. 6, Paris, UK Delegation to Rome, 28-6-1946; 
Gambino, op. cit., pp. 181-218; Miller, op. cit., p. 192; Mammarella, op. cit., p.
117. The first pact had been signed in Paris in 1934.
25. Rabel, Between East and West, op. cit., p. 7; Novak, op. cit., pp. 
161-239, passim.
26. Ibid., pp. 7-42.
27. Ibid., pp. 42-5; Cassels, A., Mussolini’s Early Diplomacy, Princeton, 
1979, p. 10; Salvemini, G., The Fascist Dictatorship in Italy: Volume I: Origins 
and Practices, London, 1928, pp.15-54, passim; De Grand, A., Italian 
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pp. 11-6.
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the two communities had been exacerbated by Mussolini’s brutal occupation 
of Yugoslavia.28 For the Yugoslavs the incorporation of Trieste and its 
surrounding hinterland was a means of bringing all the South Slavs within the 
confines of their own nation-state. Tito’s partisan advance had repelled the 
German occupiers northwards and westwards towards Trieste, the city-port on 
the Adriatic which was itself a main issue of contention between Italians and 
Yugoslavs and which both claimed as rightfully theirs. Trieste was liberated 
simultaneously by Allied and Yugoslav troops in the closing days of the Second 
World War. During those last and difficult days tensions ran high. Allied troops 
and Yugoslav partisans faced each other in a war of nerves. The West insisted 
that Yugoslavia should relinquish its occupation of Trieste as it would prejudice 
the final outcome of the territorial clauses of the Peace Treaty with Italy. All out 
war over the Trieste issue was averted simply because Yugoslavia, 
discouraged by Stalin’s lack of support, bowed to Western pressure and 
agreed reluctantly in May 1945 to accept Allied Military Government control of 
the city until the Peace Treaty had been finalized and signed. Thus Venezia 
Giulia, was divided into two zones. ‘Zone A’ contained Trieste and its environs 
and was administered by the Allies. ‘Zone B’ contained the rest of the region 
and was administered by Yugoslavia. The Trieste issue remained unresolved 
until 1954.29 Thus, from May 1945 up to the Tito/Stalin split in summer 1948, 
the Western Allied Forces and the Yugoslavs faced each other along the 
boundary between Zones ‘A’ and ‘B’ in an increasingly tense and fragile
28. Novak, op. cit., pp. 49-69; BBC, Timewatch, Fascist Legacy: A 
Promise Unfulfilied, Part: I, Elstree, 1989; Palumbo, M., ‘Genocidio all’
Italiana’, Epoca, 17-1-1988; Yugoslav State Official Publication, Italian War 
Crimes in Yugoslavia, Belgrade, 1945.
29. Harris, op. cit., pp. 340-1; Rabel, op. cit., pp. 5-7; Novak, op. cit., pp. 
90-1,198 and 240-471, passim.
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atmosphere of constant flare-ups and border incidents.30 The veneer of old 
Allied camaraderie was becoming dented not only by the entrenched positions 
adopted by both the Yugoslavs and Italians but also by the strains of the 
emerging Cold War. In view of the inability of Yugoslavia to take on the West 
single-handedly the British concluded that Yugoslavia would not dare to use 
force against Italy to resolve territorial issues without having first secured the 
prior agreement of the Soviet Union and a ‘go-ahead’ from Stalin. The Foreign 
Office decided that minor incidents in the region could be discounted as the 
result of ethnic tensions or a hotheaded Yugoslav reaction but any major 
incident could only be the product of Soviet making and incitement.31 In which 
case, the Foreign Office predicted, any major incident in the area could end up 
as ‘war with capital W’.32
In the immediate post-war climate Italy’s internal and external security 
problems were perceived as one problem which was the result of an 
orchestrated Soviet campaign to wear down the West rather than two distinct 
problems. As a result, fears about communist intentions and designs on Italy’s 
security meant that British decision-makers were absorbed with Italy’s current 
political problems and less concerned with its Fascist past. Any lingering 
doubts that had initially existed about how far the British government should go
30. Ibid.; FO 371/72482/R380/44/70, 9-1-1948, secret, despatch, no. 1, 
‘Annual Report on Trieste’, Sullivan, political advisor, Trieste, to Bevin, 1-1- 
1948; FO 371/72619/R3083/3083/92, 8-3-1948, secret, telegram, no. 423, Sir 
Victor Mallet, the British Ambassador, Rome to FO, 6-3-1948; ibid.,
R4617/3038/92, 14-4-1948, secret, telegram, no. 349, Sir Charles B.P. Peake, 
the British Ambassador in Belgrade to FO, 12-4-1948; ibid., R5302/3038/92, 
29-4-1948, secret, telegram, no. 742, Mallet to FO, 28-4-1948;
FO 371/60708/2064/1344/22, 17-6-1946, top secret, telegram, no. 906,
Clutton to FO, 18-6-1946.
31. Lane, Britain, the Cold War and Yugoslav Unity, p. 59.
32. FO 371 /60564/ZM3164/35/22, 12-9-1946, minutes by Ross, 24-9- 
1946, Warner, 21-9-1946 and R.M.A. Hankey, head of the Northern 
Department, 20-9-1946.
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in re-arming an ‘ex-enemy1 state were dispelled by the marked deterioration in 
relations between East and West, the identification of the Soviet Union as a 
potential future enemy which would endanger British interests in the region and 
also by the May-June 1945 crisis over Trieste. The conclusion was drawn that 
for a pro-Western Italian government to survive after the withdrawal of the 
Allied Forces it would need to have the back up of efficient armed forces.33
Britain and the birth of the post-fascist Italian army
From the moment of the signing of the Long Armistice Terms, in September 
1943, the occupation forces attempted to create a rudimentary army structure 
for the new Italian state.34 As every aspect of the Regno del Sud was in chaos 
such a task was not an easy one. Nothing of the old military structure of Italy 
remained; there was no organization and few records. The war had inflicted 
savage losses on it and in addition approximately one million of its former 
combatants were detained as POWs in various countries. Italy found itself 
divided into two after its capitulation. Similarly, the remaining rump of the Italian 
army that was loyal to the ‘cobelligefent’ regime of the South, the King and 
Badoglio came under the direct control of the Allied Command, in contrast, the 
forces in the North which remained loyal to Mussolini, obeyed the Said 
Republic Command, a front for the Wehrmacht.35 Above all, however,
33. Lewis, op. cit., pp. 128-135 and 258-9; Arcidiacono, op. cit., pp. 
239-266, passim; Ellwood, ‘Al tramonto’ pp. 75-92; Rothwell, op. cit., pp. 74- 
290, passim; FO 371/43951/R11376/1962/22, 21-7-1944, top secret, telegram, 
no. COS(W)182, COS to JSM, 20-7-1944; WO 204/3814, top secret, telegram, 
NAF 1051, Alexander to CCS, 3-8-1945; FO 371/43335/N2883/183/38, 12-5- 
1944, top secret, PHP(43)1(0), 24-4-1944; FO 371/49889/ZM2425/243/22, 30- 
4-1945 minute by Ross, 23-4-1945.
34 FO 371/49954/ZM4139/2273/22, 1-8-1945, minutes by Ross, 7-8- 
1945 and Hoyer-Millar, 8-8-1945; memorandum by Major General Browning, 
undated; FO 371/49889/ZM3288/243/22, 17-6-1945, telegram, no. 126,
Charles to FO, 8-9-1945.
35. Clark, op. cit., pp. 302-10; For the RSI see: Anfuso, F., Roma, 
Berfino, Said, 1936-1945, Milano, 1950; Bertoldi, S., Contro Said, Milano,
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successive and humiliating defeats during the war had deeply eroded the 
Army’s morale and had diminished it in the eyes of ordinary Italians.36
The task of equipping and reorganising a new Army for the Regno fell on 
British shoulders because of Britain’s numerical superiority in the 
Mediterranean theatre and because of its role as a ‘senior partner1 within the 
liberating forces in the early stages of the Allied occupation of Italy.37 The 
British government under pressure from Field Marshall Sir Henry M. Wilson, 
SACMED, endorsed the reconstruction and re-equipment of the Italian armed 
forces and on 30 August 1944, Churchill made this decision public.38 
Consequently, the British military in Italy undertook to transform the few 
disparate service units they had organised in 1943 into fighting units. This was 
mainly because they wanted to free up some of their own units to fight against 
the Germans at the Western Front and to boost the confidence of the South.39 
Italian Generals were brought in from POW camps in England and India to 
head this embryonic structure which was centred around the rudimentary 
Italian Ministry of War at Lecce in Southern Italy.40 By the end of the war, Major
1984; Bocca, G., La repubblica di Mussolini, Bari, 1977; Deakin, F. W., Storia 
della Repubblica di Said, Torino, 1963; Degli Espinosa, A., II Regno del Sud, 
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op. cit., pp. 84-8, 91-2 and 189.
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39. WO 204/3809, secret, letter, MMIA to AFHQ, 6-2-1945; top secret, 
telegram, FAN 487, CCS to SACMED, 31-1-1945.
40. FO 371/43951/R13067/1962/22, 12-9-1944, minute by Williams, 30- 
8-1944; top secret, telegram, FAN 387, CCS to AFHQ, 10-8-1944; ibid.,
R17955/1962/22, 6-11-1944, top secret, memorandum, by Browning, 4-10- 
1944; top secret, letter, Charles to Sargent, 30-10-1944.
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General Browning, the GOC of the British dominated Allied Military Mission to 
the Italian Army (MMIA), had succeeded in creating five battalions of which four 
had seen action and which according to his own testament had excelled 
themselves in battle against the Germans and had shown that ‘under proper 
direction and assistance the Italians could be of great value as soldiers’.41
Despite Browning’s ringing endorsement of the re-establishment of the Italian 
military structure as a ‘unique feature in the history of war’, by the time of the 
liberation of the whole of the Italian peninsula, this new force was still ill- 
equipped, badly organised, demoralised and alienated from the very people it 
was supposed to serve. Up to this time the British had been the main provider 
of equipment and training but their efforts to equip the interim Italian armed 
forces up to the end of the war had not been very successful because of lack 
of equipment and resources due to the exigencies of the overall war effort and 
also because, initially, there had been doubts about how far Britain should go 
in re-arming an ‘ex-enemy’ state.42 Liberation in April 1945, brought with it the 
collapse of Mussolini’s neo-fascist republic, the eventual dissolution of the 
AMG regime and the restoration to direct Italian government jurisdiction of all 
Italy with the exclusion of the disputed areas of Alto Adige and Venezia Giulia, 
but it did not bring about the unification of all Italian services under a single 
command. The army and the Carabinieria were returned to Italian control in 
December 1945 but the Italian navy and air force still remained under the
41. FO 371/43951/R11376/1962/22, 21-7-1944, top secret, telegram, 
no. COS(W)182, COS to JSM, 20-7-1944; FO 371/49954/ZM4139/2273/22, 1- 
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control of General Morgan for both administrative and operational purposes.43 
As if this state of affairs did not cause enough disorganisation, in the aftermath 
of liberation, some army units disbanded themselves voluntarily and 
spontaneously which created confusion and further disorganized an already 
chaotic military structure.44
The new Italian army was the heir to the failures of the fascist military forces 
because, in reality, epurazione (epuration, the purge of fascists) proved to be 
but a cosmetic exercise which left the military establishment along with the 
judiciary as the least purged institutions.45 Its lacklustre reputation had 
moreover, to compete with the popularity of the partisan units which were 
perceived by many in Italy as a successful force of brave liberators.46 By 
spearheading the struggle against the Said Republic and the Nazis in the 
North, the partisan brigades - the bulk of which were under PCI control - had 
fired the imagination of the Italian people. This was in stark contrast with the 
armed forces which along with other institutions of the ‘old right’ had been 
tainted by collaborationism with Fascism and the King whom Britain, under 
Churchill, had patronized despite the adverse opinion of the Foreign Office and
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the Americans.47 When the war ended the Allies feared the potential firepower 
of the communist controlled partisan units and they decided to frustrate 
Togliatti’s initiative for the automatic enlisting of such units to the army by 
banning the absorption of whole units. Armed units of the Resistance had first 
to be disarmed, demobilized and ‘screened’ and only then could individual 
‘rehabilitated partisans’ join.48 This did very little in either rehabilitating the 
standing Army in the eyes of ordinary Italians or in improving the state of the 
forces. More significantly, such action only served to compound the traditional 
rift that had existed between ordinary Italians and an army which had 
developed in parallel and with little interaction with Italian society and which 
had been used by the State since 1871 as a means of repressing civil 
disturbances through the use of excessive force.49
A greater problem for the armed forces surfaced after June 1946 with the 
abolition of the Monarchy and the establishment of the First Italian Republic. 
The Italian army had a special and complex relationship with the Monarchy. 
Throughout its history, it had succeeded in serving all Italian governments 
irrespective of their political complexion, by adopting the doctrine of 
‘apoliticism’. The army derived its legitimacy not from the people but from the 
‘military-political complex’ at the pivot of which stood the House of Savoy. It
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carried out the orders of the state but it did not owe its loyalty directly to the 
state but to the King. With the Monarchy gone, the whole relationship between 
army and the state had to change radically but how it was to change was not 
exactly clear.50
Such problems were compounded by reports, in May 1946, that the condition 
of the Italian land forces which had passed to Italian control and responsibility 
on December 1945, was one of apparent deterioration. The reports identified 
the reasons for this as being the lack of equipment, vehicles and spare parts. 
This was due to the fact that most of the equipment of the Italian army came 
either from indigenous sources or through the Allied disposal agencies and 
was made of inferior and obsolete material. The Italian government was so 
pressed for the few resources it had or was given by the allies that it poured 
them into civil rehabilitation and not military use.51 The problems of 
reconstructing the Italian armed forces were further exacerbated by the 
uncertainties and ceilings a future Peace Treaty would impose.52
50. Ibid.; Mammarella, op. cit., pp. 108-19 and 134-8; llari, op. cit., p.
19; D’Orsi, La macchina, op. cit. pp. 7-19; Ceva, ‘Le Forze Armate’, op. cit., p. 
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The realization of this state of affairs led to the adoption by Britain of a more 
vigorous and interventionist approach towards Italian military matters.53 By the 
end of the war Britain had become inextricably involved in the reconstruction 
effort for the Italian armed forces and was extremely well placed to continue 
with this role. Of the standing Italian army which totalled 368,000 men, 272,000 
were supplied by the Allies of which 160,000 soldiers, including 10,000 
Carabinieri, were supplied by the British, 83,000 by the USA and the rest by 
various international commitments. Of what was but a skeleton air force, the 
British supplied three out of four existing squadrons54 and what had been 
saved of the Italian Fascist navy was supplied solely with British fuel and 
stores.55 Italy lacked both the administrative and financial resources to 
undertake the task of reconstructing her own armed forces alone. In addition, 
American surpluses in Italy, were not sufficient to meet the Italian army’s 
requirements.56 The Americans still viewed the Mediterranean as a British 
sphere of influence and up until the second half of 1946 they did not pose a 
serious threat to British involvement in Italy. Indeed, the British government, at 
this stage, was happy to encourage the Americans to get more involved in 
sharing some of the crippling financial burdens it was incurring through its 
commitments to the Italian military.57 For the purposes of maintaining 
standardization it was decided that Britain would have to continue equipping
53. PREM 8/66, ORC(45)23, COS(45)189th mtg., 29-8-1945; Miller, op. 
cit., 192; FRUS, 1945, Vol. IV, pp. 1050-51; Lewis, op. cit., pp. 128-135 and 
258-9; Ellwood, ‘Al tramonto’, pp. 75-86.
54. Nuti, L., U esercito italiano, pp. 12-45.
55. FRUS, 1946, Vol. V, pp. 917-8, 940-1 and 950; Miller, op. cit., p. 192.
56. FO 371/60602/ZM217/89/22, 15-1-1946, secret, letter, FO to Air 
Ministry, 19-1-1946; ibid., 60602/ZM89/89/22, 5-1-1946, minute by Ross, 5-1- 
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the interim Italian forces since most of their equipment was British already.58 
Thus, the task of equipping and training the Italian army from 1944 and 
throughout 1947 was assumed mainly by Britain.
The approach Britain took in order to achieve its aims up to the signing of the 
Peace Treaty was through the provision of training and equipment to the Italian 
military services through the Allied Military Mission to the Italian Army (MMIA). 
Once the Treaty had been concluded Britain hoped to convince the Italian 
government to invite the Allies to furnish military missions to each of its 
services. The idea of missions to the Italian services was not a new one. It was 
based on the continuation of the close relationship fostered between the Italian 
Services and the British element in the MMIA during the period of co­
belligerency. Its conception was directly attributable to the wartime National 
government. In August 1945, the incoming Labour government in an attempt 
to underpin the Italian Prime Minister, Ferruccio Parri, and to secure a stake 
in Italian reconstruction proposed to him the strengthening of his security 
forces through the attachment of missions.59 The Italian government, however, 
refused to accept missions which excluded the third Ally, the USSR. Parri, a 
creature of anti-fascism and the Resistance was not prepared to undermine the 
cohesion of his government nor did he wish to antagonise the Soviets prior to 
the conclusion of the Peace Treaty negotiations. He felt that the Armistice 
terms precluded the acceptance of such proposals.60 In any case, the fact that
58. FO 371 /60602/ZM217/89/22, 15-1-1946, secret, letter, FO to Air 
Ministry, 19-1-1946; ibid., ZM89/89/22, 5-1-1946, minute by Ross, 5-1-1946;
FO 371 /60604/ZM3152/89/22, 12-9-1946, letter, FO to Admiralty, 19-9-1946; 
Miller, op. cit., p. 191.
59. FO 371 /49771 /ZM3214/3/22, 12-6-1945, minute by Harvey, 1-7-
1945.
60. FO 371/60622/ZM592/187/22, 20-2-1946, letter, Sargent to Sir, A.
Street, Control Office for Germany and Austria, WO, 1-3-1946, 30-8-1946;
ibid., ZM619/187/22, 21-2-1946, memorandum briefing the Secretary of State
prior to his meeting with Admiral Stone, 20-2-1946; Miller, op. cit., p. 191.
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the British proposal came to Parri via Chief Commissioner Stone could not 
have helped matters particularly since both Stone, personally, and the State 
Department were rather unhappy with the British proposals.61 The British 
government let the issue drop for the time being because they did not wish to 
impose the matter on the Italian government and it was thought to be only a 
matter of time before the Italians invited missions voluntarily.62
With the replacement of Parri by De Gasperi, the end of Allied Administration 
and the dissolution of the Armistice regime, the British felt more confident of 
success because of De Gasperi’s anti-communism and his pessimistic view of 
Italy’s internal security situation.63 Bevin and the Western Department were 
particularly supportive of the missions idea because it seemed to offer the best 
way forward in helping the Italian government maintain internal security and at 
the same time seamlessly adapting and perpetuating British involvement from 
the reconstruction of the interim Italian forces stage into the post-treaty 
period.64 The Service Departments too, were supportive of the idea. When they 
were approached by the Foreign Office to give their thoughts and approval to 
the plan their response was uniformly in favour because they had concluded 
that:
from the strategic aspect of view it is important to keep the
Italians looking West rather than East for advice and assistance
61. WO 204/2261, Item 9, SACMED to Stone, 21-8-1945; Stone to 
SACMED, 21-9-1945; WO 204/2267, top secret, telegram, NAF 1051, Stone to 
Chiefs of Staff, 27-9-1945; Miller, op. cit., p. 191.
62. WO 204/2267, top secret, telegram, NAF 1051, Stone to COS, 27-9- 
1945; letter, Stone to SACMED, 19-9-1945.
63. Ibid.; FO 371/60622/ZM187/187/22, 12-1-1946, secret, letter, WO to 
FO, 20-8-1946; FO 371/60603/ZM2883/89/22, 22-8-1946, secret, letter, 
Brigadier General C.S. Sudgen, WO, to Hoyer-Millar, 20-8-1946.
64. FO 371/60604/ZM3774/89/22, 11-11-1946, memorandum by Ross, 
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in the training of their Army ... it would be a pity after all the 
pains we have taken to reorganize along British lines if we were 
suddenly to withdraw our assistance.65
This time however, extra care was taken to ensure the success of the plans. 
The Foreign Office instructed the Rome Embassy and British element of the 
AFHQ at Caserta to keep this decision secret from Admiral Ellery Stone 
because it wanted the opportunity to put its case directly to the State 
Department first and not to have it filtered by Stone’s anti-British slant.66 On 5 
February 1946, London presented to its American Allies its first step in the 
process of attaching missions to the Italian services by unveiling plans for 
attaching a British-only police mission to the Italian internal security forces on 
the grounds of improving administrative efficiency. The British proposals were 
presented by Bevin, a warm supporter of the police mission idea. When Stone 
approached him to complain, Bevin brushed aside his objections in an abrupt 
and brusque manner.67 On 23 May 1946, Sir Orme Sargent, Deputy Under­
secretary of the Foreign Office, met Niccold Carandini, the Italian Ambassador 
to the Court of St. James’, and asked him about his country’s attitude towards 
the police mission. Carandini assured Sargent that he would press the urgency 
of the matter to the Italian government but could not say anything more
65. FO 371/60603/ZM2883/89/22, 22-8-1946, secret, letter, Sudgen to 
Hoyer-Millar, 20-8-1946.
66. FO 371/60622/ZM336/187/22, 28-1-1946, telegram, no. 129, Rome 
to FO, 25-1-1946; ibid., ZM187/187/22, 12-1-1946, minute by Ross, 11-1- 
1946; ibid., ZM275/187/22, 21-1-1946, minute by Ross, 21-1-1946.
67. FO 371 /60622/ZM1728/187/22, 23-5-1946, minute by Ross, 7-5- 




Although the aim was to have a mission per service, British interest inevitably 
focused on the internal security forces and on the Italian air force. This was 
because of the perceived threat that the ‘red menace’ posed to British interests 
and because an air-mission was regarded to be the most lucrative from the 
procurement point of view. It was precisely because of the severe British 
concerns about the ability of the Italian police forces to uphold the law and 
public order which prompted British contemplation for the planting of a covert 
police mission to the Italian police forces even whilst the De Gasperi 
government was still considering the issue. The idea had been fermenting in 
the Foreign Office since January 1946. The plan was to attach police officers 
to the existing MMIA without the prior approval of the Italian government and 
without even consulting with it. The implementation of this plan was delayed as 
a result of the pleas of Sir Noel Charles and General Morgan who both feared 
that should the presence of such a mission be revealed it would make the 
position of De Gasperi untenable and because, in any case, they genuinely 
believed that the Italians would soon answer in the affirmative. However, by 
April 1946, London had done all the waiting it was willing to do and gave the go 
ahead for the infiltration of the MMIA by British police officers whose main task 
would be to advise and train the Carabinieri, the militarised arm of the Italian 
police and which was for operational purposes under the control of the Ministry
68. FO 371/60622/ZM3560/187/22, 15-10-1946, secret, letter, Charles 
to Harvey, 8-10-1946; secret, letter, Hoyer-Millar to Ward, 2-11-1946; ibid, 
ZM3914/187/22, 22-11-1946, secret, telegram, no. 1355, FO to Washington, 
22-11-1946; FO 371/60604/ZM4197/89/22, 12-12-1946, telegram, no. 1822, 
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of War.69 The other task for the British infiltrators apart from assisting the 
Carabinieria, was to ‘expand the extent of their influence to other police forces’ 
and assist the Italian government to ‘summon up sufficient courage to ask 
them to stay on as a full blown police mission’.70
Similarly, the British were particularly interested in the procurement of 
equipment to the Italian airforce. The Italian airforce had been grounded in the 
post-armistice period although some of its units were still active under Allied 
control and had been employed to help the Allies overcome manpower 
problems in the Italian theatre of war. From 1943 to 1946, the Italian airforce 
was administered at a post-armistice nominal strength of 100,000 men 
although only 31,000 were on the active list. The British felt that the airforce 
had to be re-organised and rationalized before the Peace Settlement for two 
reasons: first, because of the unnecessary burden it posed on the Italian Air 
Ministry due to its onerous financial costs and second, to get the Italians 
psychologically accustomed to the fact that their air force would be reduced in 
the post-treaty period to a mere ghost of its pre-war strength.71
In the light of these considerations SACMED produced a paper which he 
submitted to the UK and US governments and in which he proposed that the 
interim Italian airforce personnel should not exceed 15,000 men as he was
69. FO 371/60622/ZM187/187/22, 12-1-1946, telegram, no. 566, FO to 
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certain that the Russians would never agree to higher numbers.72 He proposed 
that the future operational status and role of the Italian air force had to be 
determined by the following criteria: first, that their size should be small enough 
for the Italian government to be able to maintain it in an efficient state; second, 
that no Italian government could ever again be able to use it as an aggressive 
force that could threaten the security of its neighbours and the imperial lines 
of communications and, third, that it should be strong enough to deter 
aggression on Italy, to assist the land forces in the maintenance of internal 
security and help the Allies to safeguard Italy’s frontiers’.73
Once Morgan’s proposals were accepted the next task was to determine the 
exact size of the air force. The British felt that a leaner air force could be 
trained and equipped to achieve a high degree of efficiency and be ready to 
assume the responsibility of defending the country when the Allied Forces were 
withdrawn according to the provisions of the Treaty.74 At the same time, the 
overriding factor determining the size of the Italian air force was to be the 
economic ability of Italy to maintain it as well as its other forces and that it could 
fulfil its obligations as set out by the Treaty. It was decided that the equipping 
of the air force and the parts of its combat aircraft should be of Allied
72. AIR 23/6344, top secret, telegram, NAF 1169, SACMED to CCS and 
British Chiefs of Staff, 26-6-1946; top secret, telegram, FAN 697, CCS to 
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manufacture so that the Allies retained complete control of its operational 
strength by increasing or restraining Italian operational ability through the 
regulation of the supply of aircraft and spare parts.75
As these deliberations were taking place in London, the Council of Ministers 
was locked in tense discussions aimed at finalising the draft Peace Treaty for 
Italy and the other ex-enemies. The peacemaking process during 1945-46 
which was outwardly characterized by the efforts of the ‘Big Three’ to 
cooperate, in fact was punctuated by emerging tensions in East-West relations 
and the drift towards Cold War as the negotiation process exposed the 
interests of East and West to be mutually inimical.76 The Peace Treaty with Italy 
generated a great deal of rancour as the West strove for a lenient treaty whilst 
the Soviets, having been effectively excluded from the allied administration of 
Italy, were far more interested in reparations, championing the cause of 
Yugoslavia and in keeping Italy weak.77
The treaty, which has been described as the ‘swan-song’ of the Wartime 
Alliance,78 was born out of acrimony and frequent compromises. As the first 
leaks as to its contents occurred it appeared to the Italians that what was 
taking shape in Paris exceeded their worst nightmares. The Italian Peace 
Treaty limited the Italian armed forces to 300,000 men. It set total reparations
75. Ibid.
76. Byrnes, op. cit., Chapter 8, passim; Gaddis, op. cit., pp. 304-6 and 
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to $360 million. It required Italy to relinquish its Empire by confirming the 
independence of Albania and Ethiopia, returning the Dodecanese to Greece 
and renouncing all Italian claims to other colonies. Italy had also to cede a 
small part of its home territory to France and to accept the internationalisation 
of Trieste. Most of its fleet had to be surrendered to the victorious powers.79 
The Treaty was regarded as both punitive and unjust by Italy and Italian 
politicians began to clamour for its revision. They were concerned about the 
disarmament and the colonial clauses but the most vexatious was the 
reduction of the Italian Navy to a mere ghost of its previous self.80 The 
realization that co-belligerency had not turned into a comprehensive 
redemption for Italy’s Fascist folly generated much bad feeling in Italian 
government and military circles. The Italians who felt particularly aggrieved by 
the contents of the military clauses of the Treaty, initially directed their 
resentment against all the victors, but soon the resentment became particularly 
pronounced against the British.
Bevin’s attempts to ensure a larger fleet for Italy as well as larger security 
forces, failed in the face of unyielding Soviet opposition. American 
determination to negotiate and sign any treaty, good or bad, on the basis that 
they would not pay more than lip-service to clauses they did not agree with until 
the treaty had been revised, did not assist him.81 The inevitable Italian street
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protests were accompanied by wild talk that the Italian navy would be prepared 
to scuttle ships rather than surrender them to Yugoslavia or Russia.82 Since the 
Italian navy had remained under the supervision of the Royal Navy in 
accordance with the Cunningham-De Courten agreement of 23 September 
1943, the Admiralty became worried that should the Italians decide to go ahead 
with their threats and succeed then Britain would be accused by the Soviets 
of collaborationism. The Italian Naval Ministry was strongly warned to resist 
any such temptations as it would prove to the detriment of Italy.83 Italian naval 
circles had hoped that Britain would protect the Italian navy from savage cuts 
and from the indignity of ceding any of its ships to the Soviet Union. The 
Italians not only felt that Britain was the power that gained the most out of a 
reduced Italian navy but they also felt severely let down.84 Bitterness over the 
disarmament and colonial clauses, fury that Britain had failed to protect the 
Italian navy and the lingering memories of the British heavy handedness during 
the period of co-belligerency all fused together to damage Anglo-ltalian 
relations and to plunge British popularity in Italy to an all time low.85 The 
situation led the Admiralty to conclude wisely, that the Italians would be unlikely 
to accept willingly a naval mission either before or after the signing of the 
Treaty.86
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In the meanwhile, inflammatory headlines appeared in the Italian Press such 
as ‘Italy Unarmed to the Mercy of All’,87 ‘British Indiscretions Regarding Our 
Armed Forces’,88 and ‘Italy Has Almost Ceased to Exist as an Independent 
Nation’.89 Bevin protested his innocence and revealed to De Gasperi the 
support he had given to Italy. Although the politicians were easy to mollify the 
Italian press and public were implacable. Britain tried to improve its image with 
and within Italy by using the BBC and its contacts with Italian socialist 
politicians such as Nenni and Saragat.90 Nenni, in turn, confided to Attlee that 
he was determined to see the Peace Treaty signed and he asked for Britain’s 
help. Britain decided that the least it could do was to return its share of the 
Italian fleet for scrapping to the Italians as a damage limitation exercise.91
In the meantime, a parallel crisis associated with the Venezia Giulia region had 
been unfolding which maintained Italian ill-feeling towards Britain. The tense 
stalemate over the Venezia Giulia situation had continued since neither Italy 
nor Yugoslavia were satisfied with the territorial clauses referring to Trieste and 
which had been declared a Free Port. The possibility of a Yugoslav military
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action against Italy to solve the problem by force could not be discounted. De 
Gasperi told General Morgan that Italian troops should be allowed to take part 
in any Allied operations to defend Italy’s North-Eastern border.92 This request 
was looked upon favourably by the Allied Military Authorities in the light of the 
logistical problems they faced because of demobilization. The Joint Staff 
Mission (JSM) and the SACMED were aware that their forces would be 
overstretched in the event of a Yugoslav attack so they wanted to use Italian 
troops to supplement the guarding of lines of communications and thereby 
allow Allied troops to be used in active duty more efficiently and effectively. The 
JSM was particularly concerned that should they not be allowed to use Italian 
troops for support duties, then the Allied forces’ own ability to maintain the 
status quo in Venezia Giulia would be compromised.93
General Morgan looked at the matter favourably because he was aware that 
Italian troop deployment would enable Britain to begin to reduce its own troop 
commitment in the region which had been delayed because of Italy’s 
precarious internal security situation and the worsening in East-West relations. 
In early 1946, both Attlee and Dalton stressed the need for scaling down 
overseas commitments for both economic and domestic reasons. Bevin’s 
unyielding opposition succeeded in convincing his colleagues that drastic
92. FO 371/60563/ZM2643/35/22, 2-8-1946, top secret, JSM 296, JSM 
to Chiefs of Staff, 31-6-1946; ibid., ZM2697/35/22, 7-8-1946, secret, letter 
Lowe, WO to Ross, 2-8-1946; minutes by Hoyer-Millar, 8-8-1946 and 9-8- 
1946; top secret, telegram, COS(W)358, Chiefs of Staff to JSM, 16-8-1946.
93. Ibid., top secret, telegram, no. JSM 296, JSM, Washington to WO, 
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reductions should not occur before the conclusion of the peace treaties.94 
Nevertheless reductions of the British commitment in Italy were unavoidable. 
The British government had the biggest troop commitment in Italy and Venezia 
Giulia. It amounted to 239,000 men from the land forces and 30,000 men from 
the RAF. There were also 70,000 men who were provided by the Dominions 
and India. The next largest contingent was the American one which was rather 
small in comparison fluctuating between 70,000 and 80,000 men. The British 
government had hoped that by April 1946 it would be able to reduce its troop 
commitment to 120,000 men approximately and remove all Dominion and 
Indian troops. By June 1946 preferably or by the end of 1946, at the very latest, 
it hoped to remove all British troops from Italy excluding those in Venezia Giulia 
and those manning the lines of communication to Austria who it was hoped, 
could be withdrawn as soon as the Peace Treaty came into force.95 Complete 
withdrawal from Italy was delayed because of fears about PCI intentions during 
the elections and referendum of June 1946. The Straits Controversy, the 
resumption of the Greek Civil War and the increasing tension between Italy and 
Yugoslavia because of Yugoslavia’s dissatisfaction with and refusal to sign the 
Italian Peace Treaty, had identified the Central and Eastern Mediterranean as 
an easily combustible region. Any British hopes for a quick disengagement 
from Venezia Giulia were dashed by these developments and by Byrnes’ 
declaration, to the effect, that for so long as Yugoslavia did not sign the Peace
94. CAB 79/32, COS(45)264th meeting, 1-11-1946; ibid., COS(45)265th 
meeting, 2-11-1946; CAB 80/99, COS(46)5(0), 8-1-1946; ibid., C0S(46)9(0) 
Revise, 15-1-1946; CAB 131/1, top secret, DO(46)5, 15-2-1946; ibid, top 
secret, DO(46) 8, 18-3-1946; FO 371/60564/ZM3164/35/22, 12-9-1946, 
minutes by Hankey, 20-4-1946; Smith, R., and Zametica, J., The Cold 
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Treaty with Italy all Allied troops would remain in situ.96
Although the Foreign Office was aware of the benefits of Italian troop 
deployment in Venezia Giulia it regarded such action as being fraught with 
problems because Yugoslavia was technically still at war with Italy. The 
deployment of Italian troops alongside the Allies along Italy’s North-Eastern 
border could allow the Soviets to claim that the Allies were acting illegally and 
provoke the Yugoslavs into armed action which in turn, because of East West 
tensions, could flare up into a major international incident with far-reaching 
implications for local and international security.97 In view of this possible 
outcome, the initial reaction of Bevin and the Western Department was to 
reject an Italian deployment in Venezia Giulia but, in order not to estrange Italy 
and to avoid giving rise to further anti-British sentiments within Italian 
government circles the decision was not communicated to the Italian Prime 
Minister.98 Throughout this period British foreign policy had aimed at not 
antagonizing the Soviets unduly and towards localizing any incident to avoid 
any direct confrontation with the USSR.99 Furthermore, the Foreign Office did 
not want to incite Yugoslavia to careless action at a time when negotiations for 
the Peace Treaty were still in progress and Edvard Kardelj, the Yugoslav 
Foreign Minister had left no-one in any doubt after his speech in Paris that his
96. CAB 79/32, COS(45)264th meeting, 1-11-1946; ibid.,
COS(45)265th meeting, 2-11-1946; CAB 80/99, C0S(46)5(0), 8-1-1946, 
C0S(46)9(0) Revise, 15-1-1946; FRUS, 1947, Vol. Ill, p. 892; Lewis, op. cit., 
pp. 248-50; Miller, op. cit., pp. 169-74 and 196-8.
97. FO 371/60603/ZM2350/89/22, 6-7-1946, secret, telegram, no. 377, 
Rome to FO, 14-7-1946; secret, telegram, no. 438, FO to Rome, 26-7-1946.
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government was greatly distressed with the Treaty provisions for Trieste.100 
The Foreign Office’s view was supported by evidence gathered by British 
Intelligence sources which reported a reluctance on Yugoslavia’s part to act 
since only 30% of its fighter planes were serviceable.101 It was precisely for 
these reasons that the Foreign Office felt that a public sanctioning of the use 
of Italian troops in the case of a conflict with Yugoslavia would create more 
trouble than benefits since such action could be interpreted as a 
provocation.102
This initial decision of the Foreign Office and its rationale did not convince 
General Morgan and Admiral Stone103 and this led to discord between the 
Foreign Office and the British military and eventually, Britain and America.104 
The British military reminded the Foreign Office that it would be very difficult for 
reinforcements to be brought in from elsewhere. In order to strengthen their 
argument they pointed out, in a veiled threat calculated at deflecting the 
objections of the Foreign Office, that reinforcements if needed could only be 
found in Palestine and that a weakening of the British military presence there
10°. Ibid., minutes by Hoyer-Millar, 8-8-1946 and 9-8-1946.
101. FO 371/60564/ZM3659/35/22, 29-10-1946, top secret, letter, Major 
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102. FO 371 /60564/ZM3164/35/22, 12-9-1946, minutes by Hankey, 
20-4-1946, and Warner, 21-9-1946; ibid., FO 371/60603/ZM2351/89/22, 
minute by Warner, 21-3-1946; FO 371/60563/ZM2643/35/22, 2-8-1946, 
minutes by Hoyer-Millar, 7-8-1946, 8-8-1946 and 9-8-1946.
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would expose Palestine to the risk of trouble.105 General Morgan, a fervent 
supporter of the involvement of Italian troops in the defence of their own 
country, maintained that this would boost their morale, improve their 
operational capability and facilitate the task of the Allies in re-organizing and 
rehabilitating the Italian armed forces. He also stressed that this was a good 
public relations exercise for Britain.106 General Sir Hastings Ismay, the Military 
Secretary to the Cabinet, shared this view and when the British military realized 
that their American colleagues fully supported their views, they became 
intransigent. The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff had decided that General 
Morgan ‘should be allowed full use of all troops in Italy in case of Yugoslav 
aggression’107 and the American delegation to the Paris Peace Conference lost 
no opportunity to make its feelings on the matter clear to Bevin.108
This pressure made Bevin and the Foreign Office overcome their initial 
opposition to the use of Italian troops in Venezia Giulia, but they did not 
capitulate completely. The Foreign Office was unwilling for Britain to be seen 
by the world as openly colluding with an ‘ex-enemy’ against a recent ally with 
whom Bevin still hoped to put relations on an ‘even keel’ despite American 
opposition.109 At the same time however, the Foreign Office had always
105. FO 371/60563/ZM2697/35/22, 7-8-1946, secret, letter, WO to 
Western Department, 2-8-1946, ibid., ZM3569/35/22, PM 46/144, letter from 
the Foreign Office to the Prime Minister, 29-10-1946.
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memorandum by General Sir Hastings Ismay, Military Secretary for the 
Cabinet to Attlee, 26-7-1946; confidential, letter, Hoyer-Millar to Charles, 8-8-
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accepted that if the use of Italian troops was the only alternative to a military 
defeat at the hands of the Yugoslavs, then it would be prepared to contemplate 
ad-hoc arrangements. Thus, Bevin and the Foreign Office sought to distinguish 
between minor and major episodes occurring in Venezia Giulia and proposed 
that the matter of the deployment of Italian troops be decided according to the 
seriousness of the situation. The Foreign Office continued to hold out on its 
insistence that even if SACMED were to use Italian troops in the defence of the 
region, such a decision should not be communicated to the Italian government. 
It maintained this line to the end, despite persistent requests from the British 
Chiefs of Staff and SACMED to disclose the decision to the Italians as a means 
of improving Anglo-ltalian relations. Instead, the Foreign Office suggested that 
the Italian Prime Minister ought to be told simply that the issue was still under 
consideration. For the moment at least, the Foreign Office view prevailed.110
British handling of this issue showed clearly that Britain, unlike America, was 
not willing to go out of its way to antagonize the Yugoslavs and that it was 
determined to respect the Treaty it had just negotiated in Paris. Britain hoped 
that if no rush decisions were taken and if Italian and Yugoslav tempers cooled, 
then, Italy and Yugoslavia would eventually sign the Treaty and a potentially 
dangerous incident in the area could be averted. The British attitude towards 
upholding the Peace Treaty and the issue of the use of Italian troops prior to 
the ratification of the Treaty by the Italian Parliament showed clearly the 
framework within which British policy towards Italy was set. The policy was 
bound by the parameters of regard for international law and adherence to 
treaty provisions but at the same time strengthening and rehabilitating the
11°. FO 371 /60564/ZM3614/35/22, 12-9-1946, top secret, memorandum 
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Italian armed and security forces within these limits. America and Britain found 
themselves in disagreement over their approach to Italian matters and Britain 
found itself unprepared for the American’s willingness to allow Italy open 
leeway with the provisions of the Peace Treaty and which in the end resulted 
in the undermining of relations between Britain and Italy.111 The Foreign Office 
hoped that any difficulties its policy towards the Peace Treaty policy had 
created in Anglo-ltalian relations would be temporary ones and that as soon 
as the Italians had time to cool down they would see that Britain had tried to 
shield their country from some of the most extravagant claims of Yugoslavia 
and the USSR and that in time, the Italian government would be persuaded to 
invite the proposed missions.112
Such optimism, however, was rather misplaced in view of the obstacles Britain 
had to overcome since the mission proposals had some unnattractive aspects 
from the Italian point of view.113 Britain had to convince the Italian government 
not only to accept the missions but also to persuade it to finance them. The 
Treasury had decided that the resources for the reconstruction of Italian 
armed and police forces had to be found from the Italians and it was unwilling 
to endorse the Foreign Office’s proposal to fund the missions until the Italian
111. FO 371/79349/Z7984/10535/22, 8-12-1949, confidential, despatch, 
no. 739, Mallet to Attlee, 1-12-1949; DEFE 5/16, top secret, COS(49)327, 
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government would be willing to assume their upkeep.114 It was also not 
prepared to allow Britain to enter into barter agreements with Italy, a decision 
which created liquidity problems for the Italian government and made them less 
than willing to enter into any purchase agreements at this stage.115 The Italians 
faced even more severe financial limitations than the British due to their war- 
devastated economy. Moreover, in view of the ever spiralling costs of 
maintaining their armed and police forces they were extremely reluctant to 
incur further financial commitments especially since such expenditure would 
be unpopular with its impoverished population and with the Communist and 
Socialist components of the government.116
In addition to such problems there were other practicalities to consider with 
regards to the stationing of missions in the post-treaty period and which made 
the pursuit such a policy a potential minefield. The PCI had been an integral 
part of all postwar Italian governments since 1944 and this complicated the 
situation since it was believed the PCI could oppose and frustrate any Allied 
plans designed to push the Italian internal security forces towards an anti­
114. FO 371/60602/ZM89/89/22, 5-1-1946, minute by Ross, 10-1-1946; 
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communist stance.117 The missions would only be worthwhile from the British 
point of view if they could remain in Italy after the Peace Treaty was signed. If 
this could not be achieved then the whole missions idea was not worth 
pursuing. The Treaty however, had specified that all military forces would have 
to vacate Italy within ninety days of its ratification.118 The Air Ministry also 
spotted an obvious contradiction in the whole missions concept. It observed 
that:
it would be somewhat inappropriate to have on the one hand a 
mission whose primary aim would be a general amelioration of 
the Italian Armed forces while at the same time providing other 
officers on the staff of the Ambassador to see that the Peace 
Treaty terms were carried out.119
As a result of these concerns, Whitehall saw no point in attaching missions 
without the explicit consent and open invitation of the Italian government. The 
Foreign Office embarked on the task of cultivating the Italians and assessing 
what type of mission would be most agreeable from both the Italian point of 
view and best for British interests. This decision brought to the fore the 
question of the most effective composition of the missions. Should they 
comprise only British personnel or should they be Anglo-American in 
composition. A major worry surrounding the latter option was that it could 
inadvertently present the Soviet Union and the PCI with valuable propaganda 
by re-igniting Russian accusations that Britain and the United States were 
‘ganging up’ against the USSR. Jack Ward, the counsellor at the British 
Embassy in Rome warned that Britain ought not to accept combined Anglo-
117. FO 371/60562/ZM975/35/22, 22-3-1946, top secret, FX 62994, 
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118. Wheeler-Bennett and Nichols, op. cit., pp. 672-8.
119. FO 371/60603/ZM2983/89/22, 29-8-1946, despatch, no. 429, 
Charles to Attlee, 19-8-1946; report, Brodie to the British Embassy in Rome, 
26-7-1946.
119
American missions as the Communists could capitalize on them and, in any 
case, he did not think that the Americans would be willing to get involved.120 
However, some sections of the Foreign Office were not deterred by such 
concerns and were ready to adopt a more adversarial policy towards the Soviet 
Union than Bevin himself. Thus, Christopher F. A. Warner, the Superintending 
Under-Secretary of the Information Department of the Foreign Office 
maintained that the Soviets would still think tha t:
Britain and that US [were] conniving against them - indeed, in 
many ways we are, in the sense that they are carrying out a 
general offensive against both His Majesty’s Government and 
the US government and the latter two governments believe in 
close co-operation. Italy is one of the countries over which the 
Communists and the Russians want to establish their influence 
and which we want to link with the West.121
Ward’s views however, gained the ascendancy as the reluctance of America 
to get involved in any post-Treaty military missions became as apparent as the 
urgency with which the Foreign Office regarded the internal security situation 
in Italy. Thus, the Foreign came to view as preferable purely British missions 
in order to achieve the crucial objective of Britain consolidating its position in 
Italian military affairs. The Service Departments also came out in favour of 
British-only missions when they were asked by the Foreign Office to give their 
opinion on the feasibility, desirability and the composition of these missions.122
London’s views however, were not fully compatible with those shared by some 
British officers in Italy, who felt that if anything went wrong then criticism and
12°. FO 371 /60604/ZM3612/89/22, 22-10-46, minute by Ross, 23-10- 
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blame would be directed towards Britain. These officers also had concerns that 
all-British missions would alienate those American officials in Italy and, in 
particular Ambassador Alexander Kirk, all of whom had tried to convince the 
US government of the merits of joint Allied missions. It is quite clear that British 
and American officials based in Italy had forged a close relationship during the 
war and despite Admiral Stone’s anti-British outbursts, they were anxious to 
continue allied cooperation in this field. The concerns by officers at a local 
level, however, were buried by the continued unwillingness of the United States 
to get involved in Allied missions. Eventually, Admiral Warren, General 
Goulburn and Air Vice-Marshall Brodie, the heads of the Service sub­
commissions of the Allied Commission agreed that British-only advisory and 
technical missions for the Italian services after the Peace Treaty had come into 
force were the best option ‘both from the point of view of British policy and also 
in the interests of the efficiency of the Italian forces.123
It was the rapid deterioration of the internal security situation in Italy in the 
second half of 1946 that alarmed both the Italian government and the Allies 
and which presented Britain with an opportunity to push forward its plans. As 
summer gave way to autumn, dissatisfaction with the Peace Treaty coupled 
with renewed food shortages, economic stagnation, rapid rises in inflation and 
unemployment and a large and hungry floating refugee population resulted in 
further social unrest.124 To contain the disorders the Carabinieri resumed their 
time-honoured heavy-handed ways of repressing protest by opening fire on 
demonstrators thereby precipitating further disorder. De Gasperi felt that if the
123. FO 371/60603/ZM2883/89/22, 22-8-1946, letter, Brigadier General 
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police been properly equipped and trained in modern methods such levels of 
violence could have been avoided. Under these circumstances, De Gasperi 
approached Morgan to ask for assistance in improving the training and 
efficiency of the Italian security forces and he also told David McKey, the 
charg6 d’affaires of the American Embassy in Rome, that he would welcome 
the attaching of an Allied mission to the police but he restated that he could not 
exclude the Russians and if the latter were to be included he would never 
agree to such a mission, especially, one that was acceptable to the PCI.125
Thus, the British found the moment propitious for renewing their attempts. The 
Western Department suggested that the best way to promote the missions was 
to exploit De Gasperi’s concerns on the efficiency of the Italian internal security 
forces and emphasise the benefits these from a Police mission that would not 
only concentrate on the Carabinieria but also on the Sicurezza Pubblica - the 
Italian civil police force which was in a state of disarray and which had been 
identified by Noel Charles as ideologically suspect. The fear was that if the 
relatively isolated civil police continued to be left to its own devices, its state of 
demoralization could expose it to Communist infiltration and in time the 
Communists could convert it into a militia along Balkan lines.126 Similar 
concerns had been voiced vociferously by the Americans since 1945.127
The Foreign Office raised the issue with the Italians in October 1946. Hoyer- 
Millar asked Ward, who had left the Reconstruction Department for Rome, to 
make it absolutely clear to the Italians that the missions would have a purely
125. FRUS, 1946, Vol. V, p. 940; Miller, op. cit., pp. 191-3.
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advisory role, that Britain had no intention of dictating policy and that they 
would be small with no executive powers.128 The Foreign Office had concluded 
that such small missions would be more palatable to the Italians, especially if 
it was made explicit that they would not retain all the functions that they had 
enjoyed under the Armistice regime and which had excited much public hostility 
in Italian military circles when they had become public knowledge.129 The 
missions would be attached directly to the Italian armed services or, would 
come under the corresponding service attach6 at the British Embassy in 
Rome. Their aim would be to improve the fight-worthiness of the Italian army 
and they would also furnish Britain with the necessary intelligence concerning 
the morale, state and effectiveness of the Italian army all of which had been 
assessed to be at low ebb.130
From 15 October and throughout November 1946, whilst still seeking to 
convince the Italians to accept the missions the British offered them yet 
another alternative, namely, for Italian police officers to be trained in the UK. 
This did not mean the that the British had decided to abandon, albeit 
reluctantly, their plans for a police mission. They continued pressing for such 
a mission even after the signing of the Peace Treaty in February 1947 and right 
up until the end of 1947, despite the fact that the Italian Desk of the Foreign 
Office began voicing its doubts on the likelihood of the Italian government
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accepting it.131
The British felt justified in their approach of promoting their overall mission 
plans on the back of a mission dedicated to the training of the Carabinieri and 
the other law enforcement agencies on two grounds. First, because the British 
government had concluded that the main threat to Italy’s future orientation in 
international affairs and consequent disposition towards Britain came not from 
the Red Army but from the PCI;132 and second, because of De Gasperi’s 
worries that his police forces were not able to deal effectively with internal 
disorders. The British were determined that the police mission, in particular, 
would have to be an entirely British affair rather than an Allied one because of 
US diffidence, the urgent attention Italy’s internal security situation required and 
concerns that the calibre of American police officers would not be of as high 
quality as their British counterparts.133
The political realities facing De Gasperi in 1946 were not different from those 
which faced Parri in 1945. Italy was still governed by a heterogeneous coalition 
of parties which included the Communists and the only foreign policy that could 
be agreed upon was one of neutrality. The acceptance of military missions that 
excluded advisors from the Soviet Union would fly against the grain of such a
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ZM212/187/22, 14-1-1946, letter, Ross to Beighton, Treasury, 21-1-1946; ibid., 
ZM1729/187/22, 23-5-1946, minutes by Sargent and Ross, 15-6-1946.
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policy.134 De Gasperi was an astute politician who had no desire to cause the 
downfall of his government before the Peace Treaty was signed and ratified by 
the Italian Parliament. Furthermore, the Italian government was playing for time 
to see if the Americans came up with more advantageous proposals. Thus, 
whilst showing a keen interest in accepting the cost-free elements of the British 
proposals they proved to be extremely reticent in committing themselves to any 
expenditure. Their attitude provoked the irritation of the Rome Embassy which 
came to interpret the Italian behaviour to be the result of ‘gambling somewhat 
unscrupulously on the Allies’ direct interest in the efficiency of their armed 
forces to squeeze as much free equipment as they [could]’.135
Despite British efforts, the Italian government remained equivocal and non­
committal throughout 1946. On the one hand, it would keep stressing how 
much it would like British military assistance in the form of missions and on the 
other, it kept on distancing itself from any commitment or even tentative 
affirmative reply because of the political atmosphere in Italy. At the same time, 
however, the Italians would keep the question alive through unofficial channels. 
For example, General Efisio Marras - previously Commander of Milan and 
prospective head of the Italian General Staff - approached General Goulburn, 
the head of the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission and 
let it be known that although he had no authority to speak officially, his wish 
was to come to some formal arrangement with the British concerning the 
training and equipping of the Italian army in the post-Treaty period. Baits of this 
kind, coupled with Count Carandini’s positive attitude encouraged the Foreign 
Office and the Service Departments to devise new plans and new approaches
134. FO 371/60562/ZM975/35/22, 22-3-1946, top secret, FX 62994, 
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Ross, 7-12-1946.
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to make the mission plans acceptable to the Italians.136
By December 1946, however, the Rome Embassy was becoming extremely 
frustrated with its lack of success in making the Italians clarify their position. As 
the end of 1946 approached and the last British troops from Italy were being 
readied for withdrawal, with the exception of those based in the Udine area, the 
War Office became so concerned that it proposed a fresh and ingenious 
approach to the Foreign Office and one which included a not so veiled element 
of blackmail. The War Office proposed that the Rome Embassy ought to 
approach the Italians and tell them that if they did not invite British military 
missions to assist the Italian Army in the post-treaty period then their forces 
would be forced to make do with no assistance whatsoever. However, the 
Foreign Office decided that such approach would alienate the Italians still 
further and did not proceed along the War Office lines.137 Thus, a position of 
impasse and stagnation had been reached.
By January 1947 and with the prospect of the signing of the Italian Treaty 
imminent the British realised that their scope for waiting had diminished 
uncomfortably and they would have to put their proposal to the Italians directly 
rather than to wait for them to ask. The British government put its proposals to 
the Italian government backed up by the British Air Ministry’s plan for the 
equipping of the Italian air force. The plan envisaged that of the seven 
squadrons under Fighter Headquarters, five would be furnished with British IX 
Spitfires and two with American P-51 aircraft.138 Britain however, could not 
afford to supply all this equipment in the form of aid and it expected to be paid
136. Ibid.
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in hard currency. The Air Ministry devised a mixed scheme to overcome these 
financial problems which envisaged a programme of assistance for the Italian 
Air Force which included both free and chargeable elements. The assistance 
package included the free supply of British equipment - all the Spitfires and 
some spare parts - valued at £2,149,000. Some of the aircraft were already in 
Italy and were supplied from British surplus stores in the Mediterranean. The 
package also included the supply, for payment of £305,000 in sterling in 
London, for equipment valued at £1,401,000 which would be supplied from 
surplus stores outside Italy. On top of this Britain would provide Italy with 
equipment and spare parts from new production at full prices and which was 
estimated at £1,157,000 in sterling.139
1947 brought with it new possibilities and challenges. American proposals for 
the re-equipment of the Italian Air force emerged which were more attractive 
than the British ones as they undercut them. The overall costs to the Italians 
included a ‘nominal price for aircraft spares for three years and associated 
aircraft maintenance equipment plus the actual costs incurred in placing the 
aircraft into operational standard’. Furthermore the Americans decided that the 
Italians would be ‘allowed to return P-38 aircraft for scrapping or other disposal 
and use the credit for P-51s. Moreover, they stressed that in view of the crucial 
importance of the speedy improvement of the Italian armed forces, they would 
make an effort to close the gap between ‘scrap price’ and ‘nominal cost’ as 
much as possible in order to overcome Italian financial and budgetary 
limitations. The Americans also stressed that had they not been prohibited by 
regulations they would have been willing to supply the equipment without
139. Ibid.; FO 371/67791/Z1967/135/22, 24-2-1947, confidential, 
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payment.140 Such a scheme was very difficult for Britain to better not only 
because of its well-nigh impossible economic situation in 1947, but also 
because throughout this period Britain’s view was that in terms of procurement, 
Italy ‘should be given lower priority to the Dominions and the allied countries’.141
London was extremely distressed by the American foray into an area which it 
had been agreed was its own responsibility and without even any prior 
consultation. It judged the American proposals as unrealistic as the equipment 
the Italians were likely to receive was obsolete and out of date American stock. 
In the end the United States had to withdraw its offer and to accept the 
implementation of the British proposals. The British plan was put into action 
during spring and summer 1947. Its implementation was not a straightforward 
affair because the Italians were willing to absorb the cost-free elements of the 
British package but rather reluctant to incur the costs of those aspects which 
required payment. As a result of this, the improvement in the efficiency of the 
Italian air force was not significant. British military aid and equipment to Italy 
continued also from surplus stores in Austria which also included Sherman 
tanks.142
Anglo-American difficulties over the equipping of the Italian air force revealed 
some of the problems the British would have to face increasingly in its relations 
with Italy, namely that America in its eagerness to strengthen Italy would be
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prepared to by-pass Britain. This attitude contributed greatly to the delay and 
subsequent failure of the missions plan to be implemented.143 This had been 
the case from July 1945 when the British had first put forward their proposals 
to the Italian government. The Americans had viewed the British plans with a 
distinct lack of enthusiasm and they deferred their own decision on their 
implementation for the future. When the US had been approached by the 
British yet again in August 1946, the Americans expressed their unwillingness 
to get involved but they encouraged the British authorities to explore their 
chances with the Italians once again. This equivocal approach was due to the 
fact that throughout the first half of 1946 the State Department and the 
American military were at odds with each other on how far they should 
intervene in the reconstruction of the Italian armed forces. The State 
Department advocated interventionism. The American military felt that such 
intervention would have an adverse effect on the Italian armed forces since 
their equipment had been standardised along British lines. Since Britain had 
assumed the leading role in connection with Italian military affairs they felt 
reluctant to interfere. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff understanding was that their 
‘military commitment in Italy should be reduced as rapidly as possible’.144 All 
their actions up until August 1946 had been based on the premise that ‘the 
American role in the Mediterranean theatre has always been a supporting one 
to the British and that it was undesirable to disturb the present relationship.’145
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In fact, it had been this very ambiguity in American policy towards Italian 
military affairs that had enabled Britain to maintain its influence in Italy for as 
long as it did.
As 1946 had progressed and relations between East and West worsened, the 
State Department became even determined to reduce British influence in Italy. 
The position of the State Department on further engagement in Italian military 
and police matters vis-£-vis the US Joint Chiefs of Staff stance on 
disengagement was strengthened by the attitudes of the American military 
authorities in Italy. Admiral Ellery Stone, the Chief Commissioner of the Allied 
Commission, was a fierce critic of British policy towards Italy and pressed his 
government forcefully at every given opportunity to seek an invitation from the 
Italian government for the installation of purely American missions in the post- 
Treaty Italian army. He claimed that such missions would be more successful 
because the Italian military was better disposed to accept them and because 
it was in America’s ‘long-term interests in Italy and the Mediterranean to 
undertake this responsibility vis-£-vis the postwar Italian army’. He went on to 
add that Anglo-American missions were a poor second alternative and that 
they should be acceptable only on an absolute parity basis in personnel and 
policy making matters. He pulled no punches when he gave his opinion on 
British-only missions which he described as the ‘last and least desirable’ 
alternative.146 Although Stone’s opinions did not find much favour with the 
Pentagon which regarded his views as extreme, they caused a resonance with 
the American Embassy in Rome and the more interventionist State Department 
because of the deterioration of Italian internal security and the polarization of 
the international scene. This situation succeeded in helping the State
146. FRUS, 1946, Vol. V, pp. 917 and 947.
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Department to make the Pentagon rethink its policy.147
Whilst these new realities were being digested at the Foreign Office, Count 
Carlo Sforza, the new Italian Foreign Minister, announced emphatically that the 
Italian government and the Italian Ministry of War had decided to reject the 
proposed British missions because of fears of possible communist reaction. At 
the same time he took the opportunity to convey the fact that he would 
welcome them only if they were disguised and undercover.148 The British did 
not see this decision as a final one but as an interim arrangement until De 
Gasperi was strong enough to disregard the views of his Communist coalition 
partners.
During 1947, international and domestic developments conspired to ensure 
political triumph of the Christian Democrats. With the announcement of the 
Truman Doctrine in March, perceived by De Gasperi as guaranteeing Italy as 
well,149 the signing of the Peace Treaty, the acceptance of the Constitution by 
the Italian Parliament and the split of the Italian Socialist Party, the PSIUP, De 
Gasperi decided with the encouragement of the Americans, to ditch the PCI 
and the PSIUP, his ‘disloyal coalition allies’, from his government.150 What,
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however, gave De Gasperi the parliamentary clout to play such a bold hand 
with such brutal finesse was the split in the Italian Socialist Party. The Palazzo 
Barberini schism was the result of the evident disquiet felt by many prominent 
socialists with the Pact of Unity. Giuseppe Saragat, the moderate socialist, 
decided that the so-called ‘fusionist’ line was not for him and in January 1947 
he decided to form his own party. He took with him enough Socialist deputies 
as to weaken the PSIUP to such a degree that it gave De Gasperi the chance 
to govern Italy without the support of the Left anymore.151 The subsequent 
resignation of De Gasperi’s government plunged Italy into a crisis. Palmiro 
Togliatti, the leader of the PCI, was oblivious to the machinations of De Gasperi 
and helped the latter in facilitating the signing of the universally unpopular 
Italian Peace Treaty and in the enshrining of Mussolini’s Lateran Pacts and the 
Concordat with the Vatican of 1929 into the Constitution of the Republic as 
article 7, much to the disgust of the other anti-clerical parties.152 The political 
crisis was resolved with the ditching of the PCI and PSI from government and 
the announcement of the first monocolore Christian Democratic government 
in the history of the Italian Republic on 31 May 1947.
The successful outcome of the ‘exclusion crisis’ that led to the creation of the 
first Communist-free Cabinet in Italy since 1944 and the banishment of the 
Italian Communists to the political wilderness rekindled hopes in the Foreign 
Office that Count Sforza would reverse his statement on the missions and that 
now he would welcome them.153 The Foreign Office decided to pursue the
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missions idea with renewed effort by refashioning its plans and once again
making the offer of liaison staff for the Italian services, the upkeep of which
would be supplemented by the Italians.154 However a positive response from
the Italians was still not forthcoming. This precipitated intense discussion within
the Foreign Office with the Italian Desk advocating the cancellation of the
British offer and Sir Oliver Harvey, the Superintending Under-Secretary of the
Western Department, supporting the view that Britain ought to persevere and
continue pressurising the Italians into accepting the scheme. Characteristically,
F.D.W. Brown of the Italian Desk of the Western Department minuted :
I do not think we need make any further effort to force these 
missions down the Italians’ throat and if the Italians are still 
reluctant to accept I think we should abandon the whole 
scheme...155
Harvey went on to propose however, that the issue ought to be raised during 
Sforza’s visit to London in autumn 1947.156
By 1947 Italian public opinion was not particularly friendly towards Britain and 
it soon became evident that British influence in the internal affairs of the 
country had been replaced by that of America. The reputation of Britain had 
suffered in the main because of its decision to grant independence to India and 
to withdraw from Greece. The announcement of the Truman Doctrine had 
transformed America in the minds of many Italians as the only guarantor 
against the USSR. The announcement of the ERP had shown that America 
was a universal provider. Italians had also become aware of Britain’s acute
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economic problems and this had raised serious doubts in Britain’s ability to 
pursue its own foreign policy and exert influence in Italian affairs.157
The British government fought back against such notions by attempting to 
restore good relations with Italy and at the same time it sought to neutralize the 
influence of the PCI in the run up to Italy’s first general election since the 
collapse of Fascism. Britain and Italy signed a financial agreement and Bevin 
took steps to support Saragat. Morgan Phillips’, the Secretary of the Labour 
Party, letter to Italian trade unionists in December 1947 was only one 
manifestation of this more-proactive policy.158 Britain tried, simultaneously to 
strengthen cultural relations between the two countries by inviting Italian 
journalists to Britain to see for themselves the ‘English Revolution’ in social and 
industrial-relations reform. The exhibition ‘Britain Today’ which was presented 
in many urban centres in Italy was particularly successful and drew many 
spectators from all walks of life and not just the middle and upper classes who 
usually frequented such events. As the relations between the two countries 
gradually became more positive some circles in Italy came to perceive Britain 
as a country which could exercise some restraint over the US.159 M.N.F. 
Steward, the Press Officer of the Embassy in Rome, reported that this initiative 
had paid major dividends when up to forty articles extolling British 
achievements could be traced back to participants in the scheme and that 
even Avanti! and L’UnitS had stopped attacking British imperialism. Avanti! had
157. FO 953/70/PW4830/511/922, 8-9-1947, ‘Confidential Report on 
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gone even so far as to call Bevin, the natural leader of Europe.160
In autumn 1947 Count Carlo Sforza visited London. The visit was considered 
a major success especially since Bevin agreed to return to Italy Britain’s share 
of reparations from the Italian Fleet.161 Sir Oliver Harvey decided that the time 
was opportune for him to raise the matter of the missions with Count Zoppi, the 
director general of the Italian Foreign Ministry. Zoppi was extremely 
forthcoming and assured Harvey that the Italian army had decided to accept 
the attachment of ‘technical experts’ but that the Italian navy and air force had 
not as yet reached a final decision. He went on to state that the Italian 
government was all in favour of the missions and more than willing to pay for 
their living costs. Indeed, he was so positive that he told Harvey that the 
Ministry would confirm this decision in a formal reply to the British Embassy as 
soon as possible.162
The Rome Embassy and the Foreign Office were to wait in vain for the reply 
Zoppi had promised. The War Office pressured the Foreign Office to keep 
exerting pressure on Italy on the familiar grounds that the missions would 
strengthen Britain’s ability to keep Italy within its orbit and prevent the Russians 
from supplanting its influence in the region. The War Office suggested that the 
Foreign Office should urge the Italians to came up with an affirmative decision
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by 11 November 1947.163 Eventually, in May 1948, Sir Victor Mallet, the British 
Ambassador in Rome, was told formally that the Italian government could not 
endorse the attachment of a mission to its armed forces.164 The Foreign 
Office’s conclusion was that the Italians were revelling in their newly found 
independence and were hiding behind excuses of budgetary difficulties and the 
potential reactions of the Soviets. Bevin accepted the Italian decision. He had 
by now come to the decision that Italian security and defence would be better 
considered when Italy became a member of the BTO and these matters were 
entertained in connection with arrangements for mutual assistance.165 The 
Ministry of Defence also agreed that the plans should be dropped. It 
recognized that any further pressure on Italy to accept the missions would 
mean that Britain would have to pay and that the Ministry would have to press 
the Treasury to fund the living costs of the mission personnel. The Ministry of 
Defence was reluctant to do so. Thus, the issue was shelved.166
The rejection of the British plans by the Italian government did not signal the 
end of British interest in the fortunes of the Italian armed forces nor did it come 
as a disappointment for Britain which embarked on implementing its fall-back 
position with regards to the Italian security forces. Thus, Britain substituted the 
now defunct idea of missions with the provision of training of the Italian armed
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and police forces by inviting Italian officers for training in the UK.167 This 
succeeded in enabling the British to keep a close eye on the state and morale 
of the Italian armed forces which was Britain’s main concern. British interest in 
strengthening Italy’s forces continued for as long as the PCI was strong and 
capable of internal subversion. The British recognised the fact that the Italian 
armed forces were regarded as ‘virtually useless for modern warfare’. 
However, they viewed the malaise inflicting the Italians as being caused not by 
the draconian provisions of the Peace Treaty but by the lack of suitable 
equipment and training.168
The British policy towards Italy in the immediate post-Treaty period always 
remained clear and steadfast, namely that the Italian armed forces had to be 
improved within Treaty limits to the degree that Italy’s ability to defend itself was 
once again restored.169 It was also its policy that the military clauses of the 
Treaty had to be implemented in order to uphold, even notionally, British rights 
with regards to the implementation of similar clauses in the Balkan Peace 
Treaties.170 It was understood however that implementation should not allow 
for a further deterioration in Italy’s ability to defend itself. This brought the 
British authorities in Rome in conflict at times with their task of enforcing the 
provisions of the Peace Treaty. Their fear that the Italian army alone could not 
deal effectively with internal armed disorders made them tolerate many
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breaches of Articles 53, 61, 63, and 67 of the Peace Treaty by the Italian 
armed forces and more particularly by the police. These breaches included 
personnel numbers above ceiling levels and the arming of the Sicurezza 
Pubblica to such a degree that they possessed more fire power per battalion 
than their British counterparts.171 Britain had also realised from the beginning 
that enforcement of the Treaty had to be carried out collectively and not 
unilaterally. America indicated from early on that it was not prepared to take 
a rigorous line towards enforcement.172 Nevertheless, the Foreign Office felt 
that Britain should not sanction such breaches openly and that its policy should 
continue to be directed towards ensuring that Italy took reasonable steps to 
comply with its Treaty obligations and that any breaches were concessions on 
the part of the enforcement agencies and were not to be presented by the 
Italians as a fait accompli.'73
This policy continued even after the inclusion of Italy in the North Atlantic 
Treaty of April 1949 as a founding member. Both the Foreign Office and the 
British military, despite their reluctance to see Italy included in NATO, agreed 
that as a member of the Atlantic Pact it had to become militarily as strong as 
possible as soon as possible. A stronger Italy was in Britain’s interest. 
However, the British approach on how to strengthen Italy differed substantially 
from the American one. The British considered that Italy already had enough
171. FO 371/73234/Z9515/9515/22, 22-11-1948, secret, despatch, no. 
380, Mallet to McNeil, 16-11-1948, minute by McNab, Military Attache, Rome; 
FO 371/73172/9649/167/22, secret, despatch, no. 382, Mallet to McNeil,
9-11-1948; ibid., Z2011/167/22, 22-3-1948, minute by Pemberton-Pigott, 
17-3-1948; ibid., Z4162/167/22, 18-5-1948, minute by Brown, 28-5-1948, 
confidential, despatch, no. 157, Mallet to Bevin, 12-5-1948.
172. Ibid., Z1336/167/22, 17-2-1948, minute by Pemberton-Pigott, 
19-2-1948, despatch, no. 58, Mallet to Bevin, 6-2-1948; ibid., Z2011/167/22, 
22-3-1948, Pemberton-Pigott, 17-3-1948.
173. FO 371/73172/Z2011/167/22, 22-3-1948, minute by Pemberton- 
Pigott, 17-3-1948.
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scope to make its armed forces much more efficient and that it had some way 
to go before it reached the levels of preparation proscribed by the Peace 
Treaty. They also considered it inexpedient to violate openly the provisions of 
the Peace Treaty. They were not averse to turning a blind eye from time to time 
to Italian violations, but they felt that sanctioning overt violations would play 
straight into the hands of PCI and Soviet propagandists. Indeed, the Soviet 
Note of 19 July had protested against Italian inclusion in NATO exactly along 
these lines. The British view was that the best way forward was to strengthen 
the Italian armed forces within Peace Treaty limits.174 Because of this, and not 
because of any feeling of gratuitous vengeance, Britain adopted a stricter 
approach towards the enforcement of the military clauses of the Treaty than 
the United States. As a consequence, each time the British sought to uphold 
the limitations imposed by the Treaty they found themselves obstructed by the 
Americans who maintained that Italy ought to be allowed some leeway.
The Rome Embassy observed this apparent divergence of policy between 
Britain and America with alarm. On the one hand, the vestiges of British 
influence in the area were slipping away because of the bitterness the British 
attitude was generating among Italians. As the British Ambassador put it, ‘it is 
we who get the kicks and the Americans who get the credit. On the other hand, 
this public rift seemed certain to have an impact on the implementation of the 
Peace Treaty. The enforcement of the Treaty, so recently ratified, was being 
undermined because the Italians could now play off the British against the
174. FO 371/79240/Z2624/1074/72, 21-3-1948, confidential, despatch, 
no. 105, Mallet to Bevin, 22-3-1948; FRUS, 1948, Vol. IV, pp. 261-5; Smith, 
The US, Italy and NATO, pp. 93-4; Sforza, Cinque Anni, pp. 258-9; RIIA, 
Carlyle, M., (ed.), Documents in International Affairs, 1949-50, London, 1953, 
pp. 268-9.
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Americans.175 Anglo-American differences over the implementation of the 
military clauses of the Treaty mirrored their divergent attitudes on the value 
they attached to the defence of Italy. The Truman Administration had made 
Italian defence a priority. It was determined to build up Italy to be able to 
withstand a Soviet attack as soon as possible. It was even prepared to turn a 
blind eye to some violations of the Peace Treaty so long as it improved Italy’s 
parlous military weakness.176
Two incidents in particular, brought the British and the Americans into 
confrontation; over the Torus project’ and Italian arms exports.177 During 
March and April 1949 the Italians declared a strong interest in acquiring a 
German torpedo boat called Torus’ from an American source and they tried to 
enlist British support. The British government, despite personal pleas from 
Sforza and Pacciardi, the Italian Minister of Defence, opposed the idea 
because it would openly contravene the Peace Treaty, specifically articles 52 
and 69 of the Treaty which forbad Italy explicitly from acquiring war materials 
of German origin or design and constructing, acquiring, employing or 
experimenting with motor torpedo boats.178 The Americans adopted a 
diametrically opposed position. They maintained that article 52 did not apply 
because Hunter, the vendor, was an American citizen and thus his boat was 
an American vessel. The United States succeeded in overriding article 52 and 
then proceeded to ignore the provisions of article 69 by allowing the Italians not
175. FO 371/79349/Z7984/10535/22, 8-12-1949, confidential, despatch, 
no. 739, Mallet to Attlee, 1-12-1949; DEFE 5/16, top secret, COS(49)327, 
‘Policy towards the Italian Armed Forces, 4-10-1949.
176. Miller, op. cit., pp. 175-6, 193-205, and 219-23; Smith, op. cit., p.
147.
177. DEFE 5/16, top secret, COS(49)327, Annex, 4-10-1949.
178. FO 371/79349/Z7984/10535/22, 8-12-1949, confidential, despatch, 
no. 739, Mallet to Attlee, 1-12-1949; Wheeler-Bennett and Nichols, op. cit., pp. 
674 and 678.
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only to complete the transaction with Hunter which gave them Torus’ but also 
to buy some ex-German mine sweepers from the United States Office of 
Foreign Liquidator. The latter purchase openly contravened articles 52 and 56 
of the Treaty, both of which prohibited the Italian navy from obtaining such 
vessels.179
The British were kept in the dark about the minesweeper deal. They only 
realized what had happened from reports in the Italian press. The Americans 
maintained that nothing untoward had occurred, claiming that the mine 
sweepers were not war material as they had been disarmed and were not to 
be incorporated directly into the Italian navy. This of course begged the 
question as to why in that case Italy needed them in the first place. The Italians 
used the incident to embarrass the British and suggested that it was about time 
they took a leaf out of the American’s book and adopted a more relaxed 
approach towards the implementation of the Peace Treaty.180 Sir Victor Mallet 
accepted the need for change. In his view, London was adopting a far too 
legalistic and rigid an approach in interpreting the terms of the Peace Treaty 
which merely underlined Britain’s ineffectualness, since the Italians were 
regularly reminded that so long as they turned to the Americans for support, 
they could always get their way.181 The British government recognising that its 
last vestiges of influence in Italy would be totally eroded should it continue 
alone in insisting upon the strict implementation of the terms of the Treaty, 
reluctantly suggested to the Americans that the two countries should liaise and 
coordinate policy on such matters before decisions were communicated to the
179. Ibid.; DEFE 5/16, secret, COS(49)327, Annex, 4-10-1949; Wheeler- 





Almost immediately afterwards a second incident occurred over Italian arms 
exports which were prohibited a fortiori by the Treaty. Article 53 forbad Italy to 
‘manufacture or possess either publicly or privately any war materials different 
in type from, or exceeding in quantity that required and permitted for their 
forces’.183 But London received numerous intelligence reports suggesting that 
the Italians were cultivating trading links in arms exports with countries in the 
Middle East and South East Asia. The same source also maintained that the 
Italian government was actively assisting these transactions, which included 
Sherman tanks, aircraft, artillery pieces and large quantities of small guns. The 
company Vickers-Armstrong also tipped off Whitehall that the Italians were 
tendering for an order to construct a destroyer for Venezuela. Though there 
was some sympathy for Italy straying slightly from the Treaty in order to 
improve its military strength, British officials could not bring themselves to 
tolerate open and flagrant breaches of the letter and spirit of the treaty. Their 
main concerns here were twofold. First, there was anxiety that such arms 
exports could at a future date be used against British forces. A case in point 
was the suspected sale of such material to Guatemala, which remained in 
dispute over the frontier with neighbouring British Honduras.184 Secondly, there 
was the worry that if Italy actively pursued an energetic arms trade, it would 
deplete its already scarce resources and consequently become even more 
dependent on the US. In turn this would mean that US supplies to other 
European countries would decrease and thus affect the security of Western
182. Ibid.
183. Wheeler-Bennett and Nichols, op. cit., pp. 674.
184. DEFE 4/25, top secret, COS(49)155th mtg, 10-10-1949; DEFE 
5/16, top secret, COS(49)327, 4-10-1949.
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Europe.185 By this stage, British influence over Italy had sharply diminished. 
The Chiefs of Staff and the Foreign Office concluded that Britain must therefore 
persuade the US to adopt a common policy towards the Italian armed forces 
and Italian armed exports and therefore they passed on to Washington all the 
information they had.186
Wholesale reorganization and reconstruction of the Italian armed forces was 
not to occur until after the creation of NATO and the decision of the US to 
commit itself unquestioningly to the defence of Europe after the Korean War 
and the adoption of NSC-68.187 The reconstruction was undertaken under the 
auspices the United States and the armed forces were under the control of the 
American military and right wing elements of the DC rather than the Italian 
State and this encouraged the creation of shambolic paramilitary organisations 
such as ‘Gladio’. All in all, a very different force than the one Britain had 
originally in mind.
Conclusion.
In the early postwar period Britain played a crucial role in reconstructing, re­
equipping and preparing the Italian armed and police forces for the tasks of 
defending their country from internal and external subversion. Planning 
focused mainly on providing equipment and attaching missions to the Italian 
defence and internal security forces. Britain’s objective had been to perpetuate 
its involvement in Italian affairs and to safeguard its position in Western Europe 
and the Middle East. British plans for restructuring and re-equipping the Italian
185. Ibid.
186. Ibid.
187. Nuti, op. cit., pp. 205-240; Gaddis, J.L., Strategies of Containment: 
A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy, New York, 
1982, pp. 89-126; Smith, op. cit., pp. 104-176, passim.
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armed forces could not be pursued without the cooperation or the complicity of 
the United States. Britain simply lacked the financial means to undertake such 
a task alone. At the same time, the Americans were becoming increasingly 
involved in Italy, partly because of the influence of the vociferous Italian lobby 
on the Democratic Administration, but more importantly, because the United 
States was coming to terms with its superpower status, the emergence of the 
Cold War and the determination of the Truman Administration from early on to 
make the defence of Italy one of its top priorities. From June 1946 onwards 
Washington became increasingly aware that if it wanted to see the Italian 
armed forces improve it would have to offer up military assistance and that such 
assistance would be quite advantageous to them as it would increase their 
leverage over Italian affairs.188 By the end of 1947 however, and with the 
withdrawal of Allied troops from Italy, the space for manoeuvre on the British 
side was shrinking rapidly. Thus, Britain came to reap the bitter harvest of the 
intransigent, punitive and unsympathetic attitude shown to Italy by Eden and 
Churchill. The Labour government’s tendency to occupy the high moral ground 
succeeded in antagonizing the Italian military and politicians and led in the end, 
along with De Gasperi’s unwillingness to accept missions supplied by just one 
of the Allied Powers, to the demise of the British plans.189 Thus, Britain had no 
option but to accept that the United States had assumed a hegemonic position 
over Italian affairs not only in economic matters but also in military affairs too. 
Consequently, it was under American tutelage, resources and assistance that 
the Italian armed forces were rebuilt and rearmed.190
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The 'British Way to Socialism’: British Intervention in the Italian 
Elections of April 1948 and its Aftermath
On 18 April 1948, Italy faced its first general election since Mussolini’s 
successful ‘march on Rome’ in 1922. The West perceived Italy as being at a 
dangerous crossroads. It was seen as a country that was susceptible both to 
internal subversion because of the strength of its Communist Party, as well as 
a country that could be won by the PCI at the ballot box through its popularity 
and its electoral pact with the socialists.The choice Italians were faced with was 
either a straightforward endorsement or an outright rejection of Communism. 
A rejection of the Christian Democrats through the ballot box would mean the 
implicit and explicit rejection of the Western liberal democratic model and would 
impair Western prestige extensively. It would put in jeopardy the success of the 
European Recovery Programme (ERP) and it would call into question the 
effectiveness of containment. Above all, the West feared that a communist 
victory would strengthen immensely the Soviet Union and the appeal of 
Communism world-wide as it would make manifest the notion that the Western 
ideal had been found wanting and that it had been discarded not through the 
use of force but through the ballot box. These considerations made Britain and 
America decide to place all their might behind the Italian anti-communist forces 
in Italy in their efforts to ensure the frustration of all communist designs on and 
within Italy.1
1. Miller, J.E., Taking Off the Gloves: The United States and the Italian 
Election of 1948', Diplomatic History, no. 7, Winter, 1983, p. 47; Pisani, S.,
The CIA and the Marshall Plan, Edinburgh, 1991, p. 107; FRUS, 1948, Vol. 3, 
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America embarked on a massive effort of overt and covert intervention utilising 
all the means it had at its disposal - falling short only of provoking civil war in 
Italy as a pretext of re-occupying it2 - to ensure that the Italian elections did not 
hold any unwanted surprises and that the Italian Communists could not mount 
a Czech type coup against De Gasperi. This policy led to America ‘taking off 
the gloves’, as Miller has so eloquently commented.3 The newly established 
organizations of the National Security Council (NSC) and the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) were mobilized to assess the danger and put 
together a programme of action that would forestall the possibility of a 
communist electoral victory. The massive American intervention in Italy in the 
lead up to the April election was both imaginative and intrusive and made use 
of direct and covert methods to achieve its ends. It was the prototype for 
similar American interventions in the domestic politics of all those countries 
which it believed were important to its national security during the entire Cold 
War period.4 As Ginsborg has observed, it was also ‘breathtaking in its 
contempt for any principle of ‘‘non intervention” in the internal affairs of an
2. Miscamble, W.D., George Kennan and the Making of American 
Foreign Policy, 1947-1950, Princeton, 1992, pp. 102-6; FRUS, 1948, Vol. Ill, 
pp. 848-9.
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independent country’.5
The adoption of the Truman Doctrine was to result in a noticeable contraction 
of British power on the northern shores of the Mediterranean. Although Britain 
had been relegated to playing merely a supporting role to that of the US, a 
reality that which was manifested in its policies towards Italy, Britain 
nevertheless remained a significant force in the influencing of developments 
in and the shaping of post-fascist Italy. The existence of a huge network of 
British financial and economic interests, the close links between the British and 
Italian military as well as the Labour Party’s links with the Italian socialist 
movement allowed Britain to continue to play a significant role in the affairs of 
the region. Britain’s involvement in the Italian general election of 1948 was to 
be both decisive and uncompromising. The British decision to intervene was 
based on two equally important objectives: to defeat the electoral challenge of 
the combined PCI/PSIUP ticket and in the long run to replace Nenni’s Partito 
Socialista Italiano di Units Proletaria (PSIUP) with a genuine social democratic 
force based on the ideals of the ‘British way to socialism’. The British 
Government had no doubts whatsoever that De Gasperi, his Christian 
Democrats and collaborators, especially Saragat’s secessionist socialists, 
should be given all the assistance they needed to defeat the looming threat of 
a PCI victory in April. Sir Victor A. L. Mallet had characterised the forthcoming 
electoral contest as ‘the real crisis in Italian politics and far and away the most 
important event since the overthrow of Mussolini’ and he recommended that 
HMG do ‘everything in its power to help and encourage the Christian 
Democrats and their allies in the electoral battle’.6 Bevin regarded Italy as
5. Ginsborg, op. cit., p. 115.
6. FO 371/73156/Z1359/93/22, 17-2-1948, secret, personal, letter, 
Mallet to Kirkpatrick, Superintending Under-Secretary of the Western 
Department of the FO, 12-2-1948.
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being the ‘weakest link in the chain of anti-communist states’7 and had assured 
Sforza that his government was determined to help the Italian government in 
its fight against communism.8 British involvement in the election also became 
inevitable from the moment the British government resolved, at Bevin’s 
insistence, that Britain had to give all the support it could to all democratic anti­
communist elements in Europe in order to resist the spread of communism 
westwards. It was Bevin’s strong contention that Britain was far better placed 
than America to offer an attractive ideological alternative to communism, one 
which would aim at the transformation of ‘London into the Mecca for social 
democracy in Europe’.9
Despite their determination to accomplish these aims, the British favoured 
lower profile operations than the Americans.10 The methods and tactics of 
British intervention were shaped by several considerations; first, concerns over 
the expediency of some of America’s interventionist plans; second, the delicate 
state of Anglo-ltalian relations; third, the Foreign Office’s belief that the 
Christian Democrats were, in any case, on course to win the elections; fourth, 
fears of undermining the last vestiges of British power in the region; fifth, the 
desire of the British government to push the Italian government into adopting 
a programme of social and economic reform which would contain the popularity 
of communism in Italy which it saw as grounded in the fundamental failure of 
the Italian government to tackle the chronic and complex problems of poverty,
7. CAB 129/25, CM(48)72, top secret, memorandum, Bevin, 3-3-1948; 
CAB 128/12, CM27(48), 8-4-1948; FO 371/73069/Z2642/2307/22, 30-3-1948, 
top secret, minute by Roberts, 26-2-1948.
8. FO 371 /73170/Z2479/165/22, 22-3-1948, despatch, no. 106, Mallet 
to Bevin, 19-3-1948.
9. CAB 129/23, CP(48)8, top secret, 4-1-1948.
10. FO 371/73069/Z2307/22, 30-3-1948, top secret, minute by Roberts, 
Bevin’s private secretary, record of discussion between Bevin and Douglas,
26-2-1948.
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ill-distribution of wealth and reform.11 One spectacular area of British 
involvement was the intervention in the internal politics of the organised labour 
movement both on the party political and on the trade union level.12 The many 
other areas of manipulation which Britain contemplated were in food supply, the 
involvement of Italy in African colonial development, Italian inclusion in the 
Brussels Treaty, naval visits to Italian ports, a solution to Italy’s surplus 
population problem, colonial concessions, Franco-ltalian border adjustments 
in favour of Italy, the future of Trieste and last but not least, a solution to the 
running sore of the Italian war criminality problem in Italy’s favour by the 
waiving of all Western claims for the extradition of alleged Italian war 
criminals.13
The Legacy of 1947
1947 was a critical year for the economic and political stabilization of the 
country and it carried with it the seeds that were to determine the attitude of 
Britain and America towards Italy in the run up to the 1948 election. The strains 
caused by the policy of containment and the announcement of the ERP in 
particular, were felt deeply in Italy as the whole political system relied on a 
tenuous co-existence of both Right and the Left in government. The Palazzo 
Barberini schism in 1946 that led to the splitting of the Italian Socialist Party
11. FO 371/73156/Z1740/93/22, 2-3-1948, confidential, telegram, no. 
386, Mallet to FO, 29-2-1948.
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and the May 1947 exclusion crisis resulted in the throwing of the PCI and PSI 
out of government. The West’s campaign to neutralize the PCI and to ensure 
the electoral victory of the Christian Democrats began as soon as De Gasperi’s 
first monocolore government was formed. Neither Britain or America raised an 
eyebrow when it became clear that De Gasperi’s new government was relying 
on support from the neo-fascist Uomo Qualunque party and the monarchists. 
In a sense the election campaign for the 1948 elections had already began.14
Exclusion from power had turned PCI from a party of government back into a 
party of protest. For the PCI this meant that it had to combine the principles of 
‘la svolta di Salerno’ with intimidatory and clandestine actions in its efforts to 
compel De Gasperi to take them back into government by showing him that he 
could not govern without communist support.15 This led to the adoption of scare 
tactics by Togliatti which aimed at presenting the PCI as a revolutionary party 
when in fact it had opted for, more or less, democratic action. Togliatti’s 
posturing speech in Parma in September 1947, advocated the possibility of the 
PCI using its 30,000 armed men against the government when, in reality, he 
was even reluctant to go ahead with the strike activity of autumn 1947.16 
Political scientists have termed the policy of the PCI as one of ‘doppiezza’ - 
duplicity - which failed to induce De Gasperi to take them back and succeeded 
in scaring the West and the Vatican into backing De Gasperi to the hilt and 
condemned to PCI from imposed ‘self- exclusion’ to ostracization.17
14. Ginsborg, op. cit., pp. 189; Mammarella, op. cit., pp. 138-40.
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The fact that the Soviet Union had decided to use Italy through the Cominform, 
as a means of indicating its displeasure with the ERP and its objectives, gave 
Togliatti’s pronouncements a distinctly sinister and threatening hue. The 
inclusion of the PCI in the Cominform made Italy appear uniquely exposed to 
Soviet pressure tactics. Thus, the outcome of the wave of strikes in late 1947 
which was foisted on the PCI by the Cominform with the objective of 
sabotaging the chances of the Marshall Plan,18 despite its limited success and 
the half-hearted zeal with which it was pursued, led Western governments to 
believe that it was a ‘dress rehearsal’ for the coming revolution.19 The strikes 
created the impression that Italy was a prime target for subversion. No one in 
the West was prepared to concede the fact that the PCI had not initiated the 
strikes but that it had merely decided, after its expulsion from government, not 
to exercise its restraining role on working class protest as it had done in the 
past and that these protests were primarily a result of the deflationary policies 
that Luigi Einaudi, the Minister of the Budget, had introduced and which had hit 
working class incomes hard.20
Indicative of the mood of the West was the analysis of the ‘Russia Committee’ 
of the Foreign Office, which concluded that the ‘recent strikes’ in Italy had 
caused a major setback to Italian economic recovery and had put Italian
18. CAB 129/25, CP(48)72, memorandum by Bevin, The Threat to 
Western Civilization’, 3-3-1948.
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political stability in jeopardy.21 Such pessimistic assessments clouded the real 
significance of the 1947 strikes which, according to Guiglielmo Emanuele, the 
editor of the Corriere della Sera, was that the PCI did not have the ability to 
bring about a successful coup d’etat without considerable foreign support.22 
Such support was difficult for either the USSR or Yugoslavia to provide without 
risking a war with the US and for which they were not ready. Truman’s 
declaration of 13 December 1947 had seen to this. On the day of the 
withdrawal of the Allied Forces from Italy the President of the United States 
declared America’s continued interest in preserving Italy as a ‘free and 
independent country’ and that ‘the US would not remain indifferent to any 
intervention direct or indirect in its internal affairs’.23 Even the most successful 
communist strike, the general strike in Milan which had succeeded in putting 
the city under PCI control, did not perturb the Italian government which took it 
in its stride.24 Togliatti’s address to the PSIUP Congress on 19-23 January 
1948, was to reflect the inability of the Left to gain power through a coup d’etat. 
In a conciliatory speech, he stressed repeatedly his party’s determination to
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24. FO 371/67768/Z10291/32/22, 27-11-1947, important, telegram, no. 
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gain power through legal means.25
Mallet, although fully aware of the dangers Italy faced, did not subscribe to the 
alarmist assessments of the Italian situation as expounded by the Russia 
Committee. In his opinion, autumn 1947 had shown to the Italian Communists 
that the tactics of direct action and violence which they had used from 
September 1947 until December 1948 had resulted in dismal failure. The 
British Embassy in Rome had concluded that the strikes had been of short 
duration and sporadic and was in full agreement with Sforza’s opinion that this 
agitation would not develop into ‘an organized revolution’ before the election.26 
Mallet believed that the PCI would try to get to power only through 
constitutional means.27 He also judged that the strikes had not had a severe 
impact on the Italian economy, reporting that the Italian market had not suffered 
any serious shortages of goods and that the price index had not risen. In fact, 
the index of wholesale prices had began to fall from September onwards.28 He 
went on to explain that problems in the Italian economy were due primarily to 
the inability of the country to export its products. Italy’s export problem was one 
of overpricing and not a lack of production of goods on time. It was simply a 
lack of international markets prepared to buy at Italian prices which were 
inflated by the pressure from government on industry to retain surplus labour 
in order to alleviate simmering social and economic tensions.29 Mallet’s 
assessments are borne out by statistics for this period. Einuadi’s programme
25. FO 371/73155Z701/93/22, 21-1-1948, report by W.H. Braine,
Labour Attache, Rome: Twentieth Sixth National Congress of the Italian 
Socialist Party’, 20-1-1948.
26. FO 371/67768/Z10140/32/22, 18-11-1947, confidential, telegram, 
no. 2182, Mallet to FO, 22-11-1947.





of deflating and reforming the Italian domestic economy had succeeded despite 
the strikes. Inflation was under control by the end of November. Bank deposits 
grew, confidence in the economy was reinforced and the Italian economy at 
last achieved its transition to a peace time mode of production.30 Mallet went 
on to inform London that any marginal impact the strikes might have had on the 
Italian economy had been more than compensated for and rectified by the 
influx of the Interim Aid that the American Administration had rushed through 
the Congress.31
The latter half of 1947 witnessed the strengthening of the anti-communist 
forces of the Italian State. The forces of law and order had stood their ground 
and Mario Scelba, the Minister of the Interior, had managed to expel all the 
communists from the security forces.32 Scelba proved to be both energetic and 
ruthless, showing little regard for issues of civil liberties and human rights and 
his methods went unchallenged within the DC.33 He reinforced and re-equipped 
the police with up to date equipment such as tear gas and encouraged them 
to intervene brutally in the breaking up of proletarian or peasant 
demonstrations.34 The police’s attempt to demilitarize the North turned quickly 
into an anti-communist campaign. Hundreds of arrests were made and many 
arms caches were uncovered.35 The Italian police authorities grew confident 
in their ability to deal with any type of disturbance. The Christian Democrats
30. Mammarella, op. cit., pp. 151-2; Ginsborg, op. cit., p. 156.
31. Ibid.; Miller, Taking Off the Gloves’, pp. 42-3; Pisani, op. cit., pp.
110- 1 .
32. Ferraresi, op. cit., p. 16; Ceva, op. cit., p.376; FO 800/471/ITALY, 
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FO 371/73234/Z9515/9515/22, 22-11-1948, secret, despatch, no. 380, Mallet 
to H. McNeil, minister of state, FO, 16-11-1947.
33. Hughes, op. cit., pp. 160-1.
34. Ginsborg, op. cit., p. 154.
35. Travis, op. cit., pp. 99-100.
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had, in parallel, rationalised their organizational structure to such a degree as 
to be able to challenge the Communist party machine throughout the country.36 
In the meanwhile, the PCI had failed in its prime tactic of wearing down De 
Gasperi enough to be invited back into his government.37 Mallet was sure that 
all the Communists could do was to try to paralyse large areas of the country 
and wreak economic havoc but that they could not overthrow De Gasperi 
without outside help. He concluded that the communist threat in Italy had been 
blunted by ‘the grouping of the anti-communist forces and the wing of the 
American Eagle’.38 He was not alone in these conclusions. Intelligence 
forecasts gathered by the Foreign Office pointed to a closely run election 
campaign from which the Christian Democrats would emerge as the largest 
single party with the PCI/PSIUP electoral alliance a close second. Even more 
reassuring to the Foreign Office was the prediction that the DC would be able 
to form a coalition with a majority that could ensure effective government and 
exclude the Left.39 The Western Department of the Foreign Office had reached 
similar conclusions which were reinforced by the fact that Sforza himself was 
confident enough to admit to Antony Eden that the communists had been 
beaten.40
36. FO 371/73155/Z145/93/22, 7-1-1948, despatch, no. 559, Mallet to 
FO, 24-12-1947.
37. FO 371/67768/Z9929/32/22, 17-11-1948, confidential, telegram, no. 
2140, Rome to FO, 14-11-1947; ibid., Z10118/32/22, 21-11-1947, confidential, 
telegram, no. 2167, Mallet to FO, 20-11-1947.
38. FO 371/73155/Z97/93/22, 5-1-1948, top secret, letter, Mallet to 
Warner, 23-12-1947.
39. FO 371/73157/Z1814/93/22, 3-3-1948, minute by Pemberton-Pigott 
Italian Desk, 13-2-1948.
40. FO 371/73155/Z108/93/22, 6-1-1948, despatch, no. 564, Mallet to 
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British Involvement in the April Elections.
Bevin was concerned that heavy-handed interventionist measures by the 
Americans could backfire and play directly into the hands of the Communists. 
The battles he had fought at the UNO with the Soviets over British intervention 
in Greece and their impact on world opinion had made him rather sensitive, at 
this stage, to accusations of intervention in the internal politics of another 
country.41 He advised caution and resisted American pressure for the British 
to adopt a more visible policy of intervention. Bevin insisted on a more low key 
and subtle policy conducted behind the scenes.42 Indeed, some of America's 
actions, motivated by its eagerness to help De Gasperi, ended up in causing 
embarrassment and in political blunder. In early January 1948, in a show of 
force, there was a series of high profile naval visits by US warships to major 
Italian ports. The show of force together with the American announcement of 
3 January that the number of marines serving in the American Mediterranean 
Fleet would be increased, created a furore in Italy. It culminated in Soviet 
accusations that such an American presence in Italian waters contravened 
Article 73 of the Italian Peace Treaty.43 It also received unfavourable publicity 
in the Italian Press44 and gave the PCI the opportunity to portray De Gasperi
41. Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Yasamee, A.J. and Hamilton, 
K.A., (eds), Documents on British Policy Overseas: The United Nations: Iran, 
Cold War and World Organisation, 1946-47, (DBPO), series I, Vol. VII,
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43. FO 371/73193/Z641/640/22, 26-1-1949, savingram, no. 10, Mallet to 
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and Sforza as men who had sold Italy out to American imperialism.45
Publicly, the Italian government provided a cover and declared that the visits 
took place with their agreement.46 Privately, however, they were dismayed by 
the exploitation of the issue by the Left and the fact that they had had to place 
their armed forces on a high level of readiness. They asked the Americans to 
curtail this programme.47 This experience made the British even more cautious 
and convinced them that their own tactics of intervention would have to be 
more understated.48 Bevin suggested caution to the Americans.49 He remained 
judicious throughout and he assessed the merits of every step of British 
involvement in the Italian elections with regards to its potential for 
embarrassment for the British government. The Italian Ambassador 
approached Frank K. Roberts, Bevin’s private secretary, to ask him if any 
prominent members of the Labour Party or of the government were prepared 
to write articles for the Corriere della Sera or other wide-circulation newspapers 
which would demonstrate how far the British Labour Party had succeeded in 
raising the standards of living of ordinary British people. Bevin was quick to 
support the idea of Labour personalities giving interviews on the achievements 
of the Labour government but he poured cold water over the suggestion of 
government Ministers writing newspaper articles. He was hesitant to allow the 
Foreign Office to become openly involved in organizing these activities
45. FO 371 /73193/Z1548/640/22, 24-1-1948, savingram, no. 31, Mallet 
to Bevin, 20-2-1048.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.; Maier, op. cit., p. 290.
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because the whole exercise could backfire and could appear to be an overt 
intervention in Italian domestic politics.50
Britain’s cautious approach was also influenced by the fact that the lead up to 
the Italian elections came at a very tense moment in Anglo-ltalian relations. 
The Mogadishu incident had impaired seriously the already tense and difficult 
relationship between the two countries.51 The British were concerned that the 
smallest mistake in their dealings with Italy at this moment could lead to the 
disappearance of any residual British influence in the peninsula and that it 
would have a knock on effect on the Italian election.52 It was obvious that a 
prerequisite for a successful British intervention was the improvement of Anglo- 
ltalian relations.53 Thus, the British government embarked on the twin tasks of 
reducing tensions in Anglo-ltalian relations and at the same time working 
towards helping the Italian government in its electoral struggle against the 
Left’s Unity of Action Pact. A series of initiatives were undertaken to improve 
relations and no one worked harder on these than Ambassador Mallet.
Initially, the British government tried to bolster the Italian ego and sooth Italian
50 Ibid., Z2172/93/22, 15-3-48, minutes by Bevin, 12-3-1948 and 
Roberts, 9-3-48.
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wounds over Mogadishu by granting permission to the head of the Italian Red 
Cross and the Italian Consul at Nairobi to visit Italian Somaliland. Then, 
progress was made in trade negotiations by allowing for an overall increase in 
Anglo-ltalian trade exchanges and their extension to include additional 
products other than those traditionally traded between the two countries.54 
More crucially, what proved to be the turning point in relations between Britain 
and Italy was the visit of the Lord Chancellor, Lord Jowitt to Rome from 2 
February to 5 March 1948. Lord Jowitfs statement of sympathy, on the day of 
his departure from Rome, for what Italian citizens had suffered during the 
Mogadishu riots, went a long way to mollifying Italian feelings. He also took the 
opportunity to remind Italians how important British friendship was for their 
country. In a broadcast over Italian radio, he used Garibaldi’s words to illustrate 
his point, ‘there should be a curse upon Italy, if ever she were to break away 
her friendship with Britain’.55 Although Lord Jowitt’s visit was in a private 
capacity, it was regarded by the Italians as being of high official and political 
importance.56 It proved to be very successful in repairing some of the damage 
the Mogadishu incident had inflicted on Anglo-ltalian relations. According to 
Victor Mallet it was ‘invaluable’ in stemming, at least temporarily, the bitter, anti- 
British hostility of the Italian Press.57 The visit of the Lord Chancellor also had 
other important outcomes. In his discussions with leading politicians he let it be
54. FO 371 /73157/Z2146/93/22, 12-3-1948, minutes by Crosthwaite to 
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known, beyond any doubt, that the Nennite PSIUP had the profound 
disapproval of the British Labour government and movement. Thus, the visit 
succeeded in improving Anglo-ltalian relations and also signalled to the Italian 
government that the Lombardo-Saragat grouping had the undoubted support 
of the British government.58
Bevin believed that the most productive tactic was to encourage and capitalize 
on developments taking place within the Italian body-politic. In his mind, every 
public foreign policy initiative had to be followed by a series of informal 
manoeuvres in order to achieve optimum results. In his attempts to achieve 
this he employed not only the machinery of the state but also the International 
Department of the Labour Party.59 Denis Healey, its energetic and charismatic 
International Secretary, spearheaded the campaign to moderate the behaviour 
of the Italian Socialist Party. During 1947, the Labour Party and the British 
government had to rethink and realign their policy towards the various 
exponents of Italian socialism. They moved from full support for Nenni in 
January 1947, to almost uncritical support for Saragat, as relations between 
East and West continued inexorably to plummet. Such a shift was not easy for 
a Labour government and Party that had traditionally championed the unity of 
the Italian socialist movement and had consistently regarded Nenni as a 
‘brilliant politician in all senses of the word’ and Saragat as ‘an ineffectual and
58. Ibid.; FO 371/73160/Z3549/92/22, 27-4-1948, despatch, no. 140, 
‘Quarterly Political Report for Italy during the First Quarter of 1948', Mallet to 
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59. Ibid.
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extremely vain intellectual’.60 Initially, the main thrust of Bevin’s policy was 
aimed at precipitating changes within the PSIUP that would weaken the Unity 
of Action Pact which the PSIUP and the PCI had formed in 1946. The policy 
aimed at detaching Nenni from the Unity of Action Pact or failing that, at 
encouraging anti-communist elements within the PSIUP to break ranks with the 
Nenni faction and thus achieving the twin objectives of weakening the PSIUP, 
and by extension the PCI, whilst creating potential allies for the Christian 
Democrats.61 The reinforcement of the Pact in December 1947 with the 
announcement that the PSIUP and the PCI would present themselves to the 
electorate as a single ticket and with unified lists caused great distress to Bevin 
as well as to many prominent Italian socialists such as Giuseppe Romita, 
Sandro Pertini and Ivan Matteo Lombardo. In fact, the latter felt compelled to 
follow Saragat out of Palazzo Barberini.62 Defections from the PSIUP, however, 
brought with them more problems than direct solutions. Only a small rump of 
the party was prepared to follow Saragat and Lombardo out into the political 
wilderness which left Nenni mustering the overwhelming support of the party. 
London estimated that some of this lack of support for the secessionists would 
soon be rectified after the January Congress of the PSIUP and that the 
ostensible rejection of the ERP by Nenni would lead to substantial defections
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to Saragat.63 These estimates were proved wrong by the bulk of the PSIUP 
membership. The PSIUP Congress produced massive support for Nenni and 
his policies: 67% of the delegates voted for the continuation of the electoral 
alliance with the PCI and 99% voted in favour of the formation of a ‘popular 
democratic front’ that would encompass all left wing parties.64 Moreover, the 
PCI and the PSIUP announced, in late January 1948, their common 
constitution of the Democratic Popular Front. These developments made Bevin 
realize beyond any doubt that Nenni’s PSIUP would not abandon its 
collaborationist course. From this point on, Labour policy moved from driving 
a wedge between the PCI and the PSIUP to building up Saragat and Lombardo 
as the only alternatives for democratic socialist voters. Thus, the British 
government took steps to legitimize the split and ensured that the Saragat 
faction was treated by the Labour Party and the TUC as the real Socialist Party 
of Italy. It achieved this by marginalizing and alienating the PSIUP within the 
international socialist movement.65
The aim of this new policy was not simply a negative one, namely to destroy 
Nenni’s PSIUP. Bevin was also motivated by the desire of replacing the PSIUP 
with a credible social democratic force reflecting the ideals of ‘British socialism’ 
and thus perpetuating a British influence in Italy.66 To this end the Labour 
government worked tirelessly to build up the prestige of Saragat and the 
appeal of his party using the logic that the stronger the party emerged from the
63. FO 371/73155/Z149/93/22, 7-1-1948, minute by Crosthwaite, 14-12-
1947.
64. Ibid., Z643/93/22, 26-1-1948, telegram, no. 140, Rome to FO, 24-4-
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elections the bigger the ‘social democratic’ input into the De Gasperi 
government and the bigger the influence of British Labour government on 
Italy.67 Unfortunately for the British, the resounding endorsement of the Nennite 
policies by the January Congress of the PSIUP showed that the Saragat 
faction did not have the capacity nor the time to be transformed into a force 
which could have a significant impact on the political scene in time for the 
elections. In view of this, British policy towards the secessionists moved away 
from the idea that ‘Socialist Unity’ could offer an instant democratic alternative 
to Nenni’s PSIUP, to one that sought to build up Saragat and his collaborators 
into a useful ally to the Christian Democrats and as such to act as the stimulus 
and instigator of social reform in future Christian Democratic governments. 
This ideological shift meant that Britain had no other choice but to embark on 
a negative policy aimed at frustrating the PSIUP’s way to power by isolating it 
in the international scene.68
The State Department felt that the British approach had been too subtle and 
anodyne so far and it urged Britain to adopt a more high profile interventionism. 
It believed that if Britain sanctioned Saragat publicly, his vote could double in 
the forthcoming election.69 Mallet, too, supported this course of action and he 
suggested that the British Labour Party, Bevin and the government ought to 
condemn Nenni’s policies and leadership publicly and express their support for 
the De Gasperi government with which Saragat had associated himself. He 
was certain that such an intercession would have a ‘galvanizing effect’ on the
67. FO 371/73155/Z714/93/22, 28-1-1948, minutes by Pemberton- 
Pigott, 31-1-48, Crosthwaite, 31-1-1948, Margaret Carlyle, 4-2-1948; despatch, 
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Saragat electoral prospects because of the influence and glamour radiating 
from the Labour Party and government to the Continent. In his opinion this was 
the single most helpful step Britain could take to keep Italy this side of the Iron 
Curtain.70 He went on to warn that such actions could not be postponed for 
ever ‘without the grave risk of this country falling under communist control 
through the suicidal folly of Nenni and his clique’; furthermore, he hoped that 
such action would encourage waverers such as Romita to defect and join 
Saragat. The Foreign Office, too, had reached a similar conclusion that the 
best option now was to throw British support behind the Christian Democrats 
who ‘with all their faults ... represented [the] only hope of a government on 
anything like social democratic lines’.71
Bevin did not need the encouragement of Washington nor of his Ambassador 
in Rome to prop up Saragat as he told Lewis W. Douglas, the American 
Ambassador to the Court of St. James’, in no uncertain terms.72 He believed, 
however, that the best way forward would be for the endorsement to come from 
the international socialist movement and not just from the British government. 
Since the Saragat and Lombardo factions were unlikely to draw much popular 
support, the Labour government felt that the unilateral support of the Labour 
Party would not have the effect of transforming their electoral outlook 
overnight. Thus, it was decided that the Labour Party ought to repudiate 
publicly Nenni’s policy of collaboration with the Communists at the forthcoming
70. Ibid.; FO 371/73156/Z1411/93/22, 19-2-1948, confidential, telegram, 
no. 309, 18-2-1948.
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meeting of the Socialist parties of the sixteen ERP nations. Bevin immediately
informed Douglas that the Trades Union Congress (TUC), in its efforts to
strengthen Saragat, had invited a Confederazione Generale Italians del Lavoro
(CGIL) grouping to their forthcoming conference on the ERP. This particular
CGIL grouping had dissented from the majority CGIL decision to turn down the
TUC invitation.73 At such a meeting, Nenni’s delegates would find it difficult, in
any case, to justify their policy towards the Marshall Plan. For maximum impact
Bevin advised that other Western European parties had to be induced to join
in the condemnation of the PSIUP. The Western Department assessed that the
most likely way of bringing about the intended results was to take measures to
shift the waverers away from Nenni. Such an action would:
more than anything else put heart into the anti-communist 
parties in their election fight and would be the most [productive] 
single step which could be taken towards keeping Italy on the 
right side of the Iron Curtain.74
The interference of the British government and Labour Party in the affairs of 
the Italian socialist movement was also parallelled by the attempts by the 
Foreign Office to improve Italy’s international role through a favourable 
settlement on the future of some of its former colonies and to help it solve its 
surplus population problem. The Foreign Office was unable to hold forth the 
prospect of colonial concessions in order to assuage Italian nationalistic 
feelings despite Bevin’s accommodating attitude towards Italy’s aspirations
73. Ibid.
74. FO 371/73157/Z2146/93/22, 12-3-1948, memorandum by 
Crosthwaite, 21-2-48.
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over Somaliland and parts of Eritrea.75 Both the British and French 
governments had agreed that on the colonial issue, the less said the better, as 
neither government was prepared, at this stage, to contemplate the wholesale 
return of the ex-Italian colonies and because they feared that the Soviets could 
exploit this issue too.76 The Americans were also concerned that the 
Europeans demonstrate openly that Italy was being treated on a basis of 
equality with the other Western European countries. For the State Department, 
one way to convey this was to invite Italy to be included in the Western Union 
as an original signatory. Both Britain and France resisted pressure from the 
Americans to incorporate Italy into the Brussels Treaty prior to the Italian 
election.77 As far as Bevin was concerned, he had taken stock of the situation 
after the reactions of the Italian Left to his Western Union speech. These 
accused him and Britain of trying to entangle Italy with alliances that would turn 
it into a battleground if and when war broke out between East and West. He 
also took into account the reaction of the Italian government which proclaimed 
that it would not enter into any defensive alliance system which carried with it
75. Ibid; CAB 128/12, CM12(48), ‘Future of Italian Colonies’, CP(48)43, 
5-2-1948; FO 371/73155/Z634/93/22, 26-1-1948, minute by Pemberton-Pigott, 
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S.M.B., Britain, the United States and the Question of the Italian Colonies, 
1940-52, PhD thesis, LSE, University of London, 1995. Mallet had 
recommended that the government ought to come out with a declaration on 
the colonial issue designed to show the Italian that Britain had always 
safeguarded Italian interests and with practical evidence that it was attempting 
to solve Italy’s surplus population problem.
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military obligations for as long as the military clauses of the Peace Treaty 
remained in place.78
The British were similarly incapable of offering any unilateral and quick 
solutions to Italy’s surplus population problem. The Foreign Office toyed with 
the idea of solving both problems simultaneously by exploring the possibility of 
Italian involvement, along with the other African powers, in planning the 
development of African resources by offering Italy a seat on an African Council 
for the Development of Overseas Territories.79 The notion of associating Italy 
with African colonial development was examined in some detail since any 
decisions on the issue could have impacted on Italy’s demographic problems, 
and as Mallet had often maintained, it would be extremely helpful if the British 
government showed some practical evidence that it was sympathetic to Italy’s 
manpower problems. Italy’s imperial aggrandizement during the nineteenth 
century and early twentieth century had been closely associated with its 
attempts to solve its surplus population problem. In view of the size of the 
problem - nearly two million Italians had to be absorbed - Britain’s contribution 
to its solution could be only a moderate one, but Bevin was eager to tackle the 
issue to the best of his ability. In fact, when he met Sforza, Bevin raised the 
matter of Italian manpower and he declared his interest in helping Italy solve 
this problem. He stated that Britain was trying to help by recruiting more Italians 
in Africa but that he was reserved about such efforts having a significant 
impact because of the enormity of the problem.80 The Italian government too,
78. FRUS, 1948, Vol. Ill, p. 45-6 and 53-4; ACS, verbale della reunione 
del Consiglio dei ministri cfe/28-1-1948; FO 371/73193/Z2449/640/22, 22-3- 
1948, telegram, no. 54, Mallet to FO, 19-3-1948; Quartararo, R., Italia e Stati 
Uniti: Gli Ann! Difficili, 1945-52, Rome, 1986, p. 258.
79. CAB 128/12, CM 12(48), CP(48)43, 5-2-1948.
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was anxious to solve this problem and had lobbied Britain consistently. The 
Foreign Office saw the best solution as being the permanent settlement of 
Italians in Britain’s African colonies as opposed to the allocation of temporary 
work on short term contracts. The Colonial Office disliked the idea intensely 
and jettisoned it, maintaining that indeed, the need for foreign labour of this 
kind in Africa was temporary. Their own objective was to train Africans to do 
these jobs and they sought to protect them from external competition. The 
Foreign Office pleaded with the Colonial Office to withdraw its opposition to the 
scheme but to no avail.81 An alternative solution to the problem of surplus 
manpower was to use Italian labour in Europe. Thus, Britain could alleviate the 
problem by allowing Italian labourers to work in Britain and by limiting the 
preferential treatment given by the Home Office for DPs from Germany. The 
Foreign Office sought actively to influence the policies of the Home Office and 
the Allied Control Commission of Germany in their endeavours to assist the 
Italian government with its pressing demographic problems.82
The Foreign Office was also interested in finding a solution for Trieste that 
would be advantageous to Italy. Bevin had concluded as early as October 
1947 that the implementation of the relevant clauses of the Italian Peace Treaty 
would lead to the absorption of the Free Territory by Yugoslavia and that the 
West had to avoid at all costs the appointment of a new Governor. He felt that 
the only solution was partition and the absorption of the Western Zone ‘A’, by
81. Kent, op. cit., pp. 177-9; CAB 129/24, CP(48)43, 4-2-1948;
FO 371/73157/Z2146/93/22, 12-3-1948, memorandum by Crosthwaite, 21-2- 
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Italy.83 His opinions were crystallized by the fact that the Yugoslav Fourth Army 
had decided to celebrate the coming into force of the Italian Peace Treaty by 
staging a rather crude and unsuccessful attempt to occupy the Western 
administrated Zone ‘A’.84 He was worried however that the United States would 
obstruct a solution along these lines. Lord Inverchapel, the British Ambassador 
to Washington and Sir Alexander Cadogan, the British Ambassador to the UN, 
tried hard to convert the United States to its point of view and to join together 
to convince the UNSC to delay the election of a Governor for the Free 
Territory.85 The aim was create ‘an atmosphere in which the idea of partition 
[came] to be accepted as the only practicable solution.86 The United States, 
despite its determination to ensure that Trieste did not fall into the hands of 
Yugoslavia, was reluctant to take any such steps before the outcome of the 
Italian election was known, fearing that this would create an untimely and 
premature crisis. It was not until the end of January that the Washington 
Embassy was able to detect a mild interest for the British proposals in the State 
Department, when a non-commital Hickerson told J. Balfour, the Minister at the 
British Embassy in Washington that ‘the ultimate solution [had to] be found in
83. FO 371/67344/R14290/10/92, 27-10-1947, top secret, telegram, no. 
11314, FO to Washington, 31-10-1947; FO 371/72484/R1474/44/70, 3-2-1948, 
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partition’.87 In the meantime, Mallet aired British thinking and proposals on 
Trieste to De Gasperi and Sforza and both declared themselves in favour of 
partition, as long as it was accompanied by an Anglo-American guarantee.88 
In fact, Sforza liked the idea so much that he broached the issue with James 
Dunn, the American Ambassador to Italy, and suggested to him that it would 
be a helpful election booster if the American, British and French governments 
were to declare in favour of partition and the return of the Anglo-American 
Zone to Italy.89
The State Department, having absorbed Italian and British thinking on Trieste, 
came up with an incredible volte face. It approached the Foreign Office, 
proposing that the American, British and French governments must declare 
their favour of ceding the whole of the Free Territory to Italy and not just the 
Anglo-American zone. Its aim was to enhance the electoral support for the anti­
communist bloc and it deemed that a sweeping declaration of this nature would 
have maximum effect as it would wrong-foot the PCI and it would show beyond 
any doubt that the West had no intention of withdrawing from Trieste.90 Bevin 
was doubtful as to the efficacy of such a public declaration at this juncture. The 
essence of British policy lay in working ‘quietly’ and consistently towards 
partition without any public pronouncement of the idea. The Foreign Office also 
felt reluctant to promise the return of a sector over which it had no jurisdiction
87. Ibid., R870/44/70, 20-1-1948, secret, telegram, no. 286, Washington 
to FO, 19-1-1948; FO 371/72512/R2340/2340/70, 19-2-1948, minute by 
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whatsoever and which was already in Yugoslav hands.91 Eventually, the 
British government fell in behind the American proposal. This was because of 
the necessity of manipulating Italian public opinion to benefit the Christian 
Democrats and the desire to lessen the thunder of the Soviet declaration of 
their intention to support the return of the ex-Italian colonies to Italy and to 
forestall a similar Soviet declaration on Trieste as well. This would deprive the 
PCI of the chance to claim that a communist victory at the ballot-box would 
make the resolution of the Trieste question easier.92 As G. A. Wallinger, head 
of the Southern Department, put it, the aim behind this decision was ‘to win 
votes for the Christian Democrats and spike the Communist gun’. 93
From the moment Bevin took the decision to support the American proposal he 
worked tirelessly to bring France on board as well. Georges Bidault, the French 
Foreign Minister, was apprehensive about the declaration as it was more or 
less tantamount to tearing up a section of a Peace Treaty that had just been 
ratified. He also felt, that the wording of the American draft was unnecessarily 
provocative and that it had not given enough prominence to France’s role.94 He 
was also worried that the timing of the declaration would overshadow his 
forthcoming visit to Turin to sign the Franco-ltalian Customs Union agreement, 
which was to be the first visit to Italy by a member of a major Western
91. FO 371/72486/R3265/44/70, 11-3-1948, undated minute by Bevin; 
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Ashley-Clarke, 11-3-1948.
94. FO 371/72486/R3508/44/70, 18-3-1948, top secret, telegram, no. 
264, Harvey to FO, 17-3-1948; ibid., R3576/44/70, 19-3-1948, top secret, 
telegram, no. 274, Harvey to FO, 18-3-1948, top secret, telegram, no. 3114, 
FO to Washington, 18-3-1948, ibid., R3723/44/70, 22-3-1948, minute by 
Kirkpatrick, 18-3-1948.
171
government since 1943. Bevin agreed to a small delay to the declaration 
despite American pressure to do the opposite.95 The Tripartite Declaration on 
Trieste was made on 20 March 1948 and it proposed that the Peace Treaty 
with Italy should be modified by an additional protocol that would place the 
whole of the Free Territory under Italian sovereignty. Ostensibly, America, 
Britain and France claimed that their principal motivation for this proposal was 
the fact that up to now, arrangements had failed to provide for the proper 
administration of the area, namely the failure of the Four Powers to agree on 
a Governor for the area, and because they believed that this solution would 
‘meet the democratic aspirations of [its] inhabitants facilitating the re­
establishment of peace and stability’ in the region.96
The Tripartite Declaration on Trieste contributed greatly towards neutralizing 
any anti-Western sentiment Italian nationalists may have harboured after the 
Peace Treaty; it helped to consolidate the nationalists behind the DC and it put 
the PCI and Soviet Union in an extremely difficult position. Any sign of support 
from the PCI for such a solution to the Trieste problem would have helped it, 
but it would have simultaneously driven a wedge between the Soviet Union and 
Yugoslavia. This was something that Stalin was not prepared to countenance 
at this juncture. The Italian Government felt the Declaration to be an extremely 
important electoral asset to them.97 De Gasperi himself, confided to Mallet later 
that he believed that the Declaration on Trieste had deprived the Communists
95. FO 371 /72486/R3712/44/70, 22-3-1948, top secret, telegram, no. 
387, Bevin to Oliver Harvey, 17-3-1948; FO 371/73055/Z2559/273/72, 24-3- 
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of a good electioneering issue.98
What had helped coalesce policy on Trieste and accelerate the frequency of 
intervention in Italian domestic affairs in the run up to the election had been the 
hysteria and foreboding that had gripped the West after the Czech Coup, which 
had occured only two months before. Western circles drew the conclusion that 
similar tactics to those used in Prague could be employed in Italy too and that 
Italians would not even have the chance to cast their vote in the ballot box, 
despite the fact that any analogies with Prague were rendered invalid by the 
absence of any Red Army troops in Italy.99 A major concern for Bevin was the 
fact the PCI, through the use of its dominant position in the Italian trade union 
movement, could organise industrial disturbances not only to sabotage the 
success of the Marshall Plan, but also to subvert the Italian government 
through factory Committees of Action and parallel the predicament of 
Czechoslovakia.100 Thus, communist strength and activities within the CGIL 
were monitored closely. The Rome Embassy reported that the national 
Congress of the CGIL of July 1947 had demonstrated that the Communists had 
succeeded in winning most of the top posts including that of the Secretary 
General which was occupied by Di Vittorio. The PCI had scored 60% of the 
vote followed by Nenni’s PSIUP with 25%, the DC with 12% and Saragat with 
a mere 2% of the vote. The PCI also controlled trade unions in key industrial 
city centres like Turin, Genoa and Taranto. It controlled 86 out of the 92
98. FO 371/73158/Z2763/93/22, 1-4-1948, minute by Bevin, 24-3-1948; 
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Chambers of Labour and it held a virtual monopoly of power in the metallurgical 
industries. The Foreign Office Research Department, (FORD), similarly, 
pointed out that the PCI was benefiting from the hegemonic position it had 
assumed within Italian organized labour and that its superb organizational 
structure had ensured that its minority status did not deprive it from power and 
strength.101
This portrayal of Communist omnipotence gave a rather distorted picture of the 
actual strength of the PCI. It appeared to be so strong because it had been 
consistently successful in securing and maintaining influential posts within the 
trade union movement. Soviet actions were however difficult to explain to non- 
Communists, especially when Western Socialists had condemned them 
promptly. Furthermore, the ERP and its promises of prosperity made De 
Gasperi almost invincible. The DC had intensified its trade union activities and 
its collateral organisation, the Association of Catholic Workers, had seen its 
membership increase from 200,000 members in 1946 to nearly 1,000,000 by
1947. In contrast, PCI trade union membership appeared to be waning; it had 
fallen from 52% to 43%, during the same period according to the estimates of 
the British Embassy in Rome. The worrying trend identified by Mallet and Ward 
was that this fall in the popularity and support of the PCI was being picked up 
by Nenni’s PSIUP. The Embassy advised that the only way to make good this 
drift to the PSIUP was to encourage disaffected PSIUP supporters to join the 
secessionists.102 Margaret Carlyle, of the Italian Section of the Research 
Department of the Foreign Office (FORD), also identified the weakness of the
101. FO 371/73158/Z2587/93/22, 25-3-48, FORD report on 
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PCI and recommended that the condemnation of communism by the Labour 
Party and the Trade Unions would help enormously to ‘cement Italian Socialist 
resistance’ to it.103
Carlyle also proposed that De Gasperi should be made to understand that the 
only way to defeat communism for good was by embarking on a bold 
programme of reform even against the wishes of his wealthy supporters since 
further unfulfilled and undelivered promises would only play into the hands of 
Communists.The FORD had distinguished the following economic reasons to 
explain the PCI’s appeal: high inflation since 1945, had led to a rapid rise in 
the cost of living; high unemployment exacerbated by a high birthrate - half a 
million children were bom each year - and the exhaustion of lands to emigrate 
to in contrast to the situation in the early twentieth century; the desperate 
situation of the South coupled with illiteracy and finally, the maldistribution of 
wealth and the mutual cooperation of the PCI with the PSIUP.104 Carlyle 
commented that the Southern voter attracted to the PCI was profiled as being 
poor, uneducated and politically naive, not a natural supporter of the PCI. She 
concluded that such a voter could be poached and persuaded to vote for the 
governing coalition provided that it came up with a programme of addressing 
the specific problems of the South. It all depended on the Government taking 
effective measures and making good of its promises105 because, as Carlyle put 
it succinctly, ‘the South has waited for over seventy years; the Communists are
103. FO 371/73158/Z2587/93/22, 25-3-48, memorandum drafted by 
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prepared to see that it will wait no longer*.106
Bevin insisted that communist trade union activity still had to be monitored 
carefully and closely because his experience as a Union boss during the 
interwar years had convinced him that the Czech prototype could be re­
enacted in an Italy which he regarded as being an ‘immediate danger spot*.107 
His worries were not assuaged despite the Italian government decree of 
December 1947 which had banned the establishment and operation of political 
committees of action in factories and workshops and thus removed the 
prospect of PCI coup d’Gtat Czech fashion.108 He reiterated his concerns to the 
Italian Foreign Minister, who despite his alarm at the Czech coup and its timing, 
remained optimistic about the election result. In his opinion, the coup would 
have an adverse effect on the Italian electorate and he believed that many 
waverers would abandon the PSIUP and thus weaken Nenni’s hold on it.109 
Sforza reassured Bevin that the Italian forces of law and order were in an 
excellent condition and capable of dealing with communist disturbances and 
that his government could rise up to any communist danger. Bevin found 
Sforza too optimistic for his liking in this instance and impressed upon him how 
important it was for the Italian government to stay put in the case of an 
emergency until help from the US and Britain was at hand.110 Again, Sforza 
assured Bevin that his government had no intention of taking Communists back
106. FO 371/73158/Z2587/93/22, 25-3-48, FORD memorandum drafted 
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into the government under any circumstances. He reiterated and, in a sense 
revealed to Bevin, the depth of American involvement in Italian security matters 
when he made open to him the fact that the Italian government had set up an 
‘impregnable fortress’ in Rome. This was the operational centre from which the 
Italian government would co-ordinate operations in the event of a Communist 
electoral success. Finally, Bevin informed Sforza that he had arranged for 
Saragat and Lombardo to be invited to the next meeting of the Committee of 
International Socialist Conference (COMISCO), something that Sforza had felt 
confident would help prise votes away from the PSIUP and deliver them to the 
Socialist Unity Parties.111
The Czech coup made Bevin and the British Cabinet see the co-operation of 
the two leading parties of the Left in Italy in almost apocalyptic terms. Bevin 
believed that once the PCI had been elected it would marginalize any 
moderating influence PSIUP could exert.112 His conclusion was that further 
and immediate steps had to be taken to strengthen the ‘forces of democratic 
socialism’ in Italy.113 For Bevin, Nenni’s decision to fight the campaign on a 
common ticket with the PCI would lead to ‘the eventual elimination of socialism 
in Italy’.114 He decided that the Labour Party ought to intervene even more 
dynamically in the elections. As a result, Morgan Phillips was instructed to 
board the same plane that was taking Healey to Rome.115 They were both 
instructed to approach those PSIUP leaders who were still reeling from the
111. FO 371/73199/Z2308/1392/22, 17-3-1948, minute by Roberts, 15-
3-1948; top secret, letter, Bevin to Mallet, 15-3-1948.
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overwhelming condemnation and isolation that they had experienced at the 
COMISCO. Their task was to find out if the latter were ready to sever their links 
with the PCI and alter their attitude and stance towards the Marshall Plan.116 
Phillips met Lelio Basso, the Secretary of the PSIUP, who underlined to him 
that the PSIUP was determined to continue its cooperation with the PCI, to 
which Phillips replied that for as long as the PSIUP was facilitating the 
Communists obtaining domination over Italy this made cooperation with the 
Labour Party impossible.117 On their return to London, Phillips wrote to Saragat 
publicly endorsing him and Healey made his famous and hardhitting anti­
communist broadcast on 10 April 1948. Both initiatives were received well and 
had a beneficial impact on the Italian social democratic vote.118
The Americans maintained their pressure on London to adopt a more 
interventionist policy. They discounted Bevin’s very realistic observation that 
Britain had only a limited influence on Italian politics and that it was doing all it 
could. The State Department insisted that Britain could do a lot more to 
influence the outcome of the election. They stressed two areas on which Britain 
could exert direct influence capitalizing on the strong links the Labour Party 
had with the PSIUP and the Italian Trade Union movement overall. The 
Americans did not fail to vent their anxieties concerning the uncertainties of the 
Italian situation and that they had identified British attitudes towards postwar 
Italy as being a contributory factor.119
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Very soon the British government found itself at odds with some of the 
American methods and plans for intervention and found it difficult to support 
them. The issues that created most tension were the handing over to Italy of 
all frozen German assets in Italy, further announcements on the issue of 
Trieste, revision of the military clauses of the Italian Peace Treaty and pressure 
on Greece to drop its reparation claims against Italy. On the first matter, 
London came under intense pressure from the Americans to agree to their 
proposal of announcing prior to the election that all frozen German assets 
would be released to the Italian government. The British government turned 
down this proposal for a number of reasons. First, it believed that it would have 
only limited appeal, because its timing was wrong and because such an 
announcement would have much greater impact as a reward after the election. 
Second, because it could antagonize the German Chancellor, Konrad 
Adenauer who had already started asking for equality of rights - 
Gleichberechtingung. Finally because Britain had not as yet decided how these 
assets should be best disposed of.120 Bevin was also greatly angered when he 
realised that the United States was putting strong pressure on a rather shaky 
Greek government to drop its reparations claims against Italy in an effort to 
influence the Italian election result. He saw this as an ‘absurd’ and 
‘objectionable’ attempt, which according to him it denoted that some people in 
the State Department were inclined to ‘conduct foreign policy on New York 
electioneering lines’. His ire was excited not only by the fact that Britain had not 
been consulted and that he had heard of this initiative from K. Tsaldaris, the 
Greek Foreign Minister, but also because he was worried that the Truman 
Administration in its attempt to clinch the Italian election result was adopting a 
recklessly one-sided policy that could have severe implications for the 
precarious pro-Western Greek government and also because it would impair
12°. FO 371/73158/Z3043/93/22, 12-4-1948, minute by Brown, 8-4-
1948.
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Italy’s relations with its neighbours in the long run.121
The issue on which Bevin proved to be totally intransigent, despite strong 
pressure from Dunn and the Italian government, was that of the revision of the 
military clauses of the Italian Peace Treaty in order to manipulate Italian public 
opinion prior to the election. The reason for this was not due to any vengeful 
feelings towards Italy but to caution and pragmatism. The Peace Treaty had 
been a thorn in the side of the Italian government, constantly generating anti- 
Western feelings amongst nationalist circles in Italy. The Italian government 
decided to capitalise on Western concerns about the security of Italy in the run 
up to the election by bringing the issue once again to the fore. In addition, it 
had assessed that a revision would increase its popularity in exactly the same 
way as the Tripartite Declaration on Trieste had done. Dunn took Italian 
concerns seriously and attempted to sell the idea of a revision to his 
government by asking it to issue a declaration in favour of, at least a partial 
revision, which would remove the limitations to Italy’s sovereignty imposed by 
the military clauses of the Treaty.122 Mallet too, believed that steps to revise the 
Treaty would be received positively by all sections of Italian public opinion as 
it ‘would flatter the pride of many Italians inside and outside the armed 
forces’.123
The Foreign Office had accepted the notion that eventually these provisions
121. FO 73154/Z3014/3014/22, 12-4-1948, minute by Bevin, undated; 
ibid., Z3171/3014/22, 15-4-1948, secret, telegram, no. 37, SirC. J. Norton, the 
British Ambassador to Greece, to FO, 14-4-1948; ibid., Z3339/3014/22, 20-4- 
1948, confidential, letter, Sargent to Inverchapel, 17-4-1948; letter, D.P. Reilly, 
Counsellor at the British Embassy in Athens to Wallinger, 12-4-1948.
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would either have to be revised or fall into disuse. In fact, the British 
government already was willingly turning a blind eye towards minor violations 
such as the arming of Sicurezza Pubblica, so long as it improved the internal 
security situation of Italy.124 What the Foreign Office, however, was determined 
to avoid, was bringing this issue to the fore at such a sensitive moment in the 
political life of Italy and giving the PSIUP/PCI ticket ammunition for their 
propagandists to back their claim with proof that the West was trying to ‘drag 
Italy1 into war against the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the Foreign Office felt that 
such a revision so soon after the signing and the ratification of the Treaty was 
unwise. It would deprive the West of the moral high ground to continue its 
accusations against the Soviet Union that the latter had ‘connived and 
instigated’ the violation of major provisions of the Balkan Peace Treaties. The 
State Department accepted albeit reluctantly, the validity of these arguments 
and decided that the time was not ripe for issuing a declaration committing the 
US to the revision of the Peace Treaty along the lines proposed by Dunn. The 
issue of revision was shelved for a more propitious moment.125
One area of the Peace Treaty on which the British government was willing to 
compromise was on the issue of the punishment of Italian war criminals. The 
British government felt that this was the time to settle the matter once and for 
all. It proposed that all the Western governments waive their rights, under the 
Peace Treaty, to demand the surrender of Italian citizens who were still
124. FO 371 /73172/Z1336/167/22, 17-2-1948, secret, despatch, no. 58, 
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standing accused of having perpetrated war crimes against UN nationals in 
exchange for a firm Italian undertaking to bring these persons to trial. The 
formulation of this proposal was a direct reaction to Sforza’s first electoral 
speech in Naples in January 1948, in which he proclaimed that Italy would do 
its utmost to punish those ‘who had committed acts contrary to humanity and 
to the noblest traditions of the Italian character* whilst also carefully hinting that 
his government would try to avoid any surrender of Italian citizens to face trial 
in foreign courts.126 The issue of Italian war crimes was ripe for manipulation 
because it could be used to flatter Italian nationalistic sentiments, and could 
also generate Yugoslav hostility which would result in Communist diffidence 
and Soviet awkwardness and it might well drive a wedge between the PCI and 
some of its nationalistic supporters. Such dynamics injected a degree of 
urgency in British attempts to deal with the issue. The Foreign Office convinced 
the Judge Advocate General’s Office to drop any objections to its proposal and 
tried to bring France on board too.127 The proposal was received coolly by the 
French because of the adverse impact it might have on their domestic politics 
and because they doubted its effectiveness. In any case, as far Bidault, was 
concerned, France had gone out of its way to help De Gasperi by returning to 
Italy territories which, under the Treaty, had been granted to it through by being 
party to the Tripartite Declaration, by signing the Franco-ltalian Customs Union 
agreement and finally by upgrading its Embassy staff in Rome.128 To the great 
relief of the Italian government the British government brushed aside French
126. FO 371/73180/Z1836/317/22, 28-2-1948, minute by Brown,
28-2-1948; ibid., Z1625/317/22, 12-2-1948, letter, Rome to War Crimes 
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concerns, announcing that they were prepared to go ahead alone129 and 
communicated their decision to pass the responsibility of its remaining war 
crimes trials to the Italian courts.130 In fact, the Americans had made the same 
decision as well and Britain did not have to act unilaterally.131 These actions 
gave a further boost to the electoral prospects of the anti-communist ticket 
literally on the eve of the election in Italy.
The adoption of a policy that pledged the support of a British Labour 
government to an overtly conservative party was not entirely free of problems 
for Bevin or others in the British government. What continued to niggle and 
frustrate the British government even more was the apparent inability or even 
unwillingness of the Italian government to improve the condition of the South 
and introduce effective land reform. This inaction annoyed the British because 
it exposed the Labour government to charges and taunts that it was supporting 
a reactionary regime and because there was the likelihood that it increased the 
appeal of communism. The latter issue was of immediate concern because the 
problem of the South had emerged as the prominent one in the pre-election 
period.132 The British Embassy reported from Rome that the Communist Party 
had made inroads in the South and that there were indications that it was 
overcoming traditional Southern conservativism through promises of better
129. FO 371/73180/Z2464/317/22, 22-3-1948, confidential, telegram, no. 
304, H. Ashley-Clarke, Minister, British Embassy Paris, to FO, 22-3-1948;
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days ahead and by highlighting the indifference of the government to the plight 
of the Mezzogiorno.
Bevin complained that he felt ‘handicapped’ every time he proposed more help 
for Italy. This was by virtue of the fact that he was receiving a plethora of 
complaints on the failure of the Italian government to enact reform and to 
improve the condition of the Italian South. He felt that such a situation was 
contrary to the principles ‘of a social democratic country like Britain’ and that 
he had been left open to accusations that he ‘was defending an Italian 
government with reactionary leanings’.133 His view was that the Italian 
government ought to improve the image it projected abroad by at last 
embarking on social and agricultural reform.134 Bevin instructed Mallet to 
convey his displeasure to the Italians in no uncertain terms.135 When Mallet 
raised the issue with De Gasperi and Sforza, their reaction was reticent, 
noncommittal and far from encouraging. Both men believed that it was an issue 
that could wait as both were fearful of alienating their natural supporters. They 
maintained that this was a long-term problem which required huge capital 
investments.136 The British were unable to influence the Christian Democrats 
to take the road to social reform because of the entrenched position held by the 
large landowners in the party. Thus, the Italian government was merely storing 
up problems which would eventually destabilize the Italian State in the 1960s 
and the 1970s. Mallet attempted to mollify Bevin by reminding him that De 
Gasperi’s government was a coalition which represented various political
133. FO 800/471/ITALY, confidential, telegram, no. 728, Bevin to Mallet,
23-3-1948; FO 371/73159/Z3102/93/22, 13-4-1948, minutes by Pemberton- 
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interests and colours, for example, Saragat’s Socialists and Pacciardi’s and 
Sforza’s Republicans and that these two parties along with the Liberal Minister 
Einaudi had just published plans for social and land reform especially targeted 
at the underprivileged and backward South.137
In the realms of cultural diplomacy and propaganda, Britain had continued to 
keep a high profile in Italy by peddling the notion that the British way to 
socialism was the only viable and democratic alternative to the totalitarian 
Soviet model. At the Biennale exhibition of 1947, the British pavilion was one 
of the most impressive, adorned as it was with Turner's paintings. The 
exhibition was co-ordinated and organised by the British Council. The Western 
Department was particularly pleased with the reception Italians had given to the 
exhibition. Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, the Superintending Under-Secretary of the 
Western Department and Christopher Warner recommended that it should be 
moved to Rome for 1948.138 The newly founded Information Research 
Department (IRD) cut its teeth with its campaign against Communism and the 
Soviet Union by mounting its first operations of ‘white’ and ‘black propaganda’ 
in Italy, much to the distress of Mallet who did not want his Embassy to be used 
for its activities for fear of being compromised and because he believed that 
it would not be able to add anything to the procedures he had already 
established to deal with issues of publicity.139 His concerns were brushed aside
137. FO 371/73159/Z3102/93/22, 13-4-48, confidential, telegram, no.
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and he was instructed to implement the new information policy directive 
immediately. In fact, Italy had been earmarked as the first priority of the new 
organization and all its initial material was prepared with Italy in mind. The main 
work of the IRD was carried out in the planting of anti-communist material with 
the Italian Press and helping Italian officials and politicians with their anti­
communist activities to discredit their opponents and thereby to neutralize 
Soviet propaganda, for instance in the case of the ex-Italian colonies. The only 
proviso was that it should ‘avoid incitement to subversive activities.140
During the spring of 1948, the internal security situation in Italy had suddenly 
deteriorated because of the heavy handed actions of De Gasperi and Scelba. 
On 9 and 10 March, the already tense political climate in Italy was exacerbated 
by a series of arrests of prominent communists in Puglia on charges connected 
with the anti-ERP general strike of November 1947. L’Unite condemned the 
actions of the security forces immediately and denounced the government for 
openly violating the ‘electoral truce’. The whole exercise was described as a 
‘punitive expedition’ by De Gasperi, who was determined to win the elections 
at all costs. Togliatti also made threatening noises by intimating that he was 
contemplating denouncing the truce altogether. Such measures created 
feelings of uncertainty and generated the impression that the situation in Italy 
was more volatile than it really was. This coupled with the alarm caused by the 
Czech coup, increased further existing Western fears of the state of the public 
order in Italy in the run up to the election.141
Such fears were reinforced by the fact that the pre-election period had seen an
140. Ibid.
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increase in border incidents between Italy and Yugoslavia.142 Scare-mongering 
and irresponsible articles appeared sporadically in the British Press. Some of 
these contained wild and, more often than not, unsubstantiated claims that 
‘shock troops’ and arms were being smuggled into Italy from Yugoslavia.143 A 
gloomy article in The Times predicted that the PCI had a fair chance of winning 
the elections.144 Such reports were not always taken at face value by the 
Foreign Office. The estimation of the Southern Department was that the 
Yugoslavs were showing ‘apprehension’ at being involved in such adventures 
and that the Soviet Union would not allow the Yugoslavs to take any action that 
might risk direct confrontation with Britain or the US at this time.145 
Nevertheless such reports and articles contributed to the general uneasiness 
arising from an already tense situation.
Fears diminished slightly, when London received reports from the British 
Legation to the Holy See which detailed the unwavering and unflagging 
involvement of the Italian clergy on the side of the anti-communist forces in the 
election. The Foreign Office, however, looked upon the intervention of the 
Vatican with a degree of trepidation and uncertainty. Although the level of 
Vatican involvement disconcerted many in the Foreign Office who recognized 
that it could alienate anti-communist secular circles, it moved nevertheless to 
endorse it. Any doubts were dispelled by the hope that the clergy could shore
142. FO 371 /72619/R3038/3038/92, 8-3-1948, secret, telegram, no.
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up support for the Christian Democrats and away from the Communists and 
the Socialists.146 London watched with astonishment at the militant stance 
adopted by the Vatican and its collateral organizations such as Catholic Action. 
The Vatican had instructed the clergy to impress on devout Catholics the 
message that abstentionism was not an option for the faithful during this 
election and that their vote was to be given only to those who could and were 
willing to offer guarantees of safeguarding ‘the rights of God, religion, family 
and society in accordance with the laws of God and of Christian morality’.147 
Most dramatically, the clergy was also instructed to refuse to offer absolution 
and the other sacraments to Communists.148 The potential of such Church 
involvement on the voting intentions of an electorate made up of 99.6% 
practising Roman Catholics was appreciated immediately. The Foreign Office 
recognised that influence of the Pope and the Cardinals could galvanize the 
electorate, especially the traditionally politically apathetic Italian women, into 
voting for the Christian Democrats rather than abstaining.149 Moreover, this 
foray of the clergy from concern for the metaphysical well-being to concern for 
the political well-being of their flock helped to thwart the main premise on which 
Togliatti had based his electoral campaign, namely that a person could cast a
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vote for the Communists and still remain a good and devout Catholic.150
From late March onwards, it was clear that the DC would emerge victorious in 
the electoral arena and that American and British intervention had indeed 
succeeded in curbing the popularity of the PCI/PSIUP ticket. Bidault, on his 
return from Turin, intimated to Sir Oliver Harvey, the British Ambassador to 
France that the Tripartite Declaration on Trieste had ‘taken the wind out of the 
sails of the Communists’.151 Intelligence reports revealed that the PCI and the 
PSIUP had all but lost all their support in the South and that the DC and the 
Saragat Socialists had absorbed it.152 Even more encouragingly, there were 
reports that the Saragat and Lombardo factions were growing in popularity, a 
development the Italian government attributed directly to the support they had 
received from the British Labour Party and the TUC.153 When Bevin met Sforza 
at Bidault’s reception in Paris on 16 April 1948, the latter confirmed he was 
optimistic about the election and that his main concern was that too many 
reactionaries would be elected on the anti-communist ticket, a niggling concern 
for Bevin too.154 Sforza payed tribute to Bevin for the activities of the Labour 
Party and in particular, to the endeavours of Healey and his impressive 
broadcast, which in his opinion, had had a profound impact on the Italian 
electorate.155
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However, new kinds of anxieties were to come to the fore. These concentrated 
around the possible reaction of the Communists to the election result and the 
concern that the PCI would try to overturn an unfavourable result through 
means of direct action. As the election date drew closer these fears grew 
among Democrazia Cristiana (DC), American and British circles. There was 
also a concomitant fear that the police forces would not be able to deal 
effectively with such an eventuality as their men would be dispersed all over 
the country guarding polling booths. Contingency plans were considered to 
have the Italian Army on stand-by to deal with any threat. The American 
government decided that a £10m consignment of equipment ought to be 
delivered immediately to be used, if the need arose, during the critical post­
election period.156 The British government was informed that the main thrust of 
US policy in assisting the DC, aimed at ensuring that Italy would have enough 
supplies and equipment to cope with any communist-inspired disorders. At the 
core of the American policy lay the intention of strengthening the Italian security 
forces to such a level as to enable them to fight their own battles against 
communist agitation. If this meant that peace treaty limits had to be violated 
then the US was prepared to do so. What was paramount was to ensure that 
US troops should not be involved in military combat in Italy.157
Scelba, the Minister of the Interior, confirmed that the latest opinion polls had 
forecast a comfortable victory for the DC and its allies but he intimated to Victor 
Mallet that he was concerned about the post electoral situation and he
156. FO 371/73156/Z1359/93/22, 17-4-48, personal, secret, letter, 12-2- 
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requested assistance.158 Scelba’s words carried much weight with the British. 
Bevin liked him and regarded him as an able and energetic man. Scelba, 
ominously noted, that this could be the only way to stop the Russians 
swallowing up Europe piecemeal and he went on to highlight the weaknesses 
of the Carabinieria as a result of the limitations imposed by the Peace Treaty. 
He told Mallet that the Allied Powers had the moral obligation to ensure that 
Italy was able to enforce article 17 which provided for the prevention of the 
resurgence, on Italian territory, of organizations ‘whose aim [was] to deprive 
the people of their democratic rights’.159 Scelba’s concerns were deeply shared 
by many in the British government. Intelligence reports also confirmed fears 
that trouble was expected to erupt around 19 and 20 April 1948.160 W. H. 
Braine, the Labour Attach^ at the British Embassy in Rome, verified Scelba’s 
concerns when he disclosed that intelligence he had gathered suggested that 
the Communists could hold an effective general strike despite the presence of 
a strong Association of Catholic Italian Workers (ACLI) element.161
Mallet saw Scelba’s request for assistance as being motivated not simply by 
fears of political disruption in the critical post-election period but also by the 
Italian government’s desire to capitalize on Anglo-American concerns over the 
election and to induce the latter two governments to commit themselves to the
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revision of the military clauses of the Peace Treaty. Thus, Mallet stressed that 
whilst the British government would do all it could to help the Italian 
government, the best way to sap the power of the Communist thrust was for 
the government to indulge in some self-help by announcing a major 
programme of social, agrarian and economic reform. This, he said, would help 
with British public opinion and would make it easier for the British government 
to support the DC. Prominent members of the Italian government could then 
go on to give interviews to British correspondents which would counteract the 
impression that the DC was the party of just clerical and reactionary forces.162
Scelba was unmoved by Mallet’s arguments and entreaties and he stated 
forcefully that the only solution to communist insurrection was for Britain and 
the US to show that they would be prepared to use force. He proposed that the 
British and American fleets commence patrols in the Adriatic after 19 April. 
Scelba’s prognostications were overly exaggerated and unduly pessimistic. 
Nevertheless, London was not prepared to discount them all willy-nilly. There 
were discussions within the different Departments of the Foreign Office to 
assess the danger and decide on the nature and adoption of the measures to 
deal with it. The Russia Committee was extremely alarmed by Scelba’s 
warnings and Sargent was at his most pessimistic. Even when everyone else 
had arrived at the conclusion that Italy would be voting overwhelmingly for a 
Christian Democratic Government, he was still not convinced. His thinking was 
greatly influenced by the Greek Civil War and by the recent events in 
Czechoslovakia. He still feared a communist victory at the ballot box or, in case 
of their electoral failure, the possibility of a communist march on Rome, 
banditry, unrest and strikes. He advised that ‘it was high time for a directive to
162. FO 371/73156/Z1359/93/22, 17-2-48, secret, letter, Mallet to 
Kirkpatrick, 12-2-1948
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be prepared for issue to the naval and military commanders on the spot’.163 
Sargent and Sir William G. Hayter, the Superintending Under-Secretary of the 
Services Liaison Department of the Foreign Office and a member of the Russia 
Committee, recommended that a Royal Navy Task Force ought to call at Italian 
ports prior to and during the election with the twin aims of impressing the Italian 
Government with the Royal Navy’s continued military strength and influencing 
the election favourably.164 The State Department also favoured strong action 
and proposed that it would be better if ships were sent as a deterrent as soon 
as the elections were over under the pretext of a goodwill visit and before any 
trouble erupted. Hayter supported by Sargent, registered his support for the 
American proposal. The result was that the Ministry of Defence and the Chiefs 
of Staff Committee approved plans for a number of Royal Navy ships to be 
placed on stand-by to be ready to sail with American ships to Italian and 
Sicilian ports if disturbances broke out.165
The Western Department considered such plans to be a misguided idea. 
Kirkpatrick submitted that such a move would be provocative. He concluded 
that the best line of action would be for De Gasperi to be told that it was up to 
the Italian government to suppress any disturbances and if practical and moral 
support was needed then the British and the American governments would be
163. FO 371/73159/Z3355/93/22, 20-4-1948, top secret, memorandum 
drafted by Sargent, 13-3-1948.
164. Ibid., minutes by Hayter and Sargent, 15-4-1948;
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and Brown, 1-3-1948; secret, telegram, no. 508, FO to Rome, 2-3-1948; ibid., 
Z1609/730/22, 26-2-1948, letter by Dodds (Military Branch), Admiralty, to 
Brown, 21-2-1948.
165. FO 371/73159/Z3145/93/22, 14-1-1948, secret, telegram, no. 1758, 
Washington to FO, 13-4-1948; ibid., Z3146/93/22, 14-4-1948, memorandum, 
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prepared to consider sending ships to forestall any trouble.166 The American 
and British Ambassadors in Rome were also of the opinion that naval visits to 
Italian ports were undesirable and unnecessary and that it would reflect badly 
on the Western powers to have ships in an exposed and compromising 
position. It would lay the British and American governments open to criticism 
and charges of foul play. It would also be futile because ships could take no 
meaningful action in the case of disturbances ashore since the possibility of 
bombardment of Italian cities was out of the question. Finally, the Ambassadors 
felt that any naval activity would renew the January controversy and would give 
support to communist claims that the De Gasperi government was too weak 
to stand on its own and that it was totally dependent on outside support.167
Bevin preferred to follow Mallet’s and Kirkpatrick’s measured analysis and 
advice and these extreme measures were not adopted.168 Nevertheless, by 15 
April, the British government was sufficiently concerned to suggest to the State 
Department that it would be ready to declare jointly with the Americans and 
assure the Italian government that it would be prepared to give material and 
moral assistance to the Italian forces in the event they could not cope with the 
situation. The State Department however, concluded that such an assurance 
went too far and that it could prove counterproductive. In the end, despite the 
heightened concerns and fears, both the American and British governments 
were not prepared, at this time, to consider any other measures apart from fleet
166. FO 371/73159/Z3146/93/22, 14-4-1948, memorandum, Trouble in 
Italy’, drafted by Crosthwaite, 14-4-1948; minute by Crosthwaite, 14-4-1948.
167. FO 371/73159/Z3289/93/22, 19-4-1948, top secret, telegram, no. 
691, Mallet to FO, 17-4-1948; FO 371/73195B/Z1955/730/22, 7-3-1948 secret, 
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patrols in the Adriatic.169 They also decided that the idea of issuing a 
declaration proclaiming that they would not remain indifferent if violent means 
were employed to overturn the people’s verdict was superfluous and pointless 
since this possible eventuality had been covered by Truman’s statement at the 
time of the withdrawal of the US forces from Italy.170 Ultimately, it was decided 
that it was up to the Italians to fight their own battles against the Communists 
and it was up to the West to ensure that they were adequately equipped to do 
so successfully. The shared conclusion was also that the Italian President had 
to be compelled into not entrusting the formation of a government to the 
PCI/PSIUP bloc or, indeed, to anyone who would be prepared to include these 
Parties in a governing coalition. Thus, the two governments instructed Mallet 
and Dunn to convey to De Gasperi their confidence in the ability of the Italian 
forces to maintain law and order in the post-election period. They also 
communicated to the Italian government their willingness to support it ‘in any 
way practical and appropriate should it find it necessary to call upon them for 
further assistance.171
One of the most remarkable characteristics of the pre-election period was that 
Western intervention was based on imaginary Soviet actions and plots against 
Italy when in fact there was precious little evidence that the Soviets were 
particularly concerned about the fate of the PCI. The Soviet Union remained 
resigned to a Christian Democratic victory because it had no desire to provoke
169. FO 371/73159/Z3289/93/22, 19-4-1948, top secret, telegram, no. 
691, Mallet to FO, 17-4-1948.
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a frontal confrontation with the West over Italy at a time when its priority was 
the consolidation of Eastern Europe. If anything, Soviet conduct in the run up 
to the election damaged the electoral prospects of the PCI and its allies. The 
Czech coup which occurred only two months prior to the election scared and 
alienated potential voters of the PCI/PSIUP ticket.172 On the Trieste issue, the 
Soviets failed to elaborate an attractive alternative initiative to woo Italian public 
opinion. They procrastinated for a long while only to come up with a mere 
denunciation of the West’s failure to consult with the USSR prior to the 
announcement of the Trieste Declaration.173 On the eve of the elections, the 
Soviets created a rift in their relations with Italy when they attempted to link the 
negotiations for the replacement of the 1924 commercial accord with the thorny 
issue of reparations.174 Palazzo Chigi was provoked into despatching a 
resentful note to the Soviets in which Sforza explained forcefully that, at this 
stage, Italy could not do this because it had been accepted and agreed that the 
country could not pay reparations for the next two years.175 The Soviet decision 
to veto Italy’s entry to the UNO for the third time created much negative feeling 
in Italy and its timing, just eight days prior to the election, was unproductive. 
The issue of the Italian membership had come up before the Security Council 
on 10 April and the Soviets had objected to Italian admission on legalistic 
technicalities.176
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All the Soviets were prepared to do in the way of public initiatives to help their 
proteges in the forthcoming election was to announce that they were in favour 
of Italy’s claims to gain trusteeship over its erstwhile colonies. This constituted 
a blatant attempt on the part of the Soviet Union to drive a wedge between Italy 
and the West and to induce Britain to jettison any similar idea and thereby 
putting the Soviet Union in the position of being the sole champions of Italian 
aspirations. Such attempts however, were undermined by the Soviets’ 
unwillingness to make any material concessions to Italy at all and to follow the 
example of the US and the British in renouncing their share of the Italian 
Fleet.177 Bevin capitalised further on the positive effect for the West that this 
latter gesture had on the Italians by explaining that any tardiness on Britain’s 
part to return these ships was due to British fears that they could fall into Soviet 
hands.178 The Soviet Union compounded its tactless diplomacy by continuing 
to accuse the Italian government of subservience to the US and portraying it 
as a government driving Italy towards the prospect of a third world war 
because of De Gasperi’s willingness to draw Italy into the Western Union.179 
As Valliani observed, the Italian electorate was faced with choosing between 
two patrons: the Soviet Union which promised ‘bleakness and harshness’ and 
‘the West that not only promised but had already offered largesse and had also 
the support of the ministers of God’.180 Thus, the choice for the Italians was not 
that difficult at all.
Bevin maintained his vigilance in the run up to the election and would not allow
177. FO 371/71649/N2771/31/38, 9-3-1948, minute by Crosthwaite, 
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his attention to be deflected. In April, just before the election he minuted ‘we 
must not slack on Italy1.181 He worked in a single-minded fashion to ensure the 
defeat of the combined Socialist and Communist ticket, to such a degree, that 
he was prepared to sacrifice his own party’s unity. The Labour Party had been 
deeply traumatized by the way Bevin had decided to use the party machine in 
the implementation of foreign policy. The splitting of the PSIUP, the isolation of 
Nenni and the uncritical support for Saragat and Lombardo all had a divisive 
effect on the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP). Many backbench MPs 
regarded their government’s policy with alarm. Party discipline and international 
solidarity stretched the loyalties of many a Labour MP to such a degree that 
many of them decided to break party ranks and send a letter of good wishes 
to Nenni’s PSIUP rather than to the Saragat faction, expressing their hopes 
that ‘...on Sunday, the Italian people will be left free to exercise their right as 
citizens and to declare by which government they wanted to be led in a 
democratic way’.182 The problem for the Labour leadership was that many of 
these MPs were real ‘Labourites’ and not ‘fellow travellers’ of the Zilliacus and 
Platt-Mills ilk who, by that time, had been isolated by the mainstream of the 
PLP to such a degree that they had to send their own telegram of good wishes 
to Nenni.183 The Labour government was deeply embarrassed by such actions 
but was not detracted from its determination and it reciprocated with its own 
message of unreserved support to the Socialist Unity group. The telegram was 
signed by Phillips and it was drafted by Healey who advised the Rome 
Embassy to pass it on to La Humanita, Saragat’s newspaper, for maximum
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As the election approached, the low key approach of the British government 
was vindicated when, despite its gratitude to America for its generous support, 
the Italian government became nervous at the high visibility of this aid. De 
Gasperi indicated to the State Department that he would prefer not to receive 
any more equipment from the US between now and the election. Like the 
British government he had become concerned that a ‘leak’ over the level of 
such assistance would give the Communists a propaganda bonanza.185 On the 
other hand, the considerable impact of the Labour Party on the April election 
result had escaped any criticism linking it to the government and thus showing 
it for what it really was, an effective foreign intervention in Italy’s internal affairs. 
By 8 April, the Cabinet was confident that the Christian Democrats would 
emerge victorious from the elections.186 By 16 April, the Italian security forces 
were able to revise their previously pessimistic forecasts. They declared that 
even if trouble did arise they expected it to be localized and sporadic rather 
than widespread in nature.187 The Italian police had no doubts that it could 
contain such activities. Signor Ferrari, the Director General for public security 
throughout Italy, a permanent official directly responsible to the Minister of the 
Interior, assured Mallet that the Italian government had taken the necessary 
measures to safeguard vital services in the event of disorder and a general 
strike action by keeping large deposits of petrol under safe control, by putting 
radio stations under supervision and by stationing ships in every important port
184. Ibid.
185. FO 371/73157/Z2295/93/22, 17-3-48, top secret, telegram, no.
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186. FO 371 /73160/Z3468/93/22, 26-4-1948, minute by Crosthwaite,
27-4-1948; CAB 128/12, CM27(48), ‘Italy’, 8-4-1948.
187. FO 371/73159/Z3267/93/22, 19-4-1948, secret, telegram, no. 682, 
Rome to FO, 17-4-1948.
199
ready to maintain law and order.188 It was also evident that the Prague coup 
had had a negative effect on the electorate’s perception of the PCI and its 
democratic credentials. Soviet heavy-handedness and insensitivity had 
provided the anti-communist forces in Italy with a powerful weapon. The 
passing of the ERP legislation held the prospect of prosperity and last, but not 
least, the Labour Party’s disavowal of the Nennite PSIUP had weakened it to 
the favour of the Saragat and Lombardo faction.189
The result of the 18 April election was a resounding victory for the DC and an 
unmitigated defeat for the PCI/PSIUP ticket. The DC polled 48.8% of the total 
vote which translated into a share of 53% of the seats in the Chamber and 
43% at the Senate and was nothing less than a triumphant landslide victory. 
The Popular Front combined share of the vote was a mere 31 %. The PS IL or 
the ‘Socialist Unity* ticket also did rather badly revealing its appeal to Italian 
Socialists as extremely limited. The Saragat-Lombardo grouplet received only 
7.1% of the vote.190 The result was particularly poor for the PSIUP which saw 
its strength diminish to such a degree as to be driven to playing the role of 
second fiddle to that of the PCI. Of the 182 seats the PCI/PSIUP ticket won, 
only 50 went to the PSIUP.191 Mallet in a reflective post electoral analysis of 
the result said that the victory of the DC had been clinched by a combination
188. Ibid., Z3266/93/22, 19-4-18, secret, telegram, no. 671, Mallet to 
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of foreign intervention, pressure from the Church and police intimidation.192
The Communists reacted to the electoral result with controlled fury. Togliatti 
condemned and characterized the means employed by the anti-communist 
forces to ensure the defeat of the PCI/PSIUP electoral union as being the 
coercive tactics of foreign intervention, government intimidation and 
unconstitutional Church interference. He went on to reiterate that the policies 
and tactics of the PCI had been deeply steeped in constitutional principles and 
that he was not prepared to resort to violent means to overturn the result as he 
neither wished to harm Italy nor to set back the course of democracy. He 
declared that his aim was now ‘to open and keep open and alive the problem 
of having free elections in which the representatives of the people will be 
elected without threats of starvation or war from foreigners or of eternal 
damnation from the priests’.193 The Soviet reaction was low key and resigned 
rather than belligerent. The Soviets simply denounced the result as the unfair 
product of extensive government interference, pressure from the Vatican and 
military and economic coercion from the West. ‘Radio Moscow’ pronounced 
that the result had been ‘neither free, nor democratic and that the Italian people 
had been deprived of their chance to express their will freely’.194 Such 
reactions left a lingering concern with the Foreign Office which feared that such 
views of the result in years to come would be seen as constituting an accurate 
account of events, but still there was widespread relief that the Communist
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danger for Italy had ebbed, at least for the time being.195
The new government was announced on 23 May. It contained eleven Christian 
Democrats, three Social Unity, two Republicans, two Liberals and two 
Independent ministers and it secured an emphatic endorsement of its program 
after winning a vote of confidence.196 The British government was on the whole 
satisfied with its composition but also slightly disappointed with the rather minor 
posts given to the Social Unity ministers.197 Saragat was given the Ministry of 
Mercantile Marine and the ceremonial title of Deputy Prime Minister, Roberto 
Tremelloni was a minister without portfolio and a Vice President of the Inter- 
Ministerial Committee for reconstruction which enabled Socialist Unity to have 
a say in the way in which ERP funds were used. Finally, Lombardo was given 
the Ministry of Industry and Commerce.198
The Aftermath of the Election
The victory of the DC meant that for the time being Italy had succeeded in 
averting the threat of communist rule. The British Embassy in Rome warned 
however, that the DC government was still facing an uphill task in establishing 
itself and neutralizing the PCI threat in the long term. Mallet estimated that the 
Italian government’s long-term problems were high inflation, increases in 
industrial unemployment and the generally forlorn situation of the Italian 
economy compared to the prewar period. These problems perpetuated social
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discontent and support for the PCI.199 In 1938 the net value of Italian 
agricultural production was 43.1% of its GNP, in 1946 it was only 32.8%. In 
1938 industrial production in Italy was 40.1% of its GNP, in 1946 it had fallen 
to only 12.5%.200 Unemployment stood at above 2,000,000 and it continued to 
rise at approximately 130,000 per year, despite the fact that during 1947 some 
272,000 Italians had emigrated.201 Bevin was particularly concerned with the 
persistence of high unemployment and the discontent it brought which could 
only work to the benefit of the Communists and the Socialists. Although it was 
obvious that emigration alone could not solve Italy’s unemployment problem, 
he felt that he had to try to secure outlets for Italy’s surplus labour. He 
encouraged the Australian government to accept more Italian immigrants and 
sought to find a solution to the shipping problems which were holding back the 
flow of Italian emigrants to Australia.
The absence of agrarian reform was also seen as being a deeply intractable 
problem by the British government caused by the combination of such diverse 
factors as overpopulation, centuries of governmental neglect, poverty, 
backwardness, uneconomic exploitation of the infertile land, lack of planning, 
and the devastation of war. A long-term solution to the agricultural problem was 
deemed to be of the utmost importance as 47% of the Italian population was
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dependent on the land for its livelihood.202 The situation was further 
exacerbated by the fact that seventy four people had to earn a living out of 
each square metre of arable land which revealed a huge concentration of 
population. No other Western European country presented such a dismal 
picture.203 Mallet suggested that the negative effects of these problems could 
be offset by the positive aspects of the Marshall Plan, the support of the 
Catholic Church and more importantly by ensuring Italian participation in the 
major Western organizations.204
When the British Cabinet met to discuss the election result it decided that the 
activities of the Labour Party in Italy should not fold, but that it should intensify 
its involvement with the Saragat and Lombardo faction in order to build them 
up as a moderating and reforming counterweight within the De Gasperi 
government. It was hoped that this would push the Italian government into 
adopting positive policies to solve the problems of the country rather than 
relying merely on sterile anti-communism. Similarly, the Cabinet had decided 
that developments in the Italian trade union movement should be monitored 
closely, with advice being given through the TUC to anti-communist trade 
unionists in order to reduce the communist hold on the CGIL.205 These 
decisions, coupled with the Russia Committee’s advice that Britain’s role at this 
stage was to ‘supply ideological leadership to democracy’, formed the mainstay
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of British policy towards Italian politics during the rest of 1948.206 On 1 May, 
Mallet visited De Gasperi to assure him of the British government’s continued 
support and to offer him help in the case of a communist inspired emergency 
which the Italian security forces could not control.207
The interest of the Labour government in the affairs of Italy remained 
undiminished after the triumph of Christian Democracy and its activities 
developed in several priority areas. First, to push the new Italian government 
into adopting a programme of reform. Second, to strengthen the Saragat and 
Lombardo grouping even further internationally. Third, to monitor the 
developments within the CGIL as closely as possible with the ultimate aim of 
helping its anti-communist elements gain control of the Italian trades union 
movement from the communists. Last, but not least, to spearhead an 
information campaign in Italy which would achieve the twin objectives of 
reducing the appeal of communism and keep Britain’s image at the forefront of 
Italian public opinion as being an example of a democratic country that had 
embarked on a successful programme of social reform and justice.208
As far as the first priority was concerned, the British government believed that 
immediate practical steps had to be taken by the Italian government itself to 
rectify the agrarian situation in general and to address the situation of the 
South in particular. Previous encounters with the Italian government to discuss
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the issue had left deep doubts as to De Gasperi’s commitment to any 
meaningful reform fearing as he did that it would harm the interests of his 
landowning supporters. The only hope of the British lay in the fact that the 
Americans had reached similar conclusions and that the impetus for 
addressing the issue was likely to come via the ERP. One of the main 
objectives of European Cooperation Administration (ECA) in Italy was to 
promote ‘industrial and agricultural production’.209 In view of this, Bevin 
concluded that Britain ought to adopt a two-pronged step strategy. On the one 
hand, Britain had to use its influence with the Americans to ensure that the 
latter steered the Italian government towards embarking on ‘a bold 
development, an opportunity which for Bevin was not to be missed.210 On the 
other hand, the Foreign Office concluded that priorities two and three be 
executed as soon as possible since the situation was too bad to wait for long­
term plans to work. The result was the decision for Britain to embark on a 
propaganda offensive in the Italian countryside to lessen the appeal of 
communism. The idea was for a campaign based on contrasting the benefits 
of co-operative farming as opposed to the oppression of the Russian peasantry 
caused by the collectivization forced upon them by the Bolsheviks.211 The 
campaign was based on the IRD’s paper on the collectivisation process of the 
USSR and its various papers promoting social democracy.212
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To make this aim succeed all means of disseminating propaganda were 
deployed. The British Council, the BBC and the Labour Party were all drafted 
in to carry out the information policy adopted by the Foreign Office. The BBC 
was a particularly useful tool, as quickly, it had become apparent that its 
programmes were very popular with the Italian public and that, even more 
importantly, in times of crisis the Italians tuned to it for their news as it was 
perceived to be more objective, accurate and significantly less biased than the 
Voice of America.213 The problem of using the BBC was however, that its Italian 
audience was mainly middle and upper class and that it failed to get across to 
the Italian workers and peasants who were Bevin’s main target. The Foreign 
Office expended considerable effort to ensure that the BBC varied the times 
of its broadcasts to Italy in order to reach the target audience and that even 
when expenditure cuts forced the BBC to reduce its output to Europe its Italian 
commitment remained unaltered. The BBC was also asked to ensure that its 
broadcasts contained material that appealed to working class audiences and 
to include coverage of labour movement activities from both sides of the 'Iron 
Curtain’ divide.214 The Information Office of the Rome Embassy worked 
indefatigably to ensure that the British message got through. Sir David Isolani, 
one of the Information Officers of the British Embassy, toured the country with 
the energy of a zealot and used RAI to deliver lectures on social reform in
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Britain. His lecture prior to the Genoa Congress of the Italian Socialist Party 
entitled ‘Security from cradle to grave’ launched COMISCO’s offensive against 
PSIUP.215 The role of the British Council was to inform Western Europeans of 
the current achievements of the UK and its contribution to Western 
civilization.216 The enlarged International Department of the Labour Party was 
employed to carry out the objectives of British foreign policy in Italy and Labour 
local authorities were encouraged to invite Italian Social Democrats to visit 
Britain and find out about British local government practices.217 The concept of 
twinning British and Italian towns was also adopted in an effort to support the 
Saragat and Lombardo socialists and promote Britain.218 Film and newsreel 
were also used to good effect as British films attracted audiences of 
approximately one million per quarter.219 Invitations to Italian journalists to visit 
Britain continued undiminished, but this time journalists who were identified as 
friendly to Britain were also given IRD-produced digests to use as a basis for 
articles when they returned to Italy. By September, the Rome Embassy began
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to see articles appear in the Christian Democratic press which were based on 
IRD anti-communist material and the Embassy was able to report that Italian 
public opinion was favourable to the reforms the Labour government had 
undertaken in Britain.220
The Foreign Office continued to take a close interest in the affairs of the PSIUP 
and it hoped strongly that the fusion of the Lombardo and Saragat factions 
would create, the hitherto, elusive Italian social democratic force to eclipse 
Nenni. The Socialist Unity Party, however, was plagued by internal strife, 
personal rivalries and frustrations with their posts in the De Gasperi Cabinet. 
Above all, the Party had doubts that the government which they supported 
would pursue a progressive programme of reform and that it would not use 
ERP funds for its own narrow political party ends.221 In view of these 
circumstances, the Embassy in Rome became concerned that in order for the 
Foreign Office to bring about this desired fusion of factions there was a danger 
that it could compromise the British government itself and the Embassy. As 
early as March, Mallet had expressed his unease with Warner’s idea of using 
his Embassy as a centre for IRD activities and he reiterated this position again 
in May by stating that he would prefer it if his role and that of Braine could be 
limited to simply giving general advice.222 The Western Department entertained 
similar fears that should Britain be implicated in getting involved in the affairs 
and wrangles of the Socialist Unity Party it would ‘recoil’ onto the Embassy.223 
Such concerns were brushed aside and it was decided that Braine, at least,
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should keep in close touch with any developments and that his task ought to 
be to encourage all the constituent elements of the Socialist Unity ticket to fuse 
together into ‘a stable Party1 and to urge them to continue cooperating with the 
Christian Democrats and the anti-communist alliance regardless of their 
misgivings.224
The next step in helping Saragat and Lombardo was taken at the COMISCO 
meeting in Vienna on 3 June. Nenni had been invited to attend as a delegate 
since the PSIUP was one of its constituent members. The fact that the Labour 
Party had failed to block his invitation in favour of Saragat and Lombardo 
created consternation to many in the Foreign Office. They did not understand 
the workings of the Socialist International and that it was not the British Labour 
Party which decided who received an invitation and who did not but that it was 
COMISCO which issued invitations to its members and that the Labour Party 
alone could not do anything. What Bevin and Healey did was to encourage 
Saragat and Lombardo to send delegates to Vienna requesting admission as 
members and to reassure them that all the Western European Socialist parties 
wanted to do all they could to assist them. Saragat accepted this assurance 
grudgingly, feeling that Labour had shied away from totally discrediting Nenni. 
Healey prepared the ground to ensure that the Saragat and Lombardo 
delegates were admitted on a basis of equality with the PSIUP delegates.225 At 
the conference it became evident rapidly that the PSIUP was not going to be 
treated as a normal delegation but was put in the position of a defendant 
having to explain its links with the PCI. Its continued membership of COMISCO 
hinged upon Nenni’s willingness to renounce all links with the PCI; the
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alternative was expulsion. In view of Nenni’s unwillingness to undertake such 
action the PSIUP was suspended from membership pending the outcome of 
its Genoa Conference of 27 June 1948 and the Socialist Unity Party was 
accepted as a full member. A commission made up of delegates from Britain, 
France, Belgium and Holland was set up to scrutinise the actions of the PSIUP. 
If, at its conference in Genoa, the PSIUP relieved Nenni from the leadership 
and severed its links with the PCI, then the commission would assume the task 
of reunifying the socialist forces in Italy.226
The main aim behind the various activities of the International Office of the 
Labour Party was to weaken and discredit the PSIUP to such a degree that the 
Party would wither away through member defection and then to replace the 
depleted membership by organising a regrouping of anti-communist Italian 
socialists. The processes that would lead to the eclipse of Nenni would be 
achieved through poor electoral results, the international isolation of the PSIUP 
and the international recognition of the Socialist Unity forces. The Foreign 
Office believed in the success of such a policy as the post-April PSIUP was a 
party in deep shock, reeling from defeat, riven by internal dissent and deeply 
dissatisfied with what Romita had called the PCI’s ‘imperialist attitude towards 
the PSI’.227 The PSIUP Congress in Genoa failed to produce the desired result 
of replacing Nenni, but it once again revealed the deep divisions within the 
party and indicated that it would have a lot of healing and rethinking to do 
before it became an important factor in the Italian political scene. It also had 
far-reaching implications for the relationship between the PCI and the PSIUP.
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The delegates were still in shock at the election result and the outcome of the 
Congress was a strange hybrid of disorientation, fusionism and pro and anti- 
Nennite feeling.228 Furthermore, the COMISCO decision to suspend the PSIUP 
had exactly the opposite effect to the one intended, galvanizing all delegates 
behind Nenni. Even centrists such as Romita and Altiero Spinelli who in the 
past had expressed dissent, now voiced their opposition against what they 
perceived as blatant intervention in the affairs of their party.229 It was obvious 
that at this stage intervention in PSIUP affairs was not likely to produce any 
results.
Whilst the PSIUP was licking its wounds an opportunity arose for intervention 
in the murky waters of the Italian trade union movement. The CGIL, despite the 
split of the PSIUP in 1946, the exclusion crisis of May 1947 and the emphatic 
victory of the Christian Democrats in the 18 April elections, continued to be the 
only labour organization that represented the interests of workers in Italy. The 
Pact of Rome, to which Christian Democratic, Socialist and Communist trade 
unionists had subscribed from June 1944 in the interests of the unity of the 
working class, was still intact and no rival organization had as yet posed a 
challenge to it or to the Communist supremacy within it.230 Giuseppe Di Vittorio, 
the Communist secretary of the CGIL, had emerged as the dominant 
personality in the trade union movement despite the fact that he was supposed
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to have equal status with Achille Grandi, the Christian Democrat and Oreste 
Lizzadri, the Socialist secretary, in the triumvirate that made up the leadership 
of CGIL. The reason for his pre-eminence was mainly due to his charismatic 
and indefatigable personality, the benefits which accrued to the PCI from 
cooperating with the Socialists and the fact the Communists made up the 
majority of the rank and file of the movement.231 The control the PCI exercised 
over the trade union movement coupled with its defeat at the polls had made 
the West wary that the next plan of the PCI was to harm the success of the 
Marshall Plan. The British government commenced to examine the means by 
which they could help non-communist Italian trade unionists gain control from 
the Communists. The situation they faced however was infinitely complex. The 
lack of an organised rival movement to the Communists was one part of the 
problem. The other was to determine in which direction to push the non­
communists, whether Britain should urge them to splinter the trade union 
movement or simply to encourage them to play the long-term game of eroding 
communist control from within. The Russia Committee which was asked to 
study the issue quickly split into two strands of thought. The belligerent strand 
was represented by Robert M. A. Hankey, head of Northern Department, who 
proposed that the best way forward was to divide the Italian organised labour 
by promoting alternative trade union movements that could rival the 
Communists and that the execution of this monumental task was to fall on the 
TUC which was to forge links with ‘white trades unions’. Hankey also 
suggested another, more radical approach, namely to replace communist trade 
unionists with ‘reliable’ socialist ones. A campaign based on false tax evasion 
and black marketeering charges against prominent Italian trade unionists could 
be engineered to facilitate their arrest.232 Wiser counsels prevailed. M. Gee,
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Russia Committee, reminded everyone that there were limitations on what 
Britain could do and its aim ought to be simply to ‘free’ the CGIL from 
communist control and not to make a ‘martyr’ out of Di Vittorio. The division of 
the movement was not the best way forward, as it could result in the creation 
of weak catholic trade unions which would fail to attract secular trade unionists 
to the benefit of the PCI. He proposed that the British government ought to 
utilize the TUC to show anti-communist trade unionists how to work from within 
to transform unionism into a genuine democratic movement fighting for 
traditional trade union interests. He warned that hasty actions would result in 
weak and divided unions that would fail to attract members and fail to challenge 
the pre-eminence of the PCI.233 He felt that Britain should exert responsible 
influence and not be involved in the heavy-handed tactics of the American 
Federation of Labour, (AFL).234 Braine from Rome, supported Gee, stating that 
in his opinion, anti-communist trade unionists should fight from within and wrest 
the CGIL from communist control.235
These involved discussions quickly became irrelevant as developments in 
Rome moved unexpectedly and in such a way that, for a while, the West held 
its breath at the seeming commencement of a communist insurgency in Italy. 
On 14 July 1948, Antonio Pallante, a Sicilian fanatic attempted to assassinate 
Togliatti as the latter was standing outside the Montecitorio.236 The Left 
considered this not the isolated attack of a lone fanatic on one man but a 
designed and orchestrated attack on each and every one of them. As soon as 
workers heard the news, they stopped work. Large factories such as FIAT were
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occupied by armed workers, state buildings were taken over, spontaneous 
demonstrations erupted in every city, road blocks were set up and partisans 
took out the weapons they had hidden away at the end of the war. At Abbadia 
San Salvatore, in Tuscany, two policemen were killed and the telephone 
exchange controlling communications between North and South was captured. 
In Turin, many prominent industrialists were taken hostage. Genoa for a while, 
passed from government control and into the hands of the strikers. Di Vittorio 
proclaimed a general strike which in fact had already begun.237 Suddenly Italy, 
seemingly hovered on the brink of insurrection because, as Ginsborg has put 
it, ‘all the frustrations of the previous three years - the restraints accepted by 
the partisan movement, the failure to achieve reform, the humiliation of mass 
unemployment, the defeat of the Popular Front - now welled to the surface’.238 
But it was not to be. Italy’s so called ‘last insurrectionary moment’ vanished as 
quickly and unexpectedly as it arose. Togliatti’s survival and his calming 
influence succeeded in defusing the situation and the emergency passed 
without any real threat to De Gasperi’s authority.239 The whole PCI and CGIL 
machine was mobilized to ensure that the situation did not escalate beyond 
control. Secchia, Longo and Di Vittorio, who was in America, worked day and 
night to restrain and reverse the potential uprising.240 On 16 July the general 
strike was called off and normalcy returned. Togliatti honoured the undertaking
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he had given to sceptical Italians that he would respect democratic practice 
and its rules241 and he always maintained that at this moment revolution was 
not possible.242 De Gasperi was not placated at all by CGIL leaders who had 
poured in to see and reassure him that revolution was not on their minds. 
Giulio Andreotti revealed later, that as soon as De Gasperi heard of the 
incident of the Via della Missione he met in closed session with Scelba 
immediately to draw up and put into effect a counterrevolutionary plan.243 The 
PCI’s restraint showed that it was no longer a revolutionary party even in the 
face of lost elections and political repression.244 This attitude od restraint did 
not register with either the Italian government or its American patrons and the 
PCI was in for a tough time. With its supporters disillusioned and the State bent 
on revenge, the Party entered a period of ‘gli anni duri. It had suffered three 
major defeats in only a year and faced the possibility of having its activities 
curtailed by law.245
The events of mid-July 1948 were to have far-reaching and irreversible 
implications for the Italian organized labour movement whose unity was already 
precarious after the exclusion crisis and the Christian Democratic landslide in 
the April election. Di Vittorio’s sanctioning of a general strike had provoked the 
wrath of the ACLI, the Association of Italian Christian Workers and gave 
Pastore its leader, the opportunity to implement America’s instructions and 
break away from CGIL.246 Colonel Tom Lane, the American Labour Attach^ in 
Rome, had previously advised Pastore to sever his links with CGIL and form
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a splinter trade union and abundant funds were made available from the State 
Department to support ‘Free CGIL’. Despite Di Vittorio’s attempts at mediation 
and his calling off the strike the splintering of the movement had become 
unstoppable.247
The CGIL tried to avoid such a catastrophe by stating the ACLI declaration had 
broken the premises of the Pact of Rome. On 26 July 1948, the Executive 
Committee of the CGIL, in an attempt to diminish the impact of ACLI, called for 
the expulsion of the ACLI leadership from office and membership and appealed 
over its head to Catholic rank and file workers to remain loyal to the CGIL, 
which guaranteed freedom of expression, respect for religious beliefs and 
political opinions. The ACLI’s reaction was, on the one hand, to refuse to 
accept the expulsion, stating that the Executive Committee action was ultra 
vires and on the other, to go to the courts and ask for the funds of CGIL to be 
frozen. The ACLI, however, failed to carry with them the PRI and Saragat trade 
unionists who whilst receiving covert funding from the USA still believed that 
they should not splinter the movement and should continue to fight from within 
to wrest control away from the Communists.248
These events had precipitated major debates in the different socialist 
groupings on their political future and the mutual relationships. During August, 
there were declarations and calls by both the PS IU P’s Executive Committee 
and the socialist novelist Ignazio Silone for the reunification of all the socialist 
parties. The calls capitalised on the speech by Jacometti, the new Secretary
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of the PSIUP, who proclaimed that the ‘popular front’ was dead and the Party’s 
application to COMISCO for readmission. They also capitalised on the decision 
of the Popular Front’s Executive on 12 August to issue a manifesto which 
declared its dissolution whilst pledging the continuation of a common line of 
action. Lombardo too, seemed to support the commencement of tentative 
negotiations for the reunification of all socialist groups. There were also 
rumours insinuating that Saragat and Lombardo were thinking of quitting the 
government to facilitate reunification, something which Saragat contradicted 
forcefully on 18 August.249 This atmosphere prepared the road for discussions 
between Silone and the new PSIUP secretary. Any such hopes, however, were 
dashed by the decisions of the 28th PSIUP Congress in Florence which 
continued to endorse ‘fusionisf policies. The result of this endorsement was to 
precipitate a further schism in the movement when Romita, feeling that he 
stood no chance of reuniting the PSIUP with the PS LI, left to form the Partito 
Socialista Unificato, which in 1951 joined with the PSLI to form the PSDI.250 
Thus, all these multifarious attempts at unification were to founder on the rocks 
of the Cold War and on the PSIUP’s resistance to renouncing the Pact of Unity 
of 1946. COMISCO went on, after a year’s suspension, to expel the PSIUP 
during its Amsterdam conference of 13 to 16 May 1949. The Party was told that 
it would only be allowed to rejoin when it broke away from all links with the 
PCI.251
The formation of the new splinter union movement was announced on 19 
September 1948. Its formation was viewed with resignation and sadness from 
London. Its main problem as identified by the Rome Embassy, was the Catholic
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nature of the new organization which would prevent workers from deserting the 
CGIL en masse, thus condemning the new structure to marginalization. 
Ultimately, in Braine’s words, ‘the only people to lose [would] be the ordinary 
workers whose proper interests will not be safeguarded by a divided 
movement’. Gee too, felt that the anti-communist forces within the CGIL had 
lost a unique opportunity to gain control of the organization.252 Within two years 
the once united Italian organized labour movement had splintered into three, 
the CGIL, which represented Communists and Socialists, the Confederazione 
Italiana dei Sindicati Liberi, CISL, which represented Catholic and Christian 
Democrat workers and Unione Italiana del Lavoro, UIL, which represented the 
interests of the Social Democrats and Republicans and which was established 
in spring 1950.253The CISL, despite the despondency of London and its initial 
teething problems, grew under the tutelage of Irving Brown of the AFL and 
American financial backing into a dangerous rival to the CGIL.254 CISL was 
never as large in membership as the CGIL but its initially insignificant following 
soon increased when it emerged as the favourite of the employers whilst the 
Communists were discriminated against.255 In the pseudo-insurrectionary 
climate the attempt on Togliatti’s life had created, there had been little time for 
subtle British plans to take seed. America’s direct, uncomplicated and well- 
endowed approach appeared to be the best way forward for the anti­
communists forces.
Conclusion
The British government was equally concerned as the Americans to see the
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Unity of Action Pact suffer a humiliating defeat on 18 April 1948 and took all the 
necessary steps to ensure that it did. The whole essence of British policy 
directed towards helping the De Gasperi government during the 1948 elections 
was based on the premise of anti-communism and the desire to promote ‘the 
British way to socialism’. To achieve these objectives the British Labour 
government had to ensure that the Communists and the Socialists were 
defeated comprehensively and that they could not play the role of the ‘king­
maker1 in the formation of the next Italian government. Its differing approach 
from the Americans can be narrowed down to pragmatism and a different 
reading of the situation. The Labour government preferred to keep its activities 
in the realms of secrecy and deniability rather than in overt and visible 
intervention. It knew that it was playing a supporting role to that of the 
Americans, that it lacked the influence America could muster and exert on 
Italian politics, so its intervention was bound to be less spectacular than that 
of America. It was also mindful of not provoking accusations of overt 
interference in Italian domestic politics which could ultimately play into the 
hands of the Italian Communists and their allies.256 A supporting role, however, 
in this case, did not mean a subordinate one. Britain resisted American 
proposals resolutely when it judged them to be detrimental to the cause in hand 
or damaging to the last residues of British influence in Italy. After all, Britain 
sought to offer an alternative model of Italian political development than did the 
Americans and had to be careful how to pursue its acceptance without 
alienating and offending.257
It was for these reasons that the British government used the international
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organs of the Labour Party and the British Trade Union movement to carry the 
weight of its intervention in Italian politics.258 It is almost impossible to describe 
Bevin’s unflinching determination to clinch the correct Italian electoral result as 
being either subtle or moderate. They appear so only in the light of America’s 
unfettered interventionism in order to keep the Communists at bay. Once the 
elections were won, British interest in the affairs of Italy did not peter out. There 
was still a commitment to ensure that De Gasperi pursued reform, that the 
British way to socialism could, somehow, take seed in Italy and that Britain 
could maintain a role in the affairs of the country. This commitment was 
expressed through the involvement and actions of the Foreign Office in co­
ordinating the Labour Party and the TUC and to influence developments in the 
Italian working class movement. That, Italy, in the end did not became a social 
democratic haven was not because of lack of want and effort by Britain, but 
because of Italy’s own political landscape and American intervention in the 
affairs of the country which did not allow time for British plans to mature. De 
Gasperi’s massive landslide on April 1948 and the attempt on Togliatti’s life in 
July meant that there was little time for Saragat to form an effective social 
democratic alternative to Nenni’s PSIUP and it signified the end of any 
meaningful chance for Britain to provide Italy with political leadership.
258. FO 371/73160/Z3468/93/22, 26-4-1948, minute by Crosthwaite,
27-4-1948; FO 371/73159/Z3370/93/22, 21-4-1948, minute by Roberts, 17-8- 
1948.
Chapter Four
The Birth of the North Atlantic Alliance: Britain and the Issue of
Italian Membership
At the beginning of 1948, Britain was faced with the question of how best to 
approach Western European security issues with regards to the Soviet threat. 
For Britain, the creation of an Atlantic alliance formed a major strand in a 
foreign policy which aimed to create a worldwide system of alliances.1 In view 
of the seriousness of the perceived Soviet threat, Bevin concluded that a North 
Atlantic pact ought to be signed as soon as possible.2 The creation of such a 
pact would secure two important aims. First, it would mean a long-term 
commitment by the United States to defend Western Europe, which would 
restore and boost the confidence of the beleaguered Western European 
governments. The mere presence of numbers of American occupation troops 
in Western Germany was not seen as a convincing alternative as it afforded 
only an indirect assurance to Italy and Scandinavia. Second, a pact would
1. Anderson, T. H., The United States, Great Britain and the Cold War,
1944-47, Columbia, Mo., 1981; Attlee, C. R. A., As It Happened, London,
1954, p. 239; Barker, E., The British between the Superpowers, 1945-50, 
Toronto, 1983; Bullock, op. cit., Chapter 13, passim; Cook, op. cit., pp. 117-8; 
De Staercke, A., NATO’s Anxious Birth: The Prophetic Vision of the 1940s, 
London, 1985; Dockrill, M.L. and Young, J.W., (eds) British Foreign Policy,
1945-56, London, 1989; Edmonds, R., Setting the Mould: The United States 
and Britain, 1945-50, Oxford, 1986, p. 177; Hathaway, R. M., Ambiguous 
Partnership: Britain and America, 1944-47, New York, 1981; Ireland, T., 
Creating the Entangling Alliance: The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, London, 1981, pp. 121-9; Kaplan, L. S., The United States and 
NATO: The Formative Years, Kentucky, 1984, pp. 10-12, 83-6, 110-5; 
Reynolds, op. cit., pp. 175-6; Riste, O., (ed.), Western Security: The Formative 
Years. European and Atlantic Defence, 1947-1953, New York, 1985; Young, 
J.W., Britain France and the Unity of Europe, 1945-51, pp. 105; Young, op. 
cit., pp. 142-8 and 153-6.
2. FO 371/68067/AN1196/1195/45, 18-3-1948, minute by Roberts to 
Sargent, 14-3-1948; minute by McNeil to the Prime Minister, 16-3-1948; ibid., 
AN 1296/1195/45, 23-3-1948, top secret, telegram, no. 3208, Kirkpatrick to 
Washington, 24-3-1948; ibid., AN1315/1195/45, 25-3-1948, top secret, 
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create a framework that would engage America in the peacetime military 
planning of Western Europe and prevent it slipping back to a policy of 
isolationism again.3 British anxieties about America retreating once more into 
isolationism reflected the former’s experiences of the policy constraints 
American isolationism had imposed during the inter-war years and of fighting 
alone for nearly two years before the US decided to throw its lot in with Britain 
against the Axis. Thus, for the British government, the only long-term solution 
to the security problem facing Western Europe was for America to accept 
explicit and clear obligations regarding its defence.4
The Pursuit for an American Commitment
Up to now, however, the British government had failed to convince the Truman 
Administration to take a decision and accept an unambiguous and binding 
alliance with Western Europe. Even after the irretrievable breakdown of the 
Council of Foreign Ministers conference in London in December 1947, when 
Bevin approached George C. Marshall, the American Secretary of State, on 17 
December 1947 to suggest once again the creation of an alliance with 
America, Marshall was not prepared to be drawn.5 Four days after his ‘Western 
Union’ speech, Bevin tested the waters with Robert Lovett, the US Under­
secretary of State, to see if the Americans would be willing to underwrite the 
defence of the ‘Western Union’. Lovett exclaimed that this was nothing less 
than the creation of a military alliance for which America was being asked to
3. FO 371 /73079/Z8713/2307/72, 27-10-1948, top secret, letter, Hoyer- 
Millar, Minister at the British Embassy in Washington, to Kirkpatrick, 26-10- 
1948.
4. FO 371/73069/Z3941/2307/72, 10-5-1948, top secret, telegram, no. 
5318, FO to Washington, 15-5-1948.
5. Bullock, op. cit., p. 499; FO 371/67674/Z11010/25/17, minute, record 
of conversation between Bevin and Bidault, 17-12-1947.
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provide the ‘concrete’ before it had seen any ‘blue-prints’.6
However, anxieties about Soviet intentions intensified after the Czech coup of 
February 1948. Along with the ‘Clay warning’ of 5 March, acute concern about 
the outcome of the Italian election and Soviet pressure on Finland and Norway, 
a window opened for Bevin to raise, more plausibly, the issue of creating an 
Atlantic defensive alliance.7 On 26 February, he met Douglas and seized the 
opportunity to elaborate on his concerns about Western European security. He 
told Douglas emphatically that his main concern was that inaction on the part 
of Britain and America would impair the confidence of Western European 
countries who were now under Soviet pressure. For him, the only solution was 
for the West to be seen to be taking steps to prevent another Czechoslovakia. 
The best way to do so was to evolve a joint Western military strategy.8
By painting an emotive, even alarmist picture of the predicament of Western 
Europe Bevin hoped to elicit a positive American response. He warned that the 
Russians ‘m ight... establish themselves on the Pyrenees in the next three 
months’ if the West did not ‘take effective action now* and that by April they 
would have consolidated enough to embark on further expansion.9 Bevin 
centred his argument around the potential outcome of the Italian election and 
the possibility of internal subversion in Italy, an issue that he knew was close 
to American hearts. He was aware also of America’s deep-seated concerns
6. FRUS, 1948, Vol. Ill, p. 13; Cook, op. cit., pp. 117-8; Bullock, op. cit., 
p. 522.
7. Clay, L. D., Decision in Germany, London, 1950, pp. 354-5; Bullock, 
op. cit., p. 501; Cook, op. cit., p. 121; Ambrose, op. cit., p. 96; Yergin, op. cit., 
p. 351; FO 371/73069/Z2642/2307/22, 30-3-1948, top secret, minute by 
Roberts, record of discussion between Bevin and Douglas, 26-2-1948;
8. Ibid; FRUS, 1948, Vol. Ill, pp. 31-33; Bullock, op. cit., pp. 255-6.
9. Ibid.
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about the political situation in Italy generally, so he used Italy as an additional 
bait to lure the Truman Administration into pledging itself to the defence of 
non-Communist Europe. He described Italy as ‘the immediate danger spot’, 
because the PCI had the means to deploy against De Gasperi’s government 
the same tactics that had been employed by the Czech communists to take 
power in Prague. He warned that the PCI would deploy ‘established armed 
cells’ from factories and thus immobilize the Italian army.10 He went so far as 
to suggest the use of military force by the US and the UK in the event that the 
Italian government showed signs of being unable to control its armed and 
security forces fully. He concluded by proposing to Douglas the speedy 
opening of discussions between the Americans, the British, the Benelux 
countries, the French and the Italians.11
Ambassador Douglas shared Bevin’s pessimistic assessment of the situation 
in Italy. The Russians, he believed, would do anything they could to absorb 
Italy into their sphere of influence. Bevin regarded his meeting with Douglas as 
a success. He believed that he had convinced him of the merits of his 
arguments and he boasted that he had ‘put into Douglas’s mind the idea of a 
permanent consultative body in Washington’.12 On 12 March 1948, Marshall 
responded by offering Bevin the prospect of commencing joint discussions with 
the US later that month.13
In the meanwhile, on 17 March 1948, Britain, France and the Benelux signed 
the Treaty of Brussels. This was the culmination of Bevin’s long held ambition
10. Ibid.; Warner, G., ‘Italy and the Powers, 1943-49', p. 55.
11. Bullock, op. cit., pp. 255-6.
12. Ibid.
13. FRUS, 1948, Vol. Ill, pp. 48, 52, and 419-50.
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of creating a British led force that would ensure the continuation of British 
power in a world rapidly crystallizing into a bipolar system. At the same time, 
the Treaty was an attempt to entice America to pledge itself to defend Europe 
in the face of a seemingly all-powerful Soviet Union.14 Washington’s initial 
response proved to be, on the surface at least, disappointingly non-committal. 
President Truman’s declaration on the day of the signing of the Brussels Treaty 
that:: ‘I am sure that the determination of the free countries of Europe to protect 
themselves will be matched by an equal determination on our part to help them 
do so’, was merely a holding statement until the Presidential elections were 
over. It offered nothing which could encourage opposition by isolationists and 
whilst keeping the door open to the Europeans, it gave no signal of an 
unwavering commitment.15
Thus, the road to Washington, later that same month, was an uncertain and 
uncharted one for Sir Gladwyn Jebb and General Leslie Hollis, the British 
representatives. The so-called the Pentagon Talks among the US, Britain and 
Canada took place in Washington. At these talks no firm decisions were taken 
despite the tangible degree of consensus reached by the participants.16 The 
objective for the British delegation had been to explore opportunities and to
14. Petersen, N., ‘Who Pulled Whom and How Much? Britain, the 
United States and the Making of the North Atlantic Treaty’, Millenium, Vol., XI, 
1982, p. 251; Dockrill, and Young, op. cit.; Kent, Britain’s Imperial Strategy, 
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London, 1993.
15. FRUS, 1948, Vol. Ill, pp. 54-5; Ambrose, op. cit., p. 96; Feis, op. cit., 
p. 299-300; Yergin, op. cit., p. 354; Petersen, op. cit., p. 100.
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ascertain how far the Americans were prepared to become involved in a 
Collective Defence Agreement that would guarantee the security of Western 
Europe. The delegation came away cautiously optimistic that the Truman 
Administration appeared not to be averse to the idea of concluding a pact, but 
that it still felt constrained by Congress, especially since 1948 was a year of 
Presidential elections in the US.17
At the Pentagon Talks, Italy’s potential relationship with Western European 
security arrangements was raised only tentatively. Everyone involved knew 
that no real discussion on Italy could take place prior the Italian election on 18 
April 1948.18 The Foreign Office adopted the view that although Italian inclusion 
in Western European security arrangements was neither necessary nor 
practicable, it would not reject the idea out of hand.19 The British government 
itself was not clear on exactly what role a disarmed Italy should or, indeed, 
could perform in the undertaking of binding treaty obligations, some of which 
would probably require the revision of the recently signed Italian Peace Treaty 
nor even, if membership in an Atlantic regional security system was 
appropriate for Italy. There were many factors that made Italy less than an ideal 
candidate for such a system. For Britain, the proposed Atlantic Pact was to 
form only one first step to the creation of a system of defensive treaties that 
would not only safeguard the defence of the free world but would also bolster
17. Ibid.
18. FO 371/68068A/AN13651195/45, 31-3-1948, top secret, telegram, 
no. 1514, Washington to FO, 30-3-1948; ibid., AN1400/1195/45, 31-3-1948, 
top secret, telegram, no. 1528, Jebb for Kirkpatrick, 30-3-1948.
19. FO 371/68067/AN 1276/1195/45, 23-3-1948, top secret, telegram, 
no. 1371, Inverchapel to FO, 22-3-1948; ibid., AN 1296/1195/45, 24-3-1948, 
top secret, telegram, no. 3208, FO to Washington, 24-3-1948; ibid.,
AN1315/1195/45, 25-3-1948, top secret, telegram, no. 1430, Washington to 
FO, 24-3-1948; ibid., AN 1325/1195/45, 26-3-1948, top secret, telegram, no. 
3466, Inverchapel to Bevin, 29-3-1948.
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Britain’s global position.20 In view of these plans it made sense for Britain to 
support an Atlantic treaty with a limited and carefully defined territorial scope 
which would supplement and not put at jeopardy British plans for the creation 
of a worldwide security system of pacts. Inclusion of Italy in the Atlantic 
agreement would make it over-extensive in territorial terms and went against 
the grain of the British preference for a territorially limited pact. British 
deliberations focused, thus, on three issues. First, there was the question of 
Italy’s value as a potential ally, second the question of Italy’s alliance role, in 
view of the disarmament clauses of the Peace Treaty, and third, the aptness 
of Italian membership to either the Western Union or to NATO.21
The Foreign Office regarded the creation of such a pact particularly 
advantageous for Britain. Primarily, it was seen as a means of maintaining 
Britain’s role as a major power whilst at the same time safeguarding British 
interests in Southern Europe and the Middle East and enabling it to defend 
these areas.22 Italy’s geo-strategic position made it vitally important for the 
defence of key British strategic interests such as maintaining the 
Mediterranean lines of communications and consequently for the defence of 
the Middle East and the protection of Greece and Turkey. British statesmen, 
thus, regarded Italy as a necessary member of such a defensive organization. 
Moreover, because British military planners regarded it as essentially a
20. CAB 128/14, CM(48)19 Conclusions, confidential, Annex, 5-5-1948; 
FO 371/71458/N3001/3001/63, 15-3-1948, top secret, telegram, no. 2768, FO 
to Washington, 10-3-1948; ibid., N3003/3001/63, 15-3-1948, top secret, 
telegram, no. 727, Sargent to Bevin, 13-3-1948.
21. FO 371/68067/AN1315/1195/45, 25- 3-1948, top secret, telegram, 
no. 3384, Bevin to Inverchapel, 24-3-1948.
22. Ibid.; DEFE 4/11, COS(48)39th meeting, 17-3-48; DEFE 5/10, 
C0S(48)56(0), 16-3-48; DEFE 5/10, C0S(48)49(0), 5-3-48; DEFE 4/14, 
confidential, Annex, COS(48)90th meeting, 30-6-48.
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Mediterranean and not a Western European country,23 it was believed that 
inclusion in a Mediterranean regional security system could provide a more 
propitious security arrangement for Italy.24
The Canadians, for their part, did not appear enthusiastic about seeing Italy 
included in the proposed Atlantic alliance. The Americans suggested that they, 
the British and the French should make an approach through diplomatic 
channels to Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland and, when the Italian elections 
were out of the way, to Italy to find out if these countries were prepared to 
accede to the Five Power treaty and to enter into negotiations for the North 
Atlantic Defence Agreement.25 If their responses were favourable, they would 
be invited to participate at a conference on the drafting of a ‘North Atlantic 
Treaty’.26 Eventually, it was decided to approach the aforementioned countries 
with the view to joining the North Atlantic treaty in the first instance and only 
later in connection with the Brussels Pact. This course of action met with the 
approval of the British government.27
Still, at this stage, Britain had not yet come to any firm ideas about Italy. The 
best way to describe the British attitude, at this stage, was agnosticism laden 
with profound doubts. The British government was simply pondering which of
23. DEFE 6/5, top secret, JP(48)15 Final, 18-2-48; ibid., top secret, 
JP(48)28(S) Final, 7-3-48.
24. Ibid.
25. Cook, op. cit., pp. 131-34.
26. FO 371/73069/Z3650/2307/72, 30-4-1948, top secret, Annex: A, 
memorandum by Jebb: Pentagon Talks, 5-4-1948;




these elaborate security arrangements was the most apt for Italian defence.28 
At this stage, the Foreign Office was not opposed to Italy’s inclusion a priori. 
It did foresee difficulties however, arising out of Italy’s colonial aspirations and 
Italian desires to see an early revision of the limitations imposed on the country 
by the Peace Treaty.29
After the Pentagon Talks, a period of American vacillation began which 
frustrated the British government and left it with little time to explore any other 
issues apart from deciphering American intentions. What was of the utmost 
importance for British foreign policy-makers at this stage, was to ensure 
American participation in a regional defensive system that would also include 
Canada and the principal Western European states. This aim took precedence 
over other important issues such as the shape, form and territorial scope of the 
alliance.30 By May 1948, the divisions within the Truman Administration 
between John D. Hickerson, the Director of the Office of European Affairs of 
the State Department, who favoured American involvement in a military 
alliance that included certain Western European countries and George F. 
Kennan, the head of the Policy Planning Staff (PPS) and State Department 
Counsellor, Charles Bohlen against such an undertaking became glaringly
28. DEFE 4/5, JP(48)28 Final, limited circulation, 17-3-1948;
FO 371/73071/Z5174/2307, 25-6-1948, top secret, telegram, no. 6988, FO to 
Washington, 28-6-1948.
29. Ibid.; FO 371/73069/Z3941/2307/72, 10-5-1948, top secret, 
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30. FO 371/73071/Z5174/2307, 25-6-1948, top secret, telegram, no. 
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obvious.31 At one moment, British officials and politicians would be subjected 
to gloomy and pessimistic comments on the probability of America ever 
entering into a military alliance with Western Europe and at the next, they 
would be the recipients of upbeat and encouraging messages. Bohlen, and 
Kennan, were the merchants of gloom and doom.32 At the same time, 
Hickerson and his deputy, Theodore C. Achilles, would approach the British 
Embassy in Washington with news that everything was going according to 
plan, that a Senatorial Resolution was in the process of being drafted which 
would include a declaration in favour of a pact or pacts under Article 51 of the 
UN charter.33
31. Ibid., p. 96; FRUS, 1948, Vol. Ill, pp. 6-7, 9-10 and 225-28; Kennan, 
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war materials they lacked to remedy their deficiencies. A senatorial resolution 
would back up that policy which in Kennan’s mind would prove to be much 
more effective than any Atlantic arrangement. He also believed that such a 
policy would be a more convenient option electorally for the Truman 
Administration to follow as it would not arouse traditional American feelings 
against entering formal alliances. Bohlen’s criticisms stemmed from his 
expertise in Soviet affairs that led him to believe that the proposed alliance 
would cause ‘undue provocation to the Soviets, that it was ‘too extensive’ and 
contradictory in its objectives. The Washington Embassy soon came to the 
conclusion that Bohlen was more amenable to the idea of a North Atlantic Pact 
than Kennan was ever likely to be.
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Exasperation and consternation led Sargent, Kirkpatrick and Jebb to conclude 
that the British government ought to direct all its efforts towards converting 
Marshall to the point of view that the only way to secure the West and to guard 
against the possibility of a war breaking out due to a Soviet miscalculation was 
for the US to enter into a regional defence system with the main Western 
European countries.34 Once again the issue of Italian inclusion was used as a 
bait to entice Marshall into taking the plunge.35
By early June 1948, the irritation caused by mixed American messages and 
non-committal attitudes became palpable in London.36 Bevin was concerned 
that the constant shifts of American foreign policy and Britain’s attempts to 
accommodate them, could offer the Soviets a propaganda coup by giving them 
the opportunity to create the impression that Britain had been reduced to the 
status of a vassal state. Thus, he was adamant ‘to avoid the appearance of 
American domination and unfortunate reactions here and elsewhere’. Bevin 
instructed Sir Oliver Franks, the British Ambassador to the United States, to 
pass on his concerns to Marshall undiluted and ‘in the language [he had] 
used’.37
Uncertainty and despondency were lifted as soon as the impact of the Berlin
34. Ibid., minutes by Sargent, 11-5-1948 and Kirkpatrick, 11-5-1948; 
ibid., Z4187/2307/72, 18-5-1948, minutes, by Jebb 12-5-1948 and Kirkpatrick,
11-5-1948 and 12-5-1948.
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Blockade on the American body politic became evident.38 The adoption of the 
Vandenberg resolution opened the road for America to accede to defensive 
alliances with Western European democracies and Canada and thus paved 
the way to the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security (WET).39
Britain, the Definition of the Territorial Scope of the North Atlantic 
Treaty and Italy
In view of these developments, the Five Powers began to prepare for the 
forthcoming negotiations in earnest. They drew up a draft directive aimed at a 
common negotiating position on the territorial scope of the prospective treaty. 
It was agreed, a priori that the main aim of the Five was to obtain American 
adherence to a treaty on Western European defence.40 As far as Italy was 
concerned the Brussels Treaty Organization (BTO) powers had to consider two 
alternatives; either that Italy should join the BTO which was America’s 
preferred option or that it should accede to an Atlantic arrangement. At no 
stage of the process was Italy viewed as a ‘nucleus’ country. Due to its 
Mediterranean character, it was assessed as a ‘flank’ for the defence of 
Europe. The consultation process focused on the essence of the relationship 
of the ‘nucleus’ i.e. the countries invited to participate in the Washington Talks 
with the so-called ‘flanks’ i.e., the peripheral European countries.41 Inevitably,
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Italy’s future relationship with the system was always linked with that of the 
Scandinavian countries. Italy formed the so-called ‘Southern flank’, and 
Scandinavia the ‘Northern flank1.42 The Scandinavian countries however, were 
quickly to emerge as being more important strategically than Italy due to the 
Soviet Notes of 1948 which had transformed them, in the perception of the 
West, to being in the ‘firing line’.43
Two problems arose with the inclusion of ‘flank’ countries to the alliance. First, 
the Five Powers estimated that neither they, nor the Americans, nor the 
Canadians possessed the means to protect the ‘flanks’ effectively.44 Second, 
there was anxiety among the Brussels Powers that the ‘flanks’, in their attempts 
to protect themselves, could eschew the policy of the ‘nucleus’ by calling for 
the adoption of policies that would result in spreading the resources of the 
alliance too thinly.45
On a more basic level and quite aside from these deliberations, it transpired 
quickly that some of the Five preferred to see Italy excluded from the BTO 
because they wanted a slower growth for the organization than did the
42. FO 371/73069/Z3650/2307/72, 30-4-1948, top secret, Annex: A, 
memorandum by Jebb: Pentagon Talks, 5-4-1948;
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Americans.46 As far as NATO was concerned, both the Dutch and the Belgian 
governments were opposed to Italy’s participation as a founding member. The 
French had concluded that a restricted alliance would better serve Western 
European security as it would allow military resources to be more effectively 
concentrated. Thus, they too expressed apprehension about Italy joining at this 
stage.47 Jean Chauvel, the Secretary-General of the Quai d’ Orsay, however, 
had indicated to both Hoyer-Millar, the Minister at the British Embassy in 
Wasington, and Jebb that the newly sworn-in French government had not had 
the time to come to any firm policy decision on the matter and this allowed 
some flexibility in the French position.48 The Five decided unanimously that, at 
this stage, their preference lay with a limited, territorially well-defined treaty, 
which meant that Italy would probably have to be excluded.49
When the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security began on 6 July 1948, the 
territorial scope of the pact was one of the first issues to be considered by the 
Seven Powers Working Group, made up of the representatives of the US, 
Britain, Canada, France, and the Benelux. It soon transpired that for the
46. FO 371/73073/Z5640/2307/72, 12-7-1948, top secret, letter, 
Henderson to Hoyer-Millar, 13-9-1948; minute by J.W. Russell, assisiant head 
of the Western Department, 12-7-1948.
47. FO 371/73073/Z5818/2307/72, 17-7-1948, top secret, telegram, no. 
3498, Franks to FO, 16-7-1948; FO 371/73077/Z7638/2307/72, 22-9-1948, 
minute by Montague-Brown, 16-9-1948; ibid., Z7637/2307/72, 22-9-1948, 
secret, FO minute, record of Bevin’s discussion with Schuman, 22-9-1948.
48. FO 371/73075Z6948/2307/72, 27-8-1948, minutes by Jebb, 23-8- 
1948, and Kirkpatrick, 27-8-1948; top secret, telegram, no. 4072, Franks to 
FO, 26-8-1948; top secret, telegram, no. 9666, FO to Washington 30-8-1948; 
ibid., Z7002/2307/72, 30-8-1948, top secret, letter, Hoyer-Millar to Jebb, 20-8- 
1948.
49. FO 371/73070/Z4438/2307/72, 28-5-1948, top secret, MC FP(48)1,
12-6-1948; FO 371/73072/Z5454/2307/72, 5-7-1948, top secret, 
memorandum, by Sargent, 2-7-1948; ibid., Z5613/2307/72, 10-7-1948, top 
secret, Annex, British record of the Permanent Commission of the BTO, 2nd 
meeting, 6-7-1948.
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American negotiators, the litmus test for including European states outside the 
Brussels Powers set-up, was based on the importance of each country to 
American national security. This approach could convince Congress to ratify 
the Treaty after its conclusion.50 To the surprise of the British, Italy was not 
mentioned in the initial American geographical boundary projections for the 
Treaty which included countries such as Greenland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, 
Denmark, the United Kingdom, Eire, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, 
France, Portugal and even Western Germany and Austria.51 Italy was not 
even discussed in the context of the BTO. The British found this surprising, 
especially since the Foreign Office had estimated that Italy’s accesion to the 
Treaty represented the ‘most difficult problem of all’ as far as the territorial 
scope was concerned and because mention was made of the eventual 
inclusion of Austria and Western Germany.52 The only conclusion which could 
be drawn was that not much should be read into this omission as the debate 
had not as yet started in earnest.53
The Foreign Office proved right. It soon emerged that the issue and 
consequences of Italy’s inclusion in an Atlantic system was vexing the minds 
of American policy-makers and creating disagreements and splits within the 
Truman Administration. The inclusionists were headed by Hickerson and 
Achilles and the anti-inclusionists by Kennan.54 Hickerson, while freely
50. FO 371 /73074/Z6123/2307/72, 28-7-48, Summary of Attitudes of the 
Countries Taking Part in the Washington Security Talks as shown during the 
first week of the discussions, British Embassy, Washington, 13-7-1948.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
53. FO 371 /73074/Z6140/2307/72, 28-7-1948, memorandum, by Jebb 
for Bevin, 28-7-1948; FO 371/73073/Z5818/2307, 17-7-1948, top secret, 
telegram, no. 4398, Franks to FO, 16-7-1948.
54. FO 371/73074/Z6238/2307/72, 2-8-1948, memorandum by Jebb,
28-7-1948; Miscamble, op. cit., p. 132; Smith, op. cit., pp. 78-81.
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admitting that Italy would be more of a liability than an asset from the military 
point of view in either the Brussels Treaty or in the Atlantic System, all the 
same, regarded Italian inclusion as of the utmost importance for purely political 
considerations.55 His assessment was that if Italy was left out it would have a 
‘most unfortunate’ effect on its internal security because this would demoralize 
the Italian Government and its pro-western political forces.56 Such a situation, 
he felt, would leave an isolated Italy easy prey for the designs of the USSR and 
would increase the likelihood of communist or communist-sympathising 
governments in Italy.57
Initially, Hickerson had a free run as Kennan was absent in the Far East and 
subsequently away recovering from a lengthy illness.58 As soon as Kennan 
was on his feet again however, he raised serious objections to the creation of 
a military alliance in general and Italian inclusion in particular. He felt that the 
inclusion of a non-North Atlantic country would dilute the character of the 
proposed alliance and that it would jeopardize the success of the ERP by 
polarizing the situation in Europe and by diverting funds from economic to 
military aid. If a military alliance had to be created at all, Kennan believed that 
it should be limited strictly to North Atlantic countries.59 Truman and Lovett,
55. FO 371/73078/Z8215/2307/72, 12-10-1948, top secret, letter Hoyer- 
Millar to Kirkpatrick, 7-10-1948; FO 371/73073/Z5640/2307, 12-7-1948, minute 
by Russell, 12-7-1948; Smith, op. cit., p. 82.
56. FO 371/73075/Z6948/2307/72, 27/8/48, top secret, telegram, no. 
4072, Franks to FO, 26-8-1948; Smith, op. cit., p. 81-3; Reid, op. cit., pp. 202- 
Sand 210-3.
57. Ibid.; FRUS, 1948, Vol. Ill, pp. 237-48; Miscamble, op. cit., p. 132.
58. Kennan, op. cit., pp. 404.
59. Miscamble, op. cit., p. 132.
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too, appeared to be ‘half-hearted’ about Italian inclusion.60 Franks nevertheless 
reported that, despite these splits, the State Department could be expected 
eventually to be a strong advocate of Italian inclusion.61
During the opening stages of the Washington Exploratory Talks it emerged that 
the British government had not arrived at a firm position on potential Italian 
inclusion and that many trains of thought could be discerned. Franks was of the 
opinion that Italy should be associated with a Mediterranean defensive 
arrangement alongside Greece and Turkey and not with an Atlantic system.62 
Gladwyn Jebb, the British representative at the Talks, in contrast, had come 
to the conclusion that Italian inclusion was preferable to its exclusion for both 
political and cultural reasons.63 For him the fact that Italy was not a Northern 
Atlantic country geographically, was irrelevant. As he asserted passionately,
Italy was ‘socially, economically, politically and geographically’ a Western
European country and not an ‘Eastern European or Middle Eastern country’.64 
He was also not impressed by the possibility of a Mediterranean arrangement 
for Italy because he felt that Italian security and defence could not be 
safeguarded realistically if Italy was left out of the ‘Atlantic arrangement’. He 
had also formed the opinion that such a scheme would be simply unworkable
60. FO 371/73075/Z7002/2307/72, 30/8/1948, top secret, letter, Hoyer- 
Millar, Washington to Jebb, FO, 20-8-1948; Donovan, R.J., Tumultuous Years: 
The Presidency of Harry S. Truman, 1949-53, London, 1982, p. 49.
61. FO 371/73074/Z633/3207/72, 3-8-1948, top secret, telegram, no. 
3803, Franks to Jebb, 5-8-1948.
62. FO 371/73074/Z6142/2307/72, 28-7-194, memorandum, by Jebb for 
Bevin, 28-7-1948; FO 371/73073/Z5818/2307, 17-7-1948, top secret, 
telegram, no. 3498, Franks to FO, 16-7-1948.
63. Ibid; FO 371/73074/Z6238/2307/72, 2-8-1948, top secret, telegram, 
no. 3687, Franks to FO, 28-7-1948; top secret, telegram, no. 8245, FO to 
Washington, 27-7-1948; top secret, memorandum by Jebb, 22-7-1948; 
minutes by Jebb, 29-7-1948 and Russell, 28-7-1948.
64. Ibid.
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because the Mediterranean system would require American support as well as 
an Italian willingness to associate itself with Greece, Turkey, Great Britain, 
France and Middle Eastern countries such as Syria, Lebanon, Egypt and 
eventually Israel, in a Mediterranean or Middle Eastern pact.65 He astutely 
pointed out that Italy’s size would result in its dominating the other proposed 
member countries and that this would cause resentment because Greece, 
Turkey and the Arab League already had poor relations with Italy. His argument 
was further supported by the Permanent Council of the BTO which had 
reached a similar conclusion.66
Jebb was not isolated in his thinking. In late August, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick 
prepared a memorandum for Bevin on the pros and cons of Italian inclusion, 
in which he concluded that Italy ought to be included.67 In fact, he went as far 
as to recommend that the British representative at the Washington Security 
Talks should argue in favour of Italian inclusion. Kirkpatrick’s conclusions were 
based on the firm belief that, on balance, Italian exclusion would create many 
more problems than those anticipated by inclusion.68 He advised that exclusion 
would produce a sense of grievance and demoralization which would weaken 
Italy’s resolve to defend itself. He was also critical of offering protection through 
a Mediterranean Pact system because, first, such a scheme could not be put 
in place quickly enough and second, the formation of a Mediterranean Pact 
able to afford Italy’s defence would surely mean an over-extension of 
resources. Kirkpatrick also predicted accurately that Italy would not be
65. FO 371/73074/Z6142/2307/72, 28-7-194, memorandum, by Jebb for 
Bevin, 28-7-1948.
66. Ibid., Z6238/2307/72, 2-8-1948, top secret, telegram, no. 3687, 
Franks to FO, 28-7-1948.




prepared to join the BTO if this meant that she would be barred from joining an 
American backed alliance. Similarly, he also anticipated correctly that the 
French would ultimately prefer to see Italy in the Atlantic Pact rather than in the 
Brussels Treaty.69 Kirkpatrick and Jebb were not alone in arriving at this 
conclusion. Bevin, at this time, also saw the merit of Italian inclusion.70
The British military, however, had arrived at substantially different conclusions 
to those of the Foreign Office. The Chiefs of Staff conceded that although it 
would be an advantage for a western defence arrangement to include a ‘strong’ 
Italy because it would secure the southern flank of the Western Union and 
protect the lines of communication in the Mediterranean, especially, as the 
Foggia airfields were an important strategic air base for the defence of the 
Middle East,71 the fact remained that at present Italy was too weak to be 
included. Its abilty to play a valuable role in the alliance had not only been 
curtailed by the limitations the Peace Treaty had imposed on it but also 
because of the parlous state of its armed forces. Since there was no chance 
of holding either the Italian mainland or Sicily against a large scale enemy 
attack, the Chiefs of Staff held that they should not enter into any undertakings 
of direct military assistance to Italy in the event of war during 1951-52.72 British
69. Ibid.
70. FO 371/73075/Z6948/2307/72, 27-8-1948, memorandum: ‘Atlantic 
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71. DEFE 6/6, top secret, JP(48)92 (Final), 4-9-48; DEFE 5/12, top 
secret, COS(48)200(O), 8-9-48; DEFE 6/7, JP(49)139 (Final) (Revise), 12-3- 
49; CAB 131/9, top secret, DO(49)88, Annex, ‘Place of Italy in Allied Strategy’,
24-12-1948, approved at COS(49)42nd meeting, 15-3-1949; DEFE 4/20, top 
secret, COS(49)42nd meeting, 15-3-1949; FO 371 /79346/Z4359/10535/22, 16- 
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military strategic thinking on Mediterranean defence operated along the 
following lines. Sea communications in the area had to be kept open for the 
initial deployment period as well as for the maintenance of the forces in the 
Middle East. The main danger was thought to come from submarines, air 
attacks and mines. Although the threat of surface attacks on shipping could not 
be discounted totally, they were deemed a lesser risk. Future strategy relied 
on keeping control through adequate sea and airforces and suitable bases. In 
this scenario it followed that mainland Italy was not critical for the defence of 
the Mediterranean and thus was expendable.73
In essence, the British military saw Italy as having no strategic value for the 
defence of Western Europe because of its vulnerability. They anticipated that 
a Soviet attack on Italy would be launched mainly through Yugoslavia and 
followed by a subsidiary attack through Austria.74 Northern Italy would then fall 
within D+35 days from the moment an attack had occurred, the toe of Italy 
within D+75 days and Sicily within D+100 days. It was exactly this time lag that 
made the Chiefs of Staff so unperturbed about the possibility of Italy falling into 
hostile hands because delays of this kind meant that the enemy could not 
threaten Mediterranean sea communications for at least four to five months 
from the outbreak of war.75
British military planners, also, calculated that for Italy to withstand a Soviet 
attack it would have to become a recipient of ‘considerable military
73. CAB 131/6, top secret, DO(48)61, 14-9-1948.
74. Ibid.; DEFE 6/11, top secret, JP(49)171 (Final), 16-1-1950.
75. DEFE 6/7, top secret, JP(48)141 (Final), approved by the COS in its 
first meeting in 1949, 3-1-1949; DEFE 4/19, top secret, COS(49)1st meeting, 
3-1-1949; CAB 131/9, top secret, DO(49)88, Annex, Place of Italy, 24-12- 
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assistance’.76 It would also require the deployment of such numbers of allied 
forces that an effective defence and eventual success in other theatres would 
be jeopardized.77 The Chiefs of Staff proclaimed that Britain itself could not 
spare the forces needed for the defence of Italy and that they had no intention 
of fighting to save it from a Soviet attack.78 Moreover, such a degree of military 
assistance in materiel and personnel, the Chiefs of Staff warned, would 
eventually prove embarrassing for the West for three reasons. First, because 
it would contravene the military restrictions imposed by the Peace Treaty. 
Second, because the Soviets could reap a real propaganda bonus by 
presenting Italian inclusion as an attempt by the West to enter into ‘intrigue’ 
with an ‘ex-enemy’.79 Finally, because there were only limited supplies of 
modern armaments. Any assistance given to Italy was bound to be at the 
expense of the Brussels Powers.80
The Defence Committee took all these considerations into account and 
concluded that the British Government ought to resist any moves which would 
result in the dispersal of military resources to provide support for essentially 
indefensible areas such as Italy.81 These conclusions were firmed up by the 
recommendations of the Military Committee of the BTO, which when asked by
76. DEFE 5/12, top secret, COS(48)210(O), 17-9-48; DEFE 4/16, top 
secret, COS(48)131st meeting, 20-9-1948.
77. DEFE 4/19, top secret, COS(49)1st meeting, 3-1-49.
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Montgomery, 22-10-48.
79. DEFE 5/12, top secret, COS(48)210(O), 17-9-48; DEFE 4/16, top 
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the Permanent Commission to examine Italy’s strategic position in the defence 
of Western Europe, judged that at this stage Italy was a military liability and that 
therefore its inclusion in either an Atlantic defensive arrangement or the BTO 
did not have their support ‘under any conditions’.82
As time passed, the military’s opposition to Italian inclusion hardened. The 
Chiefs of Staff not only continued to regard Italy as a military liability but also 
expressed the worry that Italy would use the opportunity of negotiations for its 
entry to bargain for a revision of the military and colonial clauses of the Peace 
Treaty.83 The Chiefs of Staff were deeply concerned that any Italian ‘push’ for 
colonial adjustments in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania in their favour would 
adversely affect British strategic interests in the Mediterranean84 and would 
prove to be extremely embarrassing for Britain as Cyrenaica was deemed to 
be essential to the successful outcome of any war against the Soviet Union.85 
They were adamant that Britain ought to acquire sole trusteeship of the area
82. DEFE 4/16, COS(48)131st meeting, item 7, 20-9-48; DEFE 5/12, 
COS(48)210(O), 17-9-48; Annex II, COS 1643/23/9/8, letter, Secretary of COS 
to the Secretary of the delegation of the Military Committee of the Five 
Powers, 23-9-48; CAB 131/6, DO(48)64, top secret, memorandum by Bevin, 
20-9-48.
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could also hold land forces and above all, it was a symbol of Britain’s 
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and thus resisted any suggestions of its return to Italy.86 The position of the 
British military remained unyielding. As they put it, epigrammatically, Italy 
should “work its passage” - which echoed the Churchillian formulation of 
1943.87
The recommendations of the military precipitated a change of heart in the 
Foreign Office. Kirkpatrick and Bevin accepted that it would be a mistake to 
include Italy in the Treaty under consideration at this time.88 For Kirkpatrick 
Italian participation was, at present, ‘difficult and problematic’.89 Bevin’s own 
apprehensions stemmed from three considerations. First, the Peace Treaty 
had rendered Italy incapable of discharging any of the military obligations 
required by a full member in a defensive alliance.90 Second, the existence of 
only limited supplies of modern armaments would mean that any assistance 
given to Italy was bound to be at the expense of the Brussels Powers.91 Third,
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the inclusion of Italy would impact adversely on Greece and Turkey.92
Developments in Washington indicating that America was prepared to 
contemplate a more territorially flexible arrangement also conspired to reinforce 
British opposition to Italian inclusion.93 Bevin believed firmly that the new 
defensive alliance ought to be regionally restricted and based on military 
cooperation alone. This is why he was resolutely determined not to include 
Italy, Greece and Turkey. He feared that their inclusion would destroy the 
validity to the claim that this was a ‘regionally’ based system.94 He also was 
adamant that the North Atlantic Pact should concern itself with defence matters 
alone and he did not wish to see its activities spreading into economic, social 
and cultural matters which were in any case covered by the Treaty of Brussels. 
The military emphasis of the project also implied that decisions on potential 
members ought to be taken on strictly military and strategic criteria and not 
political or cultural ones. Bevin’s resistance was directly motivated by two 
desires, to secure the continuation the BTO and at the same time to ensure 
that the Soviets would not be able to use the Atlantic Treaty as evidence that 
the Western democracies were run in the interests of American capitalism.95
Bevin believed that there were three alternative options which were more 
suitable for Italy. The first was for Italy to have her security safeguarded 
alongside with that of Greece and Turkey, by some kind of unilateral guarantee 
countersigned by the Atlantic Powers. The second option was for the inclusion
92. Ibid.
93. CAB 131/6, top secret, DO(48)64, memorandum by Bevin, 20-9-48.
94. Ibid.
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of Italy into a non-military organization, the Council of Europe. The third which 
was more in line with Bevin’s world view, envisaged the incorporation of Italy 
into a Mediterranean regional defence system in which the UK and the US 
would participate as well.96 Bevin was determined that the North Atlantic Pact 
should be followed by a Mediterranean one that would safeguard the security 
of Southern Europe and the Middle East and would at the same time bolster 
the British position in the area.97
The main problem in establishing a Mediterranean Pact was that Britain and 
France lacked adequate resources to sustain such a system without American 
involvement. This was a quandary that the Foreign Office recognized early on. 
Despite these problems, the idea of creating a Mediterranean Pact alongside 
a North Atlantic framework was extremely attractive for many in the British 
government and they therefore made attempts to excite a similar interest in the 
State Department to this idea.98 A Mediterranean Pact however, went down like 
a lead balloon in America. Acheson and the State Department were quick to 
quash any speculation that the US was prepared to associate itself with any 
Mediterranean regional defensive system at this stage. They were concerned 
that if they adopted a favourable attitude towards such a scheme they might 
well antagonize the Congress unduly at a crucial moment when they needed 
its cooperation to ratify any American obligations towards the North Atlantic
96. FO 371/73074/Z6142/2307/72, 28-7-1948, FO memorandum for 
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Pact." As Hoyer-Millar, the Minister at the British Embassy in Washington, 
wryly put it during the Washington Talks, although he tried to bring up the 
question of other regional pacts and to peddle Bevin’s view of a North Atlantic 
alliance as the starting point of a worldwide system of defensive regional pacts 
or even the possibility of forming a Mediterranean Pact accommodating Italy, 
Greece and Turkey, his approaches were ‘never very popular1 with either the 
Americans or other Europeans for that matter.100
The Mediterranean Pact idea proved to be an unrealistically grandiose scheme 
not just because of American attitudes and logistical considerations but also 
because the Italians had no desire to see themselves dragged into a limited 
Mediterranean role with weak allies. The Italian government regarded Italy, to 
all intents and purposes, as a Western European country. The whole raison d’ 
6tre of the Christian Democratic governments of the late 1940s was their pro- 
Western outlook, the international rehabilitation of Italy and the carving out of 
a niche for their country in the Western World by participating in international 
organizations on the basis of equality with other members.101
There was also the tangible problem of Italian willingness to adhere to any 
pacts. The Foreign Office felt that no clear message was coming from the 
Italian Government indicating a desire to be included into military pacts. This 
was highlighted by the caution with which the Italians had approached the
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Western Union.102 Hoyer-Millar was told by Count Roberti, the head of the 
British desk at the Italian Ministry of External Affairs, that even though the 
Ministry was in favour of Italian association with the ‘Western Union’, a 
considerable body of public opinion existed in Italy that was opposed to any 
move of Italy ‘towards the West’.103 The humiliation and destruction caused by 
the Second World War and the polarization of the Cold War had made most 
Italians fearful of the possibility of their country becoming a battleground in the 
emergent conflict and had turned Italian public opinion overwhelmingly in 
favour of neutrality. In fact, neutralism was very strong and cut across party 
affiliations: it included communists and fellow travellers, apolitical people who 
believed genuinely that Italy could remain neutral in any struggle between 
Russia and the West and finally, those nationalists who felt that Italy had been 
badly treated by the West over the colonial issue and the Peace Treaty.104 
Roberti maintained that for as long as this state of affairs persisted it was very 
difficult for the Italian government to take the initiative, and he added 
emphatically that ‘pressure from any quarter to induce the Italian government 
to come out in favour of joining the Western Union at the present time would 
be embarrassing to Rome’.105 Such assessments were further compounded by 
the picture which was emerging from Rome. Victor Mallet sent back accounts
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of a vociferous peace movement which the Communists had managed to co­
opt during ‘monsteri demonstrations which took place on 7 November. Mallet’s 
accounts also described an embattled government in which some of its own 
elements - Giuseppe Dossetti and Giovanni Gronchi the leaders of the 
Parliamentary left wing of the Christian Democrats, and Dino Del Bo, the 
representative of the trade union wing of the Party - pressed for the adoption 
of a neutralist foreign policy.106
De Gasperi and Sforza realized that the Washington Exploratory Talks had 
given rise to new realities that Italian foreign policy would have to 
accommodate if their country was not to be isolated, but they found themselves 
in a severe dilemma about how to proceed. Alberto Tarchiani, the Italian 
Ambassador to the United States, warned that Italy had only one stark choice 
at this time, either to join an Atlantic alliance or to be left out in the cold alone. 
His admonitions were tempered by the advice of other ambassadors. From 
Paris, Pietro Quaroni, the Italian Ambassador to France, urged caution but at 
the same time he was painfully aware of Italy’s limited scope for pursuing a 
truly neutral policy. He mused, ‘today we are as free as Poland...’.107 The Italian 
government had no other option but to adopt an equivocal and cautious policy 
of balance aimed on the one hand at ensuring the speedy international 
rehabilitation of the country and on the other, at carrying the Italian Parliament 
and public opinion with it and ensuring that its defence would be guaranteed 
by the United States formally. If Sforza tried to associate Italy too closely with
106. FO 371/79292/Z851/1011/22, 28-1-1949, confidential, despatch, 
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the West and in particular, with an overtly anti-Soviet military alliance, he risked 
alienating public opinion and giving the Communists and Socialists the 
opportunity to whip up and capitalise on neutralist sentiments.108
In weighing up these considerations, Sforza developed a two-pronged 
approach. He attempted to obtain more information on the emerging Atlantic 
system and he tentatively explored its possibilities.109 He also chose to further 
European cooperation by economic means in order to offset Italy’s exclusion 
from the BTO and to mollify neutralist feeling. He proposed that the OEEC 
should be transformed into a body that would speed European unity. This 
integrative plan reflected Sforza’s domestic and foreign policy concerns, as 
well as genuine Italian pro-integrationist sentiments and economic priorities 
and at the same time was intended to avoid the pitfalls of the military 
entanglements that accession to a defensive alliance would bring with it.110
Sforza’s proposals may have been met with derision and utter contempt by 
Bevin and the Foreign Office, but they were also interpreted as reflecting 
genuine Italian neutralist feelings and the difficulties the Italian government had 
in entering into any binding military obligations. They led the British government 
to believe that Italy would not wish to join NATO and that British policy towards 
Italian inclusion did not need reassessment. This exposed Bevin to Italian 
complaints that Britain was trying to keep Italy out of any Western alliances, to
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which Bevin took strong exception. He intimated to Sir Victor Mallet that he had 
given a lot of thought about how to incorporate Italy, but his main concern right 
now was to decide on the proper territorial scope of the Treaty. Even the 
evidence of growing American support for Italian inclusion failed to curb the 
serious doubts he had developed by this stage with regards to such 
inclusion.111
Throughout this period, the British government had been the recipient of 
confused and garbled messages with regards to Italian intentions. These were 
due to Italian indecision and Sforza’s dismissive and uncooperative towards 
Duke Tommaso Gallarati Scotti which resulted in the Italian Embassy in 
London not being always fully informed.112 General Marras went to Germany 
and conducted discussions with the Americans,113 but Hoyer-Millar was unable 
to get any information about the purpose of General Marras’ visit from Count 
Roberti who was usually not a reticent man. The Foreign Office believed that 
military discussions between the Italians and the Americans had taken place 
and that Italy’s role in the defence of Europe had been discussed as well. 
General Marras and the American Military Attache in Rome were extremely 
cagey and tight-lipped about the nature of the visit. The British were also not 
told of the invitation that General Omar Bradley, the Chairman of the US Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, had issued to General Marras to visit the US.114 From the
111. FO 371/73079/Z8739/2307/72, 29-10-1948, top secret, telegram, 
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British point of view it appeared as if something had happened behind their 
backs and they were being deliberately kept in the dark. The Italian Chief of 
Staff was prepared only to say that he had gone to Germany to review Italian 
Army officers who were being trained in Germany by the Americans and to 
discuss the issue of arms standardization. More important and precise 
information emerged from Colonel Koral, the Turkish Military Attache, who was 
considered to be the best informed foreign military attache in Rome. He 
informed the British that according to a close associate of Marras, the General 
had had discussions in Germany on Italy’s role in the event of a future war but 
that they had been of an exploratory nature and no decisions had been 
taken.115
Count Zoppi, the Secretary General of the Italian Foreign Ministry contributed 
to the general confusion and succeeded in greatly arousing British suspicions. 
He had approached Ward, the British charge d’affaires to tell him that Tarchiani 
had been authorized to initiate discussions with the Americans with a view to 
determine the role they would like Italy to assume in the defence of Europe. In 
the course of this conversation Ward understood that Zoppi had implied that 
‘something was already taking place between Italian and American officers in 
Frankfurt’. Ten days later, when Zoppi met Sir Victor Mallet, he was quick to 
retract the emphasis of his earlier comments. He now claimed that all he had 
said was that the Italian Ambassador had been instructed to express to the 
State Department Italy’s interest in getting involved in the defence of Europe 
as the Italians felt that they could be ‘one of the first potential victims of
115. FO 371/73080/Z9016/2307/72, 6-11-1948, letter, Macnab to 
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Russia’.116 The result of this was that the British had become aware of Italy’s 
attempts at exploring the possibility of association with the North Atlantic Pact, 
but they were not certain how serious or determined the Italians were in 
pursuing this policy as they were not privy to what exactly was ‘passing 
between Rome and Washington’. This had given rise to speculation, 
encouraged by the Italians, that the Americans were putting pressure on Italy 
to come into an Atlantic Pact.117 The British decided that all this was down to 
Dunn exerting pressure on the Italian government.118
Throughout that autumn Britain became more and more intransigent in its 
opposition and its stance was reinforced by the conclusions of the Military 
Committee of the Brussels Treaty that Italy was a liability.119 To counter any 
potential American insistence, Kirkpatrick suggested that Italy might be invited 
to adhere to the treaty in some capacity at a later stage or to send a 
representative to the conference ‘in some distinctive capacity’, but only on the 
clear understanding that provisions ought to be made for the security of both 
Greece and Turkey as well.120
The crystallization of British reluctance was not mirrored in Washington where
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the advocates of Italian inclusion gathered momentum when France changed 
sides. The French, from being determined advocates of a territorially restricted 
alliance and Italian exclusion, were converted into fervent supporters of Italian 
inclusion.121 This policy re-orientation was based on multifarious reasons. The 
realization that American support for Italian inclusion was hardening opened 
the possibility of France’s own strategic and colonial interests being 
accommodated within the Atlantic framework. The Quai d’Orsay had long 
worried that the Treaty would evolve a distinctly northern character within 
which it would be very difficult for France to incorporate its Northern African 
colonies. France calculated that by championing Italy it would be able to shift 
the emphasis of the alliance southwards, thereby making it possible to include 
French Northern Africa.122 France also shared a border with Italy. The French 
did not relish the prospect of the Franco-ltalian border being the first line of 
defence in the event of a future European war. The inclusion of Italy would 
mean that France’s Alpine border would become safer.123
Britain was thus deprived of a strong ally and the cohesion of the BTO with 
regards to the territorial scope of the treaty was ruined.124 When Bevin was told 
of the French change of heart he did not waver but stubbornly stuck to his 
position, declaring that he still thought that ‘the disadvantages of bringing Italy
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in now outweighed the advantages’.125 In December he scribbled, ‘Italy I am 
against it at present. More consultation is needed. Can we bring Italy in without 
Greece and Turkey?’.126 However, by now, he could only count on the support 
of the Benelux countries in his efforts to exclude Italy.127
The British and French divergence of opinion remained unresolved and their 
positions became increasingly entrenched. The Permanent Commission of the 
Brussels Treaty, reflecting these divisions, failed to express a unanimous 
opinion and the Five Powers went to Washington deeply divided and unable 
to talk with one voice on the issue of Italian inclusion.128 The Anglo-French 
antagonism spread to the Washington Talks and poisoned relations between 
the two powers to the degree that Franks remarked to Bonnet, the French 
Ambassador to the United States, that he could not negotiate with a revolver 
held against his head.129
British concerns and the number of reasons for opposing Italian inclusion 
seemed to increase daily. It was an issue over which British foreign policy 
makers and strategists could see eye to eye, and they were prepared to use
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their combined strength to counteract American insistence.130 This attitude was 
strongly underpinned by genuine and widespread concern that Italy would use 
the occasion to advance some of its revisionist claims, or in Jebb’s alarmist 
words, to ‘work a combinazione’, (sic) i.e. to link the issue of their accession 
with colonial concessions and the revision of the Peace Treaty.131 The position 
of the Foreign Office hardened further when the Chiefs of Staff Committee met 
again to re-consider the inclusion of Italy and Scandinavia on 23 November. 
The Chiefs of Staff asserted forcefully that they were unaware of any new 
factors arising that made a revision of British policy towards Italy opportune or 
necessary.132
The views of the British government became public in a clumsy fashion during 
Field Marshal Montgomery’s visit to Brussels in his capacity as the Chairman 
of the Western Union’s Chiefs of Staff Committee. Montgomery outlined the 
‘grand design’ strategy for the defence of the Western Union, as had been 
agreed by the COS and identified its line of defence as extending from the Alps 
along to the Franco-ltalian border and on to the Mediterranean thus excluding 
Italy on the basis that it was not a Brussels Treaty power.133 Later, in Paris, he 
described the prospect of Italian inclusion as ‘a grave mistake’.134 He was also 
doubly negative at the possibility of rearming Italy under the Brussels Pact or
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North Atlantic Pact (NAP) umbrella because, simply, there were not enough 
arms to go around. He stated unequivocally that on military grounds he was 
strongly opposed to Italian inclusion in either arrangement. He had no doubts 
that Italian participation could only be considered on political grounds, but in 
that case, he warned, strategy and military requirements would have to be 
reshaped to suit politics.135
The opponents of Italian inclusion were running out of time as all their 
arguments appeared to fall on deaf ears.136 One of the principal reasons for 
this was that Britain was not able to exploit the splits within the State 
Department to its benefit. The Washington Embassy was disinclined to 
cultivate supporters within the State Department against Italian entry because 
it was these very individuals who were obstructing the idea of the Atlantic 
alliance. Two conflicting schools of thought were in evidence within the State 
Department. The Office of European Affairs favoured Italian inclusion on 
political grounds whereas the Policy Planning Staff advocated exclusion on 
long-term policy grounds - namely that its would solidify the present division of 
Europe further.137 However, as progress was made on a draft NATO treaty,
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Oliver Franks noted that the hand of the adversaries of the military alliance and 
of Italy’s inclusion was weakening and that the inclusionists appeared to be 
winning.138
In the light of these developments, Franks sensed that London ought to re­
examine the issue and asked for clarification on several matters. Should Italy 
be invited to join and would Northern French Africa be included too? In such 
an eventuality should any provisions be made for Greece, Turkey and Iran? 
The Defence Committee examined these questions but misled themselves with 
a false sense of security as it felt that France’s unreserved support for Italian 
inclusion could still be isolated provided that Britain presented its argument 
convincingly. Because of this firm but false perception, the Defence Committee 
prepared no fall-back position and simply reiterated its rather predictable view, 
namely, that Italy must be excluded until it had become stronger militarily and 
until Italian pro-neutralist feelings had subsided. Since the idea of forming a 
Mediterranean Pact did not appear probable, it also recommended that the 
most suitable Western organization for Italy at this time was the Council of 
Europe because this did not entail any military commitments. Many of its 
conclusions were based on the assumption that the US was prepared to 
contemplate a pact of a longer duration so long as no Mediterranean Powers 
were included.139 The Foreign Office was in full agreement with the Defence 
Committee but despite its opposition to Italian inclusion, it was not impervious 
to the impact exclusion would have on Italy which was bound to feel maligned 
and isolated.140 A solution to this problem would be for Italy, along with Greece
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and Turkey, to receive a guarantee from the North Atlantic countries.141
Oliver Franks was instructed to urge upon the representatives of the seven 
powers in Washington the disadvantages of Italian inclusion, but at the same 
time to raise the issue in such a way that Anglo-American relations and 
progress towards the signing of the Treaty did not suffer. The Foreign Office 
was anxious to ensure that the matter would not divert attention from the 
central issues at stake and it instructed its negotiators in Washington that in 
the event the Americans were absolutely determined to bring Italy in, HMG 
would find it ‘clearly necessary to review [its] position’. This reflected Bevin’s 
view that the most important issue was to secure the signing of the ‘the Atlantic 
Pact as soon as possible’.142 When the Washington Talks on the North Atlantic 
Pact resumed in December 1948 and as the participants progressed towards 
concluding a draft treaty, Italian inclusion was put on the table once again. The 
ensuing discussions revealed the seemingly irreconcilable points of view held 
by its opponents and supporters. Bonnet made an ‘impassioned’ plea in favour 
of Italy’s inclusion on the grounds of its importance to the defence of France 
and its Northern African colonies and thus by extension to European defence 
in the event of war.143 The British took the French salvos in their stride. The 
Foreign Office thought that ultimately France could be persuaded to withdraw 
its demands for the inclusion French North Africa which would make Italian 
inclusion unnecessary.144
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A month earlier, for a short time the Foreign Office had became alarmed when, 
Achilles and Hickerson convinced them that the American military had dropped 
its opposition and had accepted that Italian inclusion was desirable not only on 
political but also strategic grounds.145 The Foreign Office and Franks had 
sensed that Bohlen’s and Kennan’s rearguard action had been blunted by the 
pro-inclusionists within the State Department,146 but they found it completely 
unpalatable that the American military could reach this conclusion when both 
the British and the Western Union Chiefs of Staff had formed exactly the 
opposite opinion.147 This apparently mysterious conclusion was resolved by 
General Morgan (BJSM) who reported that the US military’s opinion on the 
matter had not ‘crystallized’ as yet, and that General Bradley had never 
advanced a military case for Italy, merely that he was concerned about the 
effects of exclusion and wanted Italy to be ‘bound up’ in some way with the 
West.148 The British took heart from these reports, again maintaining their 
stance that the alliance could not afford to undertake a commitment to Italy for
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all the reasons they had put forward many times.149 As the last session of the 
Working Group for 1948 opened and the draft Treaty was more or less ready, 
Franks made it clear that the British government thought the alliance ought to 
give Italy adequately strong assurances with regards to her security and that 
steps ought to be taken to affirm its links with the West both so that the Soviets 
did not misunderstand the situation and to minimize Italian ill-feeling.150
The attitude of the Norwegian government added further potency to British 
endeavours to exclude Italy, especially because of Norway’s immense strategic 
importance to the defence of the UK and the fact that the Norwegians were 
perceived as being in the Soviet firing line after the insistent Soviet offers of a 
non-aggression pact.151 The Norwegian government made it crystal clear that 
they would find it impossible to be party to an organization that included Italy.152 
As Halvard Lange, the Norwegian Foreign Minister, explained, the inclusion 
of Italy would mean that the pact was no longer an Atlantic one but had 
become Mediterranean in character, and Norway had no interest in being 
invoved in Mediterranean affairs. The Norwegians emphasized their 
intransigence by saying that although they were not particularly excited at the 
prospect of having Portugal involved they would go along with its membership, 
but that they drew the line at Italy.153
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Britain’s consistent opposition led the Americans to propose a series of 
undertakings. They promised that Italian inclusion would not mean that Italy 
would be allowed to exceed the military restrictions imposed upon her by the 
Peace Treaty and that it would not affect the entitlement of military supplies for 
the BTO countries. In their efforts to find a solution acceptable to all concerned 
the Americans floated, once again, the idea of Italy joining the Brussels Treaty 
initially and later on being invited to accede to the North Atlantic Pact or even 
to join the pact as an associated member. This option met with vehement and 
unanimous opposition from all the BTO powers including France. They argued 
that there were not only prohibitive objections on military grounds but also that 
it was doubtful that Italian public opinion would approve of its government 
joining a Pact that did not include America.154
All countries agreed that Greece and Turkey ought not to participate in the 
proposed alliance but that at the same time steps would have to be taken to 
ensure that their security was not compromised. Britain wanted to insert an 
article into the treaty that would cover the security of Greece, Italy and Turkey 
by stating that ‘should any member state of the OEEC other than a party to this 
treaty, be the object of an armed attack, the parties will immediately consult 
together with a view to taking such measures as may be desirable or 
necessary in order to restore the situation’.155 The Americans accepted the 
British view that the two countries would have to be provided for in some way 
and toyed with the possibility of including an article enshrining some 
assurances to all OEEC countries. France was sympathetic to idea but the 
Canadians were quick to nip it in the bud by stating that their government was
154. FO 371/73083/Z10510/2307/72, 27-12-1948, top secret, telegram, 
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not prepared to include such assurances in the Treaty itself.156
Both the Americans and the Canadians reluctantly agreed to consider the 
inclusion of some parts of French North Africa, namely Algeria and French 
Morocco, in the Pact.157 They were unwilling however to go as far as the British 
would have liked when the latter suggested including all Africa north of 30° 
north in order to include the British troops in the Suez and Cyrenaica area, or 
even to cover the Belgian Congo.158 Lovett thought that this would extend the 
scope of the Treaty too far, it would exceed the spirit of the Vandenberg 
Resolution, would be unacceptable to the Congress, and make it difficult to 
exclude Greece, Iran and Turkey.159 Oliver Franks advised against Britain 
pursuing the inclusion of Northern Africa because it would weaken their case 
to exclude Italy.160 The Foreign Office accepting his advice recognised that it 
had no hope whatsoever of including any other area of Africa apart from 
French North Africa. Franks was duly able to inform his fellow participants in 
Washington that Britain was flexible on the matter and would not be pressing 
to include the whole of North Africa.161 The Benelux representatives followed 
suit.162
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The discussion then turned to Italy. Potent and emotive arguments were 
deployed for and against its inclusion. The spectre of an Italy bereft, 
increasingly isolated and introspective and an easy prey to Communist 
propaganda and pressure, was one argument projected by Bonnet.163 Italy’s 
strategic position in the defence of Western Europe because of its 
geographical contiguity with it was another. Franks protested, equally 
persuasively, that it had to be excluded because it was not a North Atlantic 
country, it was restricted militarily by an international peace treaty, it would 
extend the alliance too far afield and that it would not contribute anything 
substantial in military terms.164 Silvercruys, the Belgian representative, Van 
Kleffens, the Dutch representative and Le Gallais, the representative of 
Luxemburg, all took the opportunity to express the strong aversion of their 
governments to incorporating Italy on military grounds.165 The ambassadors of 
the Benelux powers also declared their concerns that the inclusion of a country 
such as Italy would weaken the defensive position of the West and that in any 
case, the Italians themselves seemed to be indecisive as they had as yet not 
even solicited an association with the BTO.166 Hume Wrong, the Canadian 
representative, while noting that Italy was a special case meriting some special 
arrangement, objected to Italian inclusion on military and geographical
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164. FO 371/79218/Z47/1074/72, 4-1-1949, top secret, WET, 10th 
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grounds.167 Lovett acknowledged that although the United States had not as 
yet developed a firm position, he could not see Italy being left without any 
protection.168 Thus, the Seven Powers could reach no agreement on whether 
or not to invite Italy to join the Pact and deferred the decision for a later date, 
allowing all participants to consult their governments further.169
Franks informed the Foreign Office of the impasse, observing that he detected 
growing American support for inclusion and he warned that the British 
arguments were becoming threadbare. He requested fresh points and 
arguments from the Foreign Office which were based on detailed strategic 
thinking, the Italian reluctance and the advantages of including Italy in the 
Council of Europe rather than the Atlantic organization.170 Dealing with the first 
and third aspects of Frank’s suggestions was easy for the Foreign Office. Both 
Attlee and Bevin were in agreement that all efforts should be made to exclude 
Italy because of their certitude that Italy could not be defended for the time 
being, at least, in the event of a Red Army attack. They also shared concerns 
that Italian inclusion at this time would have an adverse effect on Italian 
domestic politics and that the Council of Europe was better suited to Italy’s 
needs because its membership did not carry any military obligations on its 
part.171 Bevin instructed that the matter ought to be referred to the Defence
167. Ibid.; FO 371/73083/Z10566/2307, 29-12-1948, top secret, Annex 
C, 24-12-1948; FO 371/79220/Z246/1074/72, 10-1-1949, top secret, telegram, 
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Committee and that Mallet had to gauge the sentiments of the Italian 
government.172 The Defence Committee affirmed that Italian inclusion would 
mean that Western Europe would have to be defended from the Rhine, along 
the Alps and then southwards to Trieste. The consequence would be the 
undertaking of extra burdens that Britain did not have the resources to 
shoulder.173 In the event of a crisis, the Defence Committee concluded, it would 
place the allies in the embarrassing position of having to tell Italy, a fellow 
participant to the pact, that they could not defend it.174
It was not as easy, however, for London to ascertain the prevailing mood in 
Rome, first, because the conflicting messages emanating from the Italian 
government were continuing and second, because Bevin and the Foreign 
Office were not paying due consideration to the advice of the Rome Embassy 
and Sir Victor Mallet, in particular.175 Mallet admitted candidly that it was not 
possible to form an exact opinion of the Italians because he had not been privy 
to the confessions of any Italian politician nor official about any firm decisions 
being made, probably because by that stage influential Italian circles had 
decided to ‘write Britain off as they felt it to be implacably mistrustful towards 
Italy.176 He felt, however, that the message he was getting from discussions
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with Sforza, Gallarati-Scotti, Zoppi and Guidotti, was that although there were 
still many schools of thought in the Italian government with regards to the 
Atlantic Pact, nevertheless Italy soon would be ‘fishing for an invitation’.177 He 
also gauged that Dunn was encouraging Italy to get involved and that should 
Italy be invited to join she would do so. He noted that the Italian government 
had undertaken a propaganda offensive to convince its public opinion that Italy 
was better off under US protection under the aegis of the NAP rather than 
finding itself in a ‘no man’s land’ between East and West.178 The Italian 
government regarded membership of the Council of Europe as an 
unsatisfactory alternative and a unilateral declaration guaranteeing Italian 
independence was viewed only as second best to full membership of the 
Atlantic Pact.179
Mallet ventured to warn that when the Italians came to request admission 
Britain ought to ‘embrace’ it or risk their resentment.180 These were prophetic 
words, but they were not taken at face value by the Foreign Office which was 
still convinced that the Italian government really did not wish to join as it could 
never hope to carry Parliament and public opinion on such an issue. The 
Foreign Office went on to discount Mallet’s assertions as being merely the
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product of American pressure on Italy.181 It felt it better to pay more attention 
to the words of the Turkish Foreign Minister who reported that De Gasperi had 
told him that Italian public opinion had not as yet been convinced that 
neutralism was not an option and that he would be embarking on a campaign 
to educate it.182 The Foreign Office was also cognisant of the fact that Saragat 
and his secessionist socialists were against inclusion because they feared that 
this would make the split with the PSI permanent and would result in Italy being 
drawn into an ever more right wing course where social reform would be 
impossible.183 The Foreign Office interpreted these confused messages 
emerging from Rome as a sign that the Italian government was reluctant to 
face the issue because it feared for its own stability.184
January 1949 saw a series of developments that made the Foreign Office 
realize that its efforts to bar Italy from the emergent Atlantic pact were rapidly 
being compromised. Soon after Dean Acheson replaced Marshall at the helm 
of the State Department, Franks warned that Acheson would be taking a closer 
personal interest in Italy. Franks also reported that he could almost sense it in
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the air that Italy was making overtures to join.185 Jebb similarly warned that 
Britain would soon face pressure to accept Italian association on political 
grounds despite the overwhelming military arguments against it.186 Despite 
these reports from Rome and Washington, the Foreign Office saw no need to 
rethink Britain’s negotiating position in Washington and continued to include 
Italy in its draft declaration safeguarding Italy alongside Greece, Turkey and 
Iran.187 Thus, when on 12 January, Tarchiani called on Hickerson at the State 
Department to submit Sforza’s memorandum of 6 January containing Italy’s 
official request for inclusion, Britain was caught unawares and had to readjust 
its policy quickly to the new realities.188 As a consequence, Britain found itself 
having to perform two major and seemingly mutually exclusive tasks, namely, 
to ensure Italian exclusion without however, publicly snubbing De Gasperi.189
British tactics evolved in two ways. There was resigned recognition that should
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the US decide to come off the fence and openly support Italy, Britain would 
have to acquiesce in its inclusion.190 This possibility led the British government 
to move quickly to secure an explicit American declaration that Italy would not 
be allowed to use entry as a means of promoting its nationalistic aspirations by 
pressing for a revision of the clauses of the Italian Peace Treaty.191 Meanwhile, 
British efforts to exclude Italy continued by playing the numbers game and 
making the ‘Washington spirit’ work for them. The Foreign Office was 
convinced that the Italian government had taken the initiative only after 
immense American encouragement, if not pressure, and despite Hickerson’s 
protestations.192 By referring the matter of Italy’s potential accession to either 
the BTO or the Atlantic Pact to the Permanent Commission of the BTO Britain 
hoped, as a last ditch attempt, to secure the unanimous opposition of all 
members of the BTO including France in the best case scenario or minus 
France in the worst case. Even in the worst case, given Canada’s attitude, 
Britain could secure five out of the seven voices on the Working Party of the 
Washington Exploratory Talks on Security and thus could hope to convince the 
US that Italian inclusion did not have majority support.193
The Permanent Commission and the Consultative Council of the BTO 
proclaimed unanimously against the inclusion of Italy in the Brussels Treaty on 
the grounds that should Italy be made a member it would expect, naturally, to
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be defended and the Five Powers simply could not afford to undertake such an 
obligation.194 In view of France’s passionate advocacy of Italian inclusion in the 
Atlantic Treaty the BTO powers failed to reach a unanimous position and a 
compromise emerged to the effect that the Five powers would acquiesce in 
Italian accession only if the US pressed for it and only if Italy were to join 
without any preconditions.195 So far as Britain and the Benelux countries were 
concerned the ball was now in America’s court and Acheson came under 
increasing pressure to state America’s position towards the issue of Italian 
entry.196
In the meanwhile, British statesmen embarked on a damage limitation exercise 
with Italy. The Italian government had formed the erroneous opinion that the 
only power opposed to Italy’s accession was Britain and that Oliver Franks was 
the only member of the Washington Working Party still holding out against Italy. 
As a result Anglo-ltalian relations had been deteriorating.197 Bevin protested 
that such a conclusion was inaccurate.198 His position was that inclusion at this 
stage was inopportune because it could plummet Italy into an internal crisis and
194. Ibid., FO to Washington, top secret, telegram, no. 940, 22-1-1949; 
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because Italy could not be given any positive security guarantees. It would be 
better for Italy to join when both it and Britain were stronger, possibly in two 
years time.199 Bevin also declared that his motives were not based upon any 
anti-Italian feelings or memories of the last war; he simply believed that it was 
in Italy’s best interests not to be included at this stage in an alliance that carried 
military obligations.200 Nevertheless, the fact that he was not prepared to 
support Italy in its choice diminished the effectiveness of his approach 
especially as America was coming to the firm conclusion that, from the moment 
De Gasperi’s government had openly asked to join, a public rejection would be 
more harmful to Italy than anything else.201
The US had committed itself to using any political, economic or military means 
to keep Italy from falling under Soviet control and did not see fit to exclude it 
from both the Brussels Treaty and the Atlantic Pact.202 Lovett expressed the 
American administration’s consensus by claiming that Italy would have to be 
associated with the Pact because of its geographical position and strategic
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concerns.203 Acheson, while preferring to keep his options open because of the 
difficulties he was facing with Congress, also let it be known that he was in 
favour of Italian accession but that his government had not committed itself yet 
to an invitation formally or informally.204 He also went on to convey his 
government’s belief that a declaration on the lines proposed to cover Greece, 
Turkey and Iran was not adequate for Italy, nor was membership of the Council 
of Europe a sufficient alternative to the Atlantic Pact. Italy would have to be 
invited to participate in the Pact, but Washington would not insist on inclusion 
in the BTO.205 He stressed, however, that the American Administration was not 
prepared to carry sole responsibility for this invitation and that the decision on 
Italian participation had to be based on common agreement among the Seven 
Powers.206
The State Department’s position was greatly facilitated by the unyielding 
support of France and in particular of Ambassador Bonnet, who propounded 
the issue of Italian accession at every given opportunity. He went so far as to 
provoke the wrath of his Brussels Treaty allies by putting his own gloss on the 
decisions of the Permanent Commission which did not always represent their
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spirit or their letter.207 As February and March unfolded, France became 
intransigent in its position and raised the stakes by claiming that if Italy was not 
included it would have to reconsider its stance towards the Atlantic Pact since 
the French Chamber and public opinion would not in these circumstances 
support French accession.208
In view of the climate American and French attitudes had produced in 
Washington, the Permanent Commission decreed that at this stage, the most 
important thing was for the Pact to be signed as quickly as possible and that 
all other issues were of lesser significance.209 Canada and the Benelux 
countries were still not convinced of the merits of Italian inclusion, but they felt 
they had ‘to bow to the inevitable’.210 Britain decided that should the Americans 
come out firmly in support of Italian inclusion and provided that Italy came in
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unconditionally and did not cause any delays, Britain too would not oppose it.211 
As soon as the British position was communicated to the State Department, 
Acheson declared the formal approval of the US government to Italian 
participation and he simultaneously issued an invitation to Italy, through 
Dunn,212 before the formal decision to accept Italy as an original signatory of 
the Pact was taken by the Working Party in Washington on 15 March 1949.213
By March, the Italian government had succeeded in convincing enough Italians 
that their country had no other choice but to commit itself to the Atlantic 
alliance. On 22nd March 1949, the debate on foreign affairs in the Italian 
Chamber of Deputies was dominated by Italy’s forthcoming acceptance of the 
US invitation. It lasted for 56 hours, without recess, and it produced a majority 
of 172 votes in favour of the result for which Sforza and De Gasperi had 
worked so hard during January and March 1949.214 Italy communicated its 
acceptance of the invitation formally on 29th March 1949.215
Bevin was slightly irritated at the speed and the manner with which matters
211. FO 371/79229/Z1807/1074/72, 28-2-1949, minute by Jebb, 
1-3-1949; FO 371/79230/Z1958/1074/72, 4-3-1949, top secret, telegram, no. 
2447, FO to Washington, 3-3-1949, top secret, telegram, no. 2449, Bevin to 
Franks, 3-3-1949; FO 371/79231/Z1898/1074/72, 4-3-1949, minute by 
Shukburgh, 4-3-1949.
212. FO 371/79231/Z2021/1074/72, 8-3-1949, top secret, telegram, no. 
1329, Franks to FO, 7-3-1949; FO 79232/Z2079/1074/72, 9-3-1949, top 
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16-3-1949; FRUS, 1949, Vol. IV, pp. 151-2 and 167; Smith, op. cit., pp. 88-9
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3-1949.
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were progressing as he was anxious to get agreement on the military 
machinery envisaged under Article 9 of the Treaty prior to Italy’s involvement 
and whilst active debate and deliberation on this was still in process.216 He 
talked of American heavy-handedness and of the Americans ‘jumping the gun’. 
He was also extremely concerned that the Italian government had lost no time 
in presenting the US with the request for urgent military supplies to fulfil its 
NATO obligations, while omitting any acknowledgement that such aid would not 
exceed the Peace treaty limits. He was concerned that the US seemed 
indifferent to the omission.217 Ultimately, however, he was relieved that at last, 
after so much time and effort, the North Atlantic Treaty was being completed, 
so he decided not to take exception.218
From the moment the Truman Administration endorsed Italian adhesion, any 
opposition from Britain became irrelevant and counterproductive. The British 
were not prepared to allow a peripheral matter to undermine the signing of the 
Treaty. The bottom line was that both the Foreign Office and the Chiefs of Staff 
knew full well that they could not expect to win a war against the Soviet Union 
without the manpower and industrial resources of the US. Britain’s main 
objective was to seek America’s ‘active support in peace and war\ If that
216. FO 371/79232/Z2081/1074/170, 9-3-1949, top secret, telegram, no. 
1371, Franks to Bevin, 8-3-1949; top secret, telegram, no. 2739, Bevin to 
Franks, 9-3-1949; FO 371/79233/Z2178/1074/72, 12-3-1949, top secret, 
telegram, no. 1449, Hoyer-Millar to Jebb, 11-3-1949.
217. FO 371/80070/ZW139/1196/170, 11-4-1949, top secret, telegram, 
no. 372/08, Washington to FO, 7-4-1949; ibid., ZW210/1196/170, 20-4-1949, 
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meant that it would have to accept Italy as an ally then so be it.219
Britain and Italy’s Role in the Nascent NATO
Britain accepted Italy’s inclusion as an unwelcome inevitability and it devoted 
its efforts to ensuring the realisation of the military alliance and the military 
organization220 which limited involvement to the ‘higher direction’ of defence 
planning to Britain, America, Canada and France221 and at the same time it 
continued with the existing bilateral secret global planning arrangements it had 
with the US.222 Both Britain and France were anxious to incorporate the BTO 
structure within the new organization because they considered it a means to 
enhance their status within the alliance223 by acting as the representatives of
219. CAB 128/15, CM(49)19th Conclusions, item 1, secret, 10-3-1949; 
CAB 129/32, Part II, top secret, CP(49)37, ‘North Atlantic Treaty’: note by the 
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 21-2-1949; CAB 131/6, top secret, DO(48)61, 14-
9-48; Folly, op. cit., pp. 189-191; Peterson, N., ‘Bargaining Power among 
Potential Allies’, pp. 198-201; Smith, op. cit., pp. 88-9.
22°. Ibid. (Article 9 of NATO had provided for the creation of political, 
military and regional machinery).
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meeting, 20-4-49; DEFE 4/21, top secret, COS(49)62nd meeting, 29-4-49; 
DEFE 4/23, top secret, COS(49) 109th meeting, 28-7-49.
222. FO 371/80057/ZW2051/1195/170, 15-9-1949, top secret, telegram, 
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the smaller European nations such as Benelux and Italy.224
The granting of NATO membership to Italy did not lead to a radical British 
reappraisal of Italy’s value in either British or allied strategy. To the end, Bevin 
continued to regard Italian membership as a mistake and his lack of 
enthusiasm was mirrored in Britain’s attitude during the discussions on Italy’s 
place within NATO’s overall strategy and peacetime defence planning.225 The 
discussions indeed only underlined British fears about the premature inclusion 
of Italy in the Alliance, namely, the effect upon the military clauses of the Italian 
Peace Treaty, Italy’s perceived indefensibility and its role within the alliance. 
Bevin sought to prevent Italy from playing an active role in the upper echelons 
of the nascent military apparatus provided by Article 9. British fears became 
abundantly clear during late summer and autumn 1949 when the discussions 
on the establishment of the military machinery of the Alliance began in earnest 
in Washington.226 Thereupon, NATO and Britain were faced with Italian 
demands for military assistance, revision of the military clauses of the Peace 
Treaty and participation in the highest echelons of the military organization of 
NATO.
As far as the military organization of NATO was concerned, Britain had
224. Ibid.
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envisaged that Italy would not participate in the ‘Steering Committee’ of the 
alliance but limit its activity to full membership of the Western Mediterranean 
Regional Planning Group (WMRPG) and associate membership of the 
Western European Regional Planning Group (WERPG or WEG), i.e. to be 
brought into consultation only when its own interests were affected or 
discussed.227 The British attitude towards Italy was primarily informed by the 
following assumptions. First, Italian defence was essentially a problem of 
Mediterranean defence and not a Western European one;228 Second, Italy was 
‘valueless militarily’, because of the terms of the Peace Treaty and the state of 
its existing armed forces.229 Third, even if the restrictions imposed by the 
Peace Treaty were relaxed and Italy raised larger forces, it would still need 
external assistance to resist external aggression and the British military 
authorities were convinced that the Italian armed forces could not put up
227. DEFE 4/23, top secret, COS(49)108th meeting, 28-7-49;
FO 371/80052/ZW1781/1195/170, 30-8-1949, top secret, Annex II, telegram, 
no. 8109, FO to Washington, 26-8-1949; FO 371/80053/ZW/1829/1195/170, 
1-9-1949, top secret, telegram, no. 4152, Franks to FO, 1-9-1949;
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effective resistance without the deployment of such numbers of allied forces 
as to prejudice an effective and successful defence in other theatres, 
something that neither the alliance as a whole nor Britain in particular could 
afford.230 Thus, because of this perception of lack of resources, the Joint 
Planning Staff and the Chiefs of Staff determined that they must dissuade the 
Americans from large-scale offers of military assistance to the Italians: much 
better that the limited resources of the alliance should go to ensuring that the 
French forces were fully equipped.231 Fourth, that the alliance had no means 
to defend its Northern border effectively at this stage.232 From the allied side, 
the only support Italy could count on was the American and British forces 
stationed in Austria and Trieste and naval back up.233 If war broke out and the 
Red Army threatened Italy, these forces would be instructed to fight alongside 
the Italians for as long as it was practical.234 No other allied land based air 
forces were to be made available. All the allies were prepared to offer was a 
strategic air offensive and they believed that a defence of Italy should not be 
prolonged.235 Finally, and most ironically, Italy was regarded as a major security
230. DEFE 4/19, top secret, COS(49) 1st meeting, 3-1-1949; DEFE 6/7, 
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risk that could compromise secret defence plans.236
In view of all these assumptions the British military considered that the allies’ 
best strategy was for their forces to secure the defence of the Yssel-Rhine- 
Switzerland line, along the Franco-ltalian border and down to the 
Mediterranean. Consequently, they strongly recommended that Britain should 
not undertake to provide direct military assistance to Italy in the event of war 
in the near future and that British forces in the area should not engage 
themselves in the defence of Italy but simply be ready to withdraw to be 
deployed on the Franco-ltalian border as soon as Northern Italy collapsed.237
The Italian government, however had other plans. In its determination to avoid 
relegation to a second-class position within the Atlantic alliance it actively 
canvassed the British, French and American governments238 and declared its 
interest in becoming a member of the ‘Steering Group’ and the Western 
European Group (WEG).239 As negotiations progressed it showed its 
determination not to be side-lined by entering a ‘reservation’ for membership
236. Ibid.; DEFE 5/15, Part I, top secret, COS(49)253, 9-7-49; DEFE 
5/15, Part II, top secret, COS(49)283, 1-9-49.
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of both the ‘Steering Group’ and the WEG which thus stalemated the 
negotiations.240
Such intensive Italian diplomatic activity exposed the real intentions of the 
American and French governments. Both governments wanted Italy excluded 
from the Steering Group.241 The Americans went so far as to instruct Dunn to 
warn Sforza that if he persisted in his demand he would only succeed in 
harming Italy’s interests.242 When Sforza disregarded this warning he was 
pressured by Acheson to withdraw his reservation.243 In turn Sforza tried to 
bargain with him and make his dropping of the claim to the ‘Steering Group’ 
conditional upon American support for Italian membership to the WEG. 
Acheson was however personally opposed to Italian inclusion in that group as 
well, but decided not to convey his views directly to Sforza but to tell him that 
this was a matter for the BTO powers. Thus, Sforza came to the realisation that 
if Italy were to participate in the WEG it would have to direct its efforts towards 
enlisting British and French support.244
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The French for their part wished to ensure that the defence of the Rhine and 
the Alps were both pursued with equal vigour and treated by the alliance as 
‘indivisible’ and as a result they deemed it militarily important that Italy was 
given a role within the WEG. Schuman also wanted to use WEG as a palliative 
for the ill-feeling resulting from Italy’s exclusion from the Steering Group.245 
However, the French government was not prepared to go as far as Bonnet had 
done in Washington, where he had actively campaigned for Italy’s full 
membership to the WEG. Indeed, the French wanted Italy to receive only an 
‘observer’ status, which would give it even less clout than the British 
proposals.246 Thus, Paul Ramadier, the French Minister of Defence endorsed 
the British proposals without further debate.247 The Benelux countries too, were 
adamantly against Italy’s full membership of the WEG.248 When the matter was 
discussed again in Washington, Italy received neither French nor American 
support, with the result that it was the only major European country not to be 
given full but only participating membership of the WEG.249
As a remedy for Italy’s injured sensibilities, Bonnet proposed that the WMRPG 
ought to be renamed the Southern European-Westem-Mediterranean Regional 
Planning Group (SE-WMRPG) and its competence be extended so as to cover 
not only the air and sea defence of the Western Mediterranean, but also the
245. FO 371/80047/ZW204/1195/170, 20-4-1949, minute by Jebb,
14-4-1949; FO 371 /80055/ZW1884/1195/170, 5-9-1949, top secret, telegram, 
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land defence of Southern Europe and Italy.250 The British immediately 
supported the proposal and the name and competences of the group were 
thereupon altered.251 The Italians were satisfied by this development but they 
were still unhappy at being refused full membership of WEG. As an alternative, 
they formulated a set of proposals aimed at affording them fuller access to the 
planning deliberations of the WEG by reconfiguring it, either through 
amalgamation with the WMRPG or by splitting it into two sub-groups.252
Britain, France and the US rejected these proposals out of hand on military 
grounds.253 The Italians came up with a further proposal which provided for 
combined meetings of any two regional planning groups for the purpose of 
coordination. Britain accepted this proposal not because of its merits but 
merely because it wanted to accommodate Italy and because it thought it would 
settle the matter of Italy’s association with the military machinery of NATO.254
Bevin was surprised when he met Sforza at the NATO meeting in Washington 
on 16 September and heard him once again lay a claim to full membership of 
the WEG. Bevin firmly told him that this was out of the question. Sforza then 
proposed an amendment of the original Italian proposal to reflect the fact that 
the problem of European defence was a common one from the North Sea to 
the Adriatic. Bevin rejected this idea too because he felt that it would be
250. Ibid., ZW1906/1195/170, 7-9-1949, top secret, telegram, no. 938, 
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interpreted by friend and foe alike to mean that the NATO powers were not 
interested in what happened east of that line and that it would antagonize, 
expose and demoralize Greece and Turkey.255 Bevin, with the British Embassy 
in Washington, worked on a new proposal which would meet some of Italy’s 
concerns. The eventual compromise provided for full cooperation among the 
European Planning Groups by making arrangements for combined meetings 
between any two or even three groups should the need arise.256 Sforza found 
that the British wording fell short of his desiderata and attempted to improve on 
it by proposing the creation of a Military Committee for the European Groups 
that would be ultimately answerable to the Military Committee of the Alliance. 
America, Britain, France and the Benelux countries combined spontaneously 
to defeat this proposal fearing that it would complicate the allied military 
machinery and short circuit the Steering Group.257 Eventually, Sforza accepted 
the compromise proposal which, with Bevin’s support, gave the Defence 
Committee the task of ensuring the full cooperation of the European Groups. 
This was to make it more appealing to the Italians. Thereafter, Sforza dropped 
all claims to Italian membership of the WEG.258 The SE-WMRPG was to be the 
only military machinery of the alliance to which Italy was accorded full 
membership. The other members were Britain, France and, after British and 
Italian insistence, the US as a consulting member.259 The main task of the
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group was to ascertain the feasibility of defending and holding Italy in the case 
of Soviet attack.260
As soon as Italy’s exclusion from the power centre of NATO’s military 
machinery became publicly known, the Italian Press reflected its 
disappointment in a series of articles which accused the Western Union 
powers of trying to ‘reduce Italy to a position of moral inferiority’.261 The Italian 
newspapers, however, reserved their most vitriolic attacks for Britain which 
was blamed for obstructionism and selfishness and matters became worse 
when even Sforza adopted a critical attitude towards Britain.262 The anti-British 
Press campaign culminated in a bitter, direct and offensive attack on Britain 
and its government by the Giornale d’ Italia.263 The close relationship between 
the newspaper and the Foreign Ministry and the fact that both Sforza and 
Zoppi had expressed dissatisfaction with the state of Anglo-ltalian relations led 
the Foreign Office to suspect that the whole campaign was being orchestrated 
from inside the Palazzo Chigi.264
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22-10-1949, confidential, telegram, no. 1310, Mallet to FO, 21-10-1949.
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Bevin was apoplectic. He had spent some pleasant moments with Sforza, both 
socially and professionally, in Washington and on the Queen Elizabeth on their 
way back to Europe. It was simply beyond his comprehension that Sforza and 
his associates would single out both him and Britain for such vitriolic attacks 
in the press, or as he put it, to ‘howl at us like this’, when he had helped Italy 
to get a fair deal and when his attitude towards Italian inclusion in the military 
machinery of NATO was identical to that of the US and the BTO powers.265 He 
was even more upset when he recalled that he had had to convince the British 
Military to adopt a less harsh line towards Italy at a time when its attitude had 
become particularly entrenched; the Foreign Office had had to remind them 
that if Britain wanted to secure the best possible military organization for its 
interests it would have to make concessions to the amour propre of the smaller 
countries and, indeed, Italy.266 Bevin sent a brusque, defiant and unequivocal 
telegram to Mallet in which he chastised him for not being fully appreciative of 
the positive elements in British policy towards Italy, before concluding that no 
matter what he did for Italy he would always be pilloried in the Italian Press and 
that he was not prepared to be ‘blackmailed about the Communist opposition 
for everi.267
Sforza tried to mollify Bevin who was still fuming, by stating that his main 
concern was to improve relations between the two countries268 and by affirming 
that, despite appearances, he and his officials had had no part in the anti-
265. FO 371 /79346/Z6940/10535/170, 22-10-1949, rough draft dictated 
by Bevin, 20-10-1949; confidential, telegram, no. 1899, Bevin to Mallet, 
21-10-1949.
266. FO 371/80053/ZW1816/1195/170 31-8-1949, secret, letter, Jebb to 
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British campaign of the Giornale d’ Italia.269 But before the damage could be 
repaired, the contents of Bevin’s telegram were leaked to the Press by the 
British Embassy in Washington which resulted in a sensationalistic Newsweek 
article entitled ‘Spanking Ernie’.270 This unfortunate development resulted in a 
further barrage of vicious anti-British press coverage in Italy which damaged 
Anglo-ltalian relations at a very delicate moment.271
The NATO powers at this stage were immersed in discussions to decide 
suitable locations for the regional planning groups. London had hoped to host 
all three of the European Planning Groups, including the SE-WMRPG. Rome 
and Paris also vied for the location because they believed that it was important, 
for psychological reasons, to have high powered NATO institutions based on 
the Continent and not just in London, in order to reassure their citizens that in 
the event of a major conflagration they would be robustly defended.272 Italy was 
especially vocal on this point. As Randolfo Pacciardi, the Italian Minister of 
Defence and Sforza put it, they must have ‘something tangible, something 
visible’ to sustain Italy’s morale in view of its vulnerability to an attack and 
which would be less likely if NATO forces were assembled on the other side of
269. Ibid., Z6902/10535/170, 22-10-1949, confidential, telegram, no. 
1310, Mallet to FO, 21-10-1949; ibid., Z6933/10535/170, 24-10-1949, 
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do not believe him’.
27°. FO 371 /79347/Z7146/10535/170, 3-11-1949, confidential, telegram, 
2013, FO to Rome, 3-11-1949; ibid., Z7210/10535/170, 4-11-1949, 
confidential, telegram, no. 1183, Franks to Bevin, 4-11-1949; Newsweek, 
article, 3-11-1949.
271. Messagero, 26-10-1949; Avantil, 26-10-1949; Corriere della Sera,
9-11-1949; FO 371/79347/Z7241/10535/170, 7-11-1949, confidential, 
telegram, no. 1183, Harvey for Bevin to Franks, 7-11-1949.
272. Ibid., Z7062/10535/170, 27-10-1949, confidential, despatch, no. 
331, Rome to FO, 26-10-1949; ibid., Z7036/19535/170, 27-10-1949, 
confidential, telegram, no. 1318, Mallet to FO, 21-10-1949;
FO 371/80060/ZW2347/1195/170, 20-10-1949, confidential, telegram, no. 241, 
Ashley-Clarke, charge d’ affaires, Paris to FO, 18-10-1949.
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the Alps.273
After much encouragement from the US, the Italians acknowledged that they 
would not object to London as the location for the SE-WMRPG. Their only 
reservation was that Rome should be the home of a subsidiary organization of 
this group, to reassure its Parliament and public opinion that Italy’s adherence 
to NATO had fully rehabilitated the country internationally and that Italy would 
not be treated as the poor relation of the alliance. The British by now were all 
too happy to offer such assurances.274 The British government assumed that 
it would have the support of the US.275 Acheson, however, during a visit to 
Paris, concluded that the French would be mortally offended if at least one of 
the military organizations was not located in Paris. Thus the US threw its 
support behind Paris.276 In this, the Americans carried the support of the 
Italians who had backtracked on promises they had given to the British. As a 
result, Paris became the host of the SE-WMRPG and Italy the location for the 
Military Working Group of the SE-WMRPG.277 Italian manoeuvres raised a few
273. FO 371/80059/ZW2298/1195/170, 10-10-1949, confidential, 
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eyebrows in the Foreign Office, but did not create significant offence.278
As discussions between NATO members began on future defence planning for 
1950 it became obvious that the British had not changed their position that the 
Italian armed forces ought to be strengthened within the Peace Treaty limits. 
To achieve this, Britain advocated that the Italians should be given assistance 
in the form of advice, equipment and training but at the same time Italy could 
not depend on NATO troops to defend it.279 The British government’s main 
emphasis remained on concentrating resources to defend areas that it 
considered of paramount importance for the defence of the realm and the 
Empire. Cutting expenditure to what was absolutely necessary had been the 
feature of all post-1946 defence plans and the British government was not 
prepared to jeopardize its economy further to accommodate lost causes.280 The 
British military still perceived Italy as indefensible in the event of the outbreak 
of a major war.281 The Italian line of defence along the Piave River and the 
Alpine passes from Austria could be held only if significant numbers of allied 
forces were diverted to Italy. There was no other option for as long as the 
Peace Treaty was in force. The manpower resources at the disposal of 
Western European powers were limited and as a consequence the diversion 
of such forces to the defence of Italy would weaken the other fronts. Thus the
278. FO 371/80069/ZW3388/1195/170, 28-12-1949, confidential, letter, 
Rome to FO, 22-12-1948.
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British military regarded the defence of Italy as an essentially Italian matter282 
and suggested that the best course of action was to encourage the Italians to 
defend their country to the best of their ability, although privately it did not think 
much of their chances.283 This prognosis was based not only on the 
assumption that the restrictions of the Treaty had curbed Italy’s ability to defend 
itself but also on the fact that the existing Italian armed forces were essentially 
both ill-balanced and poorly equipped.284 The air forces available for the 
defence of the country were also limited and most of the aircraft at Italy’s 
disposal were obsolescent British and American stock.285 The political 
significance of these conclusions did not escape the Foreign Office. The 
Italians would be greatly disaffected once they realised that in the event of a 
major war breaking out in Europe they could count on precious little help from 
their NATO allies. The Foreign Office accepted the conclusions of the military 
experts but insisted that the alliance would have to include the defence of
282. DEFE 6/10, top secret, JP(49)127 (Final), 2-11-1949; DEFE 6/11, 
top secret, JP(49)171 (Final), Annex, 16-1-1950.
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188, confidential, Mallet to Bevin, 16-6-1949. As Mallet put it ‘military virtues 
are not the strongest of the many good points of the Italian people’.
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The land forces available for the defence of Italy were seven infantry divisions, 
of which only one was fully established, three alpine regiments and an 
armoured brigade. Their equipment was largely British but dating back to the 
wartime period and supplies were short. The Italian Armed forces were also 
lacking in supporting arms and administrative support. Above all the Italian 
Government could not find funds to spare from its budget even for 
improvements with Treaty limits.
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Northern Italy in its defence planning at the earliest feasible time.286
The British were not alone in their conclusions. The Americans viewed Italy as 
an integral part of any Western defence planning. They expected the WEG to 
keep the enemy west of the Rhine and the SE-WMRPG to provide for the 
defence of the NATO areas of the Mediterranean and Northern Africa and to 
keep the enemy in Italy as far to the East and North as possible and to protect 
the western lines of communication in the Mediterranean.287 At the same time, 
however, they knew it was unlikely that adequate allied forces could be raised 
to repel a Soviet invasion and maintain order in Italy in the face of civil disorder 
provoked by the PCI. Their plans were not that different from those of their 
British counterparts and provided for allied troop withdrawal from Austria and 
Trieste into Northern Italy. The task of the allied troops would be to fight 
alongside Italian forces for as long as possible, falling back as necessary to 
support the Italians in their defence of Sicily. At least for the time being, the 
defence of Northern Italy should be shelved until it became a 'practical 
possibility’.288 NATO plans for the defence of Italy for 1951-52 were also based 
on the assumption that Northern Italy could not be held successfully and it was 
deemed to be more important to hold the French Alps. However, the 
radicalization the Korean War had wrought on American foreign policy and the 
American commitment to the defence of Europe as manifested by the creation 
of the integrated command and the massive increase in American military
286. DEFE 6/11, top secret, JP(49)171 (Final), Annex, 16-1-1950.
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production soon changed this situation.289
Conclusion
Once Bevin had succeeded in interesting the US sufficiently enough to enter 
negotiations for the creation of NATO, the British concentrated their efforts on 
getting the type of pact that was suited to their long-term policy objectives.290 
In this scheme of things Italy was seen to be superfluous to requirements. Its 
defence was deemed to be desirable but not essential.291 Italy brought with it 
a whole set of problems that the British did not wish to tackle at this time as 
these could not be resolved without modifying the Peace Treaty which Britain 
had signed only two years ago292 and any such step would provide the Soviet 
Union with propaganda currency.293 There was also the fear that the inclusion 
of weak countries would weaken the alliance and would disperse supplies and 
manpower resources to such a degree as to undermine the capacity for 
defending the main fronts. Thus, the British government consistently opposed 
the inclusion of Italy into the North Atlantic Pact, even when the French
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dropped their opposition and became fervent supporters of Italian adhesion. 
When the US decided that Italy must be included because of political 
considerations the British decided to acquiesce, but only grudgingly.294 By 
1949, signing the alliance with the United states had eclipsed every other 
priority and objective. If Italy was to be part and parcel of the achievement of 
this ultimate priority then Britain saw it as a price it had to pay. Even after Italy 
had become one of the founding members of NATO, Britain continued to try 
to minimize its influence and role within the organization because of its 
supposed vulnerability and its perceived potential to compromise strategic 
planning secrets.295 The advent of the Korean War brought with it a 
concomitant and whole-hearted American commitment to NATO which was to 
affect the attitudes of the British. Up to then, the question of Italian inclusion in 
the North Atlantic pact generated a great deal of discussion within the British 
government and it emerges clearly from documents that British policy makers 
tried hard to assess the arguments for and against Italian membership from the 
standpoint of British interests and western defence. Despite claims that Britain 
sought to exclude Italy because it could not reconcile itself to including an ex­
enemy,296 the British acted as they did because they judged Italian inclusion as 
inessential, not conducive to their interests and because they viewed NATO 
as essentially a military organization which was not to be used to resolve
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political problems.297
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Chapter Five
Italy’s Role in British Plans for European Cooperation
In the mid-1940s Britain was still a great power with global interests. Necessity 
steered Britain into adopting a multi-faceted foreign policy which would 
expedite and serve its interests. The Atlanticist line and Britain’s quest for a 
peace time pact with America1 was a strand but not the only strand of British 
foreign policy. The preservation of Britain’s imperial position and the 
maintenance of its global power were equally important considerations and the 
achievement of these interests rested on the successful creation of a British- 
led bloc of powers that maintained equidistance from the superpowers.2 On his 
return from Potsdam, Bevin was briefed by the Foreign Office on its plans for 
the creation of such a grouping which would be based on close Anglo-French 
cooperation. The Foreign Secretary found the premise of European 
cooperation as attractive and as interesting as the first time he had heard it as
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NATO, London, 1996; Greenwood, S., ‘The Third Force in the Late 1940's’, in
Brivati, B., and Jones, H., From Reconstruction to Integration: Britain and 
Europe since 1945, Leicester, 1993, pp. 59-70; Kent, J., Britain’s Imperial 
Strategy and the Origins of the Cold War, 1944-45, Leicester, 1993; Kent, The 
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a Minister for Labour in Churchill’s wartime government.3 Nevertheless he
approached the matter with caution because he was unsure about the
reactions not only of his colleagues within the government but also of those of
the Americans and the Soviet Union, so he made it clear to his officials that he
wanted the matter kept secret, ‘inside the walls of the Office’, at this stage.4
Within the safety of the ‘Office’ he stated that his long term policy was:
to establish close relations between this country and the 
countries of the Mediterranean and the Atlantic fringes of 
Europe, e.g. more especially Greece, Italy, France, Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Scandinavia. [He wanted] to see close 
association between the United Kingdom and these countries 
as much in commercial and economic matters as in political 
questions.5
This scheme necessitated the cooption of Europe and the underpinning of the 
British imperial position in the Mediterranean by frustrating any real or 
perceived Soviet encroachment. The position of Italy as, simultaneously a 
Western European and Mediterranean nation, and a country which was 
perceived to be under threat from a massive Communist Party made it an 
obvious candidate for inclusion into Britain’s European schemes. As early as 
1945 Bevin had identified Italy as one of the nations to be included in a British- 
led Western European Group. Relations between Britain and Italy both 
mirrored and manifested the former’s attempts at pushing for European 
cooperation and the course of this relationship yields interesting insights into 
the development and failure of the Western Union idea and Britain’s 
subsequent retreat from Europe. The inclusion of Italy could be justified on
3. Greenwood, S., ‘Ernest Bevin, France and “Western Union”, 1945- 
46', European History Quarterly, Vol. 14, 1984, pp. 322-6; Greenwood, Britain, 
and European Cooperation, pp. 7-10; Young, Britain and European Unity, p. 8.
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private secretary, 17-8-1945.
5. Ibid., minute by Hoyer-Millar, 21-8-1945; Annex: FO minute, 13-8-
1945.
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many counts. First, to ensure its Western orientation; second, to facilitate the 
continuation of British influence in the area; and third, to secure certain 
strategic concerns because of Italy’s pivotal position in the Mediterranean.6 
There was a fourth reason which was that the creation of a bloc including 
Western European and Mediterranean countries could ensure against a 
German military resurgence and against the possibility of Russian infiltration 
into areas of traditional British influence. Future relations with Italy, Greece and 
France formed a major concern for the Foreign Office. The aim was to 
establish, as Bevin put it, ‘as far as possible workable understandings with a 
group of friendly countries around Germany’.7 Bevin’s policy was steeped in 
economic considerations too. He was trying to ensure British economic 
independence from America in case the Truman administration adopted 
economic isolationism and he was hoping to influence and raise the level of 
economic activity within the UK. He believed that close cooperation with Italy 
and France, whose economies were primarily agricultural, could improve ‘the 
balance between industry and agriculture’ in Britain.8 For these reasons, Italy 
was seen as being important to British strategic, colonial, economic and 
political interests:
Italy’s strategic position in the Mediterranean makes it important
6. Ibid.; FO 371/43335/N2409/183/38, 21-4-1944, minute by E. O. 
Skaife, USSR Section, Research Department of the Foreign Office, (FORD), 5-
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that SHE COULD NOT (sic) come under the influence of a 
potential enemy. Our Mediterranean communications could be 
seriously threatened from Metropolitan Italy... It is therefore to 
our military interests to have a friendly Italy who would look to 
Britain and Western Europe for support.9
During 1946-47, Bevin continued to work towards the creation of the Third 
Force’. His ideas took a while to come to fruition. He was concerned not to 
encourage an untimely withdrawal of the Americans from Europe and not to 
antagonize the Soviet Union unduly.10 British economic weakness and the 
emergence of bipolarity slowed the process. He also had to overcome 
resistance from within the Labour government. The responses of the Treasury 
and the Board of Trade (BoT) were disheartening and obstructive. Both Dalton 
and Sir Stafford Cripps, the President of the BoT, were preoccupied with 
pressing financial matters connected with the abrupt cessation of Lend Lease 
and Britain’s mounting financial crisis. Reviving the British economy was their 
priority by using the American loan of 1946 prudently and not giving the 
impression to the Americans that in reality Britain was not in need of their 
financial help. Neither Department was prepared to do anything that could 
impair the delicate and precarious balance of Anglo-American relations. The 
position of the two ministries hardened as the economic and financial crisis 
deepened. Duff Cooper, the British Ambassador to Paris remarked at a later 
date, that the mere words customs union produced ‘a shudder in the Treasury 
and nausea in the BoT’.11 The economic sections of the Foreign Office were
9. Ibid.; PREM 8/515, C0S(46)43(0), 13-2-1946.
10. FO 371/73045/Z703/273/72, 27-1-1948, minute by W.N. Hogg 
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an anti -Soviet focus.
11. Duff Cooper, Old Men Forget, 1954, pp. 337-84, passim.
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also unsympathetic to Bevin’s plans. Sir Edmund Hall-Patch, Britain’s 
Permanent Representative to the OEEC, complained of lack of consultation. 
Roger Makins, the Superintending Under-Secretary of the Economic Relations 
Department of the Foreign Office, derided the idea of such a European 
‘spiritual union’ as a vague and ill-defined project. He also warned that such a 
scheme would badly erode Britain’s influence in world affairs, sap away its 
industrial and economic potential and weaken its links with the 
Commonwealth.12
Britain and the Issue of Italian Membership of the Treaty of Brussels
Despite his colleagues’ doubts and however slow he was in its achievement,
Bevin still believed that the Third Force’ scheme was feasible and Italy was
one of the countries he wanted involved in the plan. In his Western Union
speech Bevin declared:
I hope that treaties will be signed with our near neighbours, the 
Benelux countries making our treaty with France an important 
nucleus in Western Europe. We have then to go beyond the 
circle of our immediate neighbours. We shall have to consider 
the question of associating other historic members of the 
European civilization, including new Italy....13
In his Cabinet Paper, The Threat to Western Civilization’, Bevin wrote that Italy
would have to be included in the Western Union. The only unresolved matter
as far as Italy was concerned was the timing of its admittance.14
Anglo-ltalian relations had changed since 1945. Italy was no longer on its 
knees and Britain was not as powerful as it once had been. Due to its
12. FO 371/73045/Z809/273/72, 30-1-48, minutes by Hall Patch, 15-1- 
1948 and Makins, 21-1-1948.
13. Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Fifth Series, 
Vol. 446, Cols. 387-409, 1947-48, London, 1948.
14. CAB 129/25, CM(48)72, top secret, memorandum by Bevin, 3-3-
1948.
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economic and financial problems, post-war Britain had encouraged American 
involvement in Italian affairs in order to rationalize and minimize its economic 
commitments overseas.15 Nevertheless, the British government still hoped that 
Britain’s role in the area would not become marginalized.16 The years 1946- 
1947 had seen a major decrease in British popularity and influence in Italy. The 
harshness of the Italian Peace Treaty, increased American interest in the 
region and Britain’s withdrawal from Greece had taken their toll on British 
prestige with the Italians.17 In other circumstances such developments could 
have meant the end of any vestige of British influence in Italy but Britain did 
succeed in maintaining a degree of sway. This was for two reasons. First, and 
foremost, because Italian politicians, like their European counterparts, had 
failed to grasp the momentous and fundamental shift in international power 
politics and the realities of bipolarity. Thus, they maintained their belief that 
London was still the centre of political developments.18 Second, because of the 
short-lived influence of Nenni on Italy’s foreign policy and who sought to 
moderate US dominance through his attempts at cultivating London and the
15. Ellwood, op. cit., p. 171; Miller, op. cit., pp. 127.
16. Miller, op. cit., p. 143; Pedaliu, E.G.H., ‘Change and Continuity in 
British Foreign Policy towards Italy, 1939-48' in Brivati, B. and Jones, H., (eds), 
What Difference Did the War Make, Leicester, 1993, pp. 151-64; Varsori, A., 
‘Great Britain and Italy, 1945-56: The Partnership between a Great Power and 
a Minor Power?’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, Vol. 3, 1992, pp. 188-228.
17. FO 371/60711/ZM2371/1286/22, 8-7-1946, telegram, no. 1051, 
Charles to FO, 6-7-1946; ibid., ZM2514/1286/22, 18-7-1946, confidential, 
despatch, no. 369, Charles to Bevin, 18-7-1946; minutes by Ross, 19-7-1946 
and 24-7-1946, and Hoyer-Millar, 19-7-1946.
18. Di Nolfo, E., The Shaping of Italian Foreign Policy during the 
Formation of the East-West Blocs: Italy between the Superpowers’, in Becker, 
and Knipping, pp. 489-491; Vigezzi, B., ‘Italy: the End of a Great Power and 




The pace of Bevin’s long-term approach to European cooperation under British 
tutelage was quickened by the collapse of East-West cooperation and France’s 
urgency to have its security underwritten by the United States. After the 
disastrous CFM meeting in December 1947, Bevin became extremely 
concerned about Western European defence and security. He believed a rapid 
move towards the consolidation of Western Europe was of the utmost 
necessity.20 He was anxious, however, not to let it appear that Britain was 
taking an initiative which could divide Europe irretrievably by presenting the 
Western Union as merely an anti-Soviet organisation. Hence, the references 
to both the Soviet Union and to Germany in his speeches, his declaration that 
despite the problems Soviet aggressive behaviour had caused, his aim was 
not to divide Europe but merely to consolidate the West through economic and 
political means. Likewise his assertion that his scheme would create a situation 
that would allow for eventual accommodation with Eastern Europe.21 His aim 
was to build a core consisting of the Five Powers bound together by economic, 
political, defensive, cultural and social arrangements.22 Thereafter, he planned
19. Nenni, P., I nodi della politica estera italiana, Milan, 1974, pp. 44-5 
and 50-2; Nenni, Tempo, pp. 150-1, 171-7 and 255-6; Varsori, A., ‘Bevin e 
Nenni, Ottobre 1946-Gennaio 1947: Una fase nei rapporti anglo-italiani del 
secondo dopoguerra’, II politico, Vol. XLIX, 1984, pp. 241-75, passim.
20. CAB 129/23, CP(48)6, top secret, ‘First Aim of British Foreign 
Policy’, memorandum by Bevin, 4-1-1948.
21. FO 371/73047/Z1308/273/72, 16-219-48, secret, telegram, no. 337, 
FO to Paris, 13-2-1948; FO 371/73049/Z1529/273/72, 23-2-1948, FO 
memorandum, 19-2-1948; FO 371/73050/Z1846/273/72, 4-3-1948, top secret, 
PM/48/32, FO minute by Bevin to Attlee, 1-3-1948; Hansard, Parliamentary 
Debates, House of Commons, Fifth Series, Vol. 446, 1947-48, Col., 394-409, 
London, 1948, speech by Bevin in the House of Commons, 22-1-1948.
22. FO 371/73048/Z1404/273/72, 17-2-1948, minute by Roberts;
FO 371/73050/Z1865/273/72, 5-3-1948, minute by Jebb, 3-3-1948.
302
to expand this core to include other countries gradually, ‘a step at a time’.23
Bevin was aware of the immediate and inter-related problems that his plan 
faced. Its success was dependent on creating the feeling amongst members 
that the Western Union could guarantee their security and that it could inspire 
similar confidence in aspiring members. Britain alone was unable to supply 
enough of the economic resources, arms and equipment to create such a 
climate and it became patently clear that without overt American backing a 
European security system could not work.24 Bevin had to weigh the likelihood 
of an American commitment to the Western Union both prior to or after the 
public announcement of his plans. Jebb and Hollis were sent to America in the 
hope that the Truman Administration was prepared to agree to discussions on 
the subject.25 Marshall, whilst initially approving Bevin’s plan, was ultimately 
non-committal.26 Bevin had hoped that his speech might trigger some kind of 
public announcement of support from the Americans. This was deemed to be
23. FO 371/73045/Z353/273/72, 15-1-1948, minute by Bevin, 12-1-
1948.
24. FO 371/73045/Z323/273/72, 4-1-1948, minute by Kirkpatrick, 9-1- 
1948, memorandum written by Jebb: “Organization of collective self-defence 
under Article 51 of the UN Charter”, 21-1-1948.
25. Ibid., Z561/273/72, 22-1-1948, top secret, telegram, no. 1032, 
Bevin to Lord Inverchapel, Ambassador in Washington, 26-1-1948, top secret, 
telegram, no. 1070, FO to Washington, 27-1-48; ibid., Z480/273/72, 21-1- 
1948, top secret, telegram, no. 284, Inverchapel to Bevin, 20-1-1948; ibid., 
Z554/273/72, 22-1-1948, top secret, telegram, no. 304, Inverchapel to Bevin, 
20-1-1948;
FO 371/73046/Z896/273/72, 3-2-1948, top secret, telegram, no. 1516, 
Inverchapel to Bevin, 2-2-1948; ibid, Z1060/273/72, 9-2-1948, top secret, 
telegram, no. 1642, Bevin to Inverchapel, 10-2-1948.
26. FO 371/73045/Z480/273/72, 20-1-1948, top secret, telegram, no. 
284, Lord Inverchapel to Bevin, 20-1-1948; ibid., Z554/273/72, 22-1-1948, top 
secret, telegram, no. 304, Lord Inverchapel to Bevin, 20-1-1948;
FO 371/73046/Z897/273/72, 3-2-1948, top secret, telegram, no.1516, 
Inverchapel to Bevin, 2-2-1948; ibid., Z973/273/72, 3-2-1948, top secret, 
telegram, no. 1517, FO to Washington, 2-2-1948; FO 
371/68067/AN1196/1195/45, 18-3-1948, minute by Roberts to Sargent, 14-3- 
1948, minute to the Prime Minister by McNeil, 16-3-1948.
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vital in encouraging weaker countries such as Italy and Scandinavia to join the 
projected Western Union.27 Thus, Bevin’s idea had become contingent upon 
American support.
It is not an exaggeration to say that by January 1948, Anglo-ltalian relations, 
at the best of times strained, had hit an all time low. This was as a result of the 
Mogadishu incident of 11th January 1948, an incident in which fifty two Italians 
died and many more were wounded during furious anti-Italian rioting by the 
local population and that, according to Sforza, had left Italy ‘licking its wounds’ 
and becoming inward looking.28 Some Italian historians have maintained 
consistently that ‘the local British commanders were guilty of grave negligence’, 
if not complicity in the incident.29 The Italian press had a field day. Newspapers 
were replete with horror stories and allegations that the British had contributed, 
at least indirectly, to this death toll by secretly nurturing anti-Italian feelings 
among the Somalis. Italian nationalist circles grasped the opportunity to whip 
up anti-British feelings among the Italian population.30 Gallarati Scotti, the 
Italian Ambassador, did his utmost to temper the reaction of his government to 
the tragedy that had befallen the Italians in Somalia. He warned repeatedly that 
the Italian government’s treatment of the unfortunate event was misdirected 
and damaging for Italy and its interests and that it was causing untold harm in
27. FO 371/73049/Z1637/273/72, 26-2-1948, minute by Jebb, 3-3-1948.
28. ASMAE, AL, busta: 1360, memorandum by Count Carlo Sforza, 14-
7-1948.
29. Vigezzi, ‘Italy: the End of a Great Power and the Birth of a 
Democratic Power\ pp. 72.
30. For a detailed treatment of this incident and its implications for 
Anglo-ltalian relations, see: Varsori, A., II diverso declino di due potenze 




As a result of this sharp deterioration in Anglo-ltalian relations, an Italian 
involvement in the Western Union was deemed as being essential as a means 
for the British to improve their image in Italian public opinion, to strengthen the 
De Gasperi government in the run up to the April 1948 election, to sooth Italian 
bitterness over the colonial clauses of the Italian Peace Treaty and to ensure 
that Britain did not lose the last remnants of its influence in Italy. It was also 
considered that the best way to make amends for the Mogadishu incident was 
to involve Italy internationally, through the Western Union and in the 
development of Africa which Bevin considered to be ‘particularly important’.32 
To this end he set up an inquiry into the incident, apologized in person and 
expressed his sympathy for the Mogadishu incident to Gallarati Scotti, 
stressing to him that he wanted nothing to mar Anglo-ltalian relations.33 For his 
part, Gallarati Scotti assured Bevin that his government would try to prevent 
any attempts by the Soviet Union and communist circles to exploit the incident 
to whip up anti-British feeling. He also went on to point out that it was these 
circles who were trying to capitalize on Britain’s opposition to Italy’s colonial 
ambitions by presenting Britain as being the only country still bent on frustrating 
these aspirations.34
31. Biblioteca Ambrosiana, Milan, Carte Gallarati Scotti, file, no. 17, 
undated and unsigned memorandum from London; Sforza to Gallarati Scotti, 
23-1-48; Gallarati Scotti to Count V. Zoppi, Director of Political Affairs, MAE,
23-6-1948 cited in Varsori, A.,‘De Gasperi, Nenni, Sforza and their Role in 
Post-War Italian Foreign policy’, pp. 89-114.
32. CO 537/3316/25030/2, top secret, CP(48)43, memorandum by E. 
Bevin, 4-2-1948; letter, Crosthwaite to A.B. Cohen, CO, 21-6-1948;
FO 371/73046/Z1061/273/72, 9-2-1948, confidential, telegram, no. 147, FO to 
Brussels, 1-2-1948; minute by Crosthwaite, 10-2-1948.
33. FO 371/73191/Z637/637/22, 26-1-1948, minute by Roberts, record 
of Bevin’s meeting with Gallarati-Scotti, 24-1-1948.
34. Ibid.
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The Western Department of the Foreign Office had looked at colonial 
concessions and had searched for a solution to Italy’s excess population 
problems in order to help De Gasperi win the Italian election. Mallet endorsed 
this action as he was aware of the importance of such issues to Italy. He 
suggested, in addition, that Italy should be given trusteeship for all of her ex­
colonies with the exception of Cyrenaica.35 In fact, the Italians had already 
begun to agitate for a solution to the country’s over-population. They brought 
the matter up in connection with the European Recovery Programme (ERP) 
and claimed that Italy’s main contribution to the ERP would be to place her 
surplus labour at the disposal of the sixteen participating nations.36 Bevin and 
the Western Department came up with the idea of providing for an Italian 
contribution to colonial development in Africa. First, more Italians could be 
recruited to work and be allowed to settle permanently in Britain’s African 
colonies as opposed to working on short-term contracts. Second, in April 1948, 
the Foreign Office proposed that colonial development in Africa ought to be co­
ordinated through the African Development Council under the aegis of the 
Committee of European Economic Cooperation. It was intended that Italy be 
included in such a scheme in the event that it was granted trusteeship over any 
of its previous colonies. Under this scheme, Italy could join a committee which 
represented all the African Powers, namely Britain, France, Belgium, Portugal 
and South Africa. As a member of this organization and the CEEC it would be 
brought into consultation on all questions affecting the recruitment of European 
labour in Africa.37 Mallet applauded the idea as it would indicate that the British
35. FO 371 /73157/Z2146/93/22, 15-3-1948, minute by Crosthwaite, 21-
2-1948.
36. Ibid.; FO 371/73158/Z3043/93/22, 12-4-1948, minute by Brown, 8-4-
1948.
37. CO 537/3316/25030/2, top secret, note of a meeting in the Foreign 
Office, 13-4-1948, cited in Kent, Britain’s Imperial Strategy, pp. 177-9;
FO 371/73158/3043/93/22, 12-4-1948, minute by Crosthwaite, 8-4-1948;
FO 371/73157/Z2146/93/22, 15-3-1948, minute by Crosthwaite, 21-2-1948.
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government had shown publicly, practical evidence that it was sympathetic to 
Italy’s overpopulation.38
The Colonial Office disliked the idea intensely and jettisoned it fearing that any 
such policy would have a detrimental impact on African opinion.39 It maintained 
that the need for semi-skilled foreign labour of this kind in Africa was 
temporary. Its goal was to train local Africans to do these jobs and wished to 
protect them against such external competition. There was also concern about 
the reaction of the Northern African peoples to the re-introduction of Italy in the 
region. Makins tried to exploit the opposition of the Colonial Office and 
suggested that it draft a memorandum containing its objections and forward it 
to Bevin in the hope that it would lessen Bevin’s enthusiasm.40 Bevin received 
it, but he did not change his mind. He found the memorandum ‘disappointing’ 
and he took the matter up with Arthur Creech-Jones, the Colonial Secretary. 
He outlined his plans and stressed to him the importance of the scheme. Bevin 
suggested that in view of the uncooperative attitude of the Colonial Office, the 
Foreign Office should work together with the Ministry of Labour to facilitate 
Italian firms and labour participating in the development of African colonial 
resources. The two ministries responded by suggesting that the best way 
forward was to survey the various existing development schemes and their 
manpower requirements in order to assess whether or not Italian labour was 





41. Ibid., G.L. Clutton, head of the African Department of the FO, to 
A.B. Cohen, 7-9-1948; minutes by A. Creech Jones, the Colonial Secretary, 9-
9-1948, K.E. Robinson, head of the Anglo-French Economic Cooperation in 
West Africa Working Party, 17-9-1948.
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Bevin was not deterred by the repeated rebuffs from the Colonial Office. When
he met Sforza, he raised the issue of Italian labour surpluses and his
government’s interest in helping Italy solve this problem. He informed the
Italian Foreign Minister that Britain was trying to help by employing more
Italians in Africa, but he went on to stress that he was also cautious about such
action having a great impact because of the enormity of the problem. Nearly
two million excess Italians had to be absorbed. Britain’s contribution thus, he
stressed, could be only a small one.42 He also met with the Italian Ambassador
in London to explain his vision to him and Italy’s role within it. Bevin told
Gallarati Scotti that:
there was not as yet a cut and dried plan for Western Europe. 
We had to proceed step by step and if we had to put the Low 
Countries before the Mediterranean this was a question of 
method and it did not indicate any ill-will towards Italy...It was 
better to build brick by brick....[Italy] would be invited to 
participate on exactly the same level as the other countries. 
Whoever was brought in the club would be invited as an equal 
member of it, and this of course implied equal responsibilities.43
These last two sentences were of the utmost importance to the Italians whose 
whole policy during this period had been directed towards achieving such 
parity.44 Sforza had based his foreign policy the principle of Italian international 
rehabilitation and parity with other powers within a European framework.45 For 
many Italians it was also significant that such a statement had come from the
42. FO 371 /73157/Z2375/93/22, 19-3-1948, brief for Bevin’s 
conversation with Sforza drafted by Crosthwaite, 12-3-1948.
43. FO 371/73155/Z643/93/22, 26-1-1948, telegram, no. 145, Mallet to 
Bevin, 24-1-1948; FO 371/73191/Z637/637/22, 26-1-1948, minute by Roberts, 
record of discussion between Bevin and Gallarati-Scotti, 24-1-1948.
44. Varsori, A., ‘De Gasperi, Nenni, Sforza and their Role in Post-War 
Italian Foreign policy’, pp. 101-2; Miller, M., ‘Approaches to European 
Institution Building of Carlo Sforza, Italian Foreign Minister, 1947-51' in 
Deighton, A., (ed), Building Postwar Europe: National Decision Makers and 
European Institutions, 1948-63, London, 1995, pp. 55-69.
45. Sforza, C., Cinque anni a Palazzo Chigi: La politica estera italiana 
del 1947 al 1951, Roma, 1952, pp. 13.
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man in charge of British foreign policy as hitherto, Italian politicians had 
suspected that Britain was striving to frustrate some of their aspirations.46 This 
was a display of rare sensitivity on Bevin’s part where the Italians were 
concerned. The Italian Ambassador took the opportunity to stress to Bevin that 
the Italian government saw it as a means of restoring the country’s ‘dignity and 
moral force’ and, by extension, of strengthening it to withstand communism.47 
He suggested to Bevin that the colonial question ought to be considered 
against this background and that the nationalistic feelings of the Italian people 
also had to be taken into account. Gallarati Scotti saw Bevin’s Western Union 
as the ideal opportunity for these issues to be addressed simultaneously, 
envisaging as it did, close European collaboration in the fields of African 
development and in international cooperation.48
The advent of the Czech coup brought renewed concerns about the internal 
security situation in Italy. Bevin’s priority was not to give the opportunity and 
ammunition to the Communists to attack the anti-Communist electoral 
alliance.49 Thus, the Foreign Office decided not to take any steps before the 
Italian government had been consulted and it had assessed if, in view of the 
April election result, it would be politically expedient for Italy to be formally 
invited to join the Brussels Treaty as a founding member.50 Reactions to the
46. FO 371/73155/Z643/93/22, 26-1-1948, telegram, no. 145, Mallet to 
Bevin, 24-1-1948.
47. FO 371/73191 /Z637/637/22, 26-1-1948, minute by Roberts, record 
of Bevin’s meeting with Gallarati-Scotti, 24-1-1948.
48. Ibid.
49. FO 371/73069/Z2642/2307/22, 30-3-1948, top secret, minute by 
Roberts, record of discussion between Bevin and the American Ambassador, 
26-2-1948.
50. FO 371/73191/Z2376/637/22, 19-3-1948, memorandum by Sargent, 
notes for Secretary of State prior to his meeting with Sforza, 13-3-1948; ibid., 
Z643/93/22, 26-1-1948, telegram, no. 145, Mallet to Bevin, 24-1-1948.
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Western Union speech in Italy were also monitored closely. Bevin’s speech 
had been received with mixed reactions in Italy. The Vatican had welcomed it 
warmly seeing it as a means of checking the expansion of ‘atheistic and 
materialistic communism’.51 It was also received positively in the coverage of 
the pro-govemment Press. However, the socialist and communist newspapers 
attacked it with deliberate vehemence. L’ Unit£ described Bevin’s proposals as 
an attempt by Britain to relegate all Western European countries to dominion 
status, as constituting a poisonous attack on the Soviet Union and in a March 
issue it described the Treaty of Brussels as ‘the Holy Alliance against the 
people’s democracies.52 AvantiFs coverage was more restrained but equally 
negative. Its editorial on 27 January pointed out that Bevin’s plans ‘were 
designed to meet British interests which ...[were] not necessarily identical with 
those of Europe and in particular with those of Italy’.53 The Soviet Press was 
also unanimous in its condemnation of the Western Union idea which it called 
a camouflage to disguise a ‘military-political bloc’ in the ‘service of American 
imperialism and their British junior partners’ in the guise of a Western 
European organization. Pravda, in particular, called it the ‘Holy Alliance of the 
twentieth century of reactionaries and socialists against the peoples of 
Europe’.54
51. FO 371/73048/Z1331/273/72, 17-2-1948, Vatican Press 
commentary reported by Perowne, despatch, no. 21, 17-2-1948.
52. FO 371/73155/Z644/93/22, 26-1-1948, minute by Pemberton-Pigott,
26-1-1948; The Manchester Guardian, article, 25-1-1948;
FO 371/73054Z2447/273/72, 23-3-1948, telegram, no. 533, Mallet to FO, 19-3- 
1948.
53. FO 371/73155/Z991/93/22, 5-2-1948, telegram, no. 18 saving,
Mallet to Bevin, 31-1-1948.
54. FO 371 /73051 /Z2008/273/72, 10-3-1948, telegram, no. 350, M. 
Paterson (Moscow) to FO, 9-3-1948, Pravda, article, 8-3-1948;
FO 371/73052/Z2105/273/72, 12-3-1948, telegram, no. 355, Paterson to FO,
10-3-1948; FO 371/73055/Z2262/273/72, 16-3-1948, telegram, no. 369, 
Paterson to FO, 15-3-1948; Pravda, 14-3-1948.
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Italian public opinion favoured the adoption of a neutralist foreign policy. The 
majority of the Italian people believed that Italy should avoid taking part in the 
widening rift between the superpowers. The pro-neutrality sentiments arose 
from a disillusionment from previous wars and the desire to protect the country 
from another disastrous involvement. The view that neutrality could prevent 
Italy from becoming a battleground in a future conflict between East and West 
had been expressed by 70% of the Italian population and had cut across party 
lines and social classes.55 The Left Wing alliance understood clearly how deep- 
seated this fear was and designed their electoral campaign to address and 
exploit these fears. On 15 March 1948, in a pre-election speech in Milan, Nenni 
painted a sinister picture of the Western Union. He described it as the 
organization that ‘would inevitably drag Italy into the Third World War she was 
so anxious to avoid’. He went on to compare it with the Anti-Comintern Pact of 
the 1930s which was perceived by many as having brought Italy into the 
Second World War.56 The adverse reaction of the Italian Opposition Press to 
the Western Union raised fears that a premature invitation to Italy to join could 
play into the hands of anti-Western forces. Mallet’s reports from Rome 
confirmed these fears and, indeed, exacerbated them. His opinion was that the 
speech had already become an important element in the repertoire of attacks 
by the Left on the Italian government.57 Mallet’s analysis was an accurate one. 
Newspaper reports also supported his view. The Times correspondent in 
Rome put it simply and bluntly, ‘any unforeseen development connected with 
a hasty attempt to pledge Italy to a closer union with the West would provide
55. Mammarella, op. cit., pp. 236-7; FO 371/73191/Z2454/637/22, 22-3- 
48, minute by Brown, 22-3-1948; secret, telegram, no. 518, Ward to FO, 18-3- 
1948.
56. Ibid.; Avanti!, 29-1-1948; Nenni, Tempo, p. 431 and 418.
57. FO 371/73155/Z991/93/22, 5-2-1948, telegram, no. 18, saving, 
Mallet to Bevin, 24-1-1948.
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political capital for the popular front’.58
Sforza was aware of this possibility and he knew that if Italy was ever to join a 
Western organization, Italian public opinion had to be re-educated.59 He 
heaped unreserved praise on Bevin, naturally, because of his pro-European 
ideology and because he believed that the best means for Italy to achieve 
international parity was within a European framework. At the same time he 
remained cautious and cagey on the possibility of Italy joining such a 
framework in the present political climate in Italy. He went on to state and 
reiterate publicly that Italy would consider associating herself with the proposed 
structure ‘only on conditions of absolute parity’ and in the Cabinet he said that 
Italy would have to be for the time being an ‘extraneous observer1.60
When Dunn proposed that Italy should adhere to the Western Union prior to 
the elections believing that it would strengthen De Gasperi, but the Italian 
Prime Minister resolutely rejected the proposal.61 Several days later Saragat 
approached Mallet and told him in confidence that although De Gasperi and his 
government were unanimously in favour of Italy’s association with the Western 
Union they dared not commit themselves to it before the election as they might
58. FO 371/73191/Z2726/637/22, 31-3-1948, minute by Kirkpatrick, 30-
1-1948.
59. FO 371 /73061 /Z6305/273/72, 4-8-1948, secret, telegram, no. 1276, 
Mallet to FO, 2-8-1948.
60. FO 371/73155/Z643/93/22, 26-1-1948, tel. no. 145, Mallet to Bevin,
24-1-1948; Archivio Centrale dello Stato, ACS, verballe della reunione del 
Consiglio dei ministri, 28-1-1948; Varsori, A., ‘Italy’s Policy towards European 
Integration, 1948-58' in Duggan, and Wagstaff, op. cit., p. 52.
61. FO 371/73193/Z2449/640/22, 22-3-1948, telegram, no. 54, Mallet to 
FO, 19-3-1948; FO 371/73157/Z2069/93/22, 11-3-1948, secret, telegram, no. 
1126, Washington to FO, 10-3-1948; FRUS, 1948, Vol. Ill, p. 45-6 and 53-4; 
Varsori, A., ‘De Gasperi, Nenni, Sforza and their Role in Post-War Italian 
Foreign policy’, pp. 107-108; Quartararo, R., Italia e Stati Unit,i: Gli Anni Difficili, 
1945-52, Rome, 1986, p. 258.
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alienate voters who feared the possibility of another war.62 Thus, in no time, 
the idea of creating a Western Union with Italian participation became 
embroiled in the politics of the Italian election.63 Both the British and Italian 
governments were in absolute agreement that ensuring a pro-Western election 
result was the overriding concern and that all other issues, including the 
Western Union and Italian association, could wait.64 As a result, the Foreign 
Office put Italian incorporation into the Brussels Treaty on the ‘back-bumer’ 
until after the General Election in April 1948.65
In addition to the Italian election other concerns surfaced which precluded an 
immediate association of Italy with the Treaty of Brussels after its signing on 
the 17 March. There was concern that Italy would try to re-negotiate revisions 
to the Peace Treaty against her entry into the Pact.66 Orme Sargent, the 
Permanent Undersecretary of the Foreign Office, was of the opinion that Bevin 
should not leave Sforza with the impression that he was anxious to see a very 
quick Italian accession. In his opinion this would only encourage the Italians to 
make their accession conditional on the immediate revision of the military
62. FO 371/73191/Z2545/637/22, 22-3-1948, secret, telegram, no. 518, 
Ward to FO, 18-3-1948.
63. FO 371/73156/Z1316/93/22, 16-2-1948, telegram, no. 29, Mallet to 
FO, 13-2-1948; minute by Kirkpatrick, 23-2-1948.
64. FRUS, 1948, Vol. Ill, pp. 46-8; ASMAE, Ambasciata Parigi (AP), 
busta: 405, telespresso, T482, Quaroni al Ministero, 1-4-1948; Pastorelli, op. 
cit., pp. 1020-30.
65. FO 371/73191/Z2545/637/22, 22-3-1948, minute by Crosthwaite, 
22-3-1948; FO 371/68067/AN1296/1195/45, 23-3-1948, top secret, tel., no. 
3208, FO to Washington, 24-3-1948; ibid., AN1315/1195/45, 25-3-1948, top 
secret, telegram, no. 1430, Washington to FO, 24-3-1948, top secret, 
telegram, no. 3384, FO to Washington, 25-3-1948; ibid., AN1325/1195/45, 26-
3-1948, telegram, no. 1461, Bevin to Inverchapel, 29-3-1948.
66. FO 371/73049/Z1637/273/72, 26-2-1948, minute by Jebb, 20-3-
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clauses of the Peace Treaty.67
The British Military did not share Bevin’s eagerness regarding the Western 
Union in general and Italian inclusion in particular. A. V. Alexander, the Minister 
of Defence communicated these doubts to Bevin. The Chiefs of Staff 
Committee at its 17 January meeting, had decided in principle that Britain 
should not dispatch a land expeditionary force to the Continent in the event of 
a future crisis. The Chiefs believed that, at this time, for any defence 
organization to be effective and to be able to deter aggression, it needed to 
have the support of the Americans. They also stated that they could not 
possibly commit themselves to military action on the Continent until they were 
clear about the scope and scale of American commitment. Alexander urged 
Bevin to agree a common policy towards the USSR with Marshall and to open 
defence talks with the Americans as soon as possible. The Service 
Departments also expressed concerns about the possibility of the Communists 
infiltrating the Italian Ministry of Defence and compromising British strategic 
plans.68 Such attitudes which were widespread, indicated that the military was 
less than enthusiastic at the prospect of a weak country such as Italy, which 
could not defend itself, being included in such a Union.
The French too, were overtly opposed to the idea of Italian accession to the 
Brussels Treaty Organization (BTO). They maintained that such an accession 
would signify a major breach of the military clauses of the Italian Peace Treaty. 
When Jebb asked Chauvel, his opposite number at Quai d’Orsay, what he 
thought about the incorporation of Italy into the BTO, the latter described the
67. FO 371/73191/Z2376/637/22, 19-3-1948, minute by Sargent, 13-3-
1948.
68. FO 371/73052/Z2255/273/72, 16-3-1948, letter by A.V. Alexander 
Secretary of State for Defence, to Bevin, 10-3-1948.
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possibility as an attractive idea but in the same breath he outlined some of the 
less appealing aspects. He believed that an invitation for Italy to join at this 
stage would have an injurious rather than a beneficial impact on De Gasperi’s 
re-election chances because of the relentless attacks it would attract from the 
Communists. Then, he expressed concern that the treaty would impose 
obligations on Italy that it could not fulfil because of the limitations of the Italian 
Peace Treaty. At same time, accession would give Italy an opportunity to 
present a legitimate claim for release from its military restrictions in order to be 
able to carry out its obligations under the Brussels Treaty.69 Despite the 
coolness of the French, when Bevin met Bidault on his way from Paris to 
Brussels, he informed him that he was thinking of bringing Italy into the 
Western Union if De Gasperi won the election. Bidault replied, 
unenthusiastically, that even though he had no objections in principle, he was 
concerned that such action could create the circumstances for an early 
revision of the Peace Treaty and that this would provide the Communists with 
a propaganda coup. What revealed his true attitude however, was his 
assessment that it would not be expedient to ‘run after Italy too much because 
Italy would certainly would make us pay heavily for her adherence’. Bevin 
agreed to approach the subject slowly and with caution.70
The Benelux countries also expressed their apprehension and opposition. 
They wished to ensure that if Italy acceded, it did so unconditionally and that 
it would have no power to veto the incorporation of other countries. They 
wanted to preserve this privilege for the five original powers. Sir George 
Rendel, the British Ambassador to Belgium, stressed that the attitude of the
69. FO 371/73053/Z2411/273/72, 19-3-1948, minute by Sargent, 
addressed to Bevin, 5-3-1948.
70. FO 371/73055/Z2559/273/72, 24-3-1948, minute by Roberts, 18-3- 
1948, record of discussion between Bevin and Bidault, 17-3-1948.
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Benelux countries was not hostile perse to the idea of extending the Treaty in 
the future to include other countries, nor to the prospect that eventually it would 
form the nucleus for a wider Western European Organization. However, they 
saw the Western Union primarily as a means of tightening up relations among 
the Five powers. As far as they were concerned, they did not regard Italy as 
a power ‘sufficiently closely allied to them by interest or tradition to participate 
automatically’.71
As a result of such apprehensions Italy did not accede to the Treaty of 
Brussels before April 1948. Neither Bevin nor the Western Department of the 
Foreign Office saw this as permanent but regarded accession as a matter of 
timing. They sincerely continued to hope that Italy would adhere to the pact as 
soon as it was feasible. The fact that Italy was weak militarily did not change 
the views of the Foreign Office because as Kirkpatrick had pointed out, it was 
preferable ‘to have it in our military orbit rather than outside’.72 Indeed, the 
Western Department advised that cooperation in the development of Africa 
should not be confined just to the Five Power Treaty signatories. They thought 
it necessary that the involvement of Italy, Portugal, South Africa and Southern 
Rhodesia ought to be sought as well.73 Article IX of the Brussels Treaty was 
drafted in such a way as to enable other European countries to join at a later 
stage, if they wanted to, or even to participate in just those clauses which were 
the most suitable to their circumstances. It stated that ‘the High Contracting 
Parties may, by agreement, invite any other State to accede to the present
71. FO 371/73051/Z2003/273/72, 9-3-1948, secret, telegram, no. 129, 
Rendell to FO, 9-3-1948.
72. FO 371/73191/Z4084/637/22, 13-5-1948, letter from Kirkpatrick to 
Rendel, 25-5-1948.
73. FO 371/73051/Z2001/273/72, 9-3-1948, minute by Crosthwaite, 9-3-
1948.
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Treaty on conditions to be agreed between them and the State so invited’.74 
Italy for example could adhere to the economic clauses and America to mutual 
defence arrangements.75
The Christian Democrats won a landslide victory on 18 April but Italy still did 
not join the Brussels Pact. Attitudes about how quickly Italy should be 
approached to join the BTO varied significantly among the interested powers. 
The Americans had not made up their minds on the issue. The State 
Department was still undecided but Truman had reacted positively to the 
possibility of Italian accession.76 French opposition to the inclusion of Italy 
continued even after the DC’s resounding victory. The French felt that a better 
solution all around would be for Italy to be included in a future Mediterranean 
Pact, to include Britain, France, Italy, Greece and Turkey.77 The British, like the 
Americans had reached the conclusion that the bloc formation was irreversible 
for the foreseeable future, that the Soviet Union had increased its power and 
that after having succeeded in dominating Eastern Europe completely, it was 
now seeking to undermine Southern and Western Europe. In this bleak climate 
Britain decided that BTO expansion should not take place before the
74. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Carlyle, M., (ed.), Documents 
in International Affairs, 1947-48, London, 1952, Cmd. 7599, The Treaty of 
Brussels: Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective 
Self-Defence between, the United Kingdom, Belgium, France, Luxembourg 
and the Netherlands, Brussels, 17-3-1948, pp. 225-230.
75. FO 371/73054/Z2557/273/72, 24-3-1948, Bidault to Bevin, 17-3-
1948.
76. FRUS, 1948, Vol. Ill, pp. 107; Vigezzi, op. cit., p. 83; Pastorelli, op. 
cit., p. 1021.
77. FO 371/73052/Z2256/273/72, 16-3-1948, minute by Kirkpatrick, 
13-3-1948; FO 371/73191/Z2376/637/22, 19-3-1948, minute by Sargent, 13-3- 
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Americans had guaranteed the defence of the new alliance.78 Once the system 
for the defence of Europe had been guaranteed then Britain would embark on 
the creation of the Mediterranean and Pacific systems. The systems would 
ultimately be linked together to create a world-wide network of collective 
security.79
Even with the elections over the Italians themselves showed no signs of 
urgency in joining. De Gasperi approached the matter with caution not only 
because the PCI and PSI were continuing to use the issue to accentuate public 
fears that Italy was being dragged into another war but also because like 
Sforza and Quaroni, he too believed that Italy ‘should leave all roads open’ and 
explore its options as to the most advantageous means of binding itself to the 
West.80 De Gasperi did not see the Treaty of Brussels as offering an adequate 
security guarantee for Italy and he was influenced by the fact that opinions as 
to the wisdom of Italian accession to the Pact varied widely.81 The Foreign 
Office decided to leave it up to the Italians to raise the issue formally as it 
sensed that neither the Italian people nor the Italian government were anxious 
for their country to accede immediately.82 The Western Department felt that the 
Italian government should be given adequate time to formulate its programme
78. FO 371/73060/Z5543/273/72, 8-7-1948, top secret, FO 
memorandum, unsigned, undated; FO 371/73105/Z8829/8829/72, 30-10-1948, 
minute by Kirkpatrick addressed to Bevin, 8-10-1948.
79. FO 371/73060/Z5543/273/72, 8-7-1948, top secret, FO minute, 
unsigned, undated.
80. ASMAE, AP, busta: 405, letter, Quaroni a Zoppi, 20-5-1948; ACS, 
Consiglio dei ministri, 28-1-1848; ACS, minuta del verbale dell riunione del 
Consiglio dei ministri, 15-7-1948.
81. FO 371/73191/Z3648/673/22, 30-4-1948, minute by Laurence, 30-4- 
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77-80 and 83.
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and it was expected that this would take up to 1 June.83 Mallet, too, advised the 
adoption of a cautious approach.84 Bevin thus, decided ‘not to force the pace’.85
At this moment, however, De Gasperi chose to give a press conference in 
which he appeared to link the issue of Italian accession to the Brussels Treaty 
with the revision of the Italian Peace Treaty, thereby committing a grave tactical 
error.86 Bevin was greatly angered. The press conference confirmed all his 
prejudices on how Italy was conducting its diplomacy. He felt that the British 
efforts to help had been misconstrued as a willingness to accept a wholesale 
‘Italian nationalistic programme’.87 For Britain, Peace Treaty revision was not 
on the agenda at all. In fact, British opposition to the revision of its military 
clauses continued unabated even after Italy’s accession to NATO as a 
founding member and the British government could not see how a revision of 
the Treaty would help the Italian government. As far as Bevin was concerned, 
Italy stood to gain much more if it put its ‘house in order with proper schemes 
of social reform and by generous cooperation in the rehabilitation of Europe 
rather than by a policy of blackmail’.88
He instructed Mallet to attempt to make the Italians understand in no uncertain
83. Ibid., minute by Pemberton-Pigott, 26-4-1948.
84. Ibid., Z3648/637/22, 30-4-1948, secret, telegram, no. 721, Mallet to 
FO, 24-4-1948.
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minute by Pemberton Pigott, 26-4-1948.
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terms that Italian agreement to accession to the Treaty of Brussels should not 
be thought of by them as a favour to the Five Powers, but to point out to them 
that, in fact, accession would involve taking on ‘onerous additional 
commitments’.89 De Gasperi privately tried to make amends for the press 
conference. He claimed that he fully appreciated Britain’s generosity in inviting 
an ex-enemy to be party to a Treaty that would offer his country guarantees for 
its defence. However, he stressed that he had to tread warily and that he had 
to take into account Italian public opinion which had been inflamed by 
communist propaganda that had presented the aims of the Treaty as a making 
war against Russia.90 Bevin was not in the mood to be appeased. He rejected 
De Gasperi’s overtures out of hand. When Mallet tried to intercede on De 
Gasperi’s behalf, Bevin replied tersely, that he ‘must pay attention to what he 
[De Gasperi] says in public’.91 Bevin’s temper did not improve once he became 
aware of the federalist enthusiasm that the Congress of Europe at the Hague, 
had unleashed in May 1948.
Britain’s Retreat from Europe
Bevin formed a dim view of the Congress from the first moment he heard of its 
convocation. He was afraid that it would generate grandiose and impractical 
ideas, raise unrealistic expectations in both America and Europe and because, 
moreover, it gave Winston S. Churchill, the leader of the Opposition who was 
closely involved with it, a platform on which to attack Labour government 
policy.92 The Foreign Office decided that the Hague Conference should not 
receive any support from the British government but instructed British
89. Ibid.
90. Ibid., Z3755/637/22, 4-5-1948, secret, telegram, no. 769, Mallet to 
Bevin, 3-5-1948.
91. Ibid., Z3675/637/22, 1-5-1948, secret, telegram, no. 1103, Bevin to 
Mallet, 5-5-1948.
92. Bullock, op. cit., p. 730.
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ambassadors in Europe not to do anything to hinder the Conference.93 The 
decisions of the Hague Congress matched Bevin darkest nightmares. Although 
there was praise for the Treaty of Brussels, the conferees stressed that it 
should not be an end in itself and they called for the creation of a European 
Assembly, a call which was to put federalism firmly in the political lexicon of 
European cooperation.94 Bevin detested these pronouncements 
instantaneously. He was worried that such an Assembly would infringe on 
national sovereignty,95 that it would be problematic from the security point of 
view because it could be infiltrated by Communists and fellow travellers96 and 
that it would have serious implications on Britain’s relations with the 
Commonwealth.97 Above all however the European Assembly contradicted 
Bevin’s preferred approach to European integration, that of a British-led 
Western European group based primarily on colonial cooperation and 
development. He believed firmly that the support and the goodwill of the 
Commonwealth would be a great strength to Western Europe and he wanted 
to carry it with him in any move towards increased European cooperation. To 
do this he would have to seek the views of its Prime Ministers before Britain
93. FO 371 /73095/Z4416/4416/72, 27-5-1948, memorandum drafted by 
Jebb and Crosthwaite, 23-5-1948; minute by Jebb addressed to Sargent, 24-5- 
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would take a further step.98
At this time, the view of the British government was that the signing of the 
Treaty of Brussels was as far as it was prepared to go in European 
collaboration. Its view of the BTO was that it should form the hard core of an 
evolutionary process that would lead to political and economic cooperation 
among member states.99 For the British government the BTO ought to be 
expanded in two successive stages, first, the Atlantic Treaty had to be signed 
to secure Europe from the prospect of Soviet aggression and then it could 
move to the second stage which was that of European political cooperation.100 
In the of summer 1948 British policy-makers were focused on matters of 
security. For them, the accomplishment of the second stage of their three step 
approach towards the creation of a British-led Western Union, namely the 
American guarantee of the defence of the BTO through a binding Treaty, was 
of paramount priority. The Berlin Blockade had come too early for the Five 
Powers to provide a plausible deterrent to Soviet aggression and the 
heightened insecurity it had brought to Europe convinced the British beyond 
any shadow of doubt that this was the only way forward. Bevin and the Foreign 
Office were however forced to refocus on European cooperation when some 
of the Trojan horses’ of which Bevin had been so apprehensive, did indeed 
escape ‘from Pandora’s box’ and began to manifest themselves. Federalist
98. FO 371 /73045/Z353/273/72, 15-1-1945, minute by Bevin, 12-1- 
1948; FO 371/73097/Z7327/4416/72, 10-9-1948, FO minute: ‘instructions to 
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schemes were promoted during summer 1948 by both France and Italy which 
brought to the fore the issues of BTO enlargement, the creation of an 
European Assembly and challenged both the British schedule and the British 
model of European cooperation.101
In July, at the second meeting of the Consultative Council of the BTO, Bidault 
called for the convention of an ‘European Parliamentary Assembly’. Bidault’s 
proposals were the product of French Parliamentary pressure, France’s 
insecurities, its desire to promote its own economic recovery, its fear of a 
rehabilitated Germany and the endemic instability of the French Fourth 
Republic.102 Jebb and Makins, looking at the French proposals, came to the 
conclusion that a federalist response for Europe was not a panacea but would 
be an impractical gesture because of the diversity in the economies of the 
European countries, intra-European payments difficulties and because of the 
over-reaching ambitions of the scheme.103 Bevin agreed with the conclusions 
reached by his officials, but at the same time, wishing to avoid any 
misconception on Makins’ part that he was losing interest in European 
cooperation, he reiterated his interest in the Western Union concept and his 
determination to consolidate European cooperation within the Five Power set
101. FO 371/73060/Z5784/273/72, 16-7- 1948, top secret, telegram, no. 
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up.104 At the BTO, Bevin, reserved his position and claimed that the French 
proposal was ‘unsuitable’ for discussion at this time. Bidault, however, was a 
reluctant advocate of the French proposals and Bevin found it easy to 
postpone the discussion of the issue for a future meeting of the Brussels 
Treaty Consultative Commission. This only postponed troubles to later as the 
developments of summer and autumn 1948 have shown.105 Delaying tactics 
failed to quash the issue and by August the French, in close collaboration with 
the Belgians, came back with new federalist proposals.
The next challenge came from an Italy that was in the process of a monumental 
reappraisal of its foreign policy. The Italians were trying to resolve several 
questions. Could they pursue a policy of neutrality from a position of 
disarmament of the kind prescribed by the Peace Treaty? Could they adopt an 
independent foreign policy? Was dependence on America their only choice and 
finally, was the way out of their dilemma interdependence?106 The deep 
divisions in the Italian foreign policy making establishment led to the floating of 
different plans and to ambassadors exceeding their briefs in trying to force their 
government towards their own favourite choices. Whilst these divisions 
persisted, Italy sent off at times contradictory signals on its attitude to the 
process of European cooperation. On the one hand, the Italian government 
pursued its own independent plans and on the other, it indicated the wish to 
join the Brussels Treaty, although it was rather reluctant to do so. It was felt in
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1948.
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Italy that the country had made its choice between East and West at the April 
elections. Now it was looking for a period of consolidation, reflection and time 
to politically ‘re-educate’ Italian public opinion away from neutralism. The 
military limitations imposed on Italy by the Peace Treaty had rendered it a 
liability rather than an asset to any defence organization and Italian politicians 
were painfully aware of this. Dissent within De Gasperi’s camp with calls from 
left wing Christian Democrats and Saragat’s associates asking for meaningful 
social reform, made it difficult for Italian politicians to commit their country 
openly to a military organization such as the BTO, especially since America’s 
relationship with this institution had not been crystallized yet.107 De Gasperi had 
come to the conclusion the BTO was an inadequate solution for Italy108 and 
Manlio Brosio, the Italian Ambassador to the Soviet Union had described it as 
the ‘alliance of the impotents’.109 Whilst De Gasperi’s approach was more 
practical and cautious, Sforza’s was more enthusiastic and idealistic. The 
Italian government was also constrained in its choices by the fact that seventy 
per cent of the Italian public favoured a neutralist foreign policy and that this 
support cut across both party affiliation and social class.110
In view of all these problems Sforza decided to take on neutralist feelings and
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transform them into support for European Unity.111 He embarked on a process 
of educating Italian public opinion that neutrality was not an option for Italy and 
began to prepare it for the adoption of the Hague resolutions. On 18 July 1948, 
he made a speech in his capacity as the rector of the University of Perugia 
linking the notion of European cohesion with that of avoidance of war. He 
proclaimed that the ‘Italians must realise that the only method of preventing a 
Third World War was to become the herald of such a [European] Union’. 
Sforza also claimed that the only way for the Continent to avoid domination by 
a single power again was through the inauguration of a process which would 
lead to a federal union.112 He concluded his speech by once again sending out 
the message that Italy’s involvement in any type of international cooperation 
would have to be made on the basis of absolute parity with its collaborators 
and only under these circumstances would it be prepared and willing to accept 
any curtailment of its sovereignty. Sforza’s message was loud and clear. 
International rehabilitation and parity were his uppermost objectives. All other 
foreign policy aims were subordinate.113 The first impact of Sforza’s initiatives 
became apparent when in August 1948, the Italian Parliament passed a 
resolution in favour of the creation of a European Assembly.114
London remained silent during the remaining summer months waiting to see
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what the impact of Sforza’s initiative would be and not wishing to embarrass 
the Italian government with an open endorsement. The Italians however were 
rather upset by London’s silence which they perceived as lack of support from 
Britain. Sforza asked his ambassador in London to see Bevin and to pass on 
his concerns to him. When Gallarati Scotti met Bevin, the latter was in one of 
his most intransigent and testy moods. Despite the advice of his officials to 
attempt to flatter the Italians, Bevin replied abruptly to Gallarati Scotti’s concern 
about the deterioration in Anglo-ltalian relations by saying that ‘he had sensed 
nothing of the kind’. Then he went on to reiterate his position that it was up to 
the Italian government to seek entry to the BTO when the time was right and 
that Britain’s silent demeanour had been dictated by the British government’s 
wish not to embarrass the Italian government.115
If Bevin and the Foreign Office were perplexed about the motives behind the 
Italian Ambassador's complaints they did not have to wait long to discover what 
lay behind them. Italy was testing the water. By late August it became clear that 
the Italian government was toying with the idea of exploring the expediency 
and the feasibility of being associated with the Treaty of Brussels as a means 
of getting an American guarantee of its security. The Italian Section of the 
Foreign Office learnt from its opposite number at the State Department that 
Tarchiani had asked if the State Department could contrive an invitation for 
Italian entry to the BTO. The State Department took the opportunity to impress 
upon the Foreign Office its wholehearted approval of Italian accession because 
it saw Tarchiani’s initiative as an Italian declaration of disassociation with 
neutrality. At the Washington Talks, the Americans proposed that Atlantic 
defence should go hand in hand with the enlargement of the BTO, a
115. FO 371 /73199/Z6827/1392/22, 23-8-1948, secret, despatch, no. 
738, Bevin to Mallet, 20-8-1948; minute by Crosthwaite, 25-8-1948.
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development that took the Europeans by surprise.116
This apparent favour for the extension of the Brussels Treaty, Jebb believed, 
could be attributed to the American desire to precipitate European 
integration.117 Britain's concept of the creation of a Western Union, however, 
differed from the American idea in many significant aspects. There was much 
scepticism of American intentions in military as well as in Foreign Office circles. 
It was feared that the US wanted the creation of a closely integrated Europe 
that would not allow for strong nation states or empires,118 and that the US 
integrationist plans would undermine the Western Union concept and thus 
frustrate British ambitions. The cohesion of the BTO had to be safeguarded 
and not undermined by an untimely inclusion of disgruntled members that were 
not ready yet for membership which is exactly how Britain perceived Italy at this 
stage. It was widely thought by the British that Italian politicians were seeking 
association with the Five Powers as a means of revising the Italian Peace 
Treaty of 1947 and to gain colonial favours.119 At the same time, in their 
dealings with Tarchiani, the Americans were rather cold and told him that Italy’s 
accession to the BTO was a matter for the Five Powers to decide.120 Gallarati
116. FO 371/73062/Z7079/273/72, 1-9-1948, minutes by Crosthwaite,
27-8-1948 and Kirkpatrick, 28-8-1948; letter, confidential, Crosthwaite to Ward,
2-9-1948; FO 371/73062/Z6959/273/72, 27-8-1948, 25th meeting of the 
Permanent Commision of the BTO, 18-8-1948.
117. FO 371/73075/Z6947/2307/72, 27-8-1948, top secret, minute by 
Jebb, 23-8-1948; top secret, telegram, no. 9467, Jebb to Washington, 25-8- 
1948.
118. FO 371/73075/Z6510/2307/72,11-8-1948, letter, Alexander to 
Bevin, 4-8-1948.
119. FO 371/73075/Z6947/2307/72, 27-8-1948, top secret, minute by 
Jebb, 23-8-1948; top secret, telegram, no. 9467, Jebb to Washington, 25-8- 
1948.
120. FO 371/73062/Z7079/273/72, 1-9-1948, minute by Crosthwaite, 27-
8-1948.
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Scotti made a similar approach to the Foreign Office.121 The Foreign Office was 
incensed by what it saw as Italian underhand tactics and raised once again its 
suspicions about Italian diplomatic techniques.122 It interpreted Tarchiani’s 
move in the US as an attempt to go above the heads of the Brussels Powers 
to gain Italian entry to their organization.123 Bevin decided that all Permanent 
Commission members had to be informed of the Italian approach to the State 
Department and that their governments’ views be sought.124
When the matter was discussed at the Permanent Commission of the BTO, on 
2 September, it was clear that no country was anxious to see an early Italian 
accession to the Brussels Pact and that, in fact, the only power which did not 
reject Italy out of hand was Britain. The Dutch insisted that Italy should not be 
encouraged to apply and they proposed that the Italians should be told 
informally that if they decided to press the question they would be barred from 
entry.125 The British, the French and the Belgians felt that such a move would 
not be necessary because they thought it unlikely that De Gasperi would run 
the risk of rejection by employing a direct approach and because it could 
rebound on the Brussels Powers by being taken as a direct snub to Italy.126 The 
British representative faced with the insistent and sterile opposition of the 
Dutch, pointed out that although Britain had not committed itself in any way, it 
felt nevertheless, that Italian accession would bring both disadvantages and
121. Ibid.
122. Ibid., minute by Kirkpatrick, 28-8-1948.
123. Ibid.
124. Ibid., confidential, letter, Crosthwaite to Ward, 2-9-1948; ibid., 
Z7275/273/72, 9-9-1948, 2nd meeting of the Permanent Commission of the 
BTO, 2-9-1948.
125. Ibid., Z7475/273/72, 13-9-1948, top secret, 28th meeting of the
Permanent Commission, Metric Doc. 116, 8-9-1948.
126. Ibid.
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advantages. Thus, he proposed that the matter be assessed by the Military 
Committee of the BTO, as it was likely to have strategic implications.127 The 
Military Committee of the BTO was given the twin task of assessing Italy’s 
strategic value and its suitability for inclusion into either the BTO or to the 
Atlantic defensive system.128
The Military Committee adopted the assessment of the British Chiefs of Staff. 
They concluded that even though Italian inclusion would facilitate the defence 
of the Southern Flank of the Western Union and would protect the lines of 
communication in the Mediterranean, they could not endorse it because the 
Peace Treaty had turned Italy into a military liability. They went on to point out 
that the accession of Italy to either formation would be undesirable on two 
further counts. First, because any military assistance given to that country 
could become an embarrassment to the West. Second, they were concerned 
that the Soviets would use Italian membership of a Western defensive pact to 
gain propaganda capital. The Soviets could present it as an attempt by the 
West to enter into ‘intrigue’ with a recent enemy. The Military Committee’s 
recommendation was that Italy should not be included in either system ‘under 
any conditions at the present time’.129 This analysis was accepted by the British 
government in its entirety. Throughout autumn and winter 1948 and nearly right 
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The Foreign Office continued to be perplexed by the initiatives of Tarchiani and 
Gallarati Scotti. The general impression was that the two Ambassadors were 
exceeding their briefs and that they were trying to force matters.131 Crosthwaite 
thought this was highly likely in the case of Tarchiani, however, he could not 
accept that it was in the character of the Italian Ambassador in London to use 
such tactics, so he asked the British Embassy in Rome to shed some light on 
their actions.132 The Rome Embassy was taken by total surprise. They had no 
prior warning that Italy would be seeking association with the BTO and they 
were certain that the Italians would be unwilling to join it prior to it being 
underwritten by an American military guarantee.133 Sforza’s economic 
emphasis in European collaboration and his painstaking avoidance of any 
direct reference to the Treaty of Brussels was the basis for Ward’s 
conclusions. It is likely that the Embassy was ‘caught on the hop’ because of 
the absence of Sir Victor Mallet and by the fact that Ward, his charge d’ 
affaires, was not a man who had shown much finesse or sensitivity in dealing 
with the Italians.134 Count Vittorio Zoppi, however, when approached was more 
than willing to fill Ward in. The Italian Foreign Ministry had been worried by the 
increased coolness Britain had shown towards Italy when Sforza discussed 
European cooperation, hence the approach to America. Zoppi also told Ward
131 . FO 371/73062/Z7079/273/72, 1-9-1948, confidential, letter, 
Crosthwaite to Ward, 2-9-1948; FO 371/73063/Z7553/273/72, 18-9-1948, 
minutes by Pemberton-Pigott 20-9-1948, Russell 22-9-48, Crosthwaite 22-9- 
1948, Kirkpatrick, 23-9-1948, confidential, letter, Ward to Crosthwaite, 15-9- 
1948; FO 371/73191/Z3464/637/22, 26-4-1948, secret, telegram, no. 721, 
Mallet to FO, 24-4-1948.
132. FO 371/73063/Z7553/273/72, 18-9-1948, minutes by Pemberton- 
Pigott, 20-9-1948, Russell and Crosthwaite, 22-9-1948.
133. Ibid., confidential, letter, Ward to Crosthwaite, 15-9-1948.
134. FO 371/73063/Z7807/273/72, 27-9-1948, secret, letter, Ward to 
Crosthwaite, 22-9-1948. Ward dismissed London concerns as to why the 
Italians felt that there was an increased coolness on it part towards them as 
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that the Palazzo Chigi, after intense discussion, had concluded that Italy would 
have to join Western institutions eventually but for the immediate future it would 
have to be cautious because of its military weakness, thus, the Ministry 
concluded that accession at this stage would expose Italy to ‘great risks’.135 He 
intimated that in view of these considerations the Italian government had come 
to expect Italian inclusion into the ‘Western Union’ as the ‘last culminating step’ 
in the process of Italian rehabilitation and restoration to its proper place in 
European affairs.136 Zoppi continued by explaining that the Italian government 
was taking steps to bring this moment closer, by the re-education of Italian 
public opinion and by ensuring that Italy embarked on a practical programme 
of military planning and preparation that would enable it to defend its 
territory.137
No sooner had Zoppi explained all this to the British, when a new integrative 
initiative was launched by Italy. This was the ‘Sforza Plan’ which had been 
germinating since August when Sforza had aired his views in a memorandum 
to the Quai d’Orsay. In his speech to the Italian Chamber on 28 September 
1948, Sforza unveiled his alternative plans for promoting European economic 
cooperation through the OEEC. This particular organization was chosen 
because Italy was already a member and because the Italian public would 
approve further cooperation within its framework. He proposed turning the 
OEEC into a locomotive for European integration. The OEEC would be 
transformed into a permanent body. Its competence was to be extended into 
the areas of customs unions and the social, demographic and cultural arenas. 
Two further institutions would be created to help the main organizational body. 





a European Court of Justice which would arbitrate on issues that could not be 
solved by direct diplomatic contact.138
Sforza was trying to square the circle of Italian political reality whilst at the 
same time trying to promote his own preferred policy for Italy. The ‘Sforza Plan’ 
reflected Italian domestic and foreign policy concerns, as well as genuine 
Italian pro-integrationist sentiments. It was also meant to provide Italy with an 
outlet for its excess population through emigration and, at the same time, to 
avoid the military entanglements that accession to a defensive alliance would 
bring with it and which would alienate the Italian electorate.139 The Plan was in 
line with traditional Italian integrationist thinking which had always envisaged 
that European Unity would come about through political and economic 
collaboration. Sforza was a firm believer in the European ideal, however, he 
had seen enough well-meaning projects in this arena collapse due to their 
towering ambition, most notably of all, the Briand Plan. He came to the 
conclusion that the first step had to be economic integration because he 
believed firmly that the Communists were trying to create a state of economic 
disorder in Europe to further the aims of the Soviet Union. The strike wave of 
autumn 1947 and the way the Soviets went out of their way to sabotage the 
Bulgarian Prime Minister, Georgi Dimitrov’s proposal for a ‘Balkan Union’ 
provided the proof he needed to underpin his innate belief. Thus, the economic 
approach for him was the most practical one and at the same time he thought 
it the best approach to Europe’s problems at this stage. As he put, it ‘the best
138 . Cacace, op. cit., p. 326; FO 371/73099/Z9285/4416/72, 17-11- 
1948, FORD memorandum, 9-11-1948; FO 371/73099/Z4416/72, 17-11-1948, 
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method of achieving European unity was by a gradual and empirical 
process’.140
The British government found no merit in these proposals. Bevin, in particular, 
was singularly unimpressed. The opposition of the Foreign Office to the Sforza 
proposals was universal and unyielding, met with derision and utter contempt. 
It considered them to be a totally impracticable and ill-thought out hotch-potch 
of ideas formulated merely to cater for neutrality sentiments in Italy and to keep 
Italy from any military entanglements. The Foreign Office centred its objections 
on the following areas. The structure of the OEEC was not designed for 
political cooperation. It was staffed by officials geared towards completing 
specific economic tasks. The membership of the OEEC was far too diverse 
and too scattered geographically to form a coherent political union. The OEEC 
was considered to be dominated by the United States and thus European 
cooperation through this institution went against the whole notion of a British- 
led Western Union. Finally, it would merely duplicate some of the BTO 
machinery which was working effectively and would replace it with what 
Kirkpatrick described as a ‘ramshackle’ organization. As far as the Foreign 
Office was concerned, these proposals were totally impractical.141 However, 
the Foreign Office was worried that the Sforza Plan could be attractive to other 
OEEC members and decided to strangle the Italian proposals at birth. London 
made its vehement opposition to the plan known to all concerned parties and
140. FO 371/73191/7988/637/22, 5-10-1948, telegram, no. 235, Mallet 
to Bevin, 1-10-1948; ibid., Z8017/637/22, 4-10-1948, confidential, letter, Mallet 
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p. 59.
141. FO 371 /73099/Z9285/4416/72, 17-11-1948, FORD memorandum,
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Kirkpatrick, 11-10-1948; FO 371/73192/Z9208/637/22, 13-11-1948, minutes by 
Makins and Kirkpatrick, 11-11-1948.
334
fought back with a reiteration of its own plans for the creation of a Council of 
Europe.142 In the end, British ideas prevailed. Sforza’s plan died a silent death.
The announcement of the Sforza Plan had signalled the beginning of a difficult 
autumn that seemed to besiege the British and made them realise that they 
could not go on ignoring the new realities imposed by the Hague and French 
and Italian schemes for European integration. This realization was a product 
of pressure from both sides of the Atlantic. Churchill’s rather disingenuous 
pronouncements had led many Americans to believe that he was all for Britain 
entering into a federation with Europe and that the only thing that stood 
between Britain and Europe was the Labour government.143 Both American 
public opinion and the Administration had come to attach major importance to 
the process of European integration for many reasons. They saw it as a means 
of achieving political stability on the Continent, reducing its vulnerability to the 
Red Army, strengthening democratic institutions and enabling it to stand on its 
own and stop being a drain on American resources.144 By October, many 
prominent Americans had joined in attacking the British government and this 
had created a negative climate in the US for the Washington Talks. Senator 
Fulbright publicly threatened that he would oppose further allocations of ERP 
unless Europe federated at once. On 30 September, Senator Dewey 
advocated that the American Administration use the ERP as a lever to push
142. FO 371/73192/Z9658/637/22, 29-11-1948, confidential, telegram, 
no. 1817, Mallet to FO, 24-11-1948; ibid., Z9751/637/22, 1-12-1948, minute by 
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Europe towards federation. Both Senators referred flatteringly to France and 
singled Britain out as ‘dragging’ its feet.145
Bevin took the matter up with Marshall when he met him in Paris and 
complained that speeches such as Dewey’s in Salt Lake City, that berated the 
British government and threatened America withholding financial aid to Europe 
if it did not federate immediately, succeeded only in causing bitter reactions in 
Britain which was more or less being treated as ‘a small country of no 
account,146 He explained to Marshall that such criticisms were unfounded and 
unfair since it was under the British government’s tutelage that Western 
Europe had been brought together despite the grave doubts expressed by 
many economists and the concerns of the impact of such a scheme on the 
Commonwealth. Marshall tried to appease Bevin by explaining away American 
reactions as misunderstandings based on Churchill’s impact on American 
public opinion. This was an entreaty that totally misfired as Bevin riposted tartly 
that Churchill was a private individual who did not speak for Britain and whose 
Hague speech was deeply flawed as it had not taken into account the Brussels 
Treaty, the Commonwealth and the negotiations on the Atlantic Pact. He went 
on to explain that he would have to carry British public opinion with him and he 
was doing as much as it would stand for. Bevin also showed his utter contempt 
for the idea of a Parliamentary Assembly which could easily be infiltrated by 
communists given the composition of many of the European parliaments and 
which could be used by them to propound their anti-British and anti-American
145. FO 371/73105/Z8829/8829/72, 30-10-1948, minute, Kirkpatrick to 
Bevin, 8-10-1948.




American criticism had also been compounded by Italian complaints. Pietro 
Quaroni, Italy’s Ambassador to France and one of Sforza’s most trusted 
diplomats, had no doubts that Italy would have to ditch neutrality and join the 
BTO. In his efforts to push Italy in this direction he had approached Roberts 
and told him that the prevailing opinion in Rome was that Britain was ‘hanging 
back’ in relation to Italy’s association with the Western Union. Quaroni was 
worried that if and when Italy joined the Western Union or any other European 
organization, it would be America that would receive the plaudits and not the 
UK and that he thought it important that the British government made an effort 
to restore Anglo-ltalian relations ‘to their old happy state’.148 Roberts, in turn, 
explained to Quaroni that if the British government appeared to be ‘hanging 
back1 it was merely because it did not wish to embarrass the Italian government 
by giving the impression to its enemies that it was coming under pressure from 
Britain to join the Pact. Quaroni suggested that one way for the British 
government to dispel any lingering misunderstandings with Rome, was for it to 
enter into confidential negotiations with Italy regarding the timing of Italian 
accession to the Treaty.149 By now, it had become obvious that the Italians 
were exploring the possibility of joining the Western Union and that after 
Sforza’s campaign Italian public opinion would be more ready to accept such 
a choice.150 Bevin objected strongly to suggestions that he was trying to keep
147. Ibid.; FO 371/73097/6968/4416/72, 28-8-1948, immediate, 
telegram, no. 1151, Harvey to FO, 27-8-1948; ibid., Z6972/4416/72, 30-8- 
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Italy out of any schemes for European cooperation. He claimed that any 
reticence on his part was due to the fact that he did not want to embarrass the 
Italian government by appearing to be putting pressure on them to join a 
military organization.151
Bevin was becoming tired of being accused of trying to keep Italy out of 
Western institutions while the French, who were opposed to the inclusion of 
Italy in the BTO even more resolutely than the British, were accumulating 
kudos with the Italians. He felt that his views had been distorted and that 
somehow the issues of Italian adherence to the NATO and to the BTO had 
been confused. He was opposed to Italy’s entry to NATO but at the same time 
he favoured Italian entry to the Council of Europe. He had arrived at this 
position because he felt it would be disastrous for the government of Italy if he 
appeared to be applying pressure on it to join a military alliance.152
The Foreign Office was also irritated by what was to them the obvious fact, that 
the Italian government had not as yet come to any firm conclusions on its 
position towards the BTO. On 13 October 1948, Nenni launched a scathing 
attack on the Italian government’s foreign policy in the Chamber of the 
Deputies. He denounced its plans for attempting to transform the economic 
relations arising from the ERP into political undertakings, for secretly trying to 
tie Italy with the BTO and thus presenting the country with a fait accompli,153 
Sforza was quite rattled by the vehemence of Nenni’s attack and denied 
categorically that the Italian government was in the process of concluding any
151. Ibid., Z9051/637/22, 8-11-1948, minute by Roberts, 23-10-1948, 
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secret treaties with other powers.154 The difficulties the De Gasperi government 
faced in pledging Italian involvement to Western organisations were severe. 
The internal cohesion of the Christian Democratic Party was at stake as its left 
wing element, led by Gronchi, was openly against such commitments155 and 
the survival of the coalition Cabinet was at stake because Saragat had adopted 
an anti-BTO policy.156 On 27 November in a speech he gave to PSLI, members 
Saragat stated that although he supported the ERP fully he was against Italian 
adherence to the Treaty of Brussels because it would signify a complete 
rupture with Russia which in turn would adopt a policy of open hostility towards 
Italy and which would accentuate further internal domestic divisions. At the 
same time, however, he differentiated his position from that of the PSI by 
pronouncing that he was a strong supporter of European federalism and that 
he supported the Sforza proposals.157 As far as the Foreign Office was 
concerned the position it had adopted seemed to be in complete harmony with 
the position elaborated by Sforza to the Italian Parliament and by De Gasperi 
when he told Mallet and the Italian Press that he was in favour of Italian 
adherence to an economic and/or political ‘Western Union’ and not to an 
organization that presupposed military commitments.158
The British government, bruised by its many critics, decided that time for
154. Ibid.
155. FO 371/73165/9998/93/22, 9-12-1948, restricted, telegram, no. 
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reflection before further action was necessary. Amongst other things, the 
Foreign Office also felt betrayed by the policy the French government had 
adopted during and after the Hague Conference since, up to now, the French 
had objected strongly and vociferously to any suggestion of expanding the 
Treaty of Brussels. Yet, in Sargent’s words they were ready to enter into a 
federation with ‘all and sundry’, and had gone ahead in announcing their 
support for the convention of a preparatory European Assembly without any 
prior consultation with Britain.159 Kirkpatrick was entrusted with the task of 
reviewing and bringing all these strands together in an outline of the global 
situation, Britain’s role in the international system and the problem of European 
integration. His recommendation was that Britain should not allow the US to 
pressurize her into ‘foolish expedients’, but at the same time to take action that 
would frustrate the various federalist schemes and strengthen anti-communist 
elements on the Continent.160 Bevin was not prepared to be steamrollered into 
accepting a concept of European integration as proposed by the federalists 
and he was becoming irate with the criticism directed against Britain and at him 
personally that he was ‘slack’ in the establishment of the Western Union. He 
had never conceived the possibility of the creation of a federal European 
Parliament nor the formation of common standing institutions. His project had 
envisaged the promotion of close cooperation as and when issues arose on 
an informal inter-governmental basis. Its institutional modus operandi would 
resemble that of the Commonwealth, ‘an association of fully sovereign states 
bound together by intangible bonds of sympathy and common interest’.161 In
159. FO 371 /73097/Z6885/4416/72, 25-8-1948, letter, Harvey to FO, 
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view of these federalist developments the Cabinet decided that first, a 
statement had to be issued to explain that the British government’s attitude 
was not ‘obstructive or selfish’, that its objective was to secure a ‘realistic’ and 
‘effective’ process to achieve a United Europe and second, that the matter had 
to be discussed with the Commonwealth Prime Ministers.162 The October 
meeting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers made it obvious that they did 
not favour the Hague attempts to establish a federal Europe.163
Bevin had the opportunity to elaborate on Britain’s position in a rather detailed 
and lengthy reply to Eden, the Shadow Foreign Secretary, when the latter 
asked him to outline his alternatives to the proposed European Assembly. 
Bevin had said that ‘Britain had to be in two places at the same time. It had to 
remain at the centre of the Commonwealth and also [it] must be European’. In 
the same reply, he took the opportunity to outline his gradualist and 
evolutionary approach towards European integration by stating that Britain 
would have to approach its two tasks ‘step by step, by treaties, agreements’ 
but he stressed that ‘not until the questions of defence and economic 
cooperation and the necessary political devices had been organized can it be 
possible ... to establish some sort of Assembly which can deal with such 
questions which we as governments have effectuated’.164
At the 25-26 October meeting of the Consultative Council, Bevin accepted, 
grudgingly, that a Brussels Pact Committee of Inquiry should to be set up to
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163. FO 371 /73099/Z9386/4416/72, 19-11-1948, confidential, telegram, 
‘Western Union’, 29-10-1948; FO 371/73100/Z9997/72, 7-12-1948, letter,
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examine the merits of the integrative proposals but he made it clear that he 
wanted any European Assembly to be limited to the Five Powers. The 
composition of the British element of the Committee revealed much about the 
intentions of the British government. Hugh Dalton, the Chancellor of the Duchy, 
Sir Edward Bridges, the Secretary to the Cabinet, Lord Inverchapel, the former 
Ambassador in Washington, Professor Wade and Gladwyn Jebb all of whom 
with the exception of Jebb, were not particularly impressed with the plans on 
the table.165
Under pressure, the British government decided that it had to come up with its 
own counterproposals which would aim at not giving away too much, satisfying 
public opinion, curb the Hague federalist enthusiasm and preserve the 
sovereignty of the member states.166 The ‘Council of Ministers’, proposed by 
the British would be run along intergovernmental lines similar to those of the 
United Nations. The system would be flexible enough to expand to encompass 
Germany and would solve the problem of Italian association with European 
institutions thus, overcoming the existing difficulties with Italian admittance to 
the BTO.167 The British plan was also aimed at answering the problem of 
further consolidation in Europe, and, at the same time, it aimed to ensure that 
the new organization would not interfere with the work of the BTO, the OEEC 
and the organization which the Washington Talks would give birth to. Above 
all, it would allow for European consolidation without impairing the existing links 
with the Commonwealth. As the Foreign Office admitted, from its point of view 
the new organization would be more realistic because it would leave the
165. Pimlott, op. cit., pp. 565-9; Cacace, op. cit., p. 328.
166. CAB 128/13, CM68(48), 4-11-1948.
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conduct of foreign policy, military and economic affairs ‘where it belong[ed]\ 
namely, with the governments of individual states which were answerable 
through their parliaments to the public.168 For Bevin, however, it would have 
been preferable if the scheme had started with the BTO powers first and 
expanded later. Attlee agreed that Bevin ought to bring the matter up in the 
next Consultative Council of the BTO, on 25th November 1948.169
During the course of these developments, the Italian government gained a 
renewed vigour in its efforts to educate and induce Italian public opinion into 
acceptance of Italian membership of Western organizations. The renewed and 
systematic crusade was a product of the realization in Italian government 
circles that their scope for manoeuvre had diminished alarmingly.170 It also 
reflected the ongoing debate within the Italian government about what type of 
commitment Italy should enter into and whether Italy should join security 
organizations such as the one discussed at Washington.
By mid-November Sforza was ready to announce publicly and unequivocally 
that the government was under no illusion that equidistance and neutrality were 
not viable foreign policy choices for Italy and he let it be known that he was fully 
committed to steering Italy into political cooperation with the Brussels powers 
because, as he put it, European cooperation was the only option for Europe to 
emerge from ‘out of chaos’. He proclaimed that ‘the aim of Italian foreign policy 
was to obtain as much security as the times will allow and any policy contrary
168. FO 371 /73099/Z9286/4416/72, 17-11-1948, FO memorandum, 
unsigned, undated.
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to this was a policy of war1.171 De Gasperi joined in the efforts to convince the 
citizens of his country that his government had no other option but to ditch 
neutralism. He proclaimed emphatically ‘there is only but one choice between 
cooperation and isolation’ and he went on to liken isolation to asphyxiation, 
economic stagnation and a defenceless state.172 The Italian government took 
the campaign of Italian inclusion into Western European organizations directly 
to the continental capitals. De Gasperi gave a series of speeches in Paris and 
Brussels. He declared that Italy had to ‘unite with the other states of Western 
Europe in order to maintain peace and protect Western civilization from the 
menace of communism’.173
Mallet watched these developments closely. He concluded that the Italian 
government, in view of the state of public opinion and because of the 
opposition of the Gronchi and Saragat to any military entanglements, would try 
to associate Italy with the Western alliance system by stages, namely, that it 
would pursue economic and political cooperation and would try to avoid 
incurring military commitments. He exhorted London to encourage and support 
the Italian government’s bid to associate Italy with European political 
institutions, when it felt comfortable enough to adopt ‘an active foreign policy’. 
Failure by London to do so would cause deep resentment Mallet warned, 
because of the existence of feelings of inferiority and the desire by Italians to
171. FO 371/73192/Z9363/637/22, 19-11-1948, telegram, no. 1774, 
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be noticed and taken seriously by the other powers’.174 Mallet felt that the 
Italian situation was replete with dangers for Britain. Alienation and feelings of 
injustice could lead the Italians to throw their lot in with French federalist plans 
rather than support Bevin’s gradualist approach. He warned that there was an 
accumulation of bitterness towards Britain amongst Italians and that ‘it could 
leave a legacy of frustration and resentment among the comparatively small 
class who mould Italian foreign policy and who are trying to keep their country 
away from Communism and lead it towards a Western Union’. He 
recommended that since it would be only a matter of time before Italy was 
accepted by Western European structures, it would be better from the point of 
view of Anglo-ltalian relations if the British government showed more ‘sympathy 
for Italy’s efforts to associate itself with the process and it would help to defuse 
the awkwardness and tensions created by the ongoing sore of the colonial 
question.175
Mallet also astutely observed that Italy would not be prepared to join a 
‘Mediterranean Pact’, even if Britain and America were parties to such an 
arrangement, nor would it be satisfied with offers of unilateral guarantees by 
the Atlantic powers.176 During this whole period, British policy makers had failed 
to resolve the ambiguity with which they regarded Italy. The dilemma of 
whether Italy was a Western European country or, essentially a Mediterranean 
one, remained unresolved. This ambivalence surfaced once more on the 
question of whether Italy should become a member of a Western European
174. Ibid. Z9751/637/22, 1-12-1948, secret, telegram, no. 1853, Mallet 
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175. Ibid., Z9627/637/22, 26-11-1948, confidential, telegram, no. 276, 
Mallet to FO, 24-11-1948.
176. FO 371/73192/Z9411/637/22, 19-11-1948, secret, telegram, no. 
1778, Mallet to FO, 19-11-1948.
345
group or a Mediterranean one. The British Military considered Italy to be 
essentially a Mediterranean country.177 Bevin too, regarded Italy more as a 
Mediterranean nation and less as a Western European one.178 The problem 
with this perception was that it was diametrically opposed to the one held by 
the Italians themselves. At no point was the Italian government prepared to join 
a Mediterranean grouping rather than a Western European or Atlantic one. 
The Italian Foreign Ministry had also reached the conclusion that such a 
Mediterranean pact would be hopelessly weak and would not be able to protect 
Italy convincingly.179
In view of this situation, the Western Department advised that Italy would have 
to be involved in the consultative process of setting up the Council of 
Europe.180 Bevin intimated to Sir Victor Mallet that he had given considerable 
thought to how to incorporate Italy in European collaboration schemes and that 
he had concluded that the best way forward was through the Council of 
Europe.181 In mid-December Bevin praised the Italian government for the steps 
it had taken to further the course of European cooperation. He also undertook 
to assure Gallarati Scotti that British friendship towards Italy was based on a
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JP(48)1(S) Final, 16-3-1948.
178. FO 371/73046/273/72, 2-2-1948, confidential, telegram, no. 202, 
FO to Rome, 24-1-1948.
179. ASMAE, busta: 368, AM, telespresso, T. 1124, Sforza a Brosio, 
Gallarati Scotti, Quaroni e Tarchiani, 14-8-1948; ASMAE, busta: 405, lettera, 
Brosio a Sforza, 28-4-1948; ibid., AP, telespresso, T. 482, Quaroni al 
Ministero, 1-4-1948; ASMAE, busta: 1360, AL, telespresso, T.4117, Gallarati 
Scotti a Sforza, 10-8-1948.
180. FO 371/73192/Z9793/637/22, 2-12-1948, minute by Brown, 2-12-
1948.
181. FO 371/73066/Z9623/273/72, 26-11-1948, minute by Jebb, 25-11- 
1948; FO 371/73199/Z10306/1392/22, 20-12-1948, confidential, despatch, no. 
1069, Bevin to Mallet, 16-12-1948.
346
firm foundation.182
The Italians were now showing a keen interest in the scheme outlined by Bevin. 
On 29 November, Pietro Quaroni met Jebb over dinner and asked him about 
Britain’s plans for the Council of Europe. The two men had known each other 
for years and they had developed a good relationship. Quaroni wanted to know 
if Bevin would have any objections to Italian inclusion because, he said, there 
was the widespread impression in Italy that Britain was excluding Italy from 
international organizations because it was an ex-enemy. Jebb explained that 
Bevin wanted Italy to be a founding member of the Council and that he 
harboured no punitive feelings towards Italy. His only reasons for opposing 
Italian inclusion in the BTO at this point was that Italy was restricted militarily 
by a precise and severe Treaty that made it difficult for Italy to defend itself, let 
alone to come to the aid of other countries as specified by the Brussels 
Treaty.183 Jebb fleshed out Bevin’s ideas on the Council of Ministers which he 
described as a British attempt to present the ideal of a United Europe in a 
concrete and physical way and which would be a forum in which the direction 
of the European project could be examined. There would be no need for a 
written constitution for the Council so that over the years it could be allowed to 
develop into a distinct European entity.184
The Italians were sufficiently intrigued to want to explore Bevin’s plans further. 
In late December, Robert Schuman, the French Minister and De Gasperi met
182. Ibid., Z10351/1392/22, 20-12-1948, restricted, telegram, no. 1935, 
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at Cannes where they sealed their decision to proceed with the establishment 
of a Franco-ltalian Customs Union and agreed that Italy would be invited to be 
a founding member of any future European system. At the same time the 
Italians took the opportunity to express their doubts on the French proposals 
for a European Assembly because the scheme had the propensity to allow 
communists to be selected as candidates which would give them the ability to 
sabotage the organization from within.185 For Italy, the attraction of the British 
proposal lay in the fact that it did not talk about proportional representation for 
all parliamentary political forces and that it allowed for selectivity, so that each 
government could determine the most suitable means of nominating its national 
delegates for the Council of Europe.186 The Italians candidly admitted that their 
preferred scheme would be a compromise between the French and British 
proposals.187 Sforza had other reasons for supporting the British scheme. He 
believed that speed was of the essence at this stage because the Communists 
in both France and Italy were in a state of disarray. He did not want to 
squander any time on prolonged discussions and on disagreements that would 
give the Communists the opportunity to regroup and frustrate European 
integration. In his view the new organization would be ‘like a bottle and all 
would depend upon what was poured into it’.188 Sforza considered it of vital 
importance that Britain was not a reluctant party to any such organization and 
he also preferred it to take the lead in Europe once again.189
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Bevin’s proposals were also endorsed by Norway and Ireland which felt more 
comfortable with them.190 This blunted some of the thrust of the Hague 
proposals. Furthermore, the British announcement had come in time to placate 
the American Senate and American public opinion prior to the vote for the 
appropriations for the second year of the ERP.191 However, when the BTO 
Committee of Inquiry was able to report on its findings on the ‘European 
Assembly’ idea in December, its recommendations displeased Bevin greatly 
and he continued to oppose the principle of an autonomous European 
Parliamentary Assembly to the bitter end by exercising his power of veto.192 By 
now British policy had become defensive and reactive on issues of European 
cooperation. Suddenly, Bevin had lost the mantle of leadership to Schuman. 
This change in power relations between Britain and France became apparent 
by late January 1949 when Bevin had to defer to Schuman and drop his 
increasingly sterile opposition to the Assembly. Schuman simply announced 
that France would go ahead to negotiate and achieve the creation of a new 
integrative organization that contained an Assembly even without British 
support or involvement. In view of the entrenched French position Bevin had 
to concur.193 Later that month the BTO powers invited Italy to take part in the 
preparatory stages of the Council of Europe. Bevin had championed Italy’s 
inclusion as soon as he had reconciled himself to the Council of Europe as a 
means of untangling the issue of Italy’s participation in Western European
190. FO 371/73100/Z9996/4416/72, 7-12-1948, minutes by Kirkpatrick, 
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191. FO 371/73066/Z9623/273/72, 26/11/1948, secret, memorandum by 
Jebb, 26-11-1948; record of conversation with the Italian Ambassador in Paris, 
20-11-1948.
192. CAB 128/13, CM78(48), 6-12-1948; Loth, W., The Division of the 
World, 1941-1955, London, 1988, p. 222.
193. Ibid.; Warner, The Labour Governments and the Unity of Western 
Europe’, p. 70.
349
integrative organizations as opposed to that of NATO membership.194 Formal 
invitations were extended on 7 March 1949. On the next day De Gasperi and 
the Italian Cabinet approved the participation of Italy in these negotiations. The 
urgency with which the decision was taken denotes the eagerness of the Italian 
government to be involved in the process from the first stages of consultation 
not only in order to accomplish its European ideals but more practically to 
counteract Communist attacks for joining NATO by entering an alliance 
ostensibly dedicated to peace.195
Despite their divergent approaches and aspirations for the Council of Europe 
both the Italians and the British were disillusioned.196 Their relations as working 
partners in the Council were typified by bouts of cooperation and friction. 
Bevin’s apparent acquiescence did not mean he and the British government 
had ceased in their efforts to limit the competence and to minimize the 
importance of the nascent organization. Britain worked hard to ensure that the 
Council of Europe had no influence over European defence matters which 
remained firmly under the province of NATO and BTO. This principle was 
enshrined in the preamble of the Council.197 Economic matters were also under 
the jurisdiction of the OEEC.198 The British attitude to the Council was also 
evident in the vehemence with which they opposed the French proposal for the
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new organization to be called ‘European Union’.
The success of the Council of Europe was extremely important for Italy. It saw 
it as a means for reclaiming its status as a major Continental power. In order 
to be treated as one of the ‘Big Three’ and an equal within the organization, 
Italy was prepared to make financial sacrifices by agreeing to contribute to the 
organization’s coffers equally with France and Britain. This amounted to 26% 
of the whole institutional expenditure.199 The Italians also hoped that the new 
organization would fire the imagination of Europeans to such a degree as to act 
as a major ideological pull away from the lure of communism and that it would 
eventually become the locomotive for the realization of the federal ideal. Thus 
they, along with the French, proposed that the new organization had to be 
called the ‘European Union’.200
The Italians indicated displeasure with the British insistence of giving the 
Assembly of the new institution what they regarded as such a bland and boring 
name as the ‘Council of Europe’. They acquiesced unwillingly in British 
insistence only to press for a more explicit emphasis to be given in the 
preamble of the prospective Treaty to the ideals which had led to the 
preparatory conference and the resultant organization.201 Sforza decided that 
the matter should not rest until he had one last chance to air it at the St. James’
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meeting, prior to the signing of the Council of Europe Treaty and he went on 
to make his disappointment clear in his statement at the signing of the Statute 
of the Council of Europe on 5th May 1949. He proclaimed that Europe would 
recover its strength only through union and he launched into a federalist 
treatise which concluded that the recently signed treaty would be regarded as 
a success only when its signatories were able ‘to create a Europe in which 
national boundaries [were] not written in ink but in pencil’.202 Sforza’s torrential 
and ardent endorsement of ever closer European cooperation contrasted 
sharply with Bevin’s rather terse statement in which he said that he had hopes 
that this agreement would lay ‘the foundations of something new and hopeful 
in European life’.203 These two statements showed clearly the diametrically 
opposed foreign policy priorities of the two governments vis-a-vis European 
cooperation at this time.
The Italians tried hard to upgrade the institution and Italy’s role within it. They 
accepted financial commitments that bordered on self-sacrifice in return for 
ensuring that Italian nationals serving on the secretariat would be treated on 
a basis of equality with the two other powers.204 They worked doggedly to 
ensure that Italy’s position would be strong and set up an office at Strasbourg 
with the task of overseeing the conduct of Italian relations with the Council of 
Europe.205 All these efforts were discouraged by Britain which was determined 
to downplay the importance of the institution206 and no matter how eager Italy
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was to see the new institution succeed, Sforza was not prepared to allow his 
own ideological leaning to drive a wedge in Anglo-ltalian relations. He believed 
firmly that the whole process would be more credible and stronger with Britain 
inside it rather than out and he was prepared to pace himself to accommodate 
Britain. Typical of this attitude was his discussion with Mallet, during which it 
became clear that though Sforza was prepared to contemplate and endorse 
the dilution of his country’s sovereignty, he was also quite amenable to British 
concerns. He went out of his way to say that he did not believe that it would be 
beneficial for European collaboration if the pace towards European federation 
was forced and that ‘questions of sovereignty had to be handled with caution 
and delay’.207
Ultimately, the two countries were able to cooperate successfully and closely 
where matters of common interest arose. Issues of security and defence were 
uppermost priorities for both governments. Both were concerned that the 
Assembly of the Council of Europe could never be absolutely safe from 
communist infiltration but both countries felt that if they drafted any exclusion 
clauses as to the political composition of the national delegations to the 
Assembly, then the Council of Europe would be open to attacks by an 
increasingly belligerent and vocal Soviet Union. The latter had denounced the 
establishment of the Council as a mere ‘colonial appendage’ to the US and 
Britain, a source of cheap manpower and resources and a base for an 
aggressive war against the Soviet Union.208 The two governments worked 
tirelessly to ensure that at the preparatory conference for the establishment of 
a Council of Europe responsibility for the nomination of national delegates
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should fall on the national parliament of each member country and that national 
parliaments ought to guarantee that each nominee would undertake ‘to 
contribute loyally to the establishment of Democratic institutions in a United 
Europe’.209 This wording succeeded in excluding any self-declared communists 
from participation and eventually, most participating governments stated that 
they intended to appoint their delegates to the Consultative Assembly from all 
parliamentary parties except from those belonging to communist parties. In the 
case of Italy the delegation was made up of seven members of the Senate and 
seven members of the Deputies. The election method was based on an 
absolute majority vote which ensured the exclusion of the PCI and the PSI.210
Britain and Italy also saw eye to eye on the drafting of the criteria for the 
expansion of the organization and worked in tandem to erode the objections 
of some of their partners. Both countries attached great importance to ensuring 
that the new organization would be flexible enough to allow other Western 
countries to accede to it and worked to curb the exclusivity the Scandinavians 
wanted to impose on it.211 Sforza sided with Bevin to ensure that Greece and 
Turkey were not excluded because of their dubious democratic credentials and 
in Turkey’s case because of its different religion. Greece and Turkey were to 
be invited to join the Council of Europe at its inaugural meeting.212
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Cooperation of this kind, however, served only to mask the fact that the 
relations between the two countries had been transformed forever. Italy was 
no longer reliant on Britain and Britain was less interested in Italian affairs than 
it had been in the past. This transformation was the result of a number of 
factors. British and Western European economic and military weakness in the 
late 1940s made the achievement of a British-led ‘Western Union’ which would 
be on a par with the Soviets and the Americans impossible. The realisation of 
this state of affairs and the Continental enthusiasm for federalism led Bevin to 
move away from any binding ties with Europe, to retreat to the Empire and 
simultaneously towards cultivating a closer relationship with the United States. 
The Sterling devaluation crisis of September 1949 acted only as a footnote to 
this choice.213 In contrast, the impact on Italy of the signing of the North Atlantic 
Treaty had an almost liberating effect in the sense that now its security was 
underwritten in unequivocal terms by the US it could embark on its ultimate 
objective which was to achieve power though European cooperation and 
interdependence. However, above all, Anglo-ltalian relations had changed as 
a result of Italy’s speedy international rehabilitation, further endorsed by the 
signing of NATO and its almost total dependence on America.
Conclusion.
Bevin had included Italy in his original concept of the Western Union but his 
cautious approach and Italy’s specific problems had led him to the conclusion 
that Italy could not be one of the core countries. The delay in Italian accession
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made the Foreign Office conclude that because of Italy’s weak defences and 
the BTO’s own limitations, it could not assure the security of Italy.214 The 
eventful summer of 1948 had a catalytic effect on the BTO and on Italian 
accession to it. The federalist enthusiasm unleashed by the Hague Conference 
had alienated Bevin215 and the Berlin Blockade had shown that the BTO could 
not take any meaningful action to protect Western interests against Soviet 
encroachment.216 It was not until America assumed responsibility that the 
paralysis was lifted. In the meanwhile, Italy had embarked on an exploration of 
schemes of European integration for fear of being left out in an environment 
which it gave it no guarantee that its prospective allies would be ever be willing 
to accept it as a member for any of their schemes.217 Thus, Italy sent confused 
messages in its approach to European cooperation that irritated and frustrated 
Britain. By now, the issue of Italian adherence to the BTO had become 
entangled with the secret negotiations involving the creation of a North Atlantic 
defence system. In fact, Italian motives in the discussions for expanding the 
BTO to include Italy had become a smokescreen for the real aspirations of the 
Italian government at this time. In the dying months of 1948, the British were 
absorbed in efforts to finalize the arrangements for the creation of NATO and 
to ensure that Italy would be neither a founding member of NATO nor a 
member of the BTO.218 The Council of Europe was accepted by Britain as a 
mere sop to America and the Continent and also as a means of separating
214. FO 371/73060/Z5543/273/72, 8-7-1948, top secret, FO 
memorandum, undated; FO 371/73105/Z8829/8829/72, 30-10-1948, minute by 
Kirkpatrick to Bevin, 8-10-1948.
215. Young, Britain and European Unity, pp. 20-21.
216. Schlaim, A., ‘Britain, the Berlin Blockade and the Cold War*, 
International Affairs, Vol. 60, 1984, p. 11.
217. FO 371/73191/Z4437/637/22, letter, top secret, Jebb to Ward, 5-5-
48.
218. Bullock, op. cit., pp. 542, 643-6 and 670-1.
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issues of defence and European cooperation thus relieving the pressure on 
Britain to incorporate Italy into NATO. Bevin disliked all European proposals for 
a European Assembly which he considered as being impractical. He articulated 
plans that sapped away some of the vigour expounded at the Hague Congress 
and ‘intended ... to proceed in an orderly manner and to build the walls of a 
European Union before the roof [was] put on’219 and he used this aphorism 
once again to counter Italian complaints that Britain was ‘hanging back’.220 
Bevin, reflecting the mood of the British Cabinet, did his utmost to ensure that 
the new organization was nothing more than a powerless ‘talking shop’. As 
some of the dust of the turbulent summer and autumn of 1948 settled and after 
the signing of the NATO and the Council of Europe Treaties in spring 1949, 
what became clear was that during this period Britain and Italy had moved to 
antithetical positions with regards to European integration. Britain towards 
disassociation from European cooperation and Italy towards fervent support 
of federalism. During this period, Italy had repositioned its foreign policy in such 
a way as to succeed in becoming both a member of the Council of Europe, a 
major force deciding the process and shape of the future of Europe and a 
founding member of NATO.
219. Ibid., p. 615-626 and 765; Young, Britain and European Unity, pp. 
21; Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Fifth Series, 1947- 
48, Vol. 456, Cols. 96-107, London, 1948.
22°. FO 371/73192/Z9051 /637/22, 8-11-1948, minute by Roberts, 
23-10-1948; record of discussion with Quaroni, 23-10-1948.
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Conclusion
The end of the AMG regime in Italy on 1 January 1946 and the restoration of 
the country to Italian jurisdiction, with the exception of the disputed areas of 
Alto Adige and Venezia Giulia, ushered in a new period in the relations of Italy 
with the former AMG powers. Britain and Italy had to learn to interact as two 
sovereign nations and to replace their previously fraught relationship with a 
close but yet less restricting one. For Britain the transition to treating Italy as 
a mature nation was not always an easy one. There were several reasons for 
this. Britain’s overriding goal in foreign policy was based on the premise of 
frustrating Soviet designs and maintaining British regional and imperial 
interests and these tasks were sometimes incompatible with narrow Italian 
interests.1 The adoption by Italy of what Maier has described as ‘a strategy of 
weakness’ and ‘the politics of dependancy’2 did not play as well in London as 
it did in Washington.3 The tendency of the Italian government to co-opt the 
United States as its advocate greatly irritated Britain. For Britain, the adoption 
of such a policy on the part of Italy, put it in the invidious position of never 
being able to live up to Italian expectations merely because it was pursuing a 
more complex policy in the region than that of the United States, especially vis- 
ci-vis Yugoslavia. Britain did not wish to cut off all contact with Yugoslavia and 
isolate it, not because it had any illusions that it could replace the pervasive 
influence of the Soviet Union at this stage but simply because the Foreign
1. Arcidiacono, op. cit., pp. 239-266; Ellwood, ‘Al tramonto dell’ impero 
britannico’, op. cit., pp. 73-92; Ross, G., ‘Foreign Office Attitudes to the Soviet 
Union, 1941-45', pp. 521-40 Rothwell, op. cit., pp. 74-290, passim; Watt, ‘Britain 
the United States and the Opening of the Cold War ,^ pp. 50-5 and 57-9; 
Woodward, op. cit., 471-91; Adamthwaite, op. cit., p. 13; Kent, ‘British Policy’, pp. 
139-52; Varsori, ‘Great Britain and Italy’, pp. 188-98.
2. Maier, op. cit., pp. 290-1.
3. FO 371/79346/Z2335/10535/170, 15-3-1949, minutes by Pemberton- 
Pigott, 7-3-1949 and Sir Eyre Crowe, 4-11-1919; ibid., Z4359/10535/170, 16-6- 
1949, minutes by Shuckburgh, 26-6-1949 and Strang, 30-6-1949.
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Office and Bevin had reached the same conclusion that Churchill and Eden 
had reached before them namely, that by securing a ‘working relationship’ with 
Tito and by ‘not pulling out of Yugoslavia altogether’ could perhaps contain him 
and lessen the threat he presented to Italy and Greece especially whilst the 
Civil War in Greece was still unfolding.4 These concerns became apparent in 
Britain’s ‘tightrope acf in attempting to settle the Italian war criminality problem. 
British efforts to ‘hand over1 to Yugoslavia UNWCC registered Italian war 
criminals should be seen in this light and not as a mere punitive reflex. This 
task was hampered by the reluctance of the Americans and Italians to 
implement a policy of extraditing Italian citizens to Yugoslavia and because of 
the belated realisation that the unpopularity of this policy could harm De 
Gasperi’s government and thereby help the Communists. In view of this, the 
British showed that they were prepared to modify their policy and empower Italy 
to deal with such issues.5 The United States soon became a regular critic of 
British actions in Italy and tensions in Anglo-American relations over that 
country led to tensions, worsening relations between the two and exposed their
4. FO 371/59400/R1288/58/92, 25-1-1946, letter, Sargent to Stapleton,
29-1-1946; Lane, Britain, the Cold War and Yugoslav Unity, pp. 97-8; Lane, 
‘Putting Britain Right with Tito’, passim; Bohlen, op. cit., p. 253; FRUS, 1945, Vol. 
V, pp. 1229, 1233, 1266 and 1291-4; FRUS, 1946, Vol. II, p. 728; FRUS, 1946, 
Vol. VI., 869-70 and 887-88; Alexander, G.M., The Prelude to the Truman 
Doctrine: British Policy in Greece, 1944-47, Oxford, 1982; Papastratis, P., British 
Policy towards Greece during the Second World War, 1941-44, London, 1984; 
Richter, H., British Intervention in Greece: From Varkiza to Civil War; February 
1945 to August 1946, London, 1986; Woodhouse, C.M., The Struggle for Greece,
1941-49, London 1976; Woodhouse, C.M., Apple of Discord: A Survey of Recent 
Greek Politics in their International Setting, London, 1948; Xydis, S., Greece and 
the Great Powers, 1944-47: Prelude to the ‘Tmman Doctrine’, Thessaloniki, 1963.
5. FO 371/73180/Z2464/317/22, 22-3-1948, confidential, telegram, no. 
304, Ashley-Clarke to FO, 22-3-1948; FO 371/73181/Z2755/317/22, 1-4-1948, 
telegram, no. 360, Harvey to Bevin, 1-4-1948; confidential, telegram, no. 1078, 
Bevin to Harvey, 10-4-1948; ibid., Z4113/317/22, 17-5-1948, letter, French 
Embassy in London to FO, 14-5-1948; ibid., Z3535/317/22, 27-4-1948, letter, 
Mallet to Sforza, 16-4-1948.
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different attitudes in how the Cold War should be conducted.6
The onset of the Cold War transformed Italy into a major prize. Since, to all 
intents and purposes, postwar Italy had been strongly identified with the West, 
the British and the Americans came to view the consolidation and embedding 
of Italy in the Western bloc as being inextricably linked with the survival of the 
whole anti-communist postwar order. Both powers did their utmost to ensure 
that Italy did not go communist either through internal subversion or through 
the ballot box. The monumental and hitherto, unprecedented, intervention of 
the Truman Administration serves only to obscure the substantial and critical 
involvement of the British government in the reconstruction of Italy in the latter 
part of the 1940s.7
The fear of communism and especially the fear of the PCI which had been an 
integral part of every Italian government since 1944 was evident in all aspects
6. Barker, E., The British between the Superpowers, 1945-50, London, 
1983; Edmonds, R., Setting the Mould: The United States and Britain, 1945-50, 
Oxford, 1986; Rothwell, V. H., Britain and the Cold War, 1941-47, London, 1982; 
Kent, J., Britain’s Imperial Strategy and the Origins of the Cold War, 1944-45, 
Leicester, 1993; Young, J.W., Britain France and the Unity of Europe, 1945-51, 
Leicester, 1984.
7. Miller, J.E., Taking Off the Gloves: The United States and the Italian 
Election of 1948', Diplomatic History, no. 7, Winter, 1983; Pisani, S., The CIA and 
the Marshall Plan, Edinburgh, 1991; Hughes, H. S., The United States and Italy, 
Cambridge, Mass., 1979; Smith, E.T., The United States, Italy and NATO, 1947- 
52, London, 1991.
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of British policy towards Italy during 1946-1949.8 Britain took all the measures 
it could to frustrate the ambitions of the PCI. The British decision to continue 
its involvement in the Italian armed and police forces in this period was directly 
related to these concerns as well as promoting British interests. The Italian 
armed and police forces had been re-organized, equipped, trained and 
standardized on British lines right up to the time Italy joined NATO. The fact 
that Italy, in 1948, decided not to accept further British plans for its forces 
ought not to obscure the tremendous contribution of Britain in moulding the 
Italian forces and the continued training provided after this period.9
Britain’s low key but breathtaking involvement in the Italian General Election of 
1948 was very important not only for the victory of the anti-communist ticket but 
also for the maintenance of a united front within the Western camp. Britain 
used its influence with France to bring it on board and contribute to all
8 FO 371/43335/N2409/183/38, 21-4-1944, minute by Skaife, 5-4-1944; 
ibid., N2883/183/38, 12-5-1944, top secret, PHP(43)1(0), Post-Hostilities 
Planning Committee, Revised Draft, 24-4-1944; FO 371/56831/N3742/605/38, 21- 
3-1946, top secret, telegram, no. 1090, Franks to FO, 21-3-1946; PREM 8/515, 
top secret, C0S(46)43(0), 13-2-46; CAB 131/1, top secret, DO(46)5, 15-2-1946; 
ibid, top secret, DO(46) 8, 18-3-1946; Arcidiacono, op. cit., pp. 239-266; Ross, 
‘Foreign Office Attitudes to the Soviet Union, 1941-45', pp. 521-40; Ellwood, ‘Al 
tramonto dell’ impero britannico’, 73-92; Rothwell, pp. 74-290, passim; Watt, 
‘Britain the United States and the Opening of the Cold War\ pp. 50-5 and 57-9; 
Watt, ‘British Military Perceptions of the Soviet Union as a Strategic Threat, 
1945-50', pp. 328-335; Woodward, op. cit., 471-91; Adamthwaite, op. cit., p. 13; 
Kent, ‘British Policy’, pp. 139-52.
9. FO 371/60622/ZM187/187/22, 12-1-1946, telegram, no. 566, FO to 
Rome, 14-12-1946; ibid., ZM1178/187/22, 10-4-1946, minute by Ross, 8-4-1946; 
letter, COS to JSM, 17-4-1946; FO 371/60602/1227/89/22, 15-4-1946, minutes 
by Harvey and Ross, 16-4-1946; letter, Carandini to Harvey, 16-4-1946;
FO 371 /60603/ZM2643/89/22, 30-7-1946, secret, letter, Hoyer-Millar, to Sudgen,
30-7-1946; FO 371 /60602/ZM1584/89/22, 13-5-1946, top secret, telegram, FAN 
1135, SACMED to British Chiefs of Staff, 7-5-1946; letter, Ross to WO, 21-5- 
1946; FO 371/49890/ZM6285/243/22, 29-12-1945, minutes by Hood, 4-1-1946 
and Ross, 8-1-1946; top secret, telegram, NAF 1103, SACMED to CCS, 21-12- 
1945; letter, FO to WO, 10-1-1946; AIR 23/6343, top secret, P/319 (1st Draft), 
‘Italian Navy and Air Force’, AFHQ, 2-12-1945; top secret, P/319 (Final) 
(Revised), ‘Italian Air Force’, 15-12-1945; WO 204/3805, secret, letter, MoD to 
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1948, confidential, despatch, no. 153, Mallet to Bevin, 4-5-1948.
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interventionist schemes and had soothed ruffled French sensibilities caused 
by American heavy-handedness.10 This kept Allied unity intact and diffused 
potential squabbles that could have been exploited by the Soviet Union. The 
British Labour government supported Saragat and Lombardo after they walked 
away from Palazzo Barberini and used its influence to make sure that their 
decision to do so did not condemn them to the political wilderness.11 Such 
support guaranteed that, at least, some potentially reformist spirit was 
implanted in De Gasperi’s government. Britain also paved the way for the 
Trieste Declaration by using the UN as a forum to show that the Treaty 
provisions governing the Free Territory were not advantageous to the West nor 
Italy.12 It also attempted to associate Italy with its own plans for promoting 
European co-operation under a British led Western Union, initially, and within
10 FO 371/72486/R3508/44/70, 18-3-1948, top secret, telegram, no. 264, 
Harvey to FO, 17-3-1948; ibid., R3576/44/70, 19-3-1948, top secret, telegram, no. 
274, Harvey to FO, 18-3-1948, top secret, telegram, no. 3114, FO to Washington, 
18-3-1948, ibid., R3723/44/70, 22-3-1948, minute by Kirkpatrick, 18-3-1948;
FO 371/72486/R3712/44/70, 22-3-1948, top secret, telegram, no. 387, Bevin to 
Oliver Harvey, 17-3-1948; FO 371/73055/Z2559/273/72, 24-3-1948, minute by 
Roberts, 18-3-1948; FO 371/73173/Z1764/247/22, 2-3-1948, top secret, telegram, 
no. 982, Inverchapel to FO, 1-3-1948.
11. Bullock, op. cit., pp. 543-5; Varsori, A., ‘La Gran Bretagna e le elezioni 
politiche italiane del 18 aprile 1948', pp. 5-71, passim; Sebastiani, op. cit., 
passim; FO 1110/1/PR24/9/3, 2-3-1948, secret, despatch, no. 81, Mallet to Bevin, 
24-2-1948; secret, letter, Warner to Mallet, 25-3-1948; ibid., P138/138/3, 23-2- 
1948, secret, telegram, no. 489, Warner to Mallet, 2-3-1948; top secret, letter, 
Warner to Mallet, 24-2-1948; ibid., PR25/9/3, 2-3-1948, minute by Talbot, 3-3- 
1948; FO 1110/5/PR196/1/9/3, 13-4-1948, confidential, letter, Warner to Balfour, 
12-4-1948; secret, Annex, 12-4-1948; FO 371/73162/Z5054/93/22, 22-6-1948, 
report by Healey, 4 to 7 June 1948; minute by Carlyle, 7-7-1948; ibid., 
Z5187/93/22, 25-6-1948, restricted, telegram, no. 1065, Rome to FO, 25-6-1948; 
telegram, no. 1472, FO to Rome, 25-6-1948.
12. FO 371 /67344/R14290/10/92, 27-10-1947, top secret, telegram, no. 
11314, FO to Washington, 31-10-1947; ibid., R14290/10/92, 27-10-1947, top 
secret, minutes by Bevin, undated, Warner, 24-10-1947, Wallinger, 16-10-1947 
and Sargent, 21-10-1947 FO 371/72484/R1474/44/70, 3-2-1948, minute by 
Warner, 8-1-1948; ibid., R139/44/70, 1-1-1948, minute by Sargent, 1-1-1948; 
ibid., R506/44/70, 12-1-1948, top secret, memorandum, 2-1-1948;
FO 371 /72483/R710/44/70, 16-1-1948, secret, telegram, no. 631, FO to 
Washington, 17-1-1948; FO 371/72483/1398/44/70, 31-1-1948, secret, telegram, 
no. 433, Bevin to Cadogan, 31-1-1948.
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the Council of Europe later.13
Although Britain was not prepared to acquiesce to a total eclipse of its 
influence in the region, it never saw Italy as a test case which would manifest 
its ‘ability to continue to be a first rank power1.14 America’s economic might and 
its increased interest in the affairs of Italy made it obvious that Britain could not 
compete with it in the economic reconstruction stakes nor did Britain wish to, 
because of the onerous financial burdens such commitment would carry. Thus, 
Italy necessitated that Britain undertake a fine balancing act, on the one hand, 
having to adopt tactics and policies that perpetuated its influence and on the 
other, cultivating American interest and involvement in order to lessen the 
financial drain on its resources.15 Britain sought the maintenance of influence 
not the monopoly of power in its relations with Italy in 1946-49. In fact, Britain 
did not seek to exercise the direct power of the United States nor did it attempt 
to compete with it. On the contrary, it encouraged American involvement in Italy 
as a means of bolstering its own position.16 The willingness of the Americans 
to go over British heads in implementing their ideas upset the British 
government because of the implications for Anglo-ltalian relations and because
13. Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Fifth Series, 
Vol. 446, Cols. 387-409, 1947-48, London, 1948; CAB 129/25, CM(48)72, top 
secret, memorandum by Bevin, 3-3-1948; FO 371/73155/Z643/93/22, 26-1-1948, 
telegram, no. 145, Mallet to Bevin, 24-1-1948; FO 371/73191/Z637/637/22, 26-1- 
1948, minute by Roberts, record of discussion between Bevin and Gallarati- 
Scotti, 24-1-1948; CAB 128/13, CM78(48), 6-12-1948.
14. Gat, op. cit, p. 4.
15. FO 371/60622/ZM315/187/22, 24-2-1946, telegram, no. 1350, FO to 
Washington, 11-2-1946; record of a meeting among Home Office, Foreign Office 
and War Office officials, on the proposed police mission to Italy, 5-2-1946; ibid., 
ZM619/187/22, 21-2-1946, aide memoir for Bevin: ‘Police Mission’, 20-2-1946; FO 
371/60622/ZM592/187/22, 1-3-1946, ORC, 30-8-1945; ibid., ZM212/187/22, 14-1- 
1946, letter, Ross to Beighton, Treasury, 21-1-1946; ibid., ZM1729/187/22, 23-5- 
1946, minutes by Sargent and Ross, 15-6-1946.
16. CAB 128/14, CM(48)19 Conclusions, confidential, Annex, 5-3-1948.
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such actions undermined the foundation of a partnership with America in 
international affairs which Britain was trying to forge whilst regaining its 
strength.17
British policy towards Italy was inspired by two distinct and yet interrelated 
objectives: first, to refuse Italy to the Soviets and the PCI and second, to 
safeguard its interests in the region by a limited retrenchment that would assist 
Britain to spring back financially and recover its position as a major power 
alongside the United States and the USSR. What Britain had set out to do in 
1945 and achieved was that during the period in which it was weighing its 
options and was feeling its way in the new postwar world, access to Italy was 
not denied to it. It is clear that the Attlee government had achieved the 
transition from the punitive policy of Churchill’s Wartime National government 
to a constructive policy towards Italy from early on. The Labour government’s 
policy towards Italy showed a degree of flexibility in its implementation so that 
the ultimate aim, namely, that of Italian political stability was never put in 
jeopardy.18 The only area in which Britain showed consistent rigidity was in its 
policy towards Italian inclusion into NATO. British opposition was not based on 
an inability to consider Italy as anything other than an ‘ex-enemy’19 but on the 
perception of NATO as being primarily a military organization rather than a
17. FRUS, 1945, Vol. IV, p. 1050-9; FRUS, 1946, Vol. Ill, pp. 867-79; 
FRUS, 1946, Vol. V, p. 950; FO 371/67791/Z599/135/22, 17-1-1947, minute by 
Ross, 20-1-1947; ibid., Z1967/135/22, 24-2-1947, confidential, telegram, no. 
1702, FO to Washington, 22-2-1947; ibid., Z2238/135/22, 3-3-1947, confidential, 
telegram, no. 1308, Washington to FO, 1-3-1947; Miller, op. cit., pp. 191-2, 203, 
215 and 230.
18 FO 371/73234/Z9515/9515/22, 22-11-1948, secret, despatch, no. 380, 
Mallet to McNeil, 16-11-1948; FO 371/73172/9649/167/22, secret, despatch, no. 
382, Mallet to McNeil, 9-11-1948; ibid., Z2011/167/22, 22-3-1948, minute by 
Pemberton-Pigott, 17-3-1948; ibid., Z4162/167/22, 18-5-1948, minute by Brown, 
28-5-1948, confidential, despatch, no. 157, Mallet to Bevin, 12-5-1948.
19. Gat, op. cit., p. 181.
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political one and its desire to keep the new organization’s geographical 
competence specific so that the other regional security schemes that Britain 
wished to create could still go ahead.20
Ultimately the question of how successful British policy towards Italy was has 
to be addressed. Set against its own criteria Britain’s policy was a qualified 
success. Absolute success would have needed a different international 
environment than the one in which Britain operated in the late 1940s. The 
emergence of the Cold War had jolted the United States from the comparative 
luxury of isolationism. The interventionist policies of the Truman administration, 
America’s economic power and the potency of the Soviet threat left little scope 
for British plans to flourish fully, as the failure of the ‘Western Union’ policy 
revealed. American power had saturated the Western world and by 1949 the 
United States had emerged as the undisputed leader of the Western world. 
The influx of American power into the Central, Eastern and Northern shores of 
the Mediterranean was so complete that it was almost cataclysmic. No matter 
what policy Britain had chosen to follow in the preceding period, American 
power left no room for Britain to play a significant role in Italian affairs from 
1949 onwards. This should not diminish, however, Labour Britain’s contribution 
from 1946 to 1949 to the establishment of a pro-Western Italy.
20. CAB 128/13, CM68(48), 4-11-1948; CAB 129/30, top secret, 
CP(48)249, 2-11-1949; CAB 131/6, top secret, DO(48)20, 23-2-1948; CAB 
128/12, confidential, Annex, CM19(48)19th meeting, 5-3-1949; CAB 131/6, top 
secret, DO(48)64, memorandum by Bevin, 20-9-48.
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Glossary of Abbreviations
ACC Allied Control Commission
ACS Archivio Centrale dello Stato
AC LI Association of Catholic Italian Workers
AFHQ Allied Forces Headquarters
AFL American Federation of Labour
ALCOM Allied Commission
AMG Allied Military Government
APW Armistice and Postwar Committee
ASMAE Archivio storico e diplomatico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri
BoT Board of Trade
BTO Brussels Treaty Organization
CCS Combined Chiefs of Staff
CEEC Committee of European Economic Co-operation
CFM Council of Foreign Ministers
CGIL Confederazione Gene rale Italiana del Lavoro
CHQ.CMF Central Headquarters, Central Mediterranean Forces
CIA Central Intelligence Service
CISL Confederazione Italiana Sindicati Liberi
CO Colonial Office
COMISCO Committee of International Socialist Conference
COS Chiefs of Staff Committee
DC Democrazia Cristiana, Christian Democracy
DBPO Documents on British Policy Overseas
DJAG Deputy Judge Advocate General’s Office
366
DPs Displaced Persons
ECA European Co-operation Administration
ERP European Recovery Programme
FAN Communications indicator for messages from CCS to SACMED
FO Foreign Office
FORD Research Department of the Foreign Office
FRUS Foreign Relations of the United States
FX Military communications indicator
GNP Gross National Product
IPD Information Policy Department
IRD Information Research Department
JAG Judge Advocate General
JIC Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee
JSM Joint Staff Mission
MMIA Military Mission to the Italian Army
NAF Communications indicator for messages from SACMED to CCS
NAP North Atlantic Pact
NARA National Archive and Records Administration
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSC National Security Council
OEEC Organization of European Economic Co-operation
OSS Office of Strategic Services
PCI Partito Communists Italiano
PLP Parliamentary Labour Party
PRO Public Record Office
PSDI Partito Social-Democratico italiano
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PS I Partito Socialista Italiano
PSIUP Partito Socialista Italiano di Unite Proletaria, Italian
Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity, the full name of the PSI
RESMED Resident Minister, Mediterranean Theatre
RG Record Group
SACMED Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre
SE-WMRPG Southern Eastern Western Mediterranean Regional Planning 
Group
SHAEF Supreme Headquarters of Allied Expeditionary Force
TUC Trades Union Congress
UIL Unione Italiana Lavoratori, Union of Italian Workers
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
UNSC Security Council of the United Nations
UNWCC United Nations War Crimes Commission
WCS War Crimes Section
WEG Western European Group
WEID Western European Information Department
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